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1.1 Problem Description and Relevance
Yemen is a ‘poor state’ and the only low-income country in the Middle East. It 
faces plenty of challenges, consisting of poverty, corruption, social and political 
unrest and more recently security. These problems can lead to violence and crush 
livelihoods, jeopardizing citizens, regional neighbors, and the wider world. The state 
of Yemen is unable to govern its territories well. It is a spawning ground for global 
threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental devastation, and disease 
(Brainerd and Chollet 2007). Terrorism remains a major problem for the nation, with 
the country being a target for terrorist attacks and a potential safe haven for terrorist 
groups, who use Yemen as a logistical base for arms smuggling and recruiting 
terrorists to train them for worldwide terrorist attacks (Vieira, 2006:12). Moreover, 
the strategic geographic location of Yemen increases its security risks. The country 
overlooks the Red and Arabian Seas, as well as the Strait of Bab El Mandeb, which 
links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Yemen is one of the world’s most active 
shipping lanes, where oil is exported from the Arab Golf countries to destinations in 
Europe, the United States, and many other countries in the world. In this way, the 
country affects the global economy. Ships traveling in these waters cost more money 
due to the extra travel time, ships are diverted around the Cape of Good Hope (Aloyo, 
et al: 2010: 12)1.
Map 1.1: Shows the Strategic Geographical Location of Yemen
Source: Chossudovsky (2010), Center for Research on Globalization
In an era where territorial boundaries are blurred and where global instability and 
terrorism prevail, the need for good governance is an important condition for 
developing coherent economic and social structures. Fighting against global poverty 
1 - In looking at “the global costs of  maritime piracy, we take the largest insurance premiums related to piracy (war 
risk and K&R) and multiply these rates by 90% of  the total ship traffic transiting the high risk region of  the Gulf  of  
Aden (around 30,000 ships)”( Aloyo, et al: 2010: 12). For a more thorough computation of  the cost of  re-routing per 
ship, see BIMCO’s calculator which can be used for precisely this measurement. See: BIMCO, “Need for rethinking 







 1through the promotion of public sector reforms and sustained economic development 
in Yemen has therefore “become increasingly necessary-not just because morality 
demands it, but for reasons of global security” (Gbara, 2008:10).2 In the past two 
decades, major donors have organized several international conferences to mobilize 
the international efforts towards promoting a good governance agenda and building 
state capacity in Yemen, including in New York (2012), London (2006, 2010), Yemen 
(2007), Paris (2002), Brussels (1997), and The Hague (1996). Several international 
and regional donors participated in these conferences, including multilaterals like 
the World Bank, the United Nations, the European Commission, regional Arab funds 
(e.g. Arab Fund, Islamic Bank, OPEC) and individual countries like Germany, 
Holland, the United States and recently the United Kingdom. The aggregate volume 
of donors’ financial commitments to Yemen during these conferences, in the form of 
aid, grants, and soft loans amounted to nearly 18 billion U.S. dollars:
Figure 1.1: Aggregate Volume of Donors’ Commitments to Yemen 1995-2012 (M $)3
On the supply side, the above figure 1.1 shows that financial commitments of 
donors to support the development process in Yemen have markedly increased, 
triggered by the events of September 11 2001. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion 
2 - Before 9/11, and especially during the Cold War, foreign aid was at times used as a tactic to build strategic alliances 
or “buy” elites, gain political influence and various economic benefits, and thus influence affairs in third world coun-
tries. The effects on development were viewed as secondary (Mahanty, 2010). After 9/11 however this approach is no 
longer acceptable because the importance of  most poor nations for global security has risen significantly. Policymak-
ers in donor countries realize that there is a delicate and an accurate connection between terrorists and weak or poor 
nations (Lancaster, 2007). Most poor states have served as attractive safe-havens and staging grounds for worldwide 
terrorist attacks. They afford terrorists easy access to valuable resources which help finance their activities (Akramov, 
2006: 3). The rhetoric of  foreign aid has been increasingly shifted towards addressing the problems of  bad “gover-
nance” in poor nations: to build administrative systems and government bureaucracies, to increase public services 
delivery, to boost institutional and economical capacities and to reduce poverty and keep it down (de Haan, 2009: 8).
3 - Sources: self; Ana Echagüe, 2006, Researcher, FRIDE: 154-162; ROY: MOPIC, 2006-20012; ROY: CB, 1995-2012; 
ROY: COOAC, 1995-2012 and ROY-MOF 2002-2011; data of  the related conferences published online. These figures 
are estimated by myself, but the total number of  development aid allocation to Yemen is almost correct according 
to many sources. It is worth noting that some of  the conferences mentioned above were just to check what has been 
done in the former conferences and there were no financial commitments. 
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that donors are very keen on interests of national security and decide on the allocation 
of aid accordingly. The aggregate volume of donor commitments to Yemen made at 
the conference in The Hague (1996) amounted to nearly 500 million dollars. The aid 
volume increased significantly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. At the Paris 
conference in 2002, the volume of aid was around 2300 million dollars, and rose to 
5700 million dollars at the conference of London in 2006. This increase has to be seen 
in the context of the increasing threat of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
In 2011, commitments increased dramatically up to 7800 million dollars at the NY 
conference, reflecting the efforts to restabilize the country after the Arab Spring of 
2011.
These financial flows are meant to assist the Government of Yemen (GoY) to 
adopt the panacea of good governance, through an improvement of its public sector 
performance. The GoY has constructed several visions, missions and strategies to 
carry out highly-needed reforms in different public sector institutions. On paper, 
strategies so far have included democratization, decentralization, privatization, 
streamlining the financial sector, e-government, commencing salaries and wages 
strategies, civil service, capacity building and training of educators on all levels. The 
aim of the reforms is to improve the quality of governance, streamline the government’s 
role as well as the number of employees in the public sector, improve management of 
human and financial resources, and to change processes (GOY, 2001 [A] & [B]).
Although many of these reform programs seem extremely impressive on paper, 
creating hope and prospects for a better future in Yemen, the real effectiveness of 
these aid programs is questionable. Public sector reform and public life in Yemen is 
a “bewildering paradox” that needs more attention. Despite the past two decades of 
public reform, government agencies still perform poorly and there are dismal 
economic and social conditions4. Aid programs and projects have often failed to meet 
desired expectations, as they did not have any meaningful impact on poverty or effect 
many social and economic indicators (See Chapter 6). Yemen has yet to witness any 
major improvements in its development outcomes which could have a meaningful 
impact on security and stability. The absence of results corrupts the strategic objectives 
of donors. The worrisome development outcomes have helped to sow the seeds of the 
recent Yemeni revolution (2011)-which is ongoing. Unfortunately, donors could not 
prevent Yemen from falling back to an almost “failed state”.
Against this background of aid ineffectiveness, this dissertation is an attempt to 
4 -We mentioned before that the aggregate volume of  donors’ financial commitments to Yemen, in the form of  aid, 






 1add one piece to the foreign aid puzzle by investigating a simple question:
Why are foreign aid programs ineffective in prompting public sector reform in 
Yemen despite all the resources involved in the business of aid over the years?
This question is not limited to the Yemeni context, but applies to many poor 
nations where the effectiveness of foreign aid activities is equally unsettling. In 
investigating how real reforms can be absent despite the availability of enough 
resources, the findings from the Yemeni case study have value for other similar cases.
1.2 Why Aid Programs and Projects are Ineffective: Past Explanations
Despite the efforts of researchers and practitioners in the foreign aid discourse to 
answer this pressing question, the outcomes appear to be unsatisfactory. Ostrom 
(2005) argues that “almost every part or process of the aid system has been criticized: 
from the geopolitical agenda of donors to the distributive politics of recipient 
countries; from the ties that bind aid to procurement, to private firms in the donor’s 
country, from constraints on the power of decision-making bureaucrats to the type of 
accountability demanded” (2005: 5). However, aid ineffectiveness is still an unresolved 
problem. Many scholars that adhere to the public choice approach (PCP, see Chapter 
2), the most critical approach towards foreign aid, argue that causes of the 
shortcomings of foreign aid programs are manifold, ranging from weak policies and 
institutions in recipient countries to problems within the donor countries, and the 
aid agencies themselves ( Monkam, 2008: 2; Lancaster, 2007: 82-83).
Much of the focus of macro studies has been on the poor policy environment and 
bad governance as an explanation for the disappointing performance of aid programs 
in recipient countries (World Bank 1998; Lancaster 1999, 2007; Easterly 2006, Ear, 
2006, and Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Bad governance is regarded as an “uphill battle” 
that must be fought by aid programs in order for them to be effective. Donors talk 
about the promise of governance reform that would remedy a host of administrative, 
social, political, and economic problems, but they cannot deal with these problems.
Many studies analyze how the good intentions of donors can in fact harm poor 
nations. There is no lack of evidence to prove the argument that foreign aid is trapped 
in a “vicious cycle”. Poor nations have become increasingly dependent on foreign aid, 
with governments reducing their efforts to reform the markets, even though these 
reforms are necessary to enhance production and tax income in the rest of the 
economy. As a result, aid is diverted to government expenditure (Bauer, 2000). 
Foreign aid is effectively fungible and can be used by recipient governments to finance 
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unproductive consumption (Bearce and Daniel, 2010). One of the strong 
contemporary critics of foreign aid is William Easterly (2006) who has written several 
books related to the subject of foreign aid effectiveness. The general argument of 
Easterly and his followers (contemporaries) is that substantive aid flows contribute to 
the failure of development in many poor countries because it enlarges government 
bureaucracies, perpetuates corruption and enriches the existing elites. Easterly states 
that foreign aid activities in poor nations are unquestionably doing more harm than 
good. Supporters of this perspective go even further and argue that foreign aid should 
stop altogether to avoid damage to people in poor nations.
It can be countered however that donors can continue to give aid but with the use 
of the sticks and carrots to force reform. Donors can threaten to stop the influx of aid 
if a country does not meet the imposed conditions (Bearce and Daniel, 2010). 
According to PCP proponents, this method is a way for donors to tie their aid to 
selfish interests, such as political, strategic, commercial, cultural, and religious aims. 
Donors have more to win with the achievement of these egoistic interests than their 
small interest in holding recipient countries accountable for achieving something 
productive with aid (see for example, Jason Sorens, 2007; Easterly, 2005, 2006, 2007; 
and Stephen Browne 2006). Egoistic interests of donors work against the altruistic 
objectives of aid, and rather harm the outcomes of aid projects, reducing the 
effectiveness of aid interventions (e.g., Lancaster 1999, 2006; Easterly 2006, Lindsay 
Whitfield, 2009).
Even when we have some donor countries who intend to give aid free of egoistic 
interests, there may also be a conditionality problem stemming from the fact that the 
aid agencies have a vast bureaucracy more intent on justifying its “bureaucratic 
existence” than helping the poor (Bearce and Daniel, 2010). Bureaucrats of aid 
agencies perform their functions in the recipient countries without minimum 
standards for transparency and without being accountable. They are occupied with 
the art of convincing that aid programs are effective and successful in achieving 
altruistic objectives. Development aid officials consider aid as a “profitable business” 
that should continue to run (Hancock, 1989). According to Hancock (1989), foreign 
aid becomes nothing more than “a transaction between bureaucrats-a deal which gets 
done, in the name of others, by intermediaries and brokers. The real stakeholders in 
the affair, namely the taxpayers in the wealthy countries and the poor in the South, 







 1The PCP approach rejects foreign aid because it says it may not improve an 
environment that has poor governance. Moreover, foreign aid is an extension of 
economic and security interests abroad and does not care for accountable productivity 
in the public interest. More aid to a country negatively influences effectiveness.
1.3 Focus of the Dissertation: the Synthesis of the “Local Knowledge Syndrome”
In this dissertation we argue counter to PCP theorists and say that aid can promote 
development and aid programs can certainly work to achieve satisfactory results 
despite the poor quality of governance in recipient countries. With the right intentions 
underlying the work of many donors wanting to help disadvantaged people in poor 
nations-aid could very well flourish provided that they reach out to local knowledge. 
Aid practitioners and those in charge of development policies at the highest 
institutional levels would be in touch with reality and start incorporating “local 
knowledge” at different levels of project design and implementation.
In later chapters we discuss fully what “local knowledge” is. Here it is suffice to say 
that local knowledge involves analyzing and understanding formal organizations and 
institutions, which is also called “explicit-knowledge”, and secondly and equally 
importantly, is the knowledge of informal organizations and institutions called 
“implicit-knowledge”. This exists in the range of public and private spaces that deal 
with aid policy implementation (North, 1990, Scoot, 1998, Barnard, Cheste, 1965, 
and Polanyi, 1958 & 1966).
The quality of knowledge and ideas that inform foreign aid donors can seriously 
affect the course of the aid program in the public sector, and consequently aid 
effectiveness. As is true in many poor nations, the relative lack of resilience of the 
formal institutions and organizations is a notable feature. This is not true for the 
informal institutions and organizations in the public sector that function intensively 
besides the formal structures. There is what I call ‘the rule of the game’ that has 
a strong grip on all matters that relate to development aid. The power of Yemen’s 
formal state institutions and organizations is far less than it appears to be on paper, 
and they are subservient to the interests of informal institutions and organizations 
(Phillips, 2011: 11). To understand the dynamics of the Yemeni public sector one 
must look beyond written laws, regulations, institutional rules and procedures, and 
examine the informal rules of the game that govern organizational and individual 
behavior. These informal structures are similarly reflected in the distinctive informal 
styles of decision-making, management functions and interpersonal relations of 
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government officials (Muna, 1980). The informal structures of the public sector are 
heavily influenced by socio-political factors such as tribal structure and the traditional 
culture, values, norms and expectations of the Yemeni people.
The Local Knowledge Syndrome (LKS), which refers to the lack of local knowledge 
in aid programs, is worth considering by foreign aid officials because development 
economics alone will not help to understand aid’s ineffectiveness in the public sphere. 
Economic scholars and experts who are appointed by aid organizations do not 
generally focus on behavioral issues like motivation and social expectations of key 
organizations and individuals. Understanding governance in Yemen, especially the 
public sector reforms at stake, requires scholars and experts of public administration, 
politics, history, sociology, anthropology and other social sciences. Most economists 
lack the relevant background to understand the full complexity of the social dynamics 
and deeply-rooted value patterns of the poor (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006).
One objective of this dissertation is to generate practical and theoretical 
understanding for practitioners and foreign aid thinkers (economists), who deal with 
reforming the public sector and in particular those who are concerned with capacity 
building. If we look at the content of countrywide aid policies, there is a growing 
appreciation that policy depends on institutions for implementation – “but no one 
has figured out how to create those institutions successfully in inhospitable political 
and social climates” (Einhorn, 2001, as cited in Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 28). The 
initiators of development aid have a strong idea about helping recipient countries 
establish strong and high quality governance institutions, but they are less clear on 
how to achieve this (OECD, 2001, and UNDP, 2006). There is a practical knowledge 
deficiency, as most practitioners do not know how to bring about sustainable 
institutional changes (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 13). 
The other objective of this dissertation is to analyze factors in aid policy design 
and implementation that could unquestionably affect the realization of incorporating 
local knowledge. Development policy is constructed in three different stages. At the 
top, there is the policy-making level that is responsible for constructing aid policies 
and planning. In the middle, there is the management level that is responsible for the 
design of the implementation procedures. Finally, there is the operational level that is 
responsible for the execution of aid programs (Jaradat, 2008). I expect that local 
knowledge can be gradually dispersed throughout all the levels, however the 
complexity and uncertain conditions of the working environment causes difficulty in 






 1discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 10.
Aid policy makers use rationalistic planning and management, which often 
requires formal (explicit) and informal (implicit) knowledge that are simply not 
written down and directly available in most recipient countries. The demands of 
rationalistic planning have forced policy makers to use whatever knowledge is at 
hand, regardless of its appropriateness or accuracy (Rondinelli, 1993). Most of the 
donors’ policies are shaped by certain sets of shared western theories of change, 
norms and assumptions (Baimyrzaeva, 2012).
Over time aid policies have changed and formed three waves of reforms with 
different targets and objectives. The focus of reforms gradually extended from 
capacity development of organizations and individuals in the 1950s, to reorganizing 
the public and private sectors in the 1980s, and reshaping the whole governance 
system since the late 1990s. Donors have jumped from one reform wave to another 
without analyzing and mapping the consequences of the first wave. This is partly 
explained by the lack of practical knowledge of how to realize institutional change in 
the targeted countries. When the failure took place in a wave, economists came up 
with a new idea to design new polices and a new wave of reform even without 
understanding how and what makes a particular institutional arrangement work or 
fail in targeted countries (Baimyrzaeva, 2010). Some insiders to the process of aid 
policy-making argue that the donors do not “in fact know what to do – or that, if they 
do, they so far have been incapable of acting on that knowledge” (Jenkins and 
Plowden, 2006: 13). In addition to what we have mentioned before, it might be 
a difficult task for them to incorporate local knowledge at the strategic/policy level 
due to the hidden or normative nature of the local knowledge itself (Polanyi, 1958 & 
1966), and the process adopted by most donor countries through designing the aid 
programs. There is also a broken feedback loop from the field or the lower level to the 
higher level within the aid system (Martens, et al. 2002). Finally, there is a geographical 
separation of where the aid policy is formulated (in the capital of a donor country) 
and where the actual aid policy implementation takes place (in a recipient country). 
In this context, donors’ policies of reforms are informed by several unsupported 
assumptions about institutional change (Baimyrzaeva, 2010).
This dissertation argues that information on local knowledge could improve as 
a result of changes in the implementation process and networking in the field. There 
is a possibility for an originally inappropriate policy design to be corrected during the 
implementation process through the incorporation of local knowledge (Lindblom, 
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1959; Trowler, 1998; Hope, 2002). The reality is that implementation is an extension 
of policy formulation (Ali, 2006). But furthermore there should be a flexible strategy 
which adapts according to local difficulties and contextual factors (Nilsen, et al, 2013) 
or compliance with statutes (Matland, 1995). The implementation process of a given 
policy inevitably takes different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional 
settings (Paudel, 2009). Local Knowledge in a certain place and time can differ among 
aid recipients, aid organizations and individuals, all of which influence the 
implementation process.
Bottom-up research, conducted in the main by Europeans including Nilsen, et al, 
(2013), Friedman (2006), Howllet and Ramesh (2003), Hanf and Scharpf (1978), 
Hjern (1982), and Hull and Hjern (1987), focused on the actions of local implementers 
in adapting the reform polices to their structures. In foreign aid polices we can 
assume that decentralized actors (contractors at the middle management and 
operational levels) can be used to overcome the local knowledge syndrome (Saleh, 
2011) through direct and indirect interactions with the aid program beneficiaries 
(Ostrom, 2005; Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom et al, 1993).
What we can observe is that aid policy implementation has often used top-down 
approaches. Aid policy-making is mainly done by donor organizations and use 
contractors to implement the policies. According to the policy implementation 
theory, such a synoptic approach often ignores the relative ease with which 
implementers and interest groups can work to subvert the originally established goals 
(Nilsen, et al, 2013., Ali, 2006; Birkland, 2005, Winter, 2003; Mazmanian and Sabatier 
1981, 1983; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Berman, 1980). The traditional top-
down approach that “dominates development interventions ‘fails to take into account 
major decision makers, fails to address the problem of rationality and fails to account 
for the local knowledge that leads to projects being considered “donor” projects 
rather than “local” projects’” (Ika & Hodgson, 2010; Youker, 1999, 2003; in Ika, 
2012:34). The top-down approach often ignores the conflicts during the policy 
implementation, which is not only a missed chance to incorporate local knowledge, 
but can also jeopardize effective project implementation. If there are conflicts that 
means there are different visions, expectations, objectives and understanding of the 
objectives of the aid projects (Birkland, 2005).
It is worth noting here that policy implementation research is supposed to have 
evolved through three generations. As will be evidenced later in this dissertation, the 






 1agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation and evaluation. 
The top-down approach was used to consider implementation failure, and focused 
on factors from the perspective of central government policy makers like a lack of 
resources, poor socio-economic conditions, unclear or flawed policy, poor compliance 
by the implementers, and opposition within the policy community (Nilsen, et al, 
2013:2). The second-generation implementation studies favored the bottom-up 
model of policy implementation studies (Friedman, 2006) as they highlighted the 
significance of street-level bureaucrats to the success of policy implementation (see 
for example Lipsky, 1971 and 1980; Hjern 1982; Hjern and Hull 1983), and focused 
on the relationships between policy and practice (Paudel, 2009:39). The researchers 
in the bottom-up approach “shifted the analytical attention away from variables at the 
top or center of the system to the contextual and field variables at the bottom as the 
policy evolved in the complex process of translating policy intentions into 
action”(Nilsen, et al, 2013:3). The third generation of policy implementation research 
tried to reconcile the two approaches by developing “synthesized models and 
frameworks”. It combined the macro realm of policymakers with micro sphere of 
individual implementers (Integrated Implementation Model) (McLaughlin, 1987, in 
Paudel, 2009). Several other notable models and frameworks have emerged for 
improved our understanding of implementation theory and actions, including the 
(1) Communication Model of Interactions, (2) Governmental Policy Implementation, 
and (3) the Ambiguity-Conflict Model (see for example Johansson, 2010; Winter, 
2003; Goggin, et al, 1990). The importance of rigorous research approach was also 
highlighted, with more importance given to longitudinal study schemes and 
comparative manifold case studies to improve the number of clarifications (Nilsen, et 
al, 2013).
1.4 Local Knowledge Syndrome and the Network Perceptive 
The three generations of implementation studies and research discussed above are 
used in this dissertation as theoretical foundations, helping us to understand the 
phenomena under investigation. This is despite continued debate on and criticism of 
these three approaches, which has caused frustration among many scholars of policy 
implementation research (Paudel, 2009).
To explain why we have more and less effective aid projects in relation to LKS, 
however, I employ a different approach, which is the development associability 
approach. This approach comes from the Network Perspective, and in particular the 
32
actor network approach. The development associability approach is well-suited to 
this dissertation as the LKS has a cognitive and implicit nature, and aid policy 
implementation happens across nations and cultures. As we mentioned above, aid 
policies until now have most used the top-down approach, formulated in a donor 
country and then handed over to donor contractors to be implemented in cooperation 
with aid recipient organizations. The donor contractors apply Western management 
principles, practices, managerial styles, skills, and knowledge, which differ from 
those in the targeted poor nations. These differences can lead to potential conflicts 
during the aid policy implementation. Using the basic ideas of the actor network 
perceptive, we can prevent the different actors involved in the project from having 
conflicts, and allow them to accept each other’s viewpoints as legitimate (Scoot-
Smith, 2013). Moreover, this perspective shows us how we can incorporate 
information on local knowledge by creating a cooperative network (for more 
preliminary ideas on this, see for example Scoot-Smith, 2013, Latour, 2005; Law, 
1992; Law and Hassard, 1999). Interactions and networking are crucial tools for 
incorporating LK information and thus leading to development and adaptation to 
the specific time and context of the aid intervention (Voeten, 2013:121).
Underlining this argument, Lundvall et al (2009) emphasized that the narrow 
“formal institution focus” in aid interventions has limited value for understanding 
and explaining how to achieve real change. The authors argued that tacit or informal 
institutions and localized knowledge is more useful for building a broader 
understanding of aid interventions in developing countries” (in Voeten, 2013: 119). 
Building on the main idea of the actor network, they suggested that to incorporate 
information on the localized knowledge aid intervention should be founded on 
doing, using and interacting and involving learning. This is especially as the informal 
institutions are a critical part of the local knowledge syndrome in this dissertation, 
which suggest a more positivist ‘real’ worldview (see Chapter 3).
Before introducing the development associability approach and it relation to LKS, 
it is appropriate at this point to explain some aspects of the actor network approach. 
The actor network approach, used as an analytical framework for understanding how 
actors interact in the local context, can allow the “black box” of information on local 
knowledge to be opened. Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law have made 
major contributions in developing the actor network approach which their theoretical 
orientation and research which began in the 1970s. In its original formulation, the 






 1analytical method to “analyse the interactions between organizational unities and the 
different related actors, the relationships of domination existing there, the alliances 
amongst professionals, and conflicts arising during the interaction among the 
coalitions and between alliances and so forth” (Vásquez, 2005: 39). Carroll (2012) 
emphasized that the actor network perspective creates a “vocabulary” to examine 
how powerful networks emerge, paying “particular attention to assemblage and the 
influence of objects and people. It establishes networks and determines particular 
actions or behaviour” (2012: 64). Law (2007) sees the actor network perspective as 
“a descriptive approach” which describes how relations (both successful and 
unsuccessful) are formed. “It has a sensibility to the messy practices of rationality and 
materiality of the world. Along with this sensibility comes a wariness of the large-
scale claims common in social theory, which are usually oversimplified” (2007: 2). 
Actor network is a very accepted perspective, which has spread across a number 
of disciplines, including sociology, geography, management and organization studies, 
economics, anthropology and philosophy (Cressman, 2009). The actor network 
approach includes three basic elements identifying as key to create successful actor-
network and interactions among the network actors. These are: (1) the idea of the 
“black box”, (2) the process of ‘translation’, and (3) the involvement of material objects. 
The term “black box” is used by Law (1992, 2007) and Latour (2005) to define the 
process of forming a given network and how the associations and interactions 
between actors are established. A black box is created when all the underlying human 
and non-human interactions are clarified and there is a shared common understanding 
of the characteristics and role of each actor. For successful development intervention 
in a cluster, all the actors within it must collaborate. “A smoothly running cluster 
(a blackbox) is a prerequisite for successful development intervention in the strict 
effective sense” (Voeten: 2013: 123). 
The process of ‘translation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour 1987 & 2005) occurs when actors 
feel represented by the network and agree with the terms of cooperation. Network 
actors, as well as the relations that bind them, are translated as networks change. 
Thus, translation is the process of creating characteristics and the environments of 
collaboration and interactions, and of illustrating representations. Ultimately, this 
can lead to the creation of a reasonably stable network, and interactions in which the 
roles, interests and motivations, ideas and the rule of the game of the actors are 
mutually understood. In other words, the translation process can lead to a situation 
where the “interests of various actors are aligned, and the actor-network can speak as 
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a whole. The process of translation, if it is successful, results in an actor-network that 
has included many other actors by articulating what they want and the necessity of 
their cooperation. Translation is a process that involves consent, cooperation, and 
complex power relations” (Scoot-Smith, 2013: 6).
Heeks (2013) states that an act of translation occurs when an actor realigns the 
interests or identities of another actor so that it meets with its own. It is the process 
by which an actor joins a network is seen as “an act of ‘translation’; meaning 
a displacement from one status to another. Typically, this is explained as one actor 
reinterpreting or displacing the interests (goals, problems, solutions) or even identities 
of other actors, so as to align those actors’ interests with their own” (Heeks, 2013: 3). 
He has reviewed many studies which are dealing with the concept of translation, such 
as Horowitz (2012), who sees the process of translation as “an attempt to define and 
control others” and Williams-Jones & Graham (2003), who concurred with Lantor 
(1987) that translation does not occur at one point in time or space but in a chain, to 
which each actor adds an element of their own (in Heeks, 2013:4). 
According to Callon (1986), the accumulation of set of translations processes can 
create an actor network. These processes of translations have been divided into four 
key “moments” which are summarized as follows in Heeks and Stanforth (2013):
Source: Heeks and Stanforth (2013: 8). 
As the four key moments above describe, translation is a multi-faceted interaction 
“Problematisation – the principal actors [in Callon’s case study, the researchers] try to 
make themselves indispensable to the other actors [fishermen, the wider scientific 
community, scallops] by defining the nature of the problem those actors face in achieving 
their goals and by identifying a single way forward [the scallop breeding programme] 
which is described as an obligatory point of passage (OPP).
******
Interessement – the principal actors lock the others into place by interposing 
themselves, weakening the links of other actors to alternative interpretations and 
strengthening their focus on the problematised OPP [the scallop breeding programme is 
accepted as the way forward by the various actors].
******
Enrolment – the principal actors put interessement into practice by actions that define 
the roles that are to be played in enacting the OPP and the way in which the others will 
relate to one another within the network [those participating in the breeding programme 
accept their roles within it].
******
Mobilization – the principal actors borrow the force of their passive agent allies and 
turn themselves into their representatives or spokespeople [the research scientists speak 






 1process. It allows actors to frame agreed descriptions and implications, identify 
network representativities, and co-operate in the pursuit of individual and collective 
objectives (Carroll, 2012). The process of ‘translation’ is fruitful in examining the 
implementation of the aid projects on the ground and to describe how LK aspects can 
be incorporated by the process of interactions and building allies, which in turn has 
impacts on the level of effectiveness of the aid interventions. If translation processes 
fail it may lead to a failure to incorporate information on local knowledge and thus 
less successful aid interventions.
The third element, the involvement of material objects, is related to the insistence 
of the actor-networks approach that interactions between the actors create mutual 
understanding. According to Scoot-Smith (2013) and Heeks (2013) both argue that 
the involvement of material objects helps make networks more durable (Scoot-Smith, 
2013). Latour (2005) stresses that “non-human information” can influence our 
activities in many ways, both positive and negative, and is a vital part of creating an 
effective actor-network, despite being barely recognized or investigated by social 
scientists (2005: 242-247). It was argued by Heeks (2013) that when “material objects 
become involved – a document that records the membership or rules of the network; 
a building where the network meets– then the network becomes harder to dissipate. 
Material objects are translated as they join the network but network researchers also 
call on the idea of ‘inscription’: the way in which particular processes, interests, 
identities, values, etc. become written into, embedded into, material objects” ( 2013: 
5). 
There have been several criticisms of the actor network perspective. Golinski 
(1998) argued that the perspective offers no theory of the actor, as it falls back on 
describing anything and everything as an actor (or ‘actant’, which has become the 
accepted term). This in fact ties in with what Law (2007) says, because as we have 
seen, he defined the actor network not as a theory, but rather as a descriptive and 
explanatory method focusing on the dynamics rather than on the stability of the 
relationships. According to Scoot-Smith (2013), who quoted different scholars such 
as Amsterdamska, (1990); Collins & Yearley, (1992); Lee & Brown, (1994), the 
approach fails to explain how networks originate and how are sustained, thus can 
appear as ‘distributed essentialism’ (Scoot-Smith: 2013:7). Golinski (1998) also 
argued that the actor-network approach involves the displacement of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge from a macro social level of analysis to case studies centred on 
small groups, which are working on micro realities. Carroll (2012) critiqued the actor 
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network approach for failing to take account of ‘broader social structures’, which 
inherently influences the local social structures. Carroll, like Latour (1992, 1993) 
posits that micro- and macro- structures should be accorded the same value, as the 
macro-structure of society is made up of the same stuff as the microstructure. To 
contest this criticism Walsham (1997) suggests that the researchers who are using the 
actor network approach can “combine the methodological approach and conceptual 
ideas of actor-network approach with insights and analysis drawn from theories of 
social structures” (1997:473 quoted in Carroll, 2012). 
Despite the persuasiveness of such criticisms to the actor network approach, they 
do not undermine its real advantage as a heuristic method of dealing with LKS within 
the foreign aid discourse. The actor network approach leads us to perceive the policy 
situation in new ways, and insists that we abandon ready-made ideas and assumptions 
of change. The actor network approach is very important to study the LKS and its 
relation to foreign aid (in)effectiveness. Roome (2001) argues that the majority of 
social and institutional theories do not investigate the formation of relationships and 
human interactions, and fail to recognize the factors which lead to conducive 
(harmonious) relationships (in Voeten: 2013: 122). Stressing the above argument, 
Voeten (2013) added that most of these theories are developed in Western economies, 
and assume the presence of and importance of formal institutions working within 
relatively stable institutional frameworks. There is no attention to the roles that lively 
informal institutions play in the informal networks and organizations in poor and 
traditional countries. Until now, the dynamic roles of informal institutions have not 
yet been adequately explored. While there is abundant theory about networks, it 
often only “provides limited insights into the actual formation and evolution of 
networks and how people interact within these networks. These analytical frameworks 
generally do not pay enough attention to how materiality influences and can explain 
the behavior of innovators, the development of networks, the dynamics of clusters 
and the acknowledgement of responsibilities”( Voeten, 2013: 122).
Law (2007) argues that it is possible to describe the actor-network approach in the 
abstract. But in fact this approach is not abstract as it is grounded in empirical case 
studies. We can only understand the approach if we have a sense of those case studies 
and how these work in practice. Law likens this to symbolic interactionism and 
natural science (2007: 4). The actor-network approach focuses on micro case studies, 
which is crucial when considering the role of LKS in aid program (in)effectiveness. 






 1and varies with location, time and organization. The actor network approach provides 
prospects for some very informative analysis, as it is more practice-based than a post-
structural analysis, and moves away from the search for objective truths sought by 
positivists. (Scoot-Smith, 2013: 8). 
Actor network perceptive offers an effective method to understand how the 
development process within foreign aid can succeed or fail. I argue that development 
processes which follow a “harmony development associability” can incorporate 
information on local knowledge, as these processes create more extensive and durable 
alliances and interactions to exchange ideas and information during the actual 
process of implementation. The less successful development projects, by contrast, 
will follow the “conflicted development associability”. We will look at harmony and 
conflicted development associability in detail in in later Chapters. 
1.5 Local Knowledge Syndrome and the Development Associability Approach 
Based on the main ideas of the actor network perceptive and under the influence 
of the work of Scoot-Smith (2013), we use the development associability approach as 
an analytical tool in this dissertation to understand aid (in)effectiveness with LKS as 
a causal mechanism. According to Friedman (2006), the development associability 
approach offers an alternative to a hierarchical system by describing relationships 
between the related actors involved in a program (Friedman, 2006:486). The approach 
describes the elements of extensive human interaction, providing ideas for creating 
opportunistic social situations and to incorporate local knowledge. With the 
integration of this approach in my dissertation, the aim is to discover how donors can 
deal with LKS in actual social settings in order to ensure a high level of aid project 
effectiveness. Social interaction, either direct or indirect, is a way to transmit this 
local knowledge. Shared experiences and shared understandings among stakeholders 
are a strong incentive for learning, in particular problem-solving circumstances or 
contexts (Lam, 2006). 
Let us return to the three basic elements identified by the actor network as crucial 
to success - namely (1) the idea of the “black box”, (2) the process of ‘translation’, and 
(3) the involvement of material objects– and see how they relate to LKS and aid 
projects. We look at each of the three elements in turn below.
Information on local knowledge is not inherent or universal, and thus it is initially 
visible. Instead, the information becomes visible through virtue of the alliances 
mobilized around the aid project. The ‘development associability’ approach, therefore, 
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refuses to link project success with any purely formal achievement of ready-made 
aims or assumptions of change (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2). When the “black box” of 
information on local knowledge is opened, it is more likely that the aid intervention 
will adapt to local knowledge and thus the chance of success will be much higher 
(Scott-Smith, 2013).
The process of translation involves the mobilization of different actors, the 
alignment of their interests, and the representation of wider communities to speak as 
a single will. Successful development projects are able to define roles for people, 
stabilize identities, and speak on people’s behalf. Indeed, the successful development 
project does this not just for its beneficiaries, but also for all of its ‘stakeholders’. 
Through a complex process of minute power relations, it determines what other 
actors want to do, and what they will be capable of (Callon and Latour, 1981).
The material objects are crucial to incorporate information on local knowledge 
and to give the actor network a more tangible form. One important example of the 
material objects within the foreign aid arena is the development of online networks 
related to institutional memory of international aid organizations or agencies. As we 
mentioned before, the actor network is not really a theory, but a methodological 
approach (Latour, 1999). Actor networks, says Voeten (2013), are essentially based 
on, and framed by, non-human objects, interpretations, and scientific evidence and 
knowledge, alongside the semiotic context, which is the perceptions and opinions of 
the actors involved. Voeten notes that such a network sees the coming together of 
materiality, a positivist concept, with constructivist concepts such as perceptions, 
negotiations and role- and identity- assignment and eventually acknowledging 
responsibility.
In Chapter 3, we argue that non-human objects can provide important and rich 
historical information for aid policy makers and implementers about the rules of the 
games in the local contexts. Online networks can play a valuable role in putting local 
knowledge and capacities at the fore of the development project. Moreover, notes 
(Scarf, 2010), they can allow poor and marginalized communities to use their skills 
and knowledge to make money. They can enable “frontline development workers to 
play a more influential role in shaping development policy and practice, give civil 
society organizations a greater voice in public policy debates” (2010:69).
The occurrence of these three basic elements are by no means inevitable at the 
policymaking and implementation levels of foreign aid projects. At a macro level 






 1on local knowledge, aid organizations lack institutional memory and recipient 
countries have little information on local knowledge or theories of change (Martens 
et al. 2002). When researchers set out to examine a development project, they are 
often limited by the barriers development agencies erect in order to maintain 
a positive public image. Scholars are usually granted access only to a limited range of 
documents, many of which are already in the public domain, and which are generally 
jargon-laden explanations of events offering a rather monolithic view of the 
implementation process (Scarf, 2010; Scoot-Smith, 2013).
The non-human objects can lack information on local knowledge because of 
a number of factors that limit the ability of local knowledge actors to contribute to 
online networks, regardless of their desire to do so. According to Scarf (2010), these 
obstacles are a product of the existent power relations amongst participants, such as 
the dominance of the English language, which is compounded by tensions and 
constraints ranging from managerial opposition to local knowledge; social/cultural 
norms and resource dependencies and constraints that limited mobility and social 
connections (Scarf, 2010: 5). Scarf argues that there are considerable differences in 
the extent to which online networks promoted by donor agencies draw on local 
knowledge, experience and ideas from outside their (often rigid) network borders. 
The author also notes the focus on external audiences through websites, at the expense 
of creating true knowledge-sharing mechanisms between inside and outside (2010: 
iv).
In addition, strategic planning is essential to fully consider the local setting and to 
address the local knowledge deficiency, thus allowing the black box of information to 
be opened. However, there are several factors, which hinder this process. In Chapters 
3 and 10 we consider the factors that could possibly influence the human and non-
human interactions, as outlined by the actors network perspective, and by focusing 
on characteristics of the processes of policymaking, which are: (1) the unclear vision 
on the final goal, (2) diplomatic language and development jargon used in the 
interactions between actors, and (3) the dominance of the English language in the 
development aid realm (see for example Crespin, 2011; Olsson and Wohlgemuth, 
2003, Browne, 2006; Martens et al. 2002).
It is possible to incorporate the local knowledge only at the implementation stage. 
Within the scope of the “network perspective”, many studies have considered the 
factors which can contribute to this incorporation through harmonious networking 
(Faulkner and Rond, 2000; Vartiainen, 2002; Sako 1998 & 1992; Kanter, 1989; Isabella, 
40
2000; Putnam, 1993; Klitgaard, 1998; Board, 2002; Joop Koppenjan, and Erik-Hans 
Klijn, 2000; Dasgupta, 1988; Burns and Flam, 1987; March and Olsen, 1989; Jenkins 
and Plowden, 2006; Olsson and Wohlgemuth, 2000). The most important of these 
factors are: building trust and openness; commitment; mutual understanding; 
accepting cultural differences; equal representation; low staff rotation, and the 
numbers of actors involved in the aid project during the actual implementation 
process. Chapters 3 and 10 review these studies and the outlined factors in full.
The core Proposition and Hypotheses of the Dissertation
Considering all the theoretical foundations presented above and in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4, we developed the core proposition of the dissertation. This proposition, which 
is discussed extensively in later chapters, is as following: Aid programs and projects 
can certainly work and achieve satisfactory results in recipient countries with poor 
governance and a complex set of multiple development goals. Nevertheless, aid 
practitioners in the field and those in charge of development policies at the highest 
institutional levels should be in touch with reality and incorporate “local knowledge” in 
the project design and implementation process, as well as adopting delivery mechanisms 
to ensure effectiveness.
From this core proposition we can the formulate the following two main 
hypotheses of the dissertation, which elaborate on how LK could substantially 
contribute to the success of development programs:
(I)	 Incorporation	of	local	knowledge	in	the	policy	design	stage,	that	integrates	
formal	and	informal	institutions	and	organizations	in	host	governments	
or	 organizations,	 increases	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 aid	 programs.	 Reduced	




reduces	 the	 probability	 that	 aid	 programs	 or	 projects	 need	 redesigning,	
and	increases	their	effectiveness.
In Chapter 5 we discuss the empirical methodology. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the empirical approach used to test the above hypotheses, by using 
information and data obtained from the development program and projects (policy 
areas) of the Netherlands. We determine the causal relationships based on the 
objectives raised in each hypothesis.






 1development aid history, policy determinants, and its role in Yemen. The main 
objective is to discover the multiple goals for giving aid to Yemen and to test whether 
these goals decrease the level of effectiveness of aid interventions, increase it, or have 
no effect.
In Chapters 7-10, we test the main two hypotheses with an in-depth analysis of the 
Netherland’s bilateral Aid Program for Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary 
Education and Training Capacity (NPT) in Yemen. The NPT program is funded by 
the bilateral donor agency Nuffic, the Dutch organization for international 
cooperation to reform post-secondary organizations. Nuffic works on behalf of the 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. We selected aid program related 
to the higher education sector because more than 40% of foreign aid to Yemen goes 
directly to the education sector at all levels (MOPIC of Yemen, 2009). According to 
the Nuffic NPT projects sheets, NPT is especially directed at individuals and 
organizations of higher education in developing countries to give them a better 
chance of generating their own training institutes and staff in the long term (MinBuZa, 
2011). Developing higher institutions is a first step in the strategy to promote public 
sector reform, through training and extending the expertise, knowledge and skills of 
senior officials in the public, private, and non-governmental organization sectors.
The NPT program in Yemen was distributed across fifteen projects that were 
designed to achieve the priority areas for capacity development of higher education 
institutions in the country. In this dissertation, we focus on four aid projects which 
have direct links to the public, private, and non-governmental organization sectors. 
All of the projects began in 2004 or 2005 and finished in 2009. The projects are as 
follows:
(1) Establishment of an MPA Degree Programme at Sana’a University with 
partnership of the National Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS), 
Ministry of Civil Service. The MPA programme was developed at the Unit 
of Public Administration of Sana’a University to offer the opportunity for 
civil service managers in the various public administration institutions to 
obtain a university degree, to help them further strengthen the organization 
and management of their respective departments. At the same time the 
programme aimed to assist the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance in 
the set up and quality control of training programmes for civil servants 
through the upgraded National Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS).
(2) Establishment of an executive MBA Degree Programme at 
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Sana’a University. The project objective of MBA was to train high-level 
public and business managers by establishing an advanced degree 
programme in business administration. The focus of NPT activities was 
building the capacity of the department of Business Administration of the 
Faculty of Commerce at Sana’a University (SU) to effectively teach and 
manage an MBA degree programme. The immediate target group was the 
faculty of that department. The students should profit from the increased 
training capabilities of the teachers in the new courses, better training 
materials and equipment. The secondary target groups were the business 
organisations who will hire the graduates. Technical assistance focused on: 
(1) strengthening the general management and organisational capacity of 
the SU, and in particular the Business Administration department to run an 
MBA programme with relevance to the Yemeni business community; (2) 
capacity building activities including curriculum, course and training 
materials development, short-term in-service training for administrative 
and teaching staff, scholarships to augment staff shortages; and (3) equipping 
the library and information centre with relevant materials. 
(3) Strengthening the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University 
Graduate Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). 
The Water and Environment Centre (WEC) of Sana’a University, which 
started in 1999, is the main provider of advanced training in the water sector 
through its Graduate Programme in Water and Environment Science. 
Increasing problems in the water sector that threaten the development of 
the country have urged WEC to look for new approaches to water 
management in crisis areas. Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM) has come to the fore and has been embraced by the Government of 
Yemen. This approach sees the water crisis as a multifaceted socio-economic 
problem and advocates multidisciplinary solutions to water use instead of 
a purely technical approach. The WEC aimed to establish: (1) a Diploma 
Course in IWRM for policy and decision makers as well as for managers 
from Yemen and the Arabic Region that have working experience in the 
water and environment, and (2) a Course Programme leading to a MSc in 
IWRM. NPT assistance was requested for the institutional strengthening of 
WEC, to make it a sustainable centre offering high quality courses. 






 1Women’s Research and Training Centre (WRTC) of Aden University was 
established in 1998 to address gender issues in the development of Yemen. 
The WRTC needed strengthening in order to become a strong and 
sustainable institution able to further develop or extend its core activities. 
There were three components to the WRTC project. The first was institutional 
strengthening through developing an organisation and (financial) 
management plan for the Centre, and training of the management and 
support staff in strategic planning, programme management and finance, 
and leadership development. The second component was capacity building 
through strengthening both existing staff and qualifying new staff in applied 
research skills, adult education methodologies, course development and 
writing, policy development and analysis, as well as upgrading knowledge 
in Gender Issues. The aim was to set up a new Diploma Programme on 
Gender and Development for BA graduates, preferably with teachers with 
working experience, as well as the establishment of an active consultancy 
unit within the Centre to research, develop and implement a basic course on 
Gender and Development for all students of the Aden University. The third 
and final component was investments in aid research and training.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates the significance of this dissertation and 
the prevailing interests of the researcher, and concludes with an outline of the design 
of the dissertation.
1.6 The Significance of this Dissertation and Interest of the Researcher
Through the thorough analysis of donor policies, we hope to better understand 
why many poor nations have experienced so many cases of failed and abandoned 
development programs; and to contribute to the development of a conceptual 
framework to bring this information together. An analysis of LKS and its relation 
with the successes and failures of aid programs is critically important and urgently 
needed, as dissatisfaction with the consequences of public policies and development 
programs is widespread, not only among the citizenry, but also among public officials 
and the world community in general (Olowu & Saka, 2002). This dissertation can 
help to increase the percentage of successes and improve our knowledge and 
understanding of donor-promoted public sector reforms in poor nations.
In addition, this dissertation can also be useful in providing feedback to help 
improve the design and implementation of programs and policies. It is our sincere 
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hope that the analysis presented in this dissertation will help to generate important 
theories that can be tested in future studies, and moreover, trigger a roadmap to 
improve the implementation of aid programs in Yemen. We also hope to contribute 
significantly to scholarly literature on the topics of international development 
administration and development programs in poor nations.
As a researcher from the global South, I hope to show how we can realize 
institutional change in poor nations, solve the issue of local knowledge syndrome and 
include input from the government of the developing country. It is one step forward 
to presenting some local knowledge aspects that are more or less common to poor 
nations. This gives aid agencies a greater chance to develop their aid policies, not only 
based on development theories presented by researchers from thriving democracies 
and flourishing post-modern societies. Most western theories of development used 
by donor agencies to inform and justify their development approaches downplay 
local knowledge and the perception of poor nations.
This dissertation reviews some aspects of deep-rooted local knowledge and its 
effects on all the different levels in the daily management of the public sector (see 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation). Throughout this dissertation, we have attempted 
wherever feasible to point out some features of the informal system (the implicit local 
knowledge and unwritten rules of the game) at stake within the Yemeni civil service 
system that can be used as a backdrop for the practioners, experts or partners to 
whom my dissertation may be of interest. Researchers can use this information as 
conceptual background for the analysis in this dissertation. It is also useful for a donor 
expert or manager who is working for the promotion of public sector reforms in 
Yemen. We show how the rule of the game operates within Yemen’s civil service 
system. It describes certain informal institutions and the apparent managerial 
behavior that is important, for having effective interactions between the stakeholders 
from different worlds, including donors and recipients. 
I came to the Netherlands in 2007 to attain my Master Degree at Leiden University 
and as a part of a Dutch project to develop sound public administration in Yemen. In 
the Yemeni/Public Administration project, my dissertation has been one of the few 
counterparts to the Dutch - Nuffic/ROI project. After finishing my masters, I returned 
Yemen to teach for a year at the Center for Public Administration Development 
(CPAD) at the University of Sana’a. In 2008, I met Dr. Han Blom, the long-term 
manager of the Nuffic-NPT program in Yemen. Over several conversations we 






 1that there still existed a real problem in the delivery process of aid projects in Yemen; 
worthy of deeper investigation. With help from Dr. Blom, Dr. Frank de Zwart, Prof. 
David Lowery and Prof. Frits van de Meer, I was able to find a position at Leiden 
University, in order to conduct Ph.D. research in the area of foreign aid. I would like 
to express my heartfelt appreciation for their role in advising and preparing me for 
undertaking this research. 
I have often been struck by the successes in social, political and economic 
development programs in the Netherlands and the quality of living most Dutch 
citizens enjoy. Although I have been fortunate to have had the opportunity to 
personally observe and benefit from the same economic prosperity and freedom, I have 
often felt a considerable degree of emptiness and guilt for my inability to contribute 
in any significant way to the improvement of lives in Yemen. It is in the spirit of this 
enormous concern and burden that I have carried on my shoulders over many years, 
that I have undertaken this dissertation as a small contribution to make a difference 
for the people of Yemen. I hope that people in other relatively poor countries will 
benefit from it as well.
1.7 Defining the Main Concepts of the Dissertation
The key concepts used in this dissertation are “development”, “forging aid”, “foreign 
aid effectiveness”, “knowledge”, “local knowledge”, “local knowledge syndrome”, 
“policy design and implementation processes”, “administrative reform” and “public 
administration reform”, “good governance” and “bad governance”, “capacity building 
and development”, and “institutions”. Some of the terminology is briefly explained in 
this chapter; the other concepts will be discussed in the coming chapters of this 
dissertation. We open every chapter by defining the applied concepts in order to 
clarify the discussion for the reader. It is worth noting that the concepts overlap each 
other in foreign aid discourse. These concepts have confused different stakeholders, 
who use them freely, such as the term ‘institutional reforms’ that mostly refers to 
reforms in the public sector. The present dissertation focuses on capability and 
capacity building reforms as part of deliberate changes in the public and private 
sector institutions. These types of reforms are also related to the good governance 
agenda of donors adopted to promote public and private sectors reform processes in 
the recipient countries.
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1.7.1 The Concept of Development
The term ‘development’ has emerged as a powerful set of theories and practices 
that has influenced the post-war evolution of the developing world. It is instructive to 
note in this regard that economic and social development is the result of 
industrialization, which occurred when considerations of development were absent 
(Marc Williams, 1998). In the post-war and post-colonial period, the need for 
development of underdeveloped countries became a fundamental issue. Many 
scholars, researchers and governmental officials in industrial countries of the West, 
started to contemplate about helping the South and the East, the so-called 
underdeveloped or poor countries. Foreign aid development programs became the 
main instruments of rich countries to help poor countries. The development is linked 
to foreign aid activities, implying big theories that provide solutions to the problems 
of the underdeveloped countries.
Development theories and practices have expanded in meaning since WWII, 
when foreign aid officially started. According to Baimyrzaeva “in the 1950s, 
development was associated with administrative modernization; in the 1970s and 
1980s with economic development; and since the 1990s, it has gradually incorporated 
political and social dimensions. This trend reflects the widespread recognition that 
all of these dimensions of development are interconnected and need to be accounted 
for to secure lasting and positive outcomes” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 8).
Since the 1990s, different concepts of reform have escaped from the umbrella 
term of development and now belong to complementary and interdependent 
elements of good governance theory. These concepts include, but are not limited to 
effective administrative, political, economic and social institutions – rules that 
structure and enforce the behavior of bureaucracies, elected officials, financial actors 
and civil society. Most international aid agencies (IDA) view good governance as 
both a means and an end to development. While all major IDA accept this broader 
notion of development, some leading donors, such as the IMF and World Bank, still 
tend to emphasize the economic dimensions of development. Others, such as the 
UNDP, hold a more holistic model of development as exemplified in its Human 
Development Index (HDI) (Baimyrzaeva, 2012).
1.7.2 What is “Governance”?
Although the term governance has grown in popularity in the international 






 1different things in different contexts (Frederickson and Smith, 2003: 222). The 
concept so far has a confusing variety of definitions which greatly differ with respect 
to the ongoing problems or objectives at stake (Ear, 2006). The political economist 
Joachim Ahrens (1999) demonstrated the “academic” picture of governance. In Table 
1.1 below, the most famous academic definitions from a variety of scholars are listed:
Table 1.1: Multiple Definitions of the term Governance
Source: Adapted from Ahrens (1999, p 42), by Ear (2006, p3). 
Ear (2006) has analyzed the above listed definitions and finds that Frischtak, 
Hyden and Chazan are all explicit in their definitions that governance relates to the 
‘public’ or the ‘collective good’, making a distinction between government-which 
might be completely centered on the realm of private interests and governance. 
Similarly, Bratton and van de Walle’s focus on social consensus also implies a collective 
aspect. Only Kjaer’s definition is truly completely neutral about the content of policies 
(2006:3). 
Researchers working for multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank (WB), 
IMF, OECD and UNDP have mostly developed recent policy literature. They have 
distinguished two main parallel meanings of “governance”, which often overlap. The 
first meaning is associated with the World Bank: governance is “the manner in which 
Scholar(s) Definition
Frischtak (1994: vii)
Governance capacity is defined “as the ability to co-ordinate the 
aggregation of diverging interests and thus promote policy that can be 
credibly taken to represent the public interest”
Bratton and van de Walle 
(1992: 30)
Governance is “an interactive process by which state and social actors 
reciprocally probe for a consensus on the rules of the political game.”
Boeninger (1991: 1) Governance means, “identifying economic and social objectives, and (...), charting a course designed to move society in that direction.”
Hydén (1992: 7) Governance (...) is the “conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm.”
Chazan (1992: 7)
Governance is the “capacity to establish and sustain workable relations 
between individuals and institutional actors in order to promote 
collective goals”.
Kjaer (1996:6). Governance signifies “the capacity to define and implement policies.” (Kjaer 1996: 6, emphasis omitted)
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power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources 
for development”. Leftwich (1993) argues that the World Bank definition of 
governance has a fairly limited meaning, focusing primarily on the administrative 
and managerial aspects. The Bank’s concern with sound development management 
extends beyond the capacity of the public sector as it lays down the rules that create 
predictable and transparent conduct of public and private business. It also includes 
accountability for economic and financial performance (1993: 3).
The second meaning is associated with the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). It defines the term governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels” (1997: 5). Based on 
this definition, the UNDP perceives governance as those mechanisms, institutions 
and processes through “which government, civil society organizations, and the 
private sector interact with each other in shaping public affairs and through which 
citizens articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their political, 
economic, and social rights” (2008:in Shabbir & Rondinelli, 2007: 6). Leftwich (1993) 
argues that the UNDP’s interpretation of the concept of governance has a more 
political notion to it. It involves concern for administrative improvement, but it also 
insists on competitive democratic politics.
Likewise, Kauffmann et al (1999, 2002) have identified four dimensions of 
governance: economic, administrative, political, and institutional. These reflect the 
governance concept as a combination of traditions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. The political dimension comprises processes by which those in authority 
are elected, monitored and replaced. The economic/administrative dimension 
includes the system of managing public resources, the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement policies and its relationship with the international 
economy. The institutional dimension involves citizens and the state itself as actors 
who respect society’s public institutions that govern political, social, and economic 
interactions.
The UNDP and Kauffmann et al (1999, 2002), view decision-making and policy 
making as the province of government, as well as the right and obligation of citizens 
as members of a free electorate (Rondinelli, 2008). Other studies argue that 
international donors use the term “governance” in order to fit their own specific 
mandates. For example, “the World Bank has its own interpretation of governance 
because its official mandate prevents it from dealing adequately with political issues” 






 1administrative sense of World Bank and the political sense of the UNDP, are often 
confused with each other but should be treated distinctively (and also see Leftwich & 
Wheeler, 2011).
It is clear from the above discussion that the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the term governance is a complicated task, but it is even more 
difficult to distinguish between the two concepts of “good” and “bad” governance, 
and to explore the role of governance at the level of aid effectiveness in recipient 
countries. However, this is what we now attempt to do.
1.7.3 What is “Good” and “Bad” Governance?
The definition of governance has altered through the variation of the concepts 
about “good” and “bad” governance in the international development debate. There 
is a long history of debate on the idea of good and bad governance, and there is still 
some controversy among different studies as to what constitutes good or bad gover-
nance (Soros 2002 in Ear 2006: 3-6). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005) offer an in-
teresting and systematic comparison of the two concepts:
Table 1.2: Governance Systems Model





















Authority is institutional, resides with 
official roles
Authority is personal, resides with individuals
Political leaders share power with others 
and are accountable for actions
Political leaders monopolize power and are 
unaccountable for their actions
Leaders hold onto power by providing 
collective benefits that earn support of 
large segments of society
Leaders hold onto power by providing personal 
favors that secure loyalty of key followers
Policy decisions are taken in the open 
after public discussion and review
Policy decisions are taken in secret without public 
involvement
Decision-making standards are explicit, 
and procedures are transparent
Decision-making standards are tacit, and 
procedures are indecipherable
Political parties are organized around 
stated programs that affect large numbers 
of beneficiaries defined by universalistic 
or generic categories
Political parties are organized around personalities 
and the distribution of individual benefits
Political campaigns are financed by many 
small, unconcealed donations
Political campaigns are financed by a few large, 
secret donations
Elections are free, fair, and open Elections are marked by intimidation, vote buying, 
and fraud
Civil engineering projects are disbursed 
to serve the interests of large portions of 
the country’s citizenry
Civil engineering projects are geographically 
targeted to serve the interests of small portions of 
the country’s citizenry
Citizens have appeal channels if given 
poor service
Subjects have little recourse for poor service
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Source: adopted from Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2005: 203-204.
Each positive quality listed in the first column has a negative counterpart that 
represents bad governance in the second column. While power should be exercised 
in an impersonal way, it is personalized at all levels of authority in Yemen. A set 
hierarchy and chains of checks and balances is important for transparent decision-
making, but in Yemen, civil servants at higher levels may interfere in every decision 
made at lower levels. “Instead of focusing downward on citizens, bureaucrats focus 
upward toward their superiors who can reward them. Instead of providing broad 
programs that distribute benefits to all according to established criteria, government 
provides narrow benefits to supporters. “Few people would admit liking these things” 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2005:199).
Table 1.2 shows that a distinction between “good” and “bad” governance at 
administrative and political levels of governance can often be conflated. It is difficult 
to distinguish between the two levels. The political level often influences the 
bureaucracy and the bureaucracy has its own tools to influence political decisions. It 
is not our main goal to deal with this argument in this dissertation, but it is helpful to 
keep a clear distinction. In investigating the relationship between the quality of 

























Administrators are recruited and promoted 
in competitive processes that judge their 
merit and expertise
Administrators are recruited and promoted 
as reward for personal connections with 
political leaders
There is an authorized administrative 
hierarchy with clear division of labor, specific 
standards for output, and well-defined 
reporting channels
There is an unspoken administrative 
hierarchy, with little specialization or 
specification of output and uncertain 
reporting channels
Administrators can only be dismissed with 
cause
Administrators can be dismissed for no 
reason
Administrators are prohibited from 
supplementing their salary
Administrators supplement their salary with 
bribes and kickbacks
Administrators’ actions are predictable, based 
on objective methods, and follow uniform 
procedures
Administrators’ actions are arbitrary, based 
on subjective reasoning, and follow ad hoc 
procedures
Rules are applied with neutrality, and all 
citizens receive equal treatment
Rules are applied with partiality, and people 
with close ties to government get preferential 
treatment
Binding legal contracts are used in 
government procurement and sales
Verbal agreements are used in government 
procurement and sales
Internal controls are strict, thorough records 
are maintained and regularly audited
Internal controls are lax, documentation is 






 1governance and aid ineffectiveness, one will find that these two concepts ‘contradict’ 
each other. Since the concept of “governance” is divided into two main components, 
the political sense and the administrative sense, many theoretical and empirical 
studies that assess the relationship between the quality of governance and aid 
ineffectiveness are not in agreement, many giving misleading explanations. It is quite 
an undertaking to examine the three main groups of studies. The first group 
investigates the relationship between the political notion of governance in recipient 
countries and aid ineffectiveness. The second group investigates the relationship 
between the administrative notion of governance in recipient countries and aid 
ineffectiveness. The third group investigates the influence of foreign aid on the quality 
of governance in recipient countries (some of these studies reviewed in Chapter 2).
 1.7.4 Definition of Institutions
If we take a closer look at institutional theory, there are plenty of definitions and 
descriptions that over time have been developed for the definition of institutions. In 
this dissertation, we have adopted the most common definition as developed by 
Douglass North (1991), who defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally: institutions are the humanly devised constraints that “shape” 
human interaction. As a consequence, they structure the incentives of human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic (1991: 1). The author provides 
a crucial distinction between institutions and organizations, highlighting that the 
latter provide a physical structure” and budget to human interaction. “Organizations 
include political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory 
agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social 
bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (schools, 
universities, vocational training centers). They are groups of individuals bound by 
a common purpose to achieve objectives” (North, 1991: 5). Institutions may be 
formal, e.g. legal systems, law enforcement mechanisms, and private sector 
organizations or informal unwritten institutions that are conceptually “treated as 
a residual category that appears to include a grab-bag of the leftovers: norms, culture, 
customs and traditions, kinship networks, customary law, patron-client relationships, 
and whatever else does not fit with contemporary conceptions of institutions as 
defined in constitutions and legal codes” (Corstange, 2008:7)5.
North (1991) emphasizes the importance of informal institutions in shaping any 
5- An advanced conceptualization of  institutions and its relationship with the operationalization, the concept LKS, is 
persented in Chapter 3 of  this dissertation. 
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development policy process. The alignment of rules with norms and mental models 
of the individuals in that setting ideally precede the enforceability of government-
made rules. This alignment is more important than a government’s enforcement 
capacity, especially in developing countries where such capacity is often limited. 
Reform approaches that tend to prescribe formal institutional models without regard 
to informal institutions, may deepen misalignment between rules and the local 
norms, making the enforceability of institutions even more problematic (Baimyrzaeva, 
2010).
However, it is difficult for policy makers and implementers to directly align rules 
with norms and mental models of individuals on the ground because, these norms 
are based on informal institutions that are not written or otherwise physically located. 
Policy makers need “tacit knowledge”6 about the informal institutions in order to be 
able to consider them and use them in policy intentions and implementation. Most 
aid programs in recipient countries seem to be focused largely on reforming formal 
state institutions while paying little attention to reforming the informal state 
institutions. Yet the latter are the main structures through which governance in those 
countries is exercised (Denzau and North, 1994; North, 1991; Parto, 2005; Voeten 
and Parto, 2006). A key feature of aid programs is the recognition that plans must be 
grounded in the institutional context. Such grounding requires “local knowledge” on 
what makes up the institutional landscape and entails two questions. Firstly, which 
formal and informal institutions can be used as channels through which we can 
increase capacity? Secondly, what measures can be taken to add capacity, given the 
inevitable idiosyncrasies of the local context? (Voeten and Parto, 2006:28).
1.7.5 The Definitions of “Administrative reform”, “Public administration 
Reform” and “Public Sector Reform” 
Administrative reform is often used interchangeably with public administration 
reform. Many scholars and aid agencies use the concept of “administrative reform” to 
refer to the activities aimed at promoting the internal efficiency of government 
organizations (Caiden, 1991). Public administration reform however is a broad and 
comprehensive concept, involving a political process as well as an organizational one, 
as public administration cannot only be related to the question of how civil service 
operates. Montgomery (1969) defines public administration reform as “a political 
process designed to adjust the relationship between a bureaucracy and its wider 
6 - This is indeed merged with the concept of  time and place knowledge of  Hayek (1948) or James Scott’s (1998) 






 1society or within the bureaucracy itself ” (Montgomery, in Chau, 1997: 303). 
Public administration reform is also defined as a social revision process based on 
knowledge, the power of change, a strong political will, the reinforcement of urban 
society institutions, and human resource development. In addition, genuine public 
administration reform is when the government has a real desire for reform and 
“begins to move towards serious economic and social development” (Carstens & 
Thornhill, 2000: 182-183).
According to Caiden (1969), the United Nations (1973), Dror (1976) and Leemans 
(1976), real administrative reform and public administration reform will take place 
when the two following conditions are obtained: “(1) a set value with which the 
existing bureaucratic arrangements, public personnel and values are seen to be in 
conflict. (2) The concern by politicians and the general-public that the existing 
bureaucratic structures cannot realize new goals set for them. Consequently, 
administrative reform may involve centralizing or decentralizing initiatives or both: 
the denominators are “away from” or “towards” the centre” (in Ndue, 2005: 7).
Public administration reform and administrative reform have three major stages: 
(1) Analysis of the current situation of the administrative system, (2) Formulating 
a reform strategy and finally, (3) implementing reforms (Chau, 1997: 305). Analysis 
of the actual operation of the public administration system is a very important stage, 
because the formulation of the reform strategy relies on governments deciding on the 
effectiveness of administrative systems and unveiling the causes of low performance. 
The reform strategy is a theoretical model of the reform process. Through the 
identification of a gap between reality and the desired situation, governments can 
formulate a reform strategy. If governments succeed in carrying out the analysis of 
the current situation of the administrative system, but formulate a reform strategy 
that does not reflect the outcome of the analysis, they will struggle with the third 
stage, which is the most important of them, namely the implementation of reform. 
Experts can carry out the first two stages, but the third stage is very difficult and 
experts may not be able to execute this task. Implementation usually faces many 
obstacles, like unrealistic judgment of the real causes of performance problems in the 
administrative system, and the absence of political support (political will) from top 
leaders, especially presidents (Chau, 1997: 305-307). 
The above definitions approach public administration reform and administrative 
reform from two different angles. The first focuses on institutional and administrative 
reforms, and the second focuses on social and political changes. However, many 
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donors have understood for a long time that public administration reform is limited 
to the first angle. Donors choose technical interventions to improve internal efficiency 
of government organizations, while disregarding the political and social contexts and 
dimensions.
However, this superficial incentive for public administration reform is not 
acceptable any more among aid participants, and they want an intervention that goes 
beyond the measurement of the quality of operation of civil service, to determine the 
performance of the public administration. The administration reform is also formed 
by economic, social, political, and cultural factors. Public reforms include not only 
“transformations in the civil service, but also reforms of the policy process, 
decentralization, privatization and citizens’ relationship with government through 
a greater mobilization of civil society, all of which alter the power dynamics in society” 
(Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 34).
More than a decade ago, the two concepts of public administration reform and 
administrative reform were replaced by public sector reform and governance 
concepts. Administrative reform is no longer about transforming the administrative 
state per se, but transforming governance, the relationships between societal 
institutions that exercise authority within a single country/state, a group of states, or 
a country association (Caiden, 2006:17 cited in Baimyrzaeva, 2010). The use of these 
concepts in the foreign aid arena is not that systematic, because there is still confusion, 
the concepts themselves interrelate and overlap, making it is hard task to distinguish 
between them. Different donors still prefer using these different terms even though 
in most cases they have the same content. The UN often uses the term ‘public 
administration reform’ as presented above. The WB focuses on institutional reforms, 
which call for changing the whole governance system. OECD and other bilateral 
donor agencies like Nuffic mostly use the concept of ‘capacity development’, as 
elaborated below (Girishankar, 2001).  
1.7.6 Capacity Building and Development (CB & CD)
The concept of capacity building (CB), in donors’ vocabulary, is used as 
a substitutive concept of capacity reform and institutional building. For instance, 
DFID (2010) defines CB as “enhancing the abilities of individuals, organizations and 
systems to undertake and disseminate high quality research efficiently and effectively”. 
Similar to the UNDP report 2008, DFID research (2010) identified three levels of 






 1teams via training and scholarships, to design and undertake research, write up and 
publish research findings, and influence policy makers. Organizational capacity 
includes internal policies, arrangements, procedures and frameworks such as 
developing the capacity of research departments in universities, thinks tanks etc., to 
fund, manage and sustain themselves. Institutional or societal capacity changes over 
time. It includes the “rules of the game”, and addresses the political context, the 
regulatory context, and the resources from which research is undertaken and used by 
policy makers. The institutional level is very broad and includes activities of policy 
reform, legislation, power relations and social norms that shape interactions among 
organizations7 (DFID, 2010: 3; UNDP, 2008: 4).
DFID research claims that the main goal behind the capacity building activities in 
aid recipient countries is to facilitate individual and organizational learning which 
builds social capital and trust, develops knowledge, skills and attitudes and when 
successful creates an organizational culture and a set of capabilities which enables 
organizations to set objectives, achieve results, solve problems, and create adaptive 
procedures to survive in the long run (DFID, 2010:4). Therefore, the activities and 
goals of CB are not without trouble; they demand great efforts. 
There are many generic principles that underpin successful efforts for capacity 
building, but the most important one is that capacity building should be considered 
as a “process”. When we are dealing with human beings, CB is not a ‘bolt on’ extra, 
nor is there is there a simple ‘tool kit’ to make it happen. There are a range of tools, 
which, if appropriately applied can make a significant difference. Effective CB is the 
result of the interplay between individual, organizational, network and institutional 
factors. It is difficult to plan which steps are needed or which dynamics will evolve 
from it, but planning is nevertheless essential to develop a shared vision and strategy 
(DFID, 2010: 5). The development of planning can be facilitated through a process of 
action learning and continuous adaptation of interventions in the light of experience. 
Despite the importance of CB development activities to improve human capital, 
many scholars argue that CB does not fully reflect the main development objectives 
of foreign aid programs. They consider that the concept of CB is a part of the more 
comprehensive Capacity Development. They claim that capacity building is focused 
on the individual and organizations and an increase in the individual’s capacity 
within that organization to perform. Thus according to them it is merely one element 
of capacity development as the ultimate objective of development aid (Lavergne and 
7 - The DFID report mentions that the distinction between “organizations‟ and “institutions‟ is derived from the 
work of  Douglass North and the New Institutional Economics.
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Saxby: 2001).
The concept of capacity development is viewed as an interdependent and 
interwoven process of personal, organizational and societal change that depends on 
indigenous society, commitment and ownership to give the development momentum 
and sustainability. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) states 
that capacity development: “is the process whereby individuals, groups, organizations 
and societies in developing countries enhance their abilities to identify and meet 
development challenges in a sustainable manner” (Lavergne and Saxby: 2001:4). 
UNDP also uses the same definition. In its Practice Note Report (2008), UNDP 
defines capacity development as “the process through which individuals, organizations 
and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their 
own development objectives over time. Supporting this process requires identifying 
what key capacities already exist and which additional capacities may be needed to 
reach these objectives” (UNDP, 2008:8). 
Almost all multilateral and bilateral aid agencies use more or less the same 
definition of CD, as it is considered the primary objective of development cooperation. 
This stems from the main focus of the 2005 Paris Declaration that was concerned 
with the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of development aid. However, 
only a few donor agencies have invested considerable analytical work in it. They 
persist in mixing up important aid terminology like capacity development, capacity 
building, public sector reform and governance reform. The World Bank (2000), for 
example, provides a definition of capacity building that combines the aforementioned 
elements. In its “Strategy for Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening 
Governance”, the concept CB is described as “building effective and accountable 
institutions to address development issues and to reduce poverty in borrowing 
countries. As highlighted in WDR97, helping the public sector work better in 
developing countries is a two-fold challenge: it involves (i) helping it define its role in 
line with economic rationale and with its own capacity, and (ii) helping it enhance 
performance within that role” (2000:ii).
The terms CB & CD are not new to the foreign aid discourse, but the invention lies 
in the broader shift in thinking about development, especially in the focus and scope 
of development activities. The scope of capacity development goes beyond the 
traditional focus on the internal functioning of individual formal organizations - the 
‘micro’ aspect of capacity building. Increasingly, “participants have to look at the 






 1III). Others add that CD can take place at three levels, namely micro/individual, 
meso/institutional, and macro/the-societal level (Lopes & Theison, 2003: 21). 
Capacity development includes efforts to transform the macro-level environment 
where institutions operate, and reform the meso-level of systems and structures of 
institutions. Capacity development takes place at the meso (institutional) and micro 
(project) levels. This is crucial to wider capacity development because meso level 
interventions cannot remain detached from micro-level activities (Angeles & 
Gurstein, 2000: 454).
Donors learned that the past focus on inputs such as developing organizational 
capacity through training, technology transfers and policy advice, was not adequate. 
Institutions, or the rules of the game, did not “convert those inputs into desirable 
outputs, while the governance system remained the same” (DIFD, 2003; Girishankar, 
2001, in Baimyrzaeva, 2010). In this perspective, CD is seen as complementary to 
other concepts, and incorporates institution building, institutional reform, and 
development, human resource development, development management/
administration and institutional strengthening (Lusthaus, et al, 1999). The broader 
shift in development thinking is because of the fact that donors are currently realizing 
that confronts donor agencies with a basic reality that “the heart of the problem in 
poor societies is not the lack of funding or technical know-how (the traditional 
components of aid), but a matter of governance and the resulting inability to make 
good use of existing institutions and capacities” (Bossuyt, 2001:12). In Sida’s Strategy 
for Capacity Development, the concept of capacity is explained as the circumstances 
that must be in place for development to happen. These circumstances include 
understanding, competence and well-functioning organizations and institutions. 
Capacity development is thus a much wider notion than that of institutions. 
“Institutions are only one of the many components within the concept of capacity” 
(Bandstein, 2005: 8).
In the 2005 Paris Declaration and later in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 
2008), aid participants claim that aid activities should focus on institutional reforms 
to improve capacity and the quality of governance in recipient countries. Furthermore, 
CD should not be confined to externally-determined technical fixes, but should be 
driven by endogenous processes encompassing political relationships between 
government and citizens. They declare that for capacity development to be successful, 
the private sector, civil society and NGOs should be able to practice their normal 
roles for improving governance. In this way, society will practice its power and control 
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the actions of governments through those channels. This line of thinking is 
summarized in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in the following six principles:
1. Civil society and private sector: Enable local civil society and the private 
sector to play their capacity role. 
2. Technical co-operation: Work towards demand-driven technical co-
operation and promote the use of local and regional resources, including 
South-South arrangements
3.  Fragile situations: Tailor, phase and co-ordinate capacity building and 
development in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from 
conflict
4. National, sector, and thematic strategies: Ensure integration of capacity 
development priorities in relevant national, sub-national, sector and 
thematic strategies 
5. Country systems: Assess, strengthen and promote use of country systems to 
implement policies and manage public resources, including procurement, 
financial management, results, statistics and information systems 
6. Enabling environment: Address systemic impediments to local capacity 
development (OECD, AAA, 2009).
1.7.7 The Link of the Defined Concepts to the Dissertation
In conclusion, there is a continuous change in the language of foreign aid, in 
regards to public reform. Which is reflected in the proliferation of new and modified 
terminology, such as capacity building, development, governance, governance 
reform, institutions, institutional reform, public administration reform, administrative 
reform, and public sector reform. The meaning of each of these concepts is not always 
clearly articulated. The same term may be used to convey different ideas, or different 
terms may be used to mean the same thing. Although these terms largely overlap, 
they are often used to identify or emphasize different aspects of reform. Moreover, 
organizations using one term often ignore what others say about the same content 
because they use slightly different terminology (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 21). This section, 
therefore, has attempted to identify the points of consensus on the terms used, 






 1foreign aid literature. The present research focuses public sector reform, with special 
emphasis on transformation of public administration, is one method of capacity 
building that focuses on structural dimensions of the governance system. From now, 
public sector reforms will mainly refer to the capacity building within the government 
institutions unless otherwise showed.
1.8 The Outline of the Dissertation
The overall objective of this dissertation is to improve the understanding of why 
donor-promoted public sector reforms are not effective in poor nations, especially in 
the context of Yemen. An extensive literature review of all the factors that explain aid 
ineffectiveness is impractical within the framework of this dissertation. Here we 
focus on challenging one of the key theories of foreign aid ineffectiveness, the public 
choice (PCP) approach that explains ineffective aid, by referring to the operation of 
many the multiple goals of donors, as well as the existing poor policy environment in 
a recipient country. I hypothesize that the “local knowledge syndrome” is a potential, 
if not primary, source of ineffectiveness of donor promoted public sector programs. 
I will elaborate this further in three parts.
Part I of this dissertation consists of the Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 2 describes 
my conclusions from the literature review of foreign aid effectiveness. There are two 
contradictory conclusions used to explain aid. The PIP approach argues that foreign 
aid does work and that it should be continued to reduce poverty in developing 
countries. On the other hand, the PCP approach argues that foreign aid does not 
work, and that it harms developing countries instead of helping them. It should 
therefore stop to avoid future harm in those countries. I give only a quick review of 
the factors that cause aid ineffectiveness according to the PCP approach, because it 
has been reviewed in literature extensively, and I found that the argument is not 
convincing. The LKS explanation of the ineffectiveness of aid programs has received 
less attention in literature although some aspects of local knowledge are always 
mentioned under the heading ‘future risks’ in aid organizations’ reports. Chapter 3 
defines the concept of LKS and its implications for foreign aid effectiveness. I also 
take a step back and identify some factors at the policy-making and implementation 
levels of aid programs that give rise to Local Knowledge Syndrome. Chapter 4 
continues to explore local knowledge aspects in the context of Yemen to be used as 
background in the analysis in the empirical chapters. Chapter 5 describes the 
empirical methodology, the gathered empirical data and their sources. It also shows 
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the strategy of inquiry and the employed research design for this dissertation.
Part II of the dissertation consists of Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. This part illustrates 
how the donor-promoted reforms have played out in a specific country context, and 
what outcomes they generated. The Dutch-Yemen development co-operation 
presents a useful case study to argue against the PCP approach and its presumed 
ineffectiveness of aid interventions. Chapter 6 provides a brief historical background 
of the Netherlands’ development aid history, determinants, and its role in Yemen. 
This is to test whether these goals decrease the level of effectiveness of aid interventions, 
increase it, or have no effect. In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I argue against the second PCP 
argument, which claims that foreign aid programs will not work in a poor policy 
environment. By using the Dutch-Yemen NPT program and the quantitative analysis 
method, we investigate the more effective and less effective development projects 
which aimed at public sector reform in the higher education sector in Yemen. The 
actual effects of aid projects in poor policy environments have consequences for the 
validity of the PCP approach, and might rightfully oppose the idea that foreign aid 
does not work in a poor policy environment.
Part III of the dissertation, consisting of Chapters 10 and 11, present an analysis 
of those explanatory factors that tend to systematically undervalue the formal and 
informal aspects of LKS in strategic policy thinking, middle management, and at 
operational levels. I take a closer look at the principles, priorities and the content of 
development programs in public sector reforms. Chapter 11 proposes new ideas to 
incorporate information on local knowledge in a new paradigm to ensure effective 
public sector reforms. This paradigm builds on empirical evidence and previous 
discussed theory. I try to promote the understanding of how we can have successful 
interactions and actors’ network creation at all levels, and how the knowledge 
component of both informal and formal institutions can be incorporated. Moreover, 
the final chapter brings the main findings of this dissertation together and concludes 
by highlighting the key contributions of this dissertation to academic research and 
development practice.
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The definition and evaluation of aid effectiveness is a complex problem and a very 
hard task at the same time. Over the last six decades1, hundreds of researchers have 
generated a huge amount of literature reaching contradictory conclusions as to the 
justifications of aid, the impact of aid on growth and its role in promoting 
administrative reform processes as a condition for achieving comprehensive 
development in recipient countries and reducing global poverty as a whole (Monkam, 
2008: 18; and also see Gibson et al, 2005; and Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). As 
a result, there is still a lack of theoretical harmony surrounding the effectiveness of 
foreign aid. 
Two competing broad views and conceptual perspectives on the potential of 
foreign aid effectiveness have emerged. The public interest perspective (PIP) argues 
that there is straightforward or an indirect positive effect of aid on development 
outcomes and selected macroeconomic variables such as savings, investment, and 
growth (Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001, and also see Fielding et al, 2006; Mosley et al, 
2004; Morrissey, 2003; Gomanee, et al 2003; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Clemens et. 
al. 2004; Moreira, 2005). Thus, foreign aid is essential to plug an investment gap that 
poor nations have. In return, this will get those nations out of the supposed “poverty 
trap” (for example see Sachs, 2005; Williamson, 2009; and Stiglitz, 1998). A contrasting 
perspective has grown in foreign aid discourse, which is the public choice perspective 
(PCP). It perceives foreign aid as ineffective and possibly harmful to recipient 
countries (Boone 1996 and 1995; Easterly, 2006 & 2003; Easterly, 2001; Roodman, 
2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; Bauer 2000, as cited in Williamson, 2009).
The aforementioned studies and many others have evaluated aid effectiveness 
from both micro and macro levels, relying on both cross-country comparisons and 
single country case studies, and by using broad surveys of a qualitative and multi-
disciplinary analysis as well as empirical analytical studies (Hansen and Tarp 2000: 
357). I believe that a complete survey of aid effectiveness studies is not possible and 
essential for this dissertation. Instead, in the third section of this chapter, I focus on 
summarizing the arguments of the two main conceptual perspectives: the public 
interest perspective (PIP) and the public choice perspective (PCP). In the fourth 
section, selective explanations related to public choice perspective (PCP) will be 
1 The overseas development assistance, as it is well known in today’s world as foreign aid, commenced by the Point Four 
Program that was proposed by U.S. President Truman as the fourth point in his Jan. 20, 1949, inaugural address. Truman 
“called for a ‘bold new program’ for making the benefits of  American science and industrial progress available to ‘un-
derdeveloped’ countries.” The Point Four Program came directly out of  the experiences of  the Marshall Plan that oper-
ated by the U.S. government in 1947 and aimed at the reconstruction of  Europe after World War II (Dichter 2003, 55; 
Roodman 2004, 3). The international community originally formed World Bank (WB) and the IMF in 1945 to respond 







reviewed in order to investigate the different factors and issues related to foreign aid 
in-effectiveness.
At the end of this chapter, there is a brief presentation of the main theoretical 
argument of this study, which can be used to explain why foreign programs are 
ineffective. This study argues that the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” (LKS)2 is 
conceptually tied to ineffectiveness in donor-promoting public sector reform 
programs. The LKS is the lack of clear understanding of the existing formal and 
informal institutional and organizational environments in a specific recipient 
government body, which are the critical determinants of whether imported public 
management ideas will work or not in poor nations. Most government bodies in the 
poor nations operate using informal power structures, which are far more significant 
than the formal structure of power and rules. 
My argument in this study is that the LKS can be solved by valid interactions and 
associations among the actors involved in the process of the aid intervention in a 
specific place and time. This becomes clear later in this chapter, Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 3, as the characteristics of actor-network perceptive are used to validate the 
process of local knowledge incorporation in order to ensure aid project effectiveness. 
In this dissertation actor network perceptive is not limited to a theoretical discussion 
but it is used as an analytical method that allows us “to compare the actor networks, 
identify patterns in network creation and eventually understand and explain the 
factors and conditions of the societal processes that lead towards responsible aid 
intervention”(Voeten, 2013: 17). The idea of actor network perceptive is significant 
for this study, (as I explained in Chapter 1 and in the coming chapters) as it detaches 
notions of success from objectively measurable validity and instead explains it 
through the mobilization of allies and the associability approach of reform.3
The final section of this chapter is the concluding part. I start however by defining 
the some important concepts for this chapter: foreign aid and aid effectiveness. 
2.2 Defining Foreign Aid and Aid Effectiveness
 2.2.1 What is Foreign Aid?
Foreign Aid literature is ambiguous in its definition of Foreign Aid. Some authors 
define foreign aid as “all financial flows from donor nations to developing and 
transition countries, including official grants and loans, economic aid and trade 
2 - LKS is fully conceptualized in Chapter 3 and chapters thereafter. 
3 -The applicability of  this theory to development studies will be defined, suggesting that its value lies in the way it allows 
us to rethink the notion of  success in development: the development associability’ approach. However, to incorporate 
local knowledge, the actor network creation should be successful. “In this case, actor network perceptive suggests that 
the success of  the actor-network can be attributed to the extent and durability of  its alliances. The more alliances in-
volved in the network, and the more people and things that work to maintain the network, the more successful it will 
be” (Scott-Smith, 2013: 4).
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financing, charitable aid, security and military assistance, and political aid” (Akramov, 
2006). Charitable aid is illustrated in terms of the donor effort against hunger, misery 
and despair in poor nations. Economic aid is defined in terms of sustaining the efforts 
of the populations of economically underdeveloped countries to develop their 
resources and to create conditions for self-sustained economic growth. Political, 
security and military aid is seen in terms of the donor aid programs and efforts to 
achieve “political stability in a recipient country, reducing the potential for conflicts, 
supporting peace, the promotion of democracy, the preservation of political 
independence of former colonies and maintenance of a sphere of influence for 
Western donor countries” (Pronk, 2005: 3). After events such as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the war against terrorism has become part of aid giving to some poor nations. 
Industrialized (donor) countries have realized the need for close cooperation with 
governments of developing countries to ensure global security. They have also begun 
to understand that persistent poverty makes developing countries vulnerable to 
security and other threats. Therefore, aid has been increasingly shifted towards the 
challenges of development (Burnell, 1997 as cited in Akramov, 2006).
The above definitions can be used as a starting point for this study, alongside the 
standard definition of “official development assistance” (ODA). “Between 1960 and 
1972, the donors wrestled with these questions in order to develop a definition that 
would enable them to record and compare their core development aid in a consistent 
manner. Member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD now report their aid on the basis of an agreed definition of official development 
assistance (ODA)”( Brautigam, 2009: 15).
The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) used the term ODA for the first time in the 
early 1970s. It consists of grants or loans that a bilateral or multilateral donor gives to 
a recipient country to promote economic development and reduce poverty. It 
“comprises funding from governments to developing countries (those with a per 
capita income below a regularly adjusted threshold) and to multilateral institutions 
such as the United Nations Development Program or the World Bank” (Brautigam, 
2009: 15). The OECD also has data on official development assistance (ODA) that 
includes technical cooperation, such as providing advice on making economic 
reforms and using new techniques in farming. The OECD in its data excludes military 
assistance, political development programs, export credits, and debt forgiveness for 
military loans from the definition of official development assistance (ODA). There 
are three criteria that ODA should satisfy (O’Neill, 1997):
•	 The two parties of the ODA relationship should be officials, i.e., aid is 
given by the official sector of the donor country and received by an 
official sector of the recipient country. 







and reduce poverty in the recipient country by promoting public sectors 
reforms.
•	 Aid must be granted on concessional terms, which in the case of a loan 
means that at least 25 percent of it must be in the form of a grant ( see 
also OECD, 2001 and Akramov, 2006).
This dissertation takes an even broader definition of ODA to include all money 
given by a donor country to a recipient that would be classified as official development 
assistance, including military and security aid, political development programs, 
export promotion, debt forgiveness, and non-concessional aid that is lent by bilateral 
aid agencies rather than multilateral aid agencies. In other words, any money from 
government donor organizations that benefits recipient countries in the form of 
grants, concessional loans, or non-concessional loans is considered foreign aid. The 
only exception is the use of credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which is excluded unless otherwise noted (O’Neill, 1997). I go beyond this definition 
to include a range of aid programs that aim to build the capacity and capability of the 
respective sectors, to be self-standing in managing their comprehensive development 
processes. In Chapter 8, I return to this definition when I consider how donor-
promoted public sector reform process is working in the context of Yemen. 
2.2.2 Defining Aid “Effectiveness”
What is aid effectiveness? In both foreign aid literature and amongst practitioners 
there is no agreement about how to define the term aid effectiveness. Many studies 
argue that is because of a number of interlinked reasons. First, aid is provided by 
different agencies that have very different objectives. Some objectives are altruistic, 
such as achieving development and reducing poverty in a recipient county. Others 
are egoistic, focused on the self-interests of a donor country such as promotion of 
trade, the protection of global public goods, and the war against the global terrorism. 
Second, there are a number of different factors that influence development outcomes 
beyond the provision of aid, e.g., civil wars and natural disasters in recipient countries. 
The argument is that the mix of motives for aid giving and the different factors that 
influence development outcomes “obviously make the development of a measure of 
aid effectiveness which has a broad acceptance and comparability challenging” 
(Burall, and Roodman, 2007: 3, and also see Lancaster, 2006 and De Haan, 2009). 
The adopted definition of foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
in this study is: the grants or loans that a bilateral or multilateral donor gives to a 
recipient country to promote its development in its comprehensive meaning - 
economic development, social development, and political development. In this 
dissertation I define aid effectiveness to mean the extent to which aid programs and 
projects succeed or fail, in achieving their development targets in a recipient country. 
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“Criteria for examining the success of projects usually focus on their original aims 
and objectives. Success is then measured by the nature of the objectives, and the 
extent to which these objectives have been achieved. An effective aid program, 
according to this view, has good aims, it achieves what it sets out to achieve, and it 
does so because it has inherent strengths in design and implementation. We might 
call this view the ‘development validity’ position, as it draws attention to the 
connection between success and aims” (Scott-Smith, 2013: 11).
However, in this dissertation I focus more on the relationship between foreign 
aid and donor-promoted public sector reforms programs and projects related directly 
to the egotistic aspect of aid giving: prompting development and reducing poverty 
within fragile states to ensure security and stability at the global level. I believe that 
aid projects aimed at prompting public sector reforms are part of efforts and agendas 
of donors for reducing poverty and achieving welfare for those poor and miserable 
societies.4
Of course, one can argue that foreign aid is only a part of the picture in a recipient 
country, and any recipient country has its own natural and financial resources that 
can contribute to promoting development processes. On this point I would argue that 
for many recipient countries, especially (though not exclusively) in Yemen, foreign 
aid remains a key element of efforts to promote sustainable development and poverty 
reduction. Given the volume of resources that it involves, continued efforts to make 
aid made more effective are important (Domingo et al, 2009: 7). 
The total financial commitment of donors to Yemen in the last 15 years has been 
nearly 13 billion USD, which represents more than 30 percent of the annual national 
income of the Yemeni nation. In my interview in 2010 with the Yemeni Deputy 
Ministry of Finance for the Budget Sector, he told me that about 95% of Yemen’s 
annual public income is allocated to finance the government’s net operating costs 
such as salaries, allowances and other day-to-day governmental costs, and only 5% of 
is allocated to finance public services and capital expenditures, that are the core to 
establish a healthy economy system for the nation and reducing poverty. The Deputy 
Ministry of Finance for the Budget Sector confirmed that external resources from 
donors finance 95% of public service and capital expenditures either in the form of 
grants or loans. He added that the external grants represent about 50% of the total 
external financial resources that Yemen had received over the past ten years5. 
To define the concept of aid program effectiveness quite differently, there is an 
alternative view known as the ‘development associability’ position’. Scott-Smith 
(2013) proposed this approach by using the theoretical elements of actor network 
4 - An argument about this point can be found in an advance level elsewhere. 
5 - In addition to the interview that the researcher has done on 19 of  November, 2010, with the Deputy Ministry of  Fi-
nance for the budget sector in Yemen, the researcher has collocated and reviewed the aid flows and the national budgets 
of  the both countries at the same period that mentioned above, in which I found that the same percentages are correct. 







perceptive (see chapter 1 for more details). This approach does not look at the stated 
objectives of a program and then measure effectiveness against them. Instead, it looks 
at how the objectives came about and if they are accepted in the first place, and then 
measures how people become convinced by these aims. At the base of this approach 
is the view that projects are built not on some inherent validity or superiority, but on 
the mobilization of stable and durable allies (2013: 6). Furthermore, the development 
associability evaluation approach captures the complex reality of development 
programs in a specific time and place where: size and longevity often has nothing to 
do with program aims, strength, or values; where projects may exist for many years 
in the absence of any formal markers of success; and where projects with many of 
these markers may never even get off the ground. “The ‘development associability’ 
approach refuses to associate success with any purely formal achievement of aims, 
nor with any universal or transcendental values. It seeks to remind us that development 
projects do not succeed because they “achieve their aims, but they succeed because 
they convince enough people that their aims are good. Similarly, development 
projects do not fail because they cannot meet their aims, or even because their aims 
are bad; they fail because they have not nurtured enough supporters who believe in 
the value of their aims. Success in development projects, by this view, is a matter of 
how strong and how wide the associations around the project are constructed” (Scott-
Smith, 2013:10). 
This dissertation employs Scott-Smith’s (2013) definition of the term of foreign 
aid project and program effectiveness, adding that if we have strong and wide 
associations around the project that are constructed effectively; the network of actors 
will be strong and a lot of problems such as cultural conflicts, absence of trust, and 
lack of openness, flexibility or mutual understanding will be avoided. Indeed, these 
problems can influence the process of interactions between actors in order to 
incorporate local knowledge during the policy design and policy implementation in 
a specific place and time, and make or break aid programs. These factors are identified 
and discussed in Chapters, 1, 3 and 10, where I show how they work against aid 
programs’ effectiveness at both levels: the recipient side and the donor side. 
My criterion for the conceptualization of aid effectiveness is to measure the 
contribution of foreign aid in promoting public sectors reforms, using the development 
validity position or the development associability position, which lead to economic 
and social development and welfare in recipient countries. Therefore the concern 
here is whether donor-promoted public sectors activities are effective or not in reality. 
In foreign aid discourse, this criterion has been explored from different methodological 
and ideological perspectives. There are contradictory perspectives and empirical 
results about the justifications for and effectiveness of foreign aid, which I look at in 
the following section. 
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2.3 Foreign Aid Justification and Effectiveness: Contradictory Debates 
Since donors started providing foreign aid to recipient countries, a growing body 
of research has dramatically increased our knowledge of how aid affects development 
processes in recipient countries and what factors determine the level of aid 
effectiveness. This literature has introduced two competing views and conceptual 
perspectives on foreign aid justification and on the potential of aid effectiveness: the 
public interest perspective and the public choice perspective. Based on these two 
competing conceptual perspectives, hundreds of empirical studies have investigated 
aid effectiveness in recipient countries, and have achieved contradictory results. It is 
far beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed review of such studies. 
Instead, I focus on summarizing the macro- and micro-level studies relating to both 
the public interest perspective and the public choice perspective which have 
investigated aid effectiveness in terms of both the aid-growth relationship and the 
aid-development relationship. This focus reflects the observation of Easterly (2001) 
when he argues that some recipient countries show a political economy model of 
growth without development (2001:1).
In subsection 2.3.1, I review evidence on the perspective of public interest on 
foreign aid justification, focusing in particular on one leading conceptual study of 
this perspective by Sachs (2005). Then, in subsection 2.3.2, I review evidence on the 
perspective of public choice on foreign aid justification, again focusing in particular 
on one competing and leading conceptual study of this perspective, which is by 
William Easterly (2006). After these two subsections, I move on to an analysis of 
empirical studies and explanations of aid ineffectiveness that are commonly used in 
foreign aid literature. As stated in chapter one, the main task of this dissertation is to 
provide an answer as to why Foreign aid is ineffective. The coming chapters do so by 
reviewing the main explanation of aid (in)effectiveness and then testing the theoretical 
paradigm of this dissertation.
2.3.1 The Public Interest Perspective and Foreign aid Justification
The public interest perspective was, and remains, a center argument for the use of 
foreign aid over the last sixty years in both macro- and micro-analyses. Hundreds of 
scholarly studies on the public interest perspective have argued that most “poor 
developing countries lack domestic savings to finance existing profitable investment 
opportunities and have limited or no access to international private capital markets; 
thus, official foreign assistance could play an important role (the only source in many 
developing countries) in filling the financing gap in order to attain a needed 
investment level and targeted growth rate” (Akramov, 2006: 33).
Most conceptual or high-level studies relate to the public interest perspective of 
foreign aid and they seldom provide empirical evidence to support their arguments 







which does build on empirical evidence, Jeffrey Sachs’ The End of Poverty: Economic 
Possibilities for Our Time (2005). Sachs’ analysis and proposals are backed up by his 
practical and field experience, as he has worked for twenty years in hundreds of 
countries across the world to promote economic development and welfare. In the 
study, Sachs provides successful examples of western donors’ experiences in aiding 
the poor countries: “The green revolution for food production in Asia, especially in 
China and India, vaccines and immunizations, antimalarial bed nets, oral rehydration 
therapies, agroforestry to replenish soil nutrients, antiretroviral medicines, the spread 
of family planning, and so on. In almost all of these cases, the technologies were first 
developed for the rich-country markets, or were sponsored for the poor nations in a 
special donor-led process” (Sachs, 2005: 282) 6.
Sachs argues that at the most basic level the key to ending extreme poverty is “to 
enable the poorest of the poor to get their foot on the ladder of development,…at 
least to gain a foothold on the bottom rung, from which they can then proceed to 
climb on their own” (2005: 226 & 2). In doing so, the author suggests that you must 
first consider how the poverty trap works in poor nations and how foreign aid helps 
overcome it. He explains that in households that are impoverished, “All income goes 
to consumption, just to stay alive. There are no taxes and no personal savings. 
Nonetheless, depreciation and population growth continue relentlessly. The result is 
a fall in capital per person and a negative growth rate of per capita income; that leads 
to further impoverishment of the household in the future. The figure depicts a vicious 
cycle of falling incomes, zero savings and public investment, and falling capital per 
person as a result” (2005: 246).
Sachs’ theory of how official development assistance (ODA) helps to overcome the 
poverty trap in poor nations is shown in Figure 2.1 below. In Sachs’ perspective, ODA 
can help “to jump-start the process of capital accumulation, economic growth, and 
rising house- hold incomes” (2005: 249): 
Sachs (2005) provides a solution of how donors can help the poor countries to 
foot on the ladder of development that shown in the above figure 2.1, in the form of 
official development assistance (ODA), helps to jump-start the process of capital 
accumulation, economic growth, and rising household incomes. The author suggests 
foreign aid should feed into three channels:
A little bit goes directly to households, mainly for humanitarian 
emergencies such as food aid in the midst of a drought. Much more goes 
directly to the budget to finance public investments, and some is also directed 
6 - Jeffrey D. Sachs has been cited by the New York Times Magazine as “probably the most important economist in the 
world” and by Time as “the world’s best-known economist.” He has advised an extraordinary range of  world leaders 
and international institutions on the full range of  issues related to creating economic success and reducing the world’s 
poverty and misery. Now, at last, he draws on his entire twenty-five-year body of  experience to offer a thrilling and in-
spiring big-picture vision of  the keys to economic success in the world today and the steps that are necessary to achieve 
prosperity for all. CF, See, http://www.powells.com/biblio/1-1594200459-0.
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toward private businesses (for example, farmers) through microfinance 
programs and other schemes in which external assistance directly finances 
private small businesses and farm improvements. If the foreign assistance is 
substantial enough, and lasts long enough, the capital stock rises sufficiently 
to lift households above subsistence. At that point, the poverty trap is broken, 
and figure 2.1 comes into its own. Growth becomes self-sustaining through 
household savings and public investments supported by taxation of 
households. In this sense, foreign assistance is not a welfare handout, but is 
actually an investment that breaks the poverty- trap once and for all. (2005: 
246).
Having discussed the conceptually broad view of the public interest perspective to 
the potential justification and impact of foreign aid in recipient countries, Sachs 
(2005) concludes that more aid investment is needed to end poverty in poor nations 
by filling the financial gap, thus improving basic saving, capital accumulation and 
growth. Moreover, Sachs claims that enhanced aid is needed, not just extra aid. 
Donors should focus on both the quality and quantity of foreign aid. It is currently 
difficult to realize the development objectives of foreign aid. Foreign aid is driven by 
donor objectives and tied to contractors from donor countries. For example, only 
about 24% of net bilateral aid is directed to real capital investments in low-income 
countries7.
2.3.2 The Public Choice Perspective and Foreign Aid Justification 
I now turn to discuss another conceptual approach: the public choice perspective 
and foreign aid justification. This argues that aid has been negatively associated with 
7 - This point is fully covered in the coming sections where I consider why foreign aid is not effective.
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growth and development in recipient countries and that it harms them rather than 
helps. 
In many instances throughout the years, critics of foreign aid have argued that 
the objectives of foreign aid are worthwhile but that its premises are wrong and it is 
just a waste of money (see for example: Freidman, 1958; Little and Clifford, 1965; 
Loomis, 1968; Bauer, 1972). Most of these studies argue that aid flows have largely 
contributed or will contribute to the failure of development efforts in many developing 
countries by enlarging government bureaucracies, perpetuating rent-seeking and 
corruption, and enriching the elites in poor countries (in Akramov, 2008: 34). One of 
the strongest contemporary critics of foreign aid is William Easterly who has written 
many books related to the subject of foreign aid effectiveness, the most important one 
is The White Man’s Burden (2006). Easterly wrote this book as part of an ongoing 
debate with Jeffrey Sachs. The White Man’s Burden is a thorough refutation of Sachs’ 
(2005) argument that poor nations are trapped in a so-called “poverty trap” from 
which there is no possibility of escape except when donors provide a large volume of 
foreign aid. Easterly(2006) provides statistical evidence (see Table 2.1 below) showing 
Country Name Per Capita Growth,1980-2002 (%)
Aid/GDP
(%) 1980-2002
Percent of time under IMF 
programs, 1980- 2002 (%)
Ten Best Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
South Korea 5.9% 0.03 36%
China 5.6% 0.38 8%
Taiwan 4.5% 0.00 0%
Singapore 4.5% 0.07 0%
Thailand 3.9% 0.81 30%
India 3.7% 0.66 19%
Japan 3.6% 0.00 0%
Hong Kong 3.5% 0.02 0%
Mauritius 3.2% 2.17 23%





Ten Worst Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
Nigeria -1.6% 0.59 20%
Niger -1.7% 13.5 63%
Togo -1.8% 11.18 72%
Zambia -1.8% 19.98 53%
Madagascar -1.9% 10.78 71%
Cote d’Ivoire -1.9% 5.60 74%
Haiti -2.6% 9.41 55%
Liberia -3.9% 11.94 22%
Congo, Dem Rep. -5.0% 4.69 39%





Table 2.1: Ten Best and Worst per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
Source: The White Man’s Burden, Easterly (2006)
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that so much of aid has been spent with little growth and little poverty reduction have 
been achieved. Although the White Man’s Burden of the astronomical sums of money 
of foreign aid he spent, aid programs have been negatively associated with growth in 
recipient countries. This negative association does not prove that aid caused the 
decrease in growth, but it does show that aid has not always been able to halt the 
deterioration of growth, and that success can occur without foreign assistance in aid-
receiving countries (Also see Monkam, 2008). 
The question these figures pose is why ten countries achieved the worst per capita 
growth rates during the years 1980-2002, despite to some extent receiving more aid 
than the ten countries with the best per capita growth rates during the same period8. 
Easterly (2006) and many other scholars such as Stephen Browne (2006) have 
provided answers to this question. They argue that this paradox occurred because of 
two major factors. First, development is essentially a domestic matter and development 
progress depends on the way governments are managed. The ten countries that 
achieved the best per capita growth rates are now emerging into middle and upper 
income status and have mostly managed their development processes well. They have 
used the resources at their disposal to development ends and they have acted as 
facilitators of enterprise and progress (Browne, 2006:10). By contrast, the ten 
countries that achieved the worst per capita growth rates during the years 1980-2002 
have suffered from poor and inappropriate management and corruption. At worst, 
they have been at the mercy of cynical regimes of despoilers, not developers. Many 
have also suffered the disadvantages of challenging geography, limited resource 
endowment and natural disasters (Browne, 2006).
The second major factor of the paradox is that some poor countries have a lack of 
financial resources to finance their development process. Unfortunately, the donor 
countries that have much to offer have often provided aid with the wrong development 
policies and delivery mechanisms. Most donor agencies are unaccountable, and do 
their jobs without minimum standards of transparency. Scholars of conceptual 
perspective, find that the externally-created solutions that foreign aid offers in many 
cases have actually undermined the capacity of the recipients to direct their own 
affairs. They claim that Foreign Aid has much to harm recipient countries and argue 
against scaling up foreign aid flows a Sachs (2005) advocates (in Akramov, 2006: 35)9.
To overcome these problems, William Easterly puts forward two ideas. First, 
recipient countries should find solutions to improve their own management capacities 
8 - Some other authors such as Diego (2010) argue that comparing those ten countries with the best rate of  GDP and the 
ten countries with the worst indicates an inverse relationship between aid and economic growth. From 1980 to 2002, the 
ten countries with the best per capita growth rates were under IMF programs only 11.6 percent of  the time. Meanwhile, 
the ten worst countries were under IMF supervision nearly five times as long (2010, p9).
9 - As the second perspective is straightforward the one of  the basic theses of  this study, as it is drawing to provide 
ample evidence why foreign aid does not work, I will focus more on this strand of  research in the coming sections and 







to effectively absorb external aid. Second, “planners” should rethink the following 
question: “What can foreign aid do for poor people?” It is true that there are always 
wealthy people willing to help disadvantaged people. The proposal here is that: “it 
should be the duty of aid agencies to take that generosity and effectively apply it to 
small focused projects that clearly address the needs of the poor” (in Diego. 2010: 9). 
If the West cannot learn from its mistakes and effectively bring assistance to those in 
desperate need, neither aid nor economic theory will ever eliminate poverty or ensure 
global wealth. “There will always be those who are poorer than the rest” (Easterly, 
2006: 3). For in the open expressions of Easterly, (The only Big Answer is that there is 
no Big Answer) (Easterly, 2006).
Aid donors should develop more effective delivery and allocation techniques of 
foreign aid to achieve positive effects. Aid agencies should also improve their 
transparency standard (Easterly 2006 and Williamson, 2008). They should have 
“comprehensive availability and accessibility of aid flow information in a timely, 
systematic and comparable manner that allows public participation in government 
accountability” (Moon and Williamson, 2010: 2). In this sense, policy-makers can 
obtain transparent information from lower levels about the different problems in 
recipient countries and then they can deal with them effectively, by designing 
appropriate development policies. Indeed, such claims were made in the Paris 
declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005, and the follow-up conference of donors and 
recipients at the Accra Agenda for Actions in 200810.
There is another strand of research related to the public choice perspective that 
goes beyond Easterly’s critique of foreign aid. Proponents of this school agree with 
Easterly that aid has not achieved its goals, such as promoting development and 
reducing poverty in recipient countries. Second, they agree with Easterly’s argument 
that the casual variables of foreign ineffectiveness are: (1) an inappropriate 
development model based on the “financing gap”, with lack of capacity of recipient 
countries to effectively absorb the foreign aid, and (2) maladministration caused by a 
lack of accountability for aid agencies and the weak structure of aid delivery system 
as a whole11. Proponents disagree with Easterly’s proposal on reforming the aid 
system. For example, Sorens (2007) and Deepak Lal (2006) argue that aid delivery is 
10 The Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008) are ‘founded on five core principles, born out of  
decades of  experience of  what works for development, and what doesn’t. These principles have gained support across 
the development community, changing aid practice for the better. It is now the norm for aid recipients to forge their 
own national development strategies with their parliaments and electorates (ownership); for donors to support these 
strategies (alignment) and work to streamline their efforts in-country (harmonization); for development policies to be 
directed to achieving clear goals and for progress towards these goals to be monitored (results); and for donors and re-
cipients alike to be jointly responsible for achieving these goals (mutual accountability)’. However, the issue, of  chang-
ing the donors and recipients their behavior and practice after these conferences, has been under debate in foreign 
aid literature. I will address this debate in the next sections of  this study’. CF: Development Co-operation Directorate 
(DCD-DAC) available http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
visited on 15/7/2011.
11 - The argument related to the nature of  the aid delivery system is exploted in the Chapter 5. 
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fundamentally unreformable, because the aid agencies which manage the aid 
interventions are essentially un-reformable themselves. Sorens argues, “If the aid 
agencies were to be reformed along the lines Easterly suggests, they would lose their 
political reason for existence. Although publicly funded aid has largely failed, there is 
substantial evidence supporting the benefits of private foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and not-for-profit micro lending” (Jason Sorens, 2007: 17). Soren adds that 
“both historical and contemporary evidence suggests that the most important pro-
development reform that Third World governments can make is to structure their 
political institutions so as to facilitate credible governmental commitments to private 
property rights, contract enforcement, and competitive markets” (Jason Sorens, 2007: 
20).
To sum up, the public interest perspective states that aid is justified. It helps poor 
nations and increasing aid flows by donors to recipient countries are necessary to fill 
the financial gap, which poor nations suffer from. It regards the financial gap as the 
main cause for the exacerbation of poverty in poor nations. Public choice perspective 
on the other hand, finds that foreign aid is ineffective in achieving its ultimate 
objectives: prompting developments, growth and reducing poverty in poor nations. 
Moreover, it argues that foreign aid actually harms rather than helps the poor nations, 
and suggests that foreign aid flows should stop to avoid such harm.
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss in greater detail the backdrop of the 
justifications of donor-promoted public sector reforms in recipient countries. I 
consider the main motivation and focus of this study, being why is foreign aid 
ineffective in promoting public sector reforms, achieving development and reducing 
poverty in recipient countries? I review literature on aid ineffectiveness in depth, 
using the arguments of the public choice perspective and isolating the arguments of 
the public interest perspective. The next section is an introduction to the main 
explanation of the foreign aid ineffectiveness as presented by the public choice 
perspective and related scholars and participants. Finally, I look at the other 
explanation relating to local knowledge syndrome (LKS) which is main focus of this 
dissertation. 
2.4 Why Foreign Aid is Ineffective: Towards a Theoretical Model
The question of “What is wrong with foreign aid” is very complex. It is a logical 
and grand question, which has still not been conclusively answered. Ostrom (2005) 
argues that “almost every part or process of the aid system has been criticized, from 
the geopolitical agenda of donors to the distributive politics of recipient countries; 
from the ties that bind aid to procurement from private firms in the donor’s country 
to the constraints on aid bureaucrats’ decision-making power; from the type of aid 
given to the type of accountability demanded” (2005: 5). Aid ineffectiveness is still a 







reasons for the shortcomings of foreign aid ranging from weak policies and institutions 
in recipient countries to problems within the donor countries themselves (Monkam, 
2008:1-2; Lancaster, 2007: 82-83).
2.4.1 Weak Policies and Institutions in Recipient Countries
On the recipient side, much of the focus of macro studies has been on bad 
governance as an explanation of the disappointing performance of aid in recipient 
countries (World Bank 1998; Lancaster 1999, 2007; Easterly 2006; Ear, 2006; Alesina 
and Dollar 2000). As a broad explanation, bad governance calls attention to a series 
of problems in political and economic institutions and policies, political and social 
accountability, administrative systems and government bureaucracies, and public 
service delivery in recipient countries (de Haan, 2009: 8).
Many studies related to this explanation regard the fight against bad governance 
as an “uphill battle” that works against aid effectiveness. Donors provide hundreds of 
good governance programs to overcome the problem of bad governance, but bad 
governance remains a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of aid programs. Since 
the 1950s donors have employed countless development measures to try to address 
the problem of bad governance in recipient countries. Empirical evidence shows that 
the complex problems related to bad governance have prevented the establishment of 
necessary reform conditions or the successful utilization of these development 
measures. Regardless of the good intention of donors, many studies argue that aid has 
been a mistake, because it has harmed the poor nations instead of helping them. 
Indeed, there is a great raft of evidence that suggests foreign aid exists in a perpetuated 
“vicious cycle”. This states that poor nations have become increasingly dependent on 
foreign aid. They reduce their efforts at market reforms that could enhance public 
production and tax income in the rest of the economy, and divert aid to government 
expenditure (Bauer, 2000: 45-48). Furthermore, “foreign aid is effectively fungible 
and, thus, can be used by recipient governments to finance unproductive 
consumptions” (Bearce and Daniel, 2010: 838).
There is a widespread orthodoxy among academics and aid providers alike that 
aid ineffectiveness is a result of a central and dominate variable, politics, which 
determines not only the conception and shape of aid interventions, but developmental 
success and failure in all human societies. Considering the politics of poor nations 
provides an understanding of the different performances of these societies. The 
politics in any society are shaped and in turn influenced by the “character” of its 
ruling regime (Leftwich, 2000: 4). Proponents of this orthodoxy argue that aid is 
ineffective because the majority of recipient countries are ruled by “authoritarian” 
regimes, and most of them suffer from the absence of “democratic good governance”. 
The latter refers to a political regime based on the model of a liberal-democratic 
polity, which protects human and civil rights and also a competent, non-corrupt and 
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accountable public administration. Such political systems, the argument goes, are 
functional for competitive, free market economies, and they can utilize aid in effective 
manner (Leftwich, 2008: 605).
An important example of this orthodoxy is Falling Behind (2008). Edited by 
Francis Fukuyama, this book aims to explain the nature of the development gap 
between Latin American countries, the majority of which are aid recipients and the 
United States. Tracing the histories of development over the past four hundred years 
and focusing in particular on the policies of the last fifty years, the contributors 
conclude that the political authoritarian regimes in most Latin America countries are 
at the root of the divide. They find that the authoritarian regimes maximize the 
welfare of a fixed ruling coalition instead of maximizing the welfare of a whole society 
authoritarian regime maximize the welfare of a fixed ruling coalition instead of 
maximizing the welfare of a whole society (Fukuyama, et al, 2008). 
Authoritarian Regimes and destructive and unproductive policies
Many cross–country studies that have investigated the relationship between the 
quality of governance in its political sense and aid ineffectiveness provide some 
preliminary empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that democratic institutions 
are one determinant of aid effectiveness. The reason is that political accountability 
increases government endeavor at all levels. That is, the degree of political 
accountability will determine the extent to which external resources of aid will be 
utilized for productive purposes12. In response, Svensson (1999) finds that aid has a 
negative impact on development in countries without an institutionalized check on 
governmental power because aid is often used to satisfy a non-democratic 
government’s own non-productive goals. Many other empirical studies such as Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) and Schwalbenberg (1998) confirm this. Unproductive 
development policies are in some cases “intentionally” chosen by self-interested 
authoritarian regimes in recipient countries, which have short-term prospects.
Boone (1996) and Bauer (2000) argue that the miserable conditions in most 
recipient countries are not a result of unproductive policies but a result of “destructive” 
policies adopted officially by their political dictators. Boone (1996) analyzed the 
effectiveness of foreign aid programs to gain insights into the political regimes in 97 
aid recipient countries. The author considers three alternative stylized political/
economic regimes: (I) an egalitarian regime, (II) an elitist regime and (III) a laissez-
faire regime. Boone concludes that of the three, elitist political regimes are the most 
ineffective users of aid13. Poverty is often enhanced by the destructive official policies 
12 Svensson (1999) has listed several studies that dealt with this theoretical perspective. 
13 - For the other two types of  regimes, Boone (1996) finds that the egalitarian regime has an optimal policy that is to 
transfer the aid resources to the poor and hence improve poverty indicators. The laissez-faire regime has an optimal 
policy that is to use the aid to lower distortionary taxes, and hence stimulate investment and growth. These two regimes 
have no problems with using aid in an effective way but the problems are related to the elitist regime, which in itself  is a 







introduced by such as regimes, rather than by capital shortage14. Bauer (2000) 
provides a long list of such damaging policies including:
persecution of the most productive groups, especially ethnic minorities, and 
sometimes their expulsion; suppression of trade, and at times destruction of the 
trading system; restriction on the inflow of foreign capital and enterprises; extensive 
confiscation of property including forced collectivization; voluntary or enforced 
purchase of foreign enterprises which absorbs scarce capital and deprives the country 
of valuable skills; price policies that discourage agricultural production; expensive 
forms of support of unviable activities and projects, including subsidized import 
substitution; and the imposition of specific economic controls which, among other 
adverse effects, restrict external contacts and domestic mobility and so retard the 
spread of new ideas and methods (2000, p.43).
Why are “destructive” development policies introduced?
The reasons why recipient countries adopt unproductive policies is their lack of 
capacity to develop sound policies. The argument here is that the foreign aid can 
contribute to strengthening these capacities to develop the necessary policies to 
absorb foreign aid in an effective manner. Indeed, this is the main role of foreign aid 
on the ground. It is tragic and bizarre when recipient governments officially and 
intentionally adopt “destructive” development policies to satisfy the egoistic interests 
of their corrupt ruling elites. When donors provide aid to such an environment, it 
will not be effective. Donors are engaging in an “uphill battle”, and eventually it is a 
battle they lose. 
There are many reasons why such regimes introduce “destructive” development 
policies to keep their countries in poverty. The first reason is a reflection of the 
internal political egoistic interests of corrupt ruling elites in recipient countries. As 
Easterly (2007) stated, elitist political regimes explicitly want to limit the productive 
capability of the poor, because of the latter’s potential to create political activism that 
would threaten the regime. The second reason is a reflection of an external, 
economically egoistic interest of corrupt ruling elites. It reflects a “public choice” to 
create an environment that actually attracts aid by encouraging donors to give more 
aid in a humanitarian response. Donor allocation of foreign aid is often based on the 
level of poverty in a recipient country. Elitist regimes want to continue to attract 
donor support, so have the incentive to keep the country poor continues. If elitist 
politicians understand that they will benefit from foreign aid they will create/maintain 
poverty in their societies, creating a paradox around foreign aid effectiveness on the 
recipient side. These regimes want more external financial resources to promote 
development and reducing poverty; but they adopt damaging policies that create 
misery in their countries (Williamson, 2008: 13). Bauer (2000) uses an empirical 
example of Ethiopia and Sudan in the 1980s which makes this argument clearer. “The 
14 - Boone (1995) has listed studies that supported this conclusion: Friedman (1958); Bauer (1971); Dreze and Sen 
(1989); Casella and Eichengreen (1995). 
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destructive policies of these governments have been largely responsible for the mass 
misery which in turn has been so effective in eliciting large sums of both official aid 
and private charity” (2000: 50).
The third reason offered by Easterly and Levine (1997: 5) is that ethnic diversity in 
recipient countries is one of the main causes of “destructive” development policies, as 
well as poor education, political instability, inadequate infrastructure, and other 
factors associated with slow development. “While debate persists, an assortment of 
political economy models suggest that polarized societies will be both prone to 
competitive rent-seeking by the different groups and have difficulty agreeing on 
public goods like infrastructure, education, and good policies”15. Lane and Tornell 
(1998), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller, (2000), Bridgman (2003), Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) and Michał Hulej (2006) confirmed the findings of Easterly and 
Levine (1997) that the number of ethnic groups living in a recipient country affects 
aid effectiveness, unless the recipient country builds institutions that protect common 
resources from appropriation. Moreover, Michał Hulej (2006), by using a difference-
GMM estimation model16, showed that the effectiveness of anticipated aid 
disbursements is negatively related to the number of powerful groups, with adverse 
effects being observable even before actual disbursement of aid takes place.
To show how the causal mechanism of ethnic fractionalization in recipient 
countries works against aid effectiveness, Migdal (1998) argues that ethnic 
fractionalization within those countries poses a formidable obstacle to elitist regimes 
as they attempt to maintain power. To overcome this obstacle, elitist regimes provide 
political patronage to key ethnic figures central to political and material mobilization 
in order to maintain their political support. 
A good example that illustrates the theoretical foundation of Migdal (1998) is 
provided by Cohen (2006), who investigates the relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and foreign aid effectiveness in Kenya. Cohen provides empirical 
evidence that ethnic interests have unexpected effects on the processes of formulating 
and implementing aid interventions. The author finds that in the 1991/92 financial 
year, the government of Kenya approved 654 development projects that were financed 
in the form of grant or loan by different aid agencies. However, the number of 
approved externally funded projects was somewhat less, as the government divided 
these projects into many sub-components. A major reason is “that both Government 
officials and aid agency professionals wanted a sufficient number of sub-projects to 
ensure that all ethnic areas received a fair share of the funded activity. Another reason 
why there were so many projects is that the ruling ethnic coalition used domestic 
15 Cited in Easterly and Ross Levine (1997), who presented many studies that are debating this, such as political economy 
models: [Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Alesina and Spoalare, 1995].







resources to earn rents from capital construction projects that were to be implemented 
in their home areas” (Cohen, 2006: 9-10)17. Similarly Bayart (1994) provided empirical 
evidence of “10 African dictators whom he used public office to divert large sums, 
including foreign aid, to their tribe members or clients. And elected or authoritarian 
populist regimes, defined as regimes “seeking to mobilize and represent the poor”, 
also use distortionary policies to redirect funds to their supporters” (Bayart, 1994 in 
Boone 1996: 2)18.
2.4.2 The Egoistic Behavior of Donors and Foreign Aid Ineffectiveness
A Response to the aforementioned causal logic is that different studies argue that 
donors have the ability to enforce reform conditions associated with their aid, by 
credibly threatening to hold back future aid giving (Bearce and Daniel, 2010). 
However, the public choice perspective (PCP) finds that most donors are still tying 
their aid-giving to egoistic interests such as political, strategic, commercial, cultural, 
and religion interests. The crux of the problem is that donors have a high intention of 
achieving those egoistic interests, but little interest in holding recipient countries 
accountable for achieving anything productive with aid (see for example Jason Sorens, 
2007; Easterly, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011; Stephen Browne 2006). This prevalent 
explanation of aid ineffectiveness goes further and shows that the egoistic interests of 
donors often work against the altruism objectives of aid-giving, corrupting aid 
projects’ outcomes and thus reducing the effectiveness of aid interventions (e.g. 
Lancaster 1999, 2006; Easterly 2006; Lindsay Whitfield, 2009). 
Lancaster (2007) divides the question of why aid was given into two sub-questions: 
(1) “what purposes did governments pursue with their aid?” and (2) why did they 
choose those purposes and not others? Lancaster points out that many “scholars and 
practitioners have debated whether it was or should be provided for primarily 
diplomatic purposes—advancing the national security and economic interests of the 
donor country—or whether it was or should be provided mainly to help better the 
human condition in countries receiving the aid”(2007: x).
If we consider the body of international relations literature related to foreign aid, 
there are two core theoretical perspectives on international politics that attempt to 
explain foreign policy behaviour in the context of international politics: political 
realism and constructivism. This may provide us with some theoretical directions in 
understanding some of the dynamics that surround foreign aid effectiveness.
An ‘advocate’ of the political realism perspective was Hans Morgenthau19(1948), 
17 Other studies, such as by D.W Brinkerhoff  (2005) found that certain clientelistic practices have hidden positive func-
tions, such as giving poor people access to resources. 
18 Boone (1996) has listed many old studies that found that aid flows primarily benefit wealthy political elite: Papanek 
(1972), Chenery and Ecksteing (1970), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Griffin (1970), Levy (1987), Levy (1988), Papanek 
(1973), Weisskopf  (1972) and Boone (1995).
19 - Hans Morgenthau is considered one of  the “founding fathers” of  the realist school in the 20th century. This school 
of  thought holds that nation-states are the main actors in international relations and that the main concern of  the field 
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who viewed nation-states and/or their respective governments as unitary actors in, 
and a part of, an international system which create strong incentives for policy and 
behavior, and act rationally in response to challenges and opportunities emanating 
from that system. They opt for policy choices or actions that are deemed to maximize 
their strategic goals and objectives. Morgenthau assumed that the strategic goals and 
objectives of governments are “national interests”20.
The constructivist perspective argues that a sort of norm rather than national 
interests inspire foreign policy behavior. “These norms are defined as inter-subjectively 
shared value-based expectations of appropriate behavior” (Boekle, Henning et al, 
2001:3) and they derive their ‘power’ from their ability to ‘prescribe’ what is to be 
regarded as ‘appropriate behaviour’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1988). Thus, in a 
simplistic sense, norms set standards of what is right and/or what is “wrong” within 
a given society.
The political realism perspective ignores domestic factors in formulating foreign 
policy, while the constructivism perspective regards domestic factors as mediating 
the impact of external events and trends on foreign policy choices. Lancaster (2007) 
argues that neither of them adequately explain the complexities of aid’s purposes. The 
constructivism perspective considers domestic factors, but it often draws on the field 
of comparative politics. Moreover, both constructivism and political realism lack one 
important element: the impact of domestic politics on aid giving, and then aid 
effectiveness. Lancaster (2007) argues that the ways in which foreign aid policies are 
formulated and reformulated are periodically reviewed (and often influenced) by a 
variety of domestic political forces and agendas inside a donor country. She provides 
a conceptual framework that identifies four categories of domestic political forces 
shaping foreign aid effectiveness at the domestic level: ideas, political institutions, 
interests, and the aid organization (that is, the way governments organize themselves 
to manage their aid) (Lancaster, 2007:4-19).
Lancaster (2007)21 presents a conceptual framework that explores the relationship 
between domestic forces and aid effectiveness. The domestic forces include, but are 
not limited to, widely-shared ideas relevant to aid-giving, a donor country’s political 
institutions, the interests competing for control over aid-giving, and the way donor 
governments organize themselves to manage their aid (Lancaster 2007:6). Figure 2.2 
(Below) highlights Lancaster’s conceptual framework and provides a simplified yet 
sufficient illustration of the patterns of interactions among major and informal 
is the study of  power. Morgenthau emphasized the importance of  the national interest, and in Politics among Nations, he 
wrote, “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of  international politics is 
the concept of  interest defined in terms of  power. CF, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Morgenthau, visited on 3rd 
October 2011. 
20 Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948): Politics of  the Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Revised, New York; Alfred A. 
Knopf  and Mihaela Neacsu (2009), Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of  International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-
Enchantment (International Political Theory), Palgrave Macmillan Press.
21 - This section based on Lancaster’s (2007) theoretical approach explains the relationship between domestic forces in a 







domestic forces. It highlights further interactions with the guidelines from a donor 
government’s foreign aid policy, as it is a member of the international system. This 
figure shows the relative importance of all of these elements in the churning mass 
that is policy-making towards the processes of formulation and implementation of 
foreign aid policies by donor countries(Lancaster 2007:24):
Figure 2.2. Showing the Main Domestic and International Forces that Have Influence 
over Foreign Aid Effectiveness, and their Relationship 
Note: D* are the domestic forces within a donor country
Source: self, based on Lancaster’s (2007) conceptual framework. 
Lancaster (2007) calls shared ideas relevant to aid-giving in a donor country 
“worldviews”: there are widely shared values in a given society —based on its culture, 
religion, ideology— about what is “right”, “wrong”, “appropriate” and “inappropriate” 
in public and private life. Lancaster (2007) argues that the worldviews in a given 
society can affect foreign aid through considering the following main questions: How 
do basic values regarding the obligations of the rich to help the poor and the role of 
the state in fulfilling such obligations affect the purposes of foreign aid in different 
countries? How do widely shared views about the appropriate role of the state in 
society affect the existence of civil society organizations, which, in turn, can affect the 
purposes of aid? Lancaster (2007) tested this conceptual argument through several 
case studies. For example, she finds that the norms of “social solidarity that underpin 
the social democratic traditions in Scandinavia and the Netherlands has undoubtedly 
facilitated the popularity of foreign aid in those countries”22…The Japanese tradition 
22 - There is no debate that those norms under ongoing changes. For example, I find that in the Netherlands now public 
orientation of  aid giving has changed through different factors: the international economic crisis and its consequences 
on the Dutch society and the recent rise of  the extreme right on the political map in the country. In the financial year 
2011, the Dutch government cut its yearly foreign aid to poor nations by half. What I would like to inform the reader 
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of strong state–weak society has impeded the development of relief-and development-
oriented NGOs there (2007:18).
According to Lancaster (2007), a donor country’s political institutions help shape 
the rules of “the political game”: they determine who sets the issue agenda, who has 
the right of access to decision-makers, who chooses policies, and who can veto 
decisions. Lancaster argues that there are many political institutions that directly and 
indirectly affect aid giving such as voting rules or electoral rules. A political system 
based on minority voting can more easily get their issues, including the aid issue, on 
the national political agenda than in a political system based on majority voting. This 
is because minority parties can get their niche issues on national agendas as a price of 
joining a specific political coalition. Another factor, states Lancaster, is the nature of 
the political ruling systems—parliamentary system versus presidential—and, 
especially, the role of legislatures in both systems. In parliamentary systems, the 
executive is drawn from the parliament and typically relies on its party majority or on 
a governing coalition in the parliament to remain in power. As a result, legislatures in 
parliamentary systems have a tendency to support government policies, including 
aid policies. The opposite case is a presidential system, especially when the majority 
in the parliament is from one party and the president comes from another. In this 
system, there is a tendency for parliament members to criticize executive branch 
policies, including foreign aid policies, and those criticisms in turn can deepen public 
skepticism about the efficacy and appropriateness of foreign aid. The final factor is 
the role of local governments and semi-public entities such as advisory committees 
and state-supported NGOs who have access to policy-makers, and thus can affect 
policy-making regarding foreign aid policies. 
The domestic forces in a donor country are self-interests competing for control of 
aid giving. There could be commercial interest groups that are supporting the 
commercial purposes of aid. These groups often regard aid as a vehicle for increasing 
their export markets or who view aid as a means of enhancing their access to much 
needed raw materials. Furthermore there may be public interest groups that support 
aid for relief, development and many others purposes. Interest groups with religious 
or ethnic proposes that have goals in recipient countries, such as the dissemination of 
religious values. These different interest groups have a very complicated network of 
organizations to exert pressure on policy makers, such as agricultural producer 
groups, chambers of commerce, business associations or individual corporations, 
trade unions, churches, universities, ethnic diasporas and informal networks of 
influence.
Another domestic force inside a donor country is the way donor governments 
organize themselves to manage their aid, and particularly if there is special 
in the Dutch parliamentary election in 2010 compared to the last election. The role of  the political institution in aid giv-







organization or development ministry or combining of different ministries. 
Organizers of aid within donor governments have a strong influence on the purposes 
of aid and effectiveness for two main reasons. From a bureaucratic political 
perspective, it is logical that government organizations are political actors in their 
own right. They have advocates or lobbyists for their own mission and interests. 
Those agencies have executive rules and limits that they should follow in carrying out 
their functions. However, in reality the case is different; though those public agencies 
sometimes act wholly within the executive rules and confines, often they do not. They 
“work outside those confines, allying themselves with private interest groups at home 
or international organizations, foreign government agencies, and international NGOs 
or interest groups with which they share interests”(Lancaster, 2007: 20). In some 
cases a specialized agency within the donor country that manages aid interventions 
uses “consultants” (contractors) who are normally involved in studies or in 
implementation of aid projects in recipient countries and they themselves form 
groups with any firm that they can share interests with23. Secondly, when a single 
public agency has a more unified and elevated authority to perform functions as 
related to a particular public purpose, e.g. foreign aid policy, the greater the influence 
that agency will have over the policies and programs related to its basic mission and 
purpose.
The conceptual framework of Lancaster (2007) explores the relationship between 
domestic forces in a donor country and aid giving and is a simplification of a 
considerably more complex reality shrouding foreign aid discourse at the domestic 
level. It presents a wide range of actors and factors that engage in the aid process at 
different levels and positions on the domestic level in a donor country. For example, 
the actors and factors can be either formal individuals or organizations and either 
informal individuals, organizations, and norms and ideas within a donor society. 
They have interests and concerns in shaping the processes or interventions of foreign 
aid. Those actors, indeed, have their own objectives and guidelines behind concerns. 
They are trying to influence what should be done, how it should be done and where 
it should be done (Carlsson, Jerker & Wohlgemuth, Lennart, 2003:11). Although the 
objectives and guidelines of these actors frequently change, they have a role in shaping 
how a donor government acts externally with other members of the international 
system and put continuously strong pressure on the techniques and methods by 
which both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies are managing aid interventions in 
recipient countries24. Indeed, in most cases, foreign aid policy objectives are rooted 
and reflected in the domestic forces of the donor country. 
23 - Sithara Batcha (Health/Pop. Nutrition Officer within USAID) spends her working time reading project proposals. 
Most of  these proposals come from donor businesses and NGOs. By waiving regulations, she mentions that organiza-
tions, which receive aid, can only buy goods (including but certainly not limited to automobiles and pharmaceuticals) 
produced in a donor country. 
24 In this study, the focus is on bilateral aid agencies and not on multilateral ones.
86
Having outlined the main assumptions of the conceptual framework of Lancaster 
(2007)to understand how domestic forces influence aid policy’s formulation and 
implementation in a donor country, this section now moves on to briefly present the 
well-known analyses of political realism perspective in international relations in 
order to situate the above Figure 2.2 in its proper context. The argument here is that 
foreign aid policy may be perceived as a foreign policy objective in its own right or as 
an instrument to achieve other (national) interests of a donor country, based on the 
role of politics at the international level, and such as role can be analyzing by 
investigating the nature of a donor country’s interaction with the other members of 
the international system (Stoke, 1988: 20). 
The concept of (national) interest that is so central to political realism means that, 
in international relations, nation-states and/or their respective governments are 
unitary actors in international relations who opt for policy choices or actions that are 
deemed to maximize their strategic goals and objectives. The strategic goals and 
objectives of governments are ‘national interests’. The justification of such a position 
is that states are part of an international system which creates its own strong incentives 
for policy and behavior, and act primarily in response to challenges and opportunities 
emanating from that system in the way that can realize in most cases their national/
self-interests (Lancaster, 2006 and Berthelemy, 2006). 
Scholars from the realist school claim that aid policy is merged into foreign policy 
traditions and objectives and therefore is made in a setting where the primary 
motivation is to pursue their own egoistic behavior (thereby linking aid to the self-
interests of donors)(Stokk, 1989: 1). Donor strategic interests generally include, but 
are not limited to, “diplomatic interests (e.g., establishing military bases, securing UN 
votes, supporting a preferred regime); commercial interests (e.g., “tied” aid, providing 
exports subsidies to donor countries firms, focusing on projects with high foreign 
exchange components; and cultural interests usually provided to promote a donor’s 
religion, language, or values” (Lancaster 1999: 75-77 in Monkam, 2008). The pull of 
other strategic considerations remains strong, and since 9/11, global security concerns 
have led to an increasing–and often competing – aid focus on states that are thought 
to form threats of violence to the West (Brainard, Lael, 2007).
An alternative perspective relates to political altruism. Many scholars argue that 
donors that relate aid to recipient needs and merits can base their motives of aid 
giving on altruistic behavior. The definition of recipient needs is not simple, yet most 
participants in the debate simply measure it by the income per capita of the recipient. 
The definition of merit however is much more controversial. Although there is a 
general agreement to refer, somewhat vaguely, to “good governance” criteria, such 
criteria are not easily defined (Berthélemy, 2006:78). The common understanding 
among foreign aid studies is that altruistic behavior would imply that aid decisions 







the different recipients (Berthélemy, 2006:78). 
Some studies have argued that since US President Nixon sought to “emphasize the 
humanitarian aspect” of foreign aid in 1969, these sorts of rationales have been used 
to explain foreign aid provision. The only exception for foreign aid which can 
obviously be considered as altruistic is humanitarian relief: responses to global public 
health threats, natural disasters, or food aid and other support provided in emergency 
situations. Put differently, the empirical examples show that aid is not provided on 
altruistic grounds. Instead, the assumption is made that it leads to or facilitates the 
attainment of other interests. Moreover, even the humanitarian (altruistic) motives of 
aid giving are combined with an extensive willingness to promote national interests 
or influence abroad (Berthélemy, 2006: 78).
Foreign aid is predominantly considered as an international public good and is 
supported for this reason. It is not moulded in a setting in which aid can promote 
development and reduce poverty in recipient countries. The ultimate objectives of aid 
giving as announced by donors in the Paris declaration (2001), Washington consensus 
and (2005) Accra conference (2008) are to promote development and reduce poverty 
in recipient countries, thus ensuring its effectiveness25. 
Foreign aid is created in a setting in which both domestic and international forces 
influence the outcome (Olav Stokke, 2008). The argument of this perspective, 
therefore, is most important to us because it says we cannot understand what shapes 
the relevant aid policies, strategies, priorities, and uses, and thus aid effectiveness, if 
we do not take into account strategic goals and objectives of a donor country (Neacsu, 
2009). A basic proposition can be posited here: foreign aid projects and programs can 
only be successful in promoting development in recipient countries when the egoistic 
benefits for donor governments associated with aid provision are quite small26. 
Donors should be able to enforce their reform conditions on recipient countries 
when the strategic benefits of aid provision are relatively small, leading to development 
and economic growth in recipient countries (Bearce and Daniel 2010: 838). 
It might be true that there are some donors who intend to give aid based on 
altruistic objectives. In this sense, they might impose some reform conditions that 
can ensure productive utilization of foreign aid by recipient governments. However, 
even when we have some donor countries who intend to give aid free of egoistic 
interests, there may also be a conditionality problem stemming from the fact that aid 
comes within a vast bureaucracy more intent on justifying its “bureaucratic existence” 
25 - These series of  Global Conferences were encapsulated in the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDG), which focus on human development outcomes as the focal point for coordinated action between 
development partners. The eight MDGs are: i) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; ii) achieving universal primary 
education; iii) promoting gender equality and empowerment of  women; iv) reducing child mortality; v) reducing mater-
nal mortality; vi) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; vii) ensuring environmental sustainability; and viii) developing 
a global partnership for development. Specific tar-gets and timeframes have been identified for each one of  the MDGs 
CF: Olsson, Jan, and Lennart Wohlgemuth. 2003: P40.
26 Bearce, David H., and Daniel C. Tirone( 2010) have reviewed many studies that take into account such a proposition
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than on helping the poor (Bearce and Daniel, 2010). Bureaucrats of aid agencies are 
carrying out their functions without the necessary accountability and the minimum 
standards for transparency, claiming that many aid programs and projects were 
effective and successful in achieving their altruistic objectives, even though in reality 
they were not. The Lords of Poverty (bureaucrats) consider aid as a “profitable 
business” that they should continue running (Hancock, 1989). According to Hancock 
(1989), foreign aid becomes “nothing more than a transaction between bureaucrats 
- a deal which gets done, in the name of others, by intermediaries and brokers. The 
real principles in the affair - the taxpayers in the wealthy countries and the poor in 
the South - are treated as though they are somehow incidental to the main event” 
(Hancock, 1989:62).
2.4.3 Synthesis of  the Main Argument: the LKS Explanation 
Although this study strongly agrees with the previous explanations of the 
ineffectiveness of foreign aid programs and projects, it argues that aid projects and 
programs could certainly work better and achieve more satisfactory results within 
countries which have poor governance, and where there are multiple goals in aid-
giving. It is also true that foreign aid programs are noble, sensible, and represent the 
good intention of rich nations to help more disadvantaged people in the poor nations. 
It seems that economists and political economists have failed to pay attention to a main 
“assertion” raised by this study that aid practitioners in the field and those in charge 
of development polices at the highest institutional levels should be in touch with 
reality by incorporating “local knowledge” within careful project design and/or 
implementation and adopting delivery mechanisms. They should take into 
consideration the patient’s (recipient country’s) formal and informal context with 
institutional and organizational constraints that are in a specific time and a specific 
host context or in “particular” problem-solving circumstances or contexts (Lam, 
2006). If I claim as a doctor (donor side) that my remedies (donor-prompted public 
sector reforms programs and projects) could not cure the disease (the bad governance 
in recipient countries) or even relieve the pain and the suffering of my patient, it is 
clear that I should think again about the diagnosis, and the remedies that I have given 
my patient are not applicable to deal with his or her type of illness.
The doctor and the patient are dealing with a difficult disease that has arisen 
through many factors. This disease is named in this study as Local Knowledge 
Syndrome (henceforth LKS). It needs great efforts from both doctor and patient, 
especially in incorporating its causal mechanisms within the policies to give the right 
remedies. This syndrome needs a long time to be solved in the diagnostic phase and 
/or the execution phase. The doctor and the patient should adopt a symmetric 
interaction process and united network during all stages of the aid intervention to 







for “other ways to deal with the uncertainties of complex societal issues. Solving 
wicked problems is, given the substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties, 
not only an intellectual design activity but also a strategic and institutional challenge. 
Given the mutual dependencies that make it impossible for the involved actors to 
solve complex problems in isolation, the processes of problem solving is, first, an 
issue of interaction where the actors with a stake in the problem must manage to 
coordinate their perceptions, activities and institutional uncertainties”(Joop 
Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003:9). Otherwise, it may affect the processes and 
the methods by which development aid programs and projects are formulated and 
implemented. It can lead to a failure of aid programs to promote public sector reforms 
in developing countries27.
From this perspective, this dissertation considers LKS as a third potential 
explanation of foreign aid programs’ ineffectiveness. The significance of this 
explanation is not limited to the concept of LKS and foreign aid ineffectiveness but is 
going one step further and trying to open the “black box”, to explain why this problem 
appeared within foreign aid systems. I argue that the only way to overcome the 
dilemma of LKS is to have more constructed associations around the project between 
the patient and the doctor, to get to know and understand each other during the 
policy design and implementation and to create a successful actor network (see 
Chapter 1). 
To have effective associations and interactions, there should be openness, trust, 
flexibility, peace, no conflict, and most importantly, the doctor should realize that 
their patient does not know how to heal themselves and thus the doctor should help 
them to find this way: in other words, to be an agent of change. Furthermore, a 
successful project manages to “convince more people to support its aims, it manages 
to involve more institutions in funding, it manages to mobilize more experts in 
implementation, and it makes greater use of material objects that give the project a 
more durable physical form. It is this network of durable, extensive alliances that 
explain the success of a project, not its inherent value or validity. Furthermore, this 
network of alliances is created not because a project is ‘right’ or wrong’, but because 
people and things are convinced that the project can advance their own interests, 
according to the role in the project they have been assigned” (Scott-Smith, 2013:2).
To sum up, although this study strongly agrees with the previous explanations of 
the ineffectiveness of foreign aid programs and projects, it argues that aid projects 
and programs could certainly work better and achieve more satisfactory results 
within countries which have poor governance, and where there are multiple goals in 
aid-giving. The problem is that most economists and political economists have failed 
to incorporate “local knowledge” within careful project design and/or implementation 
27 This argument is fully covered in the next chapter, divided to explain the main factors that influence aid participants 
to incorporate local knowledge during the policy design and/or policy implementation stage and even the evaluation 
stage. 
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and adopting delivery mechanisms. In the next chapters, we examine this problem, 
known as the Local Knowledge Syndrome (LKS), in detail. 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter draws on two contradictory perspectives of aid-giving justifications 
and effectiveness of foreign aid programs and projects, PIP and PCP, and three 
explanations in relation to the debate about why foreign aid programs are often 
ineffective. The PIP approach argues that aid investment is needed to end poverty in 
poor nations by filling the financial gap that can improve basic saving, capital 
accumulation, and growth. The competing PCP approach argues that the objectives 
of foreign aid are worthwhile, but that its premises are wrong, and that it is just a 
waste of money. PCP argues that foreign aid has been negatively associated with 
growth and development in recipient countries and that it harms them rather than 
helps. 
The PCP approach provides two main explanations for why foreign aid programs 
did not work and will not work. Since the 1950s, donors have employed development 
measure after measure to address the problem of bad governance in recipient 
countries. Empirical evidence shows that the complex problems related to bad 
governance in recipient countries have prevented the establishment of either the 
necessary reform conditions or the successful utilization of these development 
measures. Responding to this causal logic, different studies related to PCP argue that 
donors have the ability to enforce reform conditions associated with their aid by 
credibly threatening to hold back future aid. However, the public choice perspective 
finds that most donors still base their aid giving on political, strategic, commercial, 
cultural, and religious self-interest. The problem is that donors have a high intention 
to achieve those egoistic interests compared to their lack of interest in holding 
recipient countries accountable for achieving anything productive with aid. The PCP 
approach goes one step further and argues that, even when we have some donor 
countries who intend to give aid free of egoistic interests, there may also be a 
conditionality problem stemming from the fact that aid is provided by a vast 
bureaucracy more intent on justifying its “bureaucratic existence” than helping the 
poor. 
The key deriving theoretical response or hypothesis to PCP briefly posed in this 
chapter, combined to take the form of the theoretical framework of this study, is that 
foreign aid programs are noble, sensible, and well-intended on the part of rich nations 
to help more disadvantaged people in the poor nations. Aid projects and programs 
can certainly be effective and achieve satisfactory results in a poor policy environment 
and bad governance and with the existence of multiple donor goals. But this will only 
happen if aid practitioners in the field and those in charge of development policies at 







design and/or implementing and adopting delivery mechanisms to ensure 
effectiveness.
After reviewing the literature related to foreign aid effectiveness and developing 
our theoretical bridge in the present chapter, the next chapter addresses our theoretical 
strand more closely by defining the concept of local knowledge and showing how 
local knowledge is so important for the effectiveness of aid donors promoting public 
sector reforms in recipient countries. The next chapter takes into account the factors 
that affect the process of incorporating local knowledge at the policy design and the 
implementation of aid interventions. 

CHAPTER 3
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE SYNDROME 





The knowledge and ideas that inform public sector reform programs in developing 
countries can seriously affect the outcomes and effectiveness. If we look at the vast 
body of aid policies, there is “a growing appreciation that good policy making depends 
on good institutions for implementation – but no one has figured out how to create 
those institutions successfully in inhospitable political and social climates” (Einhorn, 
2001, as cited in Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 28).1 Aid donors have ambitious and 
distinct ideas to help recipient countries and to establish strong and high quality 
public sector/governance institutions–but they are less clear on how to achieve it 
(OECD, 2001, and UNDP, 2006). Most aid donors do not know what to do or have 
been unable to act upon the implicit and explicit local knowledge, to ensure the 
construction of high quality institutions and institutional changes (Jenkins and 
Plowden, 2006: 13).
In this chapter I demonstrate how LKS is systematically undervalued in its formal 
and informal aspects through the lens of strategic and policy thinking and/or 
implementation stage of aid policies. This lens looks at the principles, priorities, 
content and approach of the development programs in the public sector reforms in 
poor countries. Several theories and concepts are selected based on their contribution 
to a better theoretical understanding and analyzing of why “Local Knowledge 
Syndrome” is still downplayed within the foreign aid arena. These theories include 
institutional theories, public policy theory, implementation theory, the social-
engineering model, the “bounded rationality” approach and the ‘associability 
development approach’ as proposed by the network perceptive. 
Following this introduction, the rest of the chapter is as follows. The first section 
of this chapter briefly discusses public policy and policy cycle literature; we will also 
focus on the problem of identification which is linked directly to LKS. The second 
section presents the idea of aid policymaking and its social-engineering model, 
focusing on the information and knowledge available to aid policy makers in policy 
formulation and policy analysis. The third section utilizes the theory of policy 
implementation and its top-down, bottom-up and synthesis approaches. It presents 
an argument of which approach aid agencies prefer to adapt in implementing the aid 
policies, and its relation to LKS. The concluding section suggests two main hypotheses 
1 - The importance of  knowledge was presented in a speech by Wolfensohn in 1996 when he “pledged to transform the 
World Bank into the “Knowledge Bank”, with a view to making it the premier source of  knowledge for development. 
This announcement was followed by the 1999/98 World Development Report entitled ‘Knowledge for Development’, 
which warned of  an impending ‘digital divide’ that would separate poor countries and poor people from the knowledge 







that will be investigated in this dissertation regarding the Dutch NPT program for 
building the capacity of higher education in Yemen.
3.2 What is Local Knowledge Syndrome (LKS)?2
Before defining the concept of local knowledge syndrome, it is worth briefly 
defining the concept knowledge. There are extensive discussions among scholars and 
specialists about the idea of operationalizing the concept of “knowledge”. In this 
study, we adopt the concept of Warburton, Hilary and Adrienne Martin (1999), that 
knowledge is much more than a collection of facts; “it relates to the whole system of 
concepts, beliefs and perceptions that people hold about the world around them. This 
includes the way people observe and measure what is around them, how they set 
about solving problems, and how they validate new information. It also includes the 
process whereby knowledge is generated, stored, applied and transmitted to others” 
(1999:13). 
In this study we use the theories of local knowledge put forward by James Scott, 
Professor of Political Science and Anthropology at Yale University, who retrieved the 
Greek word métis to explain a concept that includes deep-rooted as well as changing 
knowledge. He said that local knowledge is
“A wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a 
constantly changing natural and human environment. All human activities require a 
considerable degree of metis, but some activities require far more. To begin with, 
skills that require adapting to a capricious physical environment, the acquired 
knowledge of how to sail, fly a kite, fish, shear sheep, drive a car, or ride a bicycle relies 
on the capacity for metis. Each of these skills requires hand-eye coordination that 
comes with practice and a capacity to “read” the waves, the wind, or the road and to 
make the appropriate adjustments” (Scott, 1998: 313-314). 
Selah (2007) compared the conceptions of Scott (1998), Boettke and Coyne (2006) 
and acknowledged that “The development community must realize that indigenous 
(informal) institutions are as important, if not more, than exogenous institutions. 
Métis is difficult and impractical to set as concrete rules, because it is ever evolving 
with experience, practice, time and space knowledge of the indigenous people. In 
addition, as more knowledge is acquired, new métis replaces old métis. Therefore, the 
development community must realize whether the métis is able to accommodate new 
implanted institutions given the changing conditions” (2007:23). However, “if the 
2 - The concept of  LKS is defined empirically in Chapter 4 where we review the meaning of  local knowledge in the 
context of  Yemen. 
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underlying métis does not align with reforms and formal institutions, these 
institutions will fail to sustain and be effective even if they are growth-inducing 
institutions” (Boettke and Coyne, 2006: 56). 
Institutional theory describes definitions of institutions in various ways. The most 
common definition is from Douglass North (1991), who defines institutions as the 
“rules of the game”, or “humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
The rules of the game can be either formally or informally determined. Formal 
institutions are usually seen as rules captured in formal structures such as constitutions, 
political institutions and formal legal and property rights systems. Formal institutions 
are imposed by official entities such as judges, courts, government, ministries and 
bureaucrats. By contrast, informal institutions are largely self-enforcing through 
tools of responsibility, such as in patron-client relationships or clan networks, or 
because following the rules is in the best interests of individuals who may discover 
themselves in a situation in which everyone is better off through co-operation (Soysa 
and Jütting, 2007). While informal institutions are generally not organized, they are 
widely acknowledged as legitimate and are, therefore, rules in use rather than just 
rules in the books, or what Ostrom terms “rules in force” (Ostrom, 2005). The recent 
paper of Parto (2005) identified accumulated definitions of the term institutions:
Source: Parto (2005)
The concept of institutions may vary from formal regulatory frameworks of the 
state to informal socially prescribed or proscribed patterns of behavior. They range 
from the national level to the individual level and all social actors and processes in 
between. Based on definitions from different authors, Parto (2005) deduces three 
1. Conventions, rules of action, embedded in social structure, locally specific (Krätke 1999) 
2. Settled habits of thought common to the generality of men (Veblen 1919) 
3. Collective action exercised by different types of organization (family, corporation, trade union, state in 
control of individual action (Commons 1924)
4. Convenient term for the more important among the widely prevalent, highly standardized social 
habits (Mitchell 1950)
5. Sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct defining social practices (Young 1994)
6. Formal organizations, patterns of behaviour, negative norms and constraints (Coriat and Dosi 1998)
7.  Mental constructs (Neale 1987). 
8. Rules of the game (North 1990). 
9. How the game is played (Nelson and Sampat 2001). 
10. A set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour (Bush 1986) 
11. Prescribed or proscribed patterns of correlated behaviour (Tool 1993) 
12. Constitutional rule systems for society, collective choice rules governing different kinds of organization, 
operational rules of organizations (Ostrom 1999).







main features of institutions. Firstly the protective level of governance, as discussed 
by Krätke (1999), Ostrom (1999) and Young (1994,2002). Secondly institutions are 
manifested in individual behaviour in the society at large, as shown by Hamilton 
(1932), Parsons (1990), Krätke (1999), and Veblen (1919). Thirdly institutions exist 
within organizations (Commons, 1924; March and Olsen, 1984; Coriat and Dosi, 
1998), among organizations (Ostrom, 1999), and among nations (Young, 1994, 2002). 
Regarding the interaction between the formal and informal institutions, Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004) provided four ways in which the informal institutions can be 
assumed to interact with formal ones: complementary, accommodating, competing 
and substitutive. As to the first, informal institutions are harmonizing to (effectively 
enforced) formal institutions, when both types of rules contain similar incentives and 
enforcement characteristics. The second type of interaction is when informal 
institutions may accommodate (effectively enforced) formal institutions, and when 
both types of institutions diverge. Informal institutions co-exist with the formal 
institutions and aim for an outcome that is not completely planned by formal rules. 
The third type takes place when informal institutions compete with formal ones, and 
when formal institutions are ineffective and the two diverge. Finally, informal 
institutions can substitute for the lack of effectiveness of formal institutions. Like 
complementary institutions, these informal institutions are intended to attain what 
formal institutions aim to do, but when the latter are ineffective or ignored by official 
sources (also see Soysa and Jütting, 2007; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Barro, 2000; 
Clague, 1997). 
In institutional theory, Hall and Taylor (1998) summarize historical institutionalism 
by providing two main approaches to understand the origin of the institutions and 
their impact: the calculus approach and the cultural approach. Both cultural and 
calculus approaches are used eclectically in institutional analysis. The calculus 
approach, from which the New Institutional Economics gathers much of its 
inspiration, focuses on strategic behavior, preferences and expectations of actors. 
While the cultural approach stresses that behavior is not strategic, but bounded by an 
individual’s worldview. The cultural view is that people involved in satisfying behavior 
within social milieus make up networks of association (Granovetter, 1985).
Three features can explain the origin of institutions. The first is the prominent role 
that control and disproportionate relations of power play in institutional analysis. 
Some groups of actors have unequal access to the decision-making process. The 
second is imported from historical institutionalism showing that the actors’ behavior 
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is “path-dependent”, as institutions are perceived as relatively determined structures 
of the historical backdrop, and are often central factors pushing development along a 
set of laid-out paths. Thirdly, institutions are not understood as the single causal force 
in policies; it is usually acknowledged that socio-economic development and the 
diffusion of ideas are also influential or causal factors (Lal, 1999; Stiglitz, 2001; 
Ensminger, 1992; Knight, 1992).
We should acknowledge that informal institutions are much more important in 
poor countries and small, traditional communities where formal institutions are less 
established and the influence of formal law and state authority is quite weak. 
Development can take place though a tedious process that involves varying power 
relations and overcoming “path dependency”. Patron-client relations that exist in 
many developing countries are a telling example. In many situations, the clients 
choose for political platforms and tenders that are unhelpful to their long-term goals, 
mainly because they achieve more direct benefits from these patrons whose demands 
they follow. Thus, “knowing the exact nature of the short- term benefits of the 
individuals who are part of these clientelistic arrangements is a first step to altering 
the way in which politics might reflect better outcomes for the poor. Wealth, access 
to careers and secure employment are three reasons feudal social relations dissipate, 
as ordinary people become less beholden to powerful elites” (Soysa and Jütting, 2007: 
39).
The Local Knowledge Syndrome (LKS) comes into play when aid development 
policies ignore the role of informal structures of power and instead rely on (weak) 
formal institutions instead of capacity building in public and private sectors. It is 
essential for the development community to realize that informal institutions and 
their “implicit knowledge” are as important, if not more, than formal institutions and 
an organizations’ “explicit knowledge”, for the effective promotion of public sector 
reforms in developing countries. The informal system or structure implies the main 
rules by which most of the recipient government bodies are administrated and 
controlled. If aid participants are aware of this system, they can successfully attempt 
to design and promote reforms and “institutional change” in non-transparent 
environments (Polanyi, 1958 & 1966).
It is not a difficult task for aid policy makers and implementers to integrate explicit 
knowledge (of formal institutions and organizations) in their work, because it is often 
available on paper or through other physical means. Implicit knowledge (informal 







nature (Polanyi, 1958 & 1966). It is not written or seen and therefore demands a 
certain amount of effort by aid participants to be found and incorporated. Direct and 
indirect interaction between stakeholders serves well to transmit local knowledge 
and to share solutions for problematic local circumstances (Lam, 2006). Tacit 
knowledge, or knowledge that is not shared, makes stakeholders unaware of the value 
of their information to others. They need to consider the best use of such knowledge 
as it is changing and decentralized (Hayek, 1945). There is a division between explicit 
knowledge, which is “objective” or “transmissible” (Penrose, 1959: 76) and tacit 
knowledge which is very difficult to incorporate simply in words. Indeed, we may not 
even know what we know (Polanyi, 1966) or why we know it (Turner and Trompenaars, 
1993), and we might even have wholly incorrect mental maps of this “knowing-in-
action”, so that we give totally ambiguous accounts of this knowledge when requested 
to define it (Schon, 1994). Ostrom, et al. (1993) explains that working in an unfamiliar 
territory creates a knowledge shortage that is overcome only by the people “who 
come to know the nature of a special physical and social setting” (1993:50). The 
effective application of tacit knowledge generally requires extensive personal contact, 
regular interaction and trust. This kind of knowledge can only be revealed through 
practice in a particular context and transmitted through successful actors-networks 
creation. To some extent, it is “captured” when the knowledge holder joins a network 
or a community of practice (Polanyi, 1958 & 1966).
Understanding and having knowledge of how institutions shape outcomes is 
particularly useful for aid policy makers in formulating sound aid policies and in 
achieving the desired objectives. The key question is: why did aid policy makers and 
implementers fail in incorporating such knowledge in order to ensure the effectiveness 
of their programs and projects?’ There are many ways of answering this question, but 
the theoretical approach taken in this study is to investigate and test some factors at 
two main levels of public policy: top policymaking level, which is responsible for 
setting up policies and aid programs plans, and policy implementation level, which is 
responsible for the design, implementation of procedures and aid program execution. 
The aid policymaking process and aid policy implementation process can be regarded 
as independent variables to explain why LKS is downplayed.
3.3. Public Policy Theory and LKS & Aid Programs 
Public policy literature is appropriate for guiding and attaining the goals of this 
research, because it can provide us with the conceptual and theoretical framework 
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critical to the understanding and knowledge of international development agencies, 
development programs and policy decisions associated with the policy areas of my 
study. In order to understand public policy in the foreign aid area, it is important first 
to conceptualize the terms policy and public policy. 
The term policy is central to the process and actions of both private institutions 
and public organizations. Individuals or private institution can make a policy choice 
which is acknowledged as private policy, while the policy made by government or its 
organizations is entitled public policy (Ozor, 2004). Governments at all levels – 
national, state and local-in developed and poor nations are active in developing and 
formulating public policies designed purposively or oriented towards solving public 
problems (Anderson, 2000). Essentially, a public policy is a government deed or 
planned act focused on accomplishing certain anticipated objectives (Dunn, 1981 
and Ikelegbe, 2006). In the light of a given societal problem, public policy directs and 
defines present and future public decisions as well as private individual or private 
business institutional actions, decisions or behavior (Chukwuemeka, 2013). On the 
other hand, Dye (1998) defines public policy as whatever government chooses to do 
or not do (1998:3), which indicates that public policy is not only about government 
actions, but also about government reaction (Nhlapo, 2012). To this end, public 
policy is defined as “a public action concerned with the public good, private rights, 
institutional inquiry and the moral condition of the citizen and of the citizenry” 
(Gbara, 2008:23). This definition is supported by Guy Peters (1993) who defined the 
concept of public policy as “the sum of government activities, whether acting directly 
or through agents, as it has influence on the lives of citizens” (1993: 4).
In order to build a theoretical framework for this study it is important to study 
public policy process and analysis. Policy analysis as an academic field of study uses 
descriptions to simplify difficulty and highlight the significant forces of policy 
dynamics (Pump 2011 in McConnell and Howlett, 2013). Two definitions of policy 
analysis are provided by Weimer and Vining (1999). The first states that “policy 
analysis is a client-oriented advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social 
values” (1999: 27). This is a simplified description of the term such as “public 
decisions” or “social values”...The second definition is the more comprehensive one 
and states that “policy analysis is a means of synthesizing information including 
research results to produce a format for policy decisions (laying out of alternative 
choices) and determining future needs for policy relevant information” (1999: 29).







explanation rather than treatment; (2) a rigorous search for the causes and 
consequences of public policies; and (3) an effort to develop and test general 
propositions about the causes and consequences of public policy and to accumulate 
reliable research findings of general relevance. Therefore, Weimer and Vining (1999) 
argue that the product of policy analysis may be advice as simple as a statement 
linking a proposed action to a likely result: passage of Z will result in consequence B. 
On the other hand, policy can be complex and comprehensive such as: the passage of 
bill A, which can be reached with extreme inevitability through parliamentary 
approach S, will result in collective social cost of M and collective social profit of D, 
but with disparate costs for group one and disparate profits for group two (in Gbara, 
2008: 37). 
There is no single or agreed-upon method to conduct public policy analysis. 
Specialists may take several roads through the policy analysis procedure since they 
are variances in training, the time available for analysis, the difficulty of the problem, 
means accessibility and administrative connections. Most specialists look at the 
problem using the methods and viewpoints of their discipline. Economists may try to 
use cost-effective and benefits analysis, a sociologist may look at the disparity 
influence on groups of citizens and attorneys may look at the legal aspect of the 
problem.
To conduct policy analysis in this dissertation, we agree with many scholars such 
as Edelman (1988), Stone (1988 & 1989), Bardach (2000), Schlesinger and Lau (2000) 
and Black (1962) who have suggested to show the image and stories about policy 
development in terms of how policy is made, how it is thought to be made and how 
it is studied and taught (in McConnell at el, 2013). One of the objectives of the study 
and analysis of aid policies in developing countries is to evaluate the level of 
understanding and study of processes, adoption, implementation, assessment and 
evaluation of development policies. This will raise the level of understanding of the 
donor agencies in the way of developing and implementing aid policies in recipient 
countries. 
If it can be understood, the policy process is regarded as a cyclical sequential 
process. The multi-stage cycle employs a metaphor invoking a central dynamic or 
temporal element, breaking the public policy making process into an iterative series 
of discrete stages and at times sub-stages, including six overlapping stages and 
additional mini-stages, in a process that never really ends (Norris, 2010:7). 
The idea of simplifying the complexity of public policy-making is rooted 
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historically in the early work of Harold Lasswell (1956 and 1971). Lasswell focused 
on improving the quality of governance by improving the quality of the information 
provided to the government. Lasswell’s main idea for a policy process begins with 
intelligence gathering, the collection, processing, and dissemination of information 
for those who participate in the decision process. It then moves to the specific choices 
made by those involved in making the decision. In the third stage, the decision-
makers actually set a path of action (or inaction). In the fourth stage, the prescribed 
course of action involves a set of sanctions, developed to penalize those who fail to 
comply with the prescriptions of the decision-makers. The policy is then implemented 
by the courts and the bureaucracy at street level and runs its course until it is 
terminated or extended. Finally, the results of the policy are appraised or evaluated 
against the aims and goals of the original decision-makers (in McConnell at el, 2013). 
Lasswell (1956) conceptualized the policy process, namely the procedure by which 
a given policy is proposed, examined, carried out, and terminated. His approach is 
multidisciplinary across the policy sciences, and gives attention to the “knowledge 
of ” (or mechanism of) the policy process as a process-oriented event. Lasswell’s 
staged approach reflects the origin of policy science, and his formulation formed the 
basis for many other models, such as a simpler model developed by Gary Brewer in 
the early 1970s(in Lyden et al, 1968; Simmons et al, 1974). 
The analysis of policy process defined by Brewer (1974) was composed of only six 
stages: (1) invention/initiation, (2) estimation, (3) selection, (4) implementation, (5) 
evaluation and (6) termination. In Brewer’s view, invention or initiation refers to the 
earliest stage in the sequence when a problem is initially identified. He also sees a 
distinction between implementation and evaluation, although in practice they 
overlap. The above concepts help create a better understanding of some aspects of 
policy making, for example, understanding the nature of the actors involved in each 
stage of the process and the ideas and knowledge they hold. However, there is no 
attention paid to the significance of the networks and subsystems in which these 
actors are organized, and the institutions they work within (Howlett, Ramesh and 
Perl 2009). Brewer “left open questions about what exactly was driving the policy 
processes once the functional logic of earlier stagist models had been left behind” ( in 
McConnell at el, 2013: 6).
It is commonly known that a policy multi-stage cycle, as a structure, is an ideal 
model from which every reality curves away (Bridgman and Davis 2000, Howlett and 







be a sequence of feedback loops (Hill 2005). However the rational for observing each 
stage separately–which is similar to Bertalanffy’s (1968) hard systems logic-is that 
each stage differs from the others in the sort of activities it involves, the expertise it 
requires, and the procedures that govern it. Furthermore, the stages model gives the 
understanding that different stages provide different sets of outcomes, which affect 
other stages, even if they occur simultaneously. Differentiating between the stages’ 
activities, procedures, outcomes, and other characteristics reveals that the interests in 
shaping each stage’s outcomes vary between actors and affect the actors’ participation 
(Parag, 2006).
Parag (2006) has reviewed the most important critiques of the cycle approach, 
which feature three main issues: 
•	 Its lack of theoretical ability to predict policy outcomes (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1993), 
•	  Its notion that public policies are dominated and led by administrators rather 
than by other actors (Jenkins- Smith and Sabatier, 1993; Colebatch, 2005), 
•	 Its focus on the bureaucratic process while disregarding content and context 
aspects (Everett, 2003) and intergovernmental relations (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1993). As a model for policy analysis, it also adheres too much to the 
normative process and imposing schematic stages on what actually happens 
(Hill 2005).
The multi-stage cycle approach is probably the most permanent tool in the policy 
sciences. Although the stages model has had many critics, it remains a dominant tool 
for analyzing the public policies in existing policy science (Weible, et al 2012). It is 
valuable for disaggregating the network of policy transactions and for examining the 
procedure through which policies are prepared (DeLeon, 1999 and Pielke, 2004). 
Let us briefly review theoretical elements related to the most important stages of 
the cycle approach, which can shed light on the LKS within foreign aid policies. In 
this dissertation, most attention is paid to the first stage of the policy cycle as it 
explains why the LKS takes place in the foreign aid arena. I argue that the problem 
definition is more than the execution; it is often at the heart of the public policy itself. 
McConnell (2010) noted that the idea of a policy process is a large one surrounding 
the problem definition. It is not merely a label for a set of facts and perceptions. It is 
the stage that sets the essential basis for the subsequent struggle over the structure of 
useful policy choices, imposing on the adoption of a policy choice, implementation, 
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and assessment. The problem definition provides a “package of ideas [which] includes, 
at least implicitly, an account of the causes and consequences of undesirable 
circumstances and a theory about how to improve them. As such, it serves as the 
overture to policymaking, as an integral part of the process of policymaking, and as 
a policy outcome. In each of these roles, it seems to exert influence on government 
action. Distinguishing among the roles clarifies the nature of that influence” (Weiss, 
1989: 97). The author regards the problem definition as an important stage as it 
highlights some aspects of the situation and puts others to one side, and it pushes 
forward some potential solutions while neglecting others.
For Weiss (1989), the policy process has an open or unfolded nature, and therefore 
problem definition should remain an open question in all stages of the policy process. 
He argues that: 
Although analysts prefer to settle on a given problem definition before proceeding 
with their work, the policy process does not require agreement on a problem 
definition before legislative or bureaucratic action ensues. As advocates seek to 
attract attention to new policy proposals, they may do so by proposing substitutes for 
the definitions guiding existing policies. As policymakers struggle through the 
process of authoritative decision-making, they typically face not only multiple 
options for addressing a given problem, but multiple definitions each implying its 
own family of solutions. Multiple definitions may survive to haunt the implementation 
process, as differing conceptions of the problem guide the various actors who work 
to turn the official rhetoric into many realities (Katzmann, 1986). A common 
language of problem definition can be stitched together to permit coalitions to move 
forward one policy or another for a time (Edelman, 1988). Later, consensus unravels 
as circumstances change, competing definitions gain adherents, and new coalitions 
form (1989: 98). 
After the problem is identified, the subsequent activities are: agenda setting 
(deciding what problem to solve), which efforts are used to raise the profile of the 
problem, possible solutions among the public and decision-makers and then policy 
formulation (deciding how to solve it) (Nilsen at el, 2013). 
The public policy formulation is part of the pre-decision stage of policymaking 
including designing the goals and priorities and options, the costs and benefits of 
each option, and the externalities of each option. It involves recognizing a set of 
policy options and public policy tools to address a problem so a ready set of solutions 
is prepared. Decision makers then choose the actual solutions by arbitrating the 
probability, political acceptance, costs and benefits. The consideration of policy 
formulation is also rooted in work on policy contexts and policy networks and who 







This study will not go further to explain these two processes because the LKS as a 
causal explanation of aid programs’ ineffectiveness seems to be located in the first 
stage of the policy process, which is problem identification. This stage, as we 
mentioned before, is the fundamental groundwork to provide information for the 
ensuing struggle over the construction of useful policy alternatives, the authoritative 
adoption of a policy choice, implementation and assessment. In addition, if the 
problem identification process was “vogue” and the right information and knowledge 
was not realized, the subsequent activities within this general cyclical model will go 
wrong and the policy may be implemented incorrectly, unevenly or even not at all. 
Within this general cyclical model, this study focuses on examining evidence 
concerning problem identification and in particular, the role of information available 
about the policy context to policy makers during the process of formulating policies. 
The context here is defined as the social environment in which implementation of the 
formulated policy takes place. The policy context is constituted in implementation 
theory, whereas the context for policy implementation may be much larger. The 
context represents influences on the implementation process and impact is, at least 
partially, beyond the control of the implementers and targets (Nilsen et al., 2013). 
Therefore, this study also focuses on policy implemention where the policy process 
has an open or unfolded nature and there is hope to incorporate information on local 
knowledge during the policy process. 
Public organizations are mainly burdened with the responsibility of policy 
implementation. Indeed, in almost every country in the world, public policies are 
applied mainly by public organizations and specifically by the officials or civil servants 
who work in them (Ezeani, 2006). To this extent, the role of government in 
development is, largely, the role of public organizations (Abah, 2010). The role the 
public organizations play is through the effective execution of government policies, 
projects and programmes aimed at accomplishing development aims and objectives 
(in Chukwuemeka, 2013). In the policy implementation theory, there are well-
developed methods for implementing polices. These methods have their own strong 
and weak points to deal with regarding the main argument in this study of LKS. 
However, before dealing with this discourse, it is vital to look at theoretical points of 
how the aid public policy is made, what information is available to aid policy makers 
and what kind of information about local knowledge they rely on. 
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3.3.1 LKS and Aid Policies and Programs 
In analyzing the question of why aid programs in the area of public sector reform 
process in recipient countries are effective or ineffective, policymaking of aid 
programs is one of the central variables. Aid program-policy design is a field of 
theoretical inquiry with its own language and principles of judgment, as well as a 
practical activity ultimately directed toward the preservation or alteration of a 
government. Donor aid agencies and their actors from different professions (especially 
economists) often engage in the identification of problems, policy formulation, 
agenda setting and decision-making, but let their contractors with their counterparts 
in recipient countries take responsibility for policy implementation.
Technically speaking, aid policy is usually made by the donor agency and planning 
takes place primarily in the donor country:
The operating unit’s strategic plan defines specific multi-year objectives that state 
how donor agency goals will be pursued in a certain country. Based on the strategic 
objectives, individual activities are planned to realize these results, typically through 
the transfer of programme funds to implementing bodies. Activity planning focuses 
mainly on the definition of outcomes, the types of government institutions that will 
achieve these outputs and the contracting and aid instruments that formalize the 
relationship between the donor agency and the aid recipient government. It is telling 
how much activity is planned by and takes place in the donor country (Jaradat, 2009: 
23)3.
The public policy concept in the foreign aid arena is not the same as the defined 
concept of public policy by different scholars provided above. The aid policy mainly 
made by different government and delivered to other governments is as a patchwork 
(formworks) to be adapted to solve their problems. Furthermore, policy makers in 
donor countries are often incapable and insufficiently aware of beliefs, traditions and 
values that are fundamental to the governments and population in recipient countries 
(Morapaya, Mysliwiec and Suzuki, 2002). There is a normative isomorphism or 
similar behavior in places where dominant donors spread certain assumptions about 
public sector reform in recipient nations (e.g., WB, UNDB, OECD and USAD). The 
key assumption is that donors know how to fix the problems of recipient countries 
that are not adequately or normally developed4. 
3 - Schneider and Ingram (1997) note that policymaking is a dynamic process and policy fits into context. The authors 
suggest: ‘What may be an excellent design in one context, may well serve poorly in another. Abstract judgments of  public 
policy are likely to be off  the mark, and the analysis of  designs requires acute sensitivity to context. Designs are nested 
inside one another and can be analyzed at many different levels. Policy analysts can study a specific policy design, even 
as small as one local program or one statue, or an entire policy area, or the policy designs of  an entire society in one or 
more historical periods.’ (1997:3).
4 - Although this normative isomorphic assumption is not dominant in the top policy levels in donor countries the whole 







This assumption travels across the donor community and shapes aid policies and 
plans. It is clear why donors’ aid policy plans are largely confined to changes of the 
most visible or short term nature, such as new legislation and organizations in formal 
laws and at the national level, thus neglecting informal institutions. This set of shared 
norms among donors, especially at policymaking level, can be “explained by the 
prevalence of rational choice models of human behavior in the social sciences and in 
the donor community. This model treats individuals as rational beings devoid of 
values and programmed to respond to external incentives that affect their well-being 
measured mainly in terms of monetary gains or losses. This perspective discounts 
other layers and dimensions of institutions and their enforcement mechanisms” 
(Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 222).
Instead of conducting research and situational analysis to identify the main 
problems of recipient countries and acquiring information on local knowledge, top 
aid policy makers or politicians in donor countries impose rationalistic and complex 
policy plans based on preconceived ideas, with poor understanding of recipients’ 
institutions and institutional processes. Their policies incorporate scientific 
knowledge and theories of development that have been mostly developed and tested 
in western countries with a thriving modern society. These theories are based on 
developed countries’ idealized models of governance and rarely have much to say 
about the practical process of bringing about change in a recipient government 
(Rondinelli, 1993).
To support the above argument, Baimyrzaeva (2012) published a detailed study of 
the knowledge and ideas that informed aid policies over time and how they affected 
their outcomes. Her study analyzed the experience of the institutional reforms 
promoted by donors in developing countries, by systematically comparing and 
contrasting the three waves of public sector reforms launched by most influential 
donors since the 1950s. The author described and analyzed each wave with specific 
attention to their respective policy contexts, the main body of knowledge and ideas 
informing each wave of reforms, the content (what the reforms intended to do), the 
approach to the reforms (how the reforms were pursued) and outcomes and lessons 
learned. There are also key lessons neglected by donors throughout all three waves of 
reforms – a deficiency of practical knowledge, in other words – which made it more 
difficult to translating the content and approach to the reforms in practice. 
In the first wave during the 1950s-60s, development was seen as the modernization 
for jobs, income, and promotions for development agencies and their experts.
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of the traditional system in recipient countries. The identification of the problem 
perceived causes of underdevelopment as lack/weakness of government institutions 
and their capacity. The solution of weak capacity within recipient countries was to 
develop modern government institutions, and this was the scope of the reform focus 
on organizational development in the public sector. This approach was derived from 
Western theories of modernization and scientific management. The approach to 
reforms focused on administrative development by importing Western institutional 
and organizational models via foreign experts to try to create a ripple effect in the 
overall system (see also: Eaton, 1972 and Israel, 1987). 
The second wave from the 1980s until 1997 shifted the aid policy makers to 
develop economic growth and free markets (i.e. minimal government intervention). 
The identification of the problem perceived causes of underdevelopment as big 
government that stifles markets. The information available to aid policy makers for 
formulating policies was based on Western theories such as neoclassical economics, 
public choice theory, and the new public management. The reforms focused on 
increasing effectiveness of public administration through infusing principles and 
practices from private sector management: freeing and strengthening the private 
sector; fostering competition within and between the public and private sectors; and 
downsizing government. The tools for realizing this new shift in aid policy were 
deregulation, decentralization, privatization, macroeconomic liberalization, 
downsizing bureaucracy and importing Western institutional models and idealized 
private sector principles (see also: Bossuyt, 2001; Grindle, 1997; Caiden, 1991; Spink, 
1999; and Shepherd, 2003). 
This second wave failed to develop the private sector, “again” because of weak 
public sector and its institutions. Thus, the donors stated to have a new agenda of 
reform that aimed to change the whole system. This third wave began in 1997 and 
continues until the present day. The main aim of this third wave is to create right 
institutions and good governance. It has imported theoretical thinking of development 
in the West such as new institutional economics and new public management 
theoretical aspects. The aid policies aim to transform government institutions 
through the participation and strengthening of business and civil society. The policy 
tools of implementing this aid policy include strengthening government institutions’ 
capacity, accountability, and transparency; deregulation and privatization; and voice 
and social participation (see Bossuyt, 2001; Jenkins and Plowden, 2006). 







policies and offered lessons and recommendations for aid policy makers to ensure 
the process of information of local knowledge of the recipient countries is 
incorporated. Although these recommendations have been available since the first 
wave of reform, they have not been put into use. The first lesson was put forward by 
Argyris (1977) who called for aid policies to be systematic by transforming the overall 
system in recipient countries (as started in the third wave), instead of focusing on 
isolated parts of the system (as in the first and second waves). Evans (2004) argues 
that to incorporate information on local knowledge, aid policy makers should shift 
their approach to be more participatory. This is by getting beneficiaries’ input at all 
stages of the policy process as opposed to being implemented by a top-down, supply-
driven approach and externally determined (see also the following section). Other 
studies argued that donors should focus on changing the existing distribution of 
power instead of importing western institutions and theories of change to different 
policy contexts. They added that the political nature and context of the reforms 
should be taken into account (see for example: Girishankar, 2001; Goyal, 1994). 
March and Olsen (1989) argued that aid policy makers have to base their policies on 
a good understanding of the process of artificial institutional change, design 
principles, and the consequences of such interventions, as opposed to guesses and 
unfounded assumptions and beliefs ( as reviewed by Baimyrzaeva,2010) .
Jenkins and Plowden (2006), experts to the foreign aid system, added to the above 
reflections, stating that aid policy makers should clearly tailor their policies of change 
to recipients’ unique context and needs, as opposed to importing formal models from 
select developed countries which is defined as best practice. Even if one argues that 
the Western theories of change can provide new development approaches for the 
poor nations, using a “one-size-fits all approach” in delivering aid programs is not an 
accurate approach to adapt the western’s theories of change to the recipients’ contexts. 
Yet such an approach is endemic within foreign aid circles. A recipient country may 
be given a suggestion for a project which fits a worldwide donor programme, but 
which is neither appropriate nor a priority for the recipient. Ideally top policy makers 
acknowledge the need to tailor reform to the specific needs and context of the country, 
rather than copying the same solutions for all recipient countries that have different 
political, administrative and cultural realities. Moreover, it is important to take into 
account the cultural aspects of the reforms in a specific recipient country (OECD, 
2005). Jenkins and Blowden (2006) argued the gap between theory and practice is 
even more substantial when what is being attempted is to transfer techniques of 
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governing between different social and political contexts or even within Western 
countries themselves (2006:11).
3.3.2 LKS and the Problem of Policy Compliance within the Donor Countries 
Themselves
Similar problems arise within the context of EU policies that are ‘the problem of 
compliance’, which shows a societal relevance of the problem of “policy fit” (Thomson, 
Torenvlied & Arregui, 2007). The theoretical concept of compliance as defined by 
Versluis (2005), is a behavior which adapts to a determined set of regulatory measures 
and thus refers to the extent to which agents act in harmony with and contentment of 
the remedies controlled in rules and norms (see also: Matthews, 1993; Checkel, 1999). 
Empirically the concept of compliance refers to the extent to which the Member 
States act in harmony with the provisions of the agreements and all regulatory 
measures such as the regulations, directives and decisions of the EU that spring from 
it. 
Versluis (2005) points out that the concept of compliance is not the same as the 
concept of “effectiveness” or “implementation”. The author cited Neyer and Zürn, 
(2001) and referred to the concept of effectiveness as the efficacy of a given regulation 
in solving a given problem. It could be that the Member States perfectly complies 
with the EU regulations, but that does not mean solving the problem or being 
effective. Implementation refers to the process of putting international policies and 
commitments into practice. “Compliance can also occur without implementation, 
for example when there is a complete ‘fit’ between the domestic practice and the 
accord. In such a case, compliance is automatic and implementation is not required” 
(2005:4-5). 
The problem of “policy fit” is well known in studies on the EU. For instance, 
consider EU legislative programs. These are a large volume of laws ordinances 
developed at EU level, from which policies emerge in member states and from local 
legislative bodies within the member states. These programs are aimed at increasing 
the level of integration among EU member states in the provision of social services, 
the availability of financial services for economic activities, the level of industrialization, 
the level of employment opportunities, the level of social or economic inequality, the 
availability of health facilities, the level of social security, the pace of educational 
development and so on (Chukwuemeka, 2013). Furthermore they can regulate other 







acts are passed at EU level, “the Member States alone are responsible for complying 
with them. Since countries have different legislative cultures, and therefore different 
approaches to compliance, it is not uncommon that Member States apply European 
legislation incorrectly, unevenly, or even not at all. Such situations have to be remedied 
as they may have a negative impact on the efficiency of the internal market and on the 
credibility and legitimacy of the EU in general” (Versluis, 2005: 5). 
Similarly, international aid agencies like the World Bank plan for large-scale 
comprehensive policies for enormous number of recipient countries in the less 
developed world. The World Bank provides structural adjustment loans, finance and 
advice for the purpose of economic development and the elimination of poverty. 
Recipient countries comply with reform packages because they are stipulated by the 
World Bank. Recipient countries are poor and they accept whatever is offered to 
them. They have a poor policy environment and lack of available theories of change. 
Another example is related to the Dutch Nuffic aid agency, which works on behalf of 
the Dutch Ministry of International Cooperation, operating wide institutional 
development programs aimed at helping a number of developing nations develop the 
capacity of their higher education intuitions as part of broader capacity development 
within the public sectors of those countries. Since these countries have different local 
characteristics and aspects, there has been “non-compliance” in adapting these 
policies5.
Policy makers in Washington or and The Hague used rationalistic planning and 
management procedures, often requiring explicit and implicit knowledge that are 
simply not available in most recipient countries. The capability of policy makers to 
predict and control the outcomes of their aid policies under these conditions of 
uncertainty, are quite limited. To reduce “uncertainty”, the demands of rationalistic 
planning have forced policy makers to use whatever knowledge is at hand, regardless 
of its appropriateness or accuracy (Rondinelli, 2003). It can be argued that the aid 
policy maker is bounded by uncertainty and trying to conduct social engineering 
plans for intervention. 
5- It seems that the policy-making process of  the aid program confronted with ‘the paradox of  compliance’, which shows 
a societal relevance in the topic of  “policy fit”. This is although the importance of  policymaking process Schneider and 
Ingram (1997) observe that policymaking is a dynamic process and policy fit into targeted context. The authors suggest: 
‘What may be an excellent design in one context, may well serve poorly in another. Abstract judgments of  public policy 
are likely to be off  the mark, and the analysis of  designs requires acute sensitivity to context. Designs are nested inside 
one another and can be analyzed at many different levels. Policy analysts can study a specific policy design, even as small 
as one local program or one statue, or an entire policy area, or the policy designs of  an entire society in one or more 
historical periods.’ (1997:3).
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3.4 The Social-engineering Model and Aid Policymaking 
This study uses the applicability and explanatory power of the social engineering 
model of policymaking to analyze the process of aid policymaking, and specifically to 
bring about a more appropriate form of policy analysis that seeks to explain why LKS 
is downplayed in the above-reviewed waves of donors’ reforms in recipient countries.
We start this section by reviewing the theories that provided information to the 
aid policy makers as mentioned in the above section and then we introduce the 
social-engineering model of aid policy makers. Since the 1950s aid policy makers 
have been using certain theories to inform their policies and to try bring about change 
in recipient countries. In the first wave of aid policies, the assumptions of the rational 
choice theory (RCT) had a prevailing influence on aid policies. As a whole, rational 
choice theory assumes individual decision makers have full information, infinite 
cognitive capacity and choose to optimize their production or consumption activities 
given their production cost structure or preferences, respectively (Rudd, 2003). The 
aid policy makers assumed that they fully understand how to change the institutions 
in poor nations and how to promote the capacities of their public sectors. 
Most of the studies of the RCT deal with the problem of “free riders” who gain 
benefit from the collective goods provided by governments (Saxonburg, 1999). 
Because of the problem of “free riders”, the agenda of reforming the public sectors is 
to cut down bureaucracy and expose it to larger internal and external control as it is 
needed. However, bureaucracy protects itself by virtue of monitoring information 
(principal-agent problem). Such a Western-grounded theoretical approach provided 
rich information for donor policy makers to formulate aid programs aimed at 
exposing the recipient government organizations to pressures and competition, 
under the assumption that they would lead to more effective public administrative 
systems in the recipient countries (Baimyrzaeva, 2012). It seems donors did not 
realize that public bureaucracy and civil servants in most recipient countries are like 
a social net containing most of the free riders, who need an income to survive with 
the deep poverty in those countries. Civil servants enter the civil service for life; the 
system is by default a career-based system. The result was the governments of the 
poor nations and the donors could not achieve the objectives of the aid programs in 
this wave.
From New Public Management (NPM) in 1980 international development with 
respect to administrative reforms of the public sector was devised (Hood, 1995; and 







practice. It was shaped and influenced by managerialism, transaction-cost economics 
and principal-agent theory. NPM shares the notion of the rationality of consequences, 
methodological individualism, and the abandonment of the normative aspects of 
institutions (Terry, 2005). Although different explanations exist as to what constitutes 
the principles of NPM, the shared statement among supporters of NPM is the “call 
for using the insights and principles that worked well in the private sector – such as 
competition, decentralization, flexibility, and pay for performance– to induce 
efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in the public sector”(Baimyrzaeva, 2012: 38). 
The aid policy makers took into account the principals of NPM and started to 
formulate aid policies such as privatizations, decentralization, introduction of 
institutionalized market or quasi-market structures and transformation of citizens 
into clients and clients into public service producers (Baraldi, et al. 2003). In countries 
where there was no constitutional democracy and the rule of law was not established 
NPM’s contribution has been questionable. For example, the privatization programs 
have opened a door for corruption in its multiple types to be practiced. It was clear in 
Yemen that most of public productive organizations shifted to the ruling elite in 
much reduced bills, and that means poor people just lost out. 
Above are just two examples of the information and assumptions that were 
available to aid policy makers, which have shaped the content and the scope of their 
aid programs in recent times. It is surprising that aid policy makers have only recently 
recognized the importance of social context. This is after introducing the assumptions 
of New Institutional Economics with the bounded rational model of the individual 
used in institutional analysis. This bounded rationality model of human decision-
making tends to rely on heuristics and learning over time, rather than optimization. 
It is worth noting that the bounded rationality model first appeared in print in 
Herbert Simon’s 1947 book Administrative Behavior, which criticised existing theories 
of public administration and proposed a new approach for the study of decision-
making (Jones, 1999: 33). Although Herbert Simon’s argument on bounded rationality 
is old, and has received its share of pointed criticisms (e.g., Arrow 1964; Boulding 
1964; Dror 1964; Etzioni 1967; Goodin and Waldner 1979; Lustick 1980; Schulman 
1975, in Jonathan Bendor, 1995, p: 819)6, it is not outdated in discussions among 
scholars of public administration and political science. Until today many scholars are 
still using it to attack abstract rarefied economic decision-making models or 
6 - The criticism to Simon’s bounded rationality thesis is well known, such ideas can be found in much advanced text 
elsewhere. 
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comprehensive rational assumptions which most aid policy makers use in formulating 
aid policies.
Simon has emphasized, “The central concern of administrative theory is about the 
boundary between the rational and the non-rational aspects of human social 
behavior” (xxviii). A noticeable principle of bounded rationality for Simon is that 
“the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the size of the problems that require suitable solutions” 
(Simon, 1947). Therefore, Simon7 spent a great deal of time and energy to develop the 
satisfying rather than maximizing model to explain the reality of policy-making in 
uncertain situations (1947( 2end 1958), 1955, 1957, 1971, and 1999). He argued that 
many expressions such as to “find the best possible policy” have little practical meaning 
because the search for alternatives is always limited and finite. Policy makers have 
limited time, skills and resources and they have incomplete information about 
alternatives and their consequences8. Simon argues that actors rarely seek optimal 
solutions by studying all the options and picking the best. Instead, administrators will 
choose for policies that are good enough. This is what Simon called “satisficing” (as 
cited in Jones, 1999).
Therefore a satisficer (the Satisfied Man instead of the Administrative Man9) seeks 
solutions that are satisfactory and sufficient. This type of behavior in policymaking 
7 - Herbert Simon “(June 15, 1916 – February 9, 2001) was an American political scientist, economist, sociologist, and 
psychologist, and professor—most notably at Carnegie Mellon University—whose research ranged across the fields of  
cognitive psychology, cognitive science, computer science, public administration, economics, management, philosophy 
of  science, sociology, and political science.” He has almost a thousand very highly cited publications, including Adminis-
trative Behavior: A Study of  Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization; Models of  Bounded Rationality, Vol. 3. MIT 
Press, 1947 CF, free Wikipedia network.
8 - Relatively related, Lindblom (1959) also attacked the abstract—rational choice paradigm by arguing that, for several 
reasons, it is an ideal toward which policy—making should approximate. First, in practice, policymaking is a complexly 
interactive process without beginning or end. It is markedly different from what is presented in the rational choice 
paradigm. Actors are rarely take into consideration all disciplined steps of  policymaking process that started in the 
comprehensive idea of  rational choice theory, but sometimes they may not go through at all. Second, decision-makers 
always have limited knowledge regarding the decision situation. The decision must be made in the midst of  uncertainty. 
If  the decision-makers decided to wait until the attainment of  complement knowledge regarding the decision situation, 
in order to have a rational decision, he would not take any decision. This means the waiting process is useless. Third, 
the limited capacity thinking of  humans means they have a lack of  capacity in dealing with the complex problems. This 
is especially given the lack of  information and the high cost of  analysis, the difficulty of  understanding all the alterna-
tives, and the difficulty of  classifying and scheduling these alternatives in programmed and accurate process. Lindblom 
(1959) emphasized that the process of  understanding all the alternatives by the policy makers may give rise to problems 
with timing and a long branch for consideration. Fourth, policy makers face real difficulties in determining the realistic 
goals in the policy making process. Thus, they are sometimes unable to develop an integrated plan includes briefing and 
familiarity with all dimensions and variables, and all elements that are related to those realistic objectives. 
9 - Simon (1947) pointed out in his criticism on the rational choice theory which first came about and developed within 
economic science, and afterwards it has been transferred to public administration. The Economic Man was not concerned 
with the behavior necessary for his brother (the Administrative Man) to describe how has decision-making process per-
formed to have an optimal decision “in reality”. However, he suggested that The Administrative Man must be a satisficer 
or a Satisficed Man in dealing with the uncertain decision situations, instead of  trying to understand the reality of  the 







processes takes place, because of the limited information-processing capability. 
Consequently, it is difficult to realize optimization when policy makers are concerned 
with a choice mechanism that pursues satisfactory results. When faced with a complex 
problem, most satisficers (actors) respond by reducing the faults to a minimal level 
(Simon, 1947; Simon 1957:270-71 as cited in Jones 1999)10. The knowledge, 
information, resources and time constraints on decision makers were so substantial 
that only those alternatives which are marginally different from the status quo could 
be realistically examined. Uncertain situations are resolved by irrational structures 
that do not fit the problems.
The social-engineering model of James Scott (1998) says that aid policies were 
formulated by using assumptions and not focused on the social contexts of their 
policies as a consequence of simplification policies from the twentieth century on 
centrally-planned social-engineering projects in high modernism states. In his well-
written book Seeing like State Scott argued, “The most tragic episodes of state-initiated 
social engineering originates in a pernicious combination of four elements” (1998: 4). 
The first element is the administrative organization of nature and society. This refers 
to the transformative simplification policies of facts in order for the state to see more 
clearly. The simplification policies aims to making complex and illegible social 
practices more standardized, comprehensive and legible to partially blind states 
which know little about their societies. 
Scott (1998) explained simplification policy by looking at the interactions between 
scientific knowledge holders and practical knowledge holders. Local societies are 
complex and it is not that easy to understand them. States exercise a “high-modernist 
ideology”- the second element of a pernicious combination-which is about having a 
strong faith in scientific, technological and human progress. Carriers of such faith 
often saw progress in aesthetic terms11. States are also of an authoritarian nature: this 
is the third element of a pernicious combination. A strong state is willing to use all its 
power to implement and impose its high modernist plans on society. Closely linked 
with this is the final element: a weak civil society unable to oppose the utopian plans 
of the state12. States, to simplify or to create “legibility” of complex phenomena, have 
10 - There are other scholars who have adopted such as idea. For example Daft & Lengel (1986) propose that high un-
certainty about the decision may result in processes which are more intuitive, e.g. to employ judgement and experience 
rather than computational routines. 
11 - And Scott importantly notes that as an ideology, such confidence is often unscientific and masks the political interests 
of  state officials.
12 - Scott (1998) has offered cases studies where too strong a conclusion is being drawn from the evidence. In Chapters 
3 to 8, Scott elaborated on the last three elements of  the pernicious combination. Here we encounter the authoritarian 
high-modernist ideas of  people such as the French architect Le Corbusier who inspired the creation of  a high-modernist 
city (Brasília), Lenin who designed the high-modernist revolutionary party, Stalin who was responsible for the high-mod-
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used the authority of scientific knowledge and its tendency to disallow other 
competing sources of judgment in its developmental agenda. The result is either a 
massive failure of these developmental agendas or the imposing of orders that isolate 
and simplify the societies that they seek to administer and develop13.
The implementation of simplified development agendas in local societies by state 
centers does not explain why such developmental agendas ultimately failed. Scott 
(1998) addresses the reasons in the final part of his book. What ultimately proved 
detrimental is the lack of importance given to practical knowledge, or metis, in the 
process of designing developmental schemes. The intellectuals and planners behind 
them were guilty of hubris, or forgot that they were mortals and acted as if they were 
gods (1998: 342). This is best illustrated in the premise behind what are tellingly 
called ‘work-to-rule strikes’, which are mentioned several times throughout Scott’s 
book. The work-to-rule strike is a job action in which employees begin “doing their 
jobs by meticulously observing every one of the rules and regulations, and performing 
only the duties stated in their job descriptions. The result (as in this case), is that the 
work grinds to a halt, or at least to a snail’s pace. The workers achieve the practical 
effect of a walkout while remaining on the job and following their instructions to the 
letter. Their action also illustrates pointedly how actual work processes depend more 
heavily on informal understandings and improvisations than on formal work rules” 
(1998: 310-311). Such a strike thus demonstrates in a powerful manner how formal 
planning based on simplified understandings of complex procedures, will always be 
inadequate in producing a functioning social order. What is overlooked in the 
creation of any social order is the informal processes and knowledge (metis14) that 
assures its effectiveness15.
The environment we live in is not static, but changing and true social reforms 
need to allow for dynamic interactions and responses that take into account what 
happens at grassroots level. Visions of transformation through top-down order and 
ernist collectivization of  Russian agriculture and Julius Nyerere who started the ujamaa village campaign in Tanzania.
13 - To make it clearer, Scott (1998) argues that the heroic simplification policy is a best solution to the central problem 
in statecraft, which is illegibility, or the inability to see and understand society (Scott, 1989, p2). It is an appropriate 
mechanism for the modern state’s center to impose order upon complex aspects of  its local society which it needed 
to understand and control by reducing these complex aspects to a level at which it can readily understand and be more 
persuasive to the state’s center (using the heroic simplification policy). 
14 - In our study metis or the practical knowledge is completely relevant to the local knowledge syndrome. 
15 - The second point of  Scott (1998), to understand the reason for the failure of  heroic simplified developmental 
schemes of  the high modernist states, is consistent with a retreat from hubris but it involves the approach development 
planners ought to take in the development process. In addition to the ignorance of  practical knowledge in the process 
of  designing developmental schemes by the planners of  the high-modernist states, they had also a faith in large-scale 







control based on “simplifications” of complex systems will ultimately fail16. 
Scott (1998) explained many of the key arguments of Friedrich Hayek (1945). The 
bureaucratic planner with a map does not know the best way to move forward, and 
cannot move humans and their lives around the territory as if on a chessboard to 
create utopia. Local, practical knowledge is needed. The locus of decision-making 
must remain with those who have the craft to understand the situation; any system 
that functions at all must create and maintain a space for those in the field to use their 
local, practical knowledge, even if the hierarchs of the system pretend not to notice 
this flexibility (Delong, 1999: 2). 
Hayek (1945) identified the practical knowledge problem in his article “The Use 
of Knowledge in Society”, as the central problem to social coordination. Every society 
has decentralized knowledge. Information is discontinuous, dispersed across many 
individuals, and often contained in articulated forms. Hayek highlighted that every 
society must find a way of tapping into this fragmented information in order for 
individuals and society to flourish (as reviewed in Williamson, 2009: 8-9). For 
example, Hayek (1945) pointed out that when we try to construct a rational economic 
order or solve an economic problem of society:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined 
precisely by fact that that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make 
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to 
allocate “given” resources - if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which 
deliberately solves the problem set by the “data”’. It is rather a problem of how to 
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends 
whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a 
problem of the utilization knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.
Hayek (1945) and subsequently Scott (1998) applied the insight of local knowledge 
in order to successfully argue that central planning according to scientific knowledge 
could never achieve rationalistic goals, because no single person or group holds all of 
the information necessary to successfully coordinate the development process 
(Williamson, 2009). Central planning according to scientific knowledge has resulted 
in a misunderstanding of planners in real situations, and the adoption of misguided 
16 -This is where Seeing Like a State comes in. Scott’s book helps us to understand that the reason for the failure of  all 
of  the heroic simplified developmental policies of  the high modernist states boils down hubris on the part of  intellectu-
als and planners. “Their actions, far from being cynical grabs for power and wealth, were animated by a genuine desire 
to improve the human condition - a desire with a fatal flaw. That these tragedies could be so intimately associated with 
optimistic views of  progress and rational order is in itself  a reason for a searching diagnosis.” (1998, p: 342).
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strategies that result in wrong and ineffective returns. Hayek (1943) stressed that “the 
object of scientific study is never the totality of all the phenomena observable at a 
given time and place, but always only certain selected aspects: and according to the 
question we ask the same spatio temporal situation may become a number of different 
objects of study. The human mind can never grasp a “whole” in the sense of all the 
different aspects of a real situation” (1943: 55).
For instance, Hayek asked “why the weeds in his garden have grown in this 
particular pattern. No single theoretical science will provide the answer. This, 
however, does not mean that to answer the question we must know everything that 
can be known about the space-time interval in which the phenomenon occurred. 
While the question we ask designates the phenomena to be explained, it is only by 
means of the laws of the theoretical sciences that we are able to select the other 
phenomena which are relevant for its explanation” (Hayek, 1943: 56). Actors often 
must make choices based on incomplete knowledge of all possible alternatives and 
their likely outcomes. With incomplete knowledge (harmonizing between scientific 
and practical knowledge) and imperfect information processing capabilities, all 
actors at all levels or contexts may make mistakes in choosing strategies designed to 
realize a set of goals (Scott, 1998; Ostrom 1986, Hyden 1990; Oakerson 1993, in 
Gibson. et all, 2008: .28).
We have restricted ability to effectively implement reform actions which have 
been planned in accordance with scientific knowledge. I emphasize this impossibility 
because, logically, social engineering is either a hard task or a wrong choice in 
developmental policy. To promote development in a given society, policy makers 
must implement procedures that adopt local knowledge into any plan. The validity of 
the plan itself depends entirely on the validity of the assumption that the policy maker 
accurately knows the circumstances surrounding his prospective decisions. If the 
policy maker does not know “what it is that he is seeking to achieve, or does not know 
what resources are at his command, or what the efficacy of the sources is with respect 
to sought after goals, then his plan—no matter how carefully formulated—is unlikely 
to result in the best possible outcome” (Israel M. Kirzner, 1985: 409)17.
17 - The theoretical debate presented above can partly explain why donor agencies and their friends in recipient countries 
cannot deal with the local knowledge at the policy making level. This, I should argue, tallies with William Easterly’s ques-
tion: “how did panaceas after panaceas of  foreign aid development solutions that have been adopted fail at the same 
time”? Development solutions have been proposed and implemented by development experts and technocrats since the 
beginning of  the development project at the end of  WW2. “Starting from the 1950s, economists believed financial aid 
was needed to fill the investment gap that existed in poor countries. When aid through the investment of  capital did not 
seem to work, the next panacea promoted was investment in education. This was followed by the solution of  popula-
tion control, then adjustment loans and finally debt forgiveness” (APA: Thoughts, n.a). In the 2000s, donors started to 







The absence of any kind of intellectual or practical framework for the processes of 
reform at the top policy-making level has constantly bedeviled donor policies in 
public sector reform (Jenkins and Blowden, 2006:48). “The ambiguous and 
inconsistent concepts and ideas on the nature of institutions and institutional change, 
and a lack of clear and practical analytical tools for understanding and mapping 
institutions, and designing implementable and effective institutional reforms” 
(Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 188) make it difficult to understand policy, let alone operationalize 
in practice, i.e. predict, design, carry out, and evaluate institutional reforms. Moreover, 
these obstacles also make it hard for top policy makers to effectively interact with 
“policy makers” in recipient countries or their “citizenry”, especially to bridge the gap 
of local knowledge or to examine how accurate the information is that they receive 
from local policy makers.
3.5 The Associability Development Approach and Aid Policymaking
Beyond the ideas of the ‘associability development approach’ presented in Chapter 
1, if there is association and network during “the aid policy formulation stage” with 
responsible government officials and decision makers of the local government in the 
recipient country, there is often only a rather short time and a complete aid policy 
program may be designed in just three weeks. In effect, this superficial and short-
term interaction between donors and recipients on high decision-making levels is 
not conducive to a fruitful exploitation of local knowledge, which local actors lack, as 
we explain in Chapter 4 (Olsson and Wohlgemuth, 2003)18. This is illustrated by the 
diplomatic language and development jargon that decision-makers use in their 
dialogue (Browne, 2006), leaving the rules of the game obscured (North, 1991). 
Policy makers on both sides suffer from an unclear vision of the final goal. The 
economists realized that there is no economic development without a sound public administration in poor nations. This 
has resulted in over $1 trillion in aid, and yet poverty persists in the world today. This tremendous failure occurred as a 
result of  visionary intellectuals and planners who were guilty of  hubris, and of  forgetting that they were mere mortals 
instead of  gods”( Scott, 1998, p. 342). This pretense to know everything leads the development technocrat to plan for 
large-scale comprehensive changes in the developing country. It was realized that they could not accomplish such large-
scale comprehensive solutions with sole policy implementation. These development waves has been reviewed briefly in 
Chapter 10 of  this study, with a focus on the donors’ public sector reforms in poor nations and to support the empirical 
part of  this study.
18 - The short interaction between the two parties at this level is nevertheless important for the whole process as they 
establish the reform values on which the aid programs must be based, solve differences of  opinion and build consensus. 
The donor in general imposes aid policies or programs that ensure ideas and experience of  how things should be done 
on the ground (Williamson, 2008). It can be described as “power games where the stronger party will impose its will on 
the weaker one” (Olsson and Wohlgemuth, 2003). The recipient party remains a passive party on the sidelines. It has 
nothing to add to the initial policy design, and simply follows the donor promoted policies. Moreover, governmental 
bodies seek assistance from donor agencies to carry out projects that are believed to fall within the donor’s development 
policy” (Jaradat, 2009, p23). Aid policies should be designed in such a way that it includes context sensitivity, attention 
for values and factors that are open to change through the work of  human agents (Edwards, 1980).
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dominance of the English language in the development aid realm makes it difficult 
for all local people to present their ideas, as most of them do not speak the English 
language (Crespin, 2011). Poor nations suffer from a lack of knowledge of theory of 
change; this is why they are poor. If we deeply look at the information on local 
knowledge practices supplied by online networks it is very revealing as it explains 
why the assumption of reform has been the dominate rule in forming donors’ 
development policies. There is no information available for the policy maker to 
support their policy making process which can fit the policy made with local aspects 
of the recipient countries. This goes along with a lack of institutional memory within 
the aid agencies and the broken information loop from the local level (Martens et al. 
2002)19.
A more problematic feature of aid policymaking process is that individual citizens, 
who are meant to be the beneficiaries of aid policies, have no voice in this stage of 
policymaking. The feedback loop to citizens is broken in foreign aid systems, because 
of the geographical and political separation between the givers and the beneficiaries 
of aid. The latter are well equipped with local knowledge, but they are not voters in 
the country that pays for the aid and thus have no real political leverage over domestic 
government political and administrative actors in a donor country. Accordingly, 
taxpayers do not have trustworthy information on the outcomes of the aid programs 
that they fund. They do not have actual political control over their politicians who 
approve these programs (Martens, 2006: 15). Pro-poor policies leave no room for 
demands of the poor as the authoritarian style of government allows for minimal 
participation (see also Chapter 2, section 2.3).
*************
To this end, I argue that the policy making processes of foreign aid programs often 
fail to take into account individual and contextual factors (LKS: place and time 
knowledge or the practical knowledge). They have adopted a “one size fits all” 
development approach that has never worked in recipient countries, only resulting in 
non-compliance of aid policies and a no-policy fit. In analyzing the factors that 
influence the process of incorporating local knowledge, “policy design” is one of the 
key issues examined in this dissertation. There is hope to incorporate the practical 
knowledge gained in the policy implementation stage that might lead to results not 
foreseen in the design. This could lead to less effort for redesigning aid programs and 
projects and probably more success and effectiveness. Brinkerhoff (1996) confirms 







this as he highlights the importance of bridging the language and terminology gap 
between those who focus on the technical content of policy (theorists) and those who 
are involved with the implementation of policies and programs (practitioners). 
Bridging this gap is crucial for it may allow development of a wider and better 
understanding of implementation factors, and the process of linking policy goals to 
outcomes. It is therefore important to study the policy implementation of aid 
programs, as it can open doors for effective interventions in the area of capacity 
building and institutional reforms (Brinkerhoff, 1996).
3.6 Policy Implementation Theory and LKS & Aid Programs 
3.6.1 What is Policy Implementation? 
The policy implementation concept is generally viewed as the process of carrying 
out, accomplishing, fulfilling, producing or completing a given task. It can inevitably 
take different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional settings (Raj 
Paudel, 2009:36). There are various ways to theoretically and empirically define the 
concept of policy implementation. Bhola (2004) suggests that policy implementation 
is a process ‘to actualize, apply and utilize it [policy] in the world of practice’ (2004: 
296). Similarly, Hope (2002: 40) sees implementation as a process of ‘transforming 
policy into practice’ (cited in Ali, 2006). It is the process of translating policies into 
programs and projects which are subsequently implemented to achieve the set goals 
or objectives (Okoli and Onah, 2003; Ikelegbe, 2006). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983 
as cited in Addo, 2011: 1) gave one of the most influential definitions20:
Policy implementation is “the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually 
incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive 
orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be 
addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, 
“structures” the implementation process. The process normally runs through a 
number of stages beginning with the passage of the basic statute, followed by the 
policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the compliance of target 
groups with those decisions, the actual impacts – both intended and unintended – of 
those outputs, the perceived impacts of agency decisions, and finally, the important 
revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute” (p. 20- 21).
It is important to state that there is a debate in the literature, which is so far unresolved 
about the discovery of the “implementation stage” in the policy process, and whether 
20 - It is not my aim to deal with the theoretical and practical debates on policy implementation, it can be found in 
advanced level elsewhere, for example in recent studies by Torenvlied and Thomson (2003). I just have given a quick 
view on the policy implementation conception which is related and helpful to specify a practical definition of  aid 
policy implementation. 
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policy making and policy implementation should be considered as distinct steps; 
with the latter following the former, or both being part of the policy making process 
(Torenvlied and Thomson, 2003; Ali, 2006). The “synoptic view” of policy 
implementation regarded policy implementation as a distinct phase from policy-
making. Thus, policy implementation is “what happens after a bill is passed” (Bardach, 
1977), in other words, policymaking ends with the passing of laws. Scholars who 
agree with this view argue that policymaking is usually done painstakingly by 
legislators and then fails at the implementation stage, because of issues related to 
bureaucracy (Ali, 2006). The contrary view is the “anti-synoptic approach” outlined 
by Pressman and Widavsky (1984; 1st edition 1973) who argued that successful 
implementation would require an almost hundred percent level of co-operation 
between implementation agencies to reach the basic policy decision. Scholars related 
to this approach, claim that there is no clear distinction between policy formulation 
and implementation, as real policy is formulated not only at the legislative or judiciary 
level, but continues to be reformulated at the administrative level (Lindblom, 1980: 
64-70; Trowler, 1998 cited in Ali, 2006).
Other scholars such as Goggin et al. (1990) and Pülzl & Treib (2006) have identified 
three generations of implementation studies and approaches related to the study of 
policy implementation, and the problems surrounding it. The first approach is top-
down, which shows that the policy maker is able to produce unequivocal policy 
objectives and control the implementation stage. The second approach is the bottom-
up component of policy implementation studies, which considered the “work on 
street-level bureaucracies, enriched the understanding of relationships within 
organizations and in particular the importance of the level where services are actually 
provided” (Friedman, 2008: 484). In this approach, the local bureaucrats are regarded 
as the “main players in the delivery of policy and conceive implementation as the 
negotiation processes within networks of implementers” (Addo, 2011: 20). The third 
approach is called hybrid (synthesis) theories, which attempt to bridge the gap 
between the other two approaches by incorporating both top-down and bottom-up 
elements, and other theoretical models (Pülzl & Treib, 2006). In this section, we focus 
on the first two approaches, as they are more relevant to explain the theoretical 
elements standing behind the idea of LKS.
Parsons (1995) has provided a long list review of the top-down studies of the 
policy implementation and he found that these studies were just based on a “blackbox 







many assumptions of the top-down approach, including that the implementation 
process is based on strategies which greatly depend on the capacity of policy objectives 
and policy tools for implementation being clearly and consistently defined, when the 
conflict is low (Matland, 1995). Dyer (1999) states that another assumption is that 
policy implementation often follows a systematic chain starting “with a policy 
message at the top and sees implementation as occurring in a chain”. 
Birkland (2005:185) cites a number of weaknesses of the top down approach. The 
most important of them, which fits with our main argument in this study, is that top-
down approaches often ignore the relative ease with which implementers and interest 
groups can work to subvert the originally established goals. Birkland rejects “the 
inevitability of adaptive implementation in which target groups and street level 
bureaucrats, subvert the original program goals. He argues that top policy designers 
do have choices about who implements a policy and what incentives and sanctions to 
impose for non-compliance and can influence the expectations and needs of target 
groups so that adaptive compliance should be unnecessary or would be 
counterproductive” (cited in Nhalapo, 2012:85).
Bottom-up models clearly describe the implementation process when the policy 
is ambiguous and conflict is low. Berman (1978), Hjern and Porter (1981), Hjern 
(1982), Hjern and Hull (1982), Hull and Hjern (1987) and Lipsky (1978) paid 
attention to understand the implementation process by considering policy from the 
viewpoint of the target population and the implementers. This means that the targeted 
groups accept the main intentions of a policy and the implementers have a high level 
of cooperation and common understanding. 
In short, the top-down approach is concerned with compliance and the bottom-
up approach is concerned with understanding how to address conflicts through 
bargaining and sometimes compromise (Birkland, 2005).
Since conflicts are likely in the presence of multiple organizations, Friedman 
(2006) argued that many studies looked at “interorganizational mechanisms for 
dealing with the conflicts and the implications of these mechanisms for policy”. The 
author provided many examples of these studies: “Stoker (1989) emphasized the 
importance of cooperation and identified implementation regimes based on how 
likely they would be to achieve cooperation. Goggin et al. (1990: 33) emphasized the 
role of the communications system linking the multiple organizations in a framework 
that combined top-down and bottom-up elements; Ostrom (1998:13) elaborated 
further on how communications can affect implementation”(2006: 498).
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Accordingly, the network perspective with the main proposed model ‘the 
associability approach’ has become an important model for inter-organizational 
relationships that has received increased attention (Friedman 2006). Friedman 
argued that the idea is not new, but it belonged to Hanf, Hjern, and Porter (1978). As 
we discussed in Chapter 1, others argued that network perspective, including the 
actor network approach, emerged during the mid-1980s, primarily with the work of 
Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law (as author cited in Ritzer, 2004). Network 
perspective defines the network as the “set of relationships among the multiple 
organizations involved in a program. Since the members may forge their own 
relationships, networks are sometimes presented as a bottom-up alternative to a 
hierarchical system in a multiple organization setting” (Friedman, 2006:486). The 
term “network” in this study is used to refer to a structure of actors involved in policy 
implementation and problem solving (Hjern, 1981). Networks are regarded as 
“patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around 
policy problems and/or clusters of means and which are formed, maintained and 
changed through a series of games. By this definition, it is clear that “networks provide 
a context for games, the interactions, in which the ultimate outcomes of policy 
processes are realized” (Joop Koppenjan, and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003:70). A network 
considered as consisting of a variety of actors, arrangements, and interdependencies 
(Wachhaus, 2008: 30).
O’Toole (1997) argued that networks have become more common in public 
administration, with a focus on the effective management of the policy implementation. 
The network approach suggests that the actors’ network creation is successful when 
more alliances are involved in the network, and they work hard to maintain the 
network. This idea is significant because when the actors’ network creation is 
successful, the process of policy implementation will be successful too. The assumption 
is linked to success in understanding institutional uncertainties in a specific policy 
problem solving setting and time. The network approach provides “theoretical 
concepts and normative starting points for analyzing and assessing complex processes 
of problem solving in network settings and the roles that perceptions and interactions 
between actors play in this” (Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003:9). 
The associability approach derived from network perspective then became an 
important contemporary means of creating knowledge, and is “a fluid mix of framed 
experiences, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a 







(Davenport and Prusak 2000: 5). For McGuire and Agranoff (2007), the associability 
approach mainly seeks a collaborative form of explicit and tacit knowledge that 
supports the policy implementation in its interorganizational missions. The authors 
presented different ideas belonging to many scholars that:
Explicit knowledge is that which can be codified and communicated easily by 
documenting in words or numbers, charts or drawings. It is the more familiar form 
of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is embedded in the senses, individual perceptions, 
physical experiences, intuition, and rules of thumb. It is rarely documented, but 
“frequently communicated through conversations with the use of metaphors” and 
includes knowledge, understanding, mental models, insights, and principles inherent 
to a discipline. As the two types of knowledge necessarily interact, its value increases 
because of its proximity to action, and when combined the knowledge is much more 
“real world” than raw data or information. In a form similar to that of organizations, 
networks rely on knowledge development/management processes, blending 
information with experience, truth, judgment, and rules of thumb (2007:10). 
The associability approach of policy implementation may face many problems 
during the actual policy implementation, which can lead to misunderstanding of the 
policy setting and may result in conflicts. This can take place because the associated 
actors within the network are mutually dependent for the achievement of their goals 
of building and solidifying networks. Actors cannot achieve their goals without the 
means possessed by other actors because of such dependencies. Interaction patterns 
around policy problems emerge between actors over the course of time and these 
interaction patterns acquire some robustness (Smith, 2013:3). Joop Koppenjan and 
Erik-Hans Klijn (2003) confirm this as they have argued that the established networks 
must “provide a context in which actors behave strategically and where they meet 
with other strategically behaving actors. Within these networks, pushing and pulling 
takes place regarding the prioritization and formulation of problems and the way 
they should be solved” (2003:10).
The process of ‘translating’ a policy, which essentially entails the actor-network, 
should involve people to articulate the policies they want to implement. The 
assumption here is that actors can rely on cooperation to achieve satisfactory 
outcomes. Given the substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties at stake in 
dealing with difficult problems, these cooperation processes can be regarded as 
learning processes. The result is that the actor-network operates as a whole (Smith, 
2013:3). Furthermore, “actors do not select policies at random. They are led by their 
perceptions of the game, their own stakes and the policies of other actors. Perceptions 
are the images that actors have about the game, and they use them to give meaning to 
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and evaluate their actions and the actions of others. On the basis of these perceptions, 
actors select strategies and evaluate the (possible) outcomes of policy processes” 
(Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003:12).
The interaction processes are when different associated actors should together 
“learn about the nature of the problem, look at the possibility of doing something 
about it, and identify the characteristics of the strategic and institutional context 
within which the problem solving develops” (Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 
2003:12). The authors added, “Cooperation interactions among actors presuppose 
learning between actors, crossing the boundaries of organizations, networks and 
coalitions. This is referred to in the literature as cross-frame reflection and learning 
between advocacy coalitions and can be viewed as the sustainable development of 
shared insights, methods of work and institutions. Substantive, strategic and 
institutional uncertainty has to be met with cognitive strategic and institutional 
learning processes” (Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003:12).
The other notion is that cooperation and learning behaviour do not emerge 
spontaneously. Rather it is important to support interaction around complex issues 
through strong management of the actors’ network settings (Kickert et al., 1997; 
O’Toole, 1997; Agranoff and McGuir, 2003; cited in Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans 
Klijn, 2003). The process of network management is not an easy task, but concentrated 
work that “requires numerous skills, tacit knowledge of the network and negotiation 
skills since the adopted strategies are implemented in a situation where singular 
hierarchical relations are lacking. The role of the network manager is one of mediator 
and stimulator of interactions and not one of a central director. This role is not given 
a priori to one actor. In principle, this role can be fulfilled by several actors, sometimes 
even by more than one actor at the same time” (Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 
2003:12).
The associability approach is not without its critics. Some say the approach focuses 
too much on the approach of the actor, because it describes anything and everything 
as an actor, or rather ‘actant’, which has become the accepted term (Amsterdamska 
1990; Collins and Yearley 1992; Lee and Brown 1994 as cited in Scott-Smith, 2013). 
Another point of criticism is that the network perspective concentrates on processes 
and institutions, but neglects the substantive aspects of problems and discussions. 
However, the network perspective is a new theoretical strand in the foreign aid arena 
that informs actors involved in implementation processes about the steps to take, for 







can be resolved as the substantive aspects of the problem we deal with are related to 
the LKS. Network perspective is particularly welcome in this study. It presents a new 
way for the related actors, who are responsible for policymaking and the 
implementation of foreign aid programs to interact. Moreover, the theory gives clues 
about how to avoid rational administrative behavior. It offers a fresh look at how we 
can solve the local knowledge problem of foreign aid, by forming effective interactions 
between the actors from both sides: recipient and donors. While Law (2007) argues 
that network perspective is not a theory, it could sooner or later be developed into a 
theoretical model capable of explaining the societal processes that lead towards real 
change in the course of reform. It can combine both constructivism and positivism, 
and not force a choice between the two of them, because it just explains and describes 
a process of development and change (in Voeten, 2013). 
3.6.2 What is Aid Policy Implementation? 
Aid policy implementation is generally close to the top-down approach as it 
adopted by the donor organizations, and it does not adequately address the 
problematic nature of the LKS. As we have seen there is a blueprint model which 
designs a “ready-made” solution or an advance solution to the identified problem. 
Scholars that are specialized in the implementation of aid policies have long wrestled 
with the question of how to operationalize policy and to pay attention to the factors 
that influence this implementation, as the initial policy travels from donor to the host 
organization. Ideally, aid policy implementation should focus not only on what can 
be implemented and on what works but rather on incorporating local knowledge to 
ensure under what specific-context conditions various policies are implemented and 
work. I consider the incorporation of local knowledge, the implementation capacity 
of policies and its success as a product of interactions between policies and people in 
a specific place and time (Honig, 2006: 2; Hayek, 1948). 
Aid policy implementation can be defined as a “cognitive process” to better 
understand the explicit and implicit knowledge in specific policy-contexts during 
project implementation. Policy implementation is an inquiry seeking to determine 
whether an organization can mix people and material in a cohesive, organizational 
unit and motivate them in such a way that they carry out stated objectives. It is also 
rarely a coherent and continuous process, but rather frequently fragmented and 
interrupted (Mudacumura, 2006). Policy implementation as a process or an inquiry 
is technical, complex and highly interactive. Besides technical analysis, it calls for 
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consensus building, consideration of the visions of key stakeholders, conflict 
resolution, compromise, contingency planning and adaptation (Mudacumura, 2006). 
The outcomes of the implemented policies are often unpredictable and largely the 
result of give and take among organizations pursuing independent goals. The 
preordained outcomes are neither automatic nor assured, and implementation is 
more like a disorderly learning process than a predictable procedure (Berman, 1978). 
It is much like an assembly process: putting together pieces from different sources, 
with perhaps rather different objectives than those originally intended, and then 
reshaping those pieces into a mechanism capable of eventually producing the required 
results (Bardach, 1977). This view is also confirmed by Smith who regards policy 
implementation, as a process that should focus not simply on what can be implemented 
and what works, but rather investigate under what conditions institutional changes 
policy implementation work. It is a process of learning that involves the slow change 
of practice through the ongoing cooperation of meaning among the targets groups. 
Furthermore, aid policy implementation is aimed at “institutional programmes that 
mean to go beyond the goals for a single institution. It is a course of action rather 
than only oriented to task, and includes values and clashes between goals. Tools used 
for efficient implementation or capacity building are never impartial and bear values 
and ethics. Development management can recognize this by analyzing conflicts 
between goals, deciding who is not participating in decision-making and by 
explaining its own normative stance.” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2005, as cited in 
Jaradat, 2008: 37) 
The Local Knowledge Syndrome stems from the dispersed nature of information. 
The absence of local knowledge prevents policy makers designing efficient aid policies 
in a complex and chaotic country setting. In this study we assume that decentralized 
agents such as contractors, can be used to overcome the LKS (Saleh, 2006). The 
implementers (contractors) of aid programs and projects are players at the heart of 
the aid system, and they can potentially close the knowledge gap through their 
interactions with the beneficiaries (Ostrom, 2006 & 2003). This is true when managers 
of development programs (the contractors or the implementers) act as agents of 
internal change and when they externally advance development (Thomas, 2007, as 
cited in Jaradat, 2008: 44). Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2005) believe that 
implementation of aid development programs and policies should be people-centered 
and should promote the capacity of development players to successfully pursue their 







and communicate with different institutions, individuals and organizations, adapt to 
different contexts and circumstances, self-renew and finally integrate scientific and 
practical knowledge to inform their missions (Morgan, 2006).
The associability approach of aid policy implementation that we discussed in 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is a particularly useful tool for showing and 
understanding the factors that influence the process of incorporating local knowledge 
during policy implementation. The implementation process of the intervention of 
donor-promoted public sector reforms is usually reduced to two components, money 
and ideas. Money, as we see it, can be transferred through cheques. Based on the 
work of Scoot-Smith (2013), we propose an alternative view on how ideas of reform 
can be transferred through interactions between actors, thus solving the LKS. Donors 
as we argued before should be aware of local knowledge. The match between scientific 
knowledge and local knowledge can mainly be achieved through contacts, interactions 
between “networks” of organizations and people; and between the donors who supply 
the expertise of reforming public sectors in uncertain settings of problem solving and 
the recipients who use it (World Bank, 1998). Therefore in addressing the LKS a great 
deal of attention is focused on identifying, analyzing and elaborating the interactions 
and cooperation as learning processes between the involved actors during the 
implementation process. 
Any foreign aid program or project is a network of actors, many objects and many 
people, where everybody should base the work on cooperative relationships between 
donor agencies and contractors: recipient organizations, local managers, counterparts 
and beneficiaries or participants. These are all one network of relations, the key idea 
being that a project or program works well if the network creation is successful, 
because this ensures the possibility of incorporating local formal and informal 
knowledge. In this case the actors will understand each other well, they will exchange 
ideas about the local environment in a specific place, and they will work towards 
achieving their aim and solving any obstacles that they face during the implementation 
process. If a network is not successfully created there will be factions and disagreement 
between actors such as between the local manager and the donor contractor. 
Consequently the possibility of incorporating local formal and informal knowledge 
is lower. It is impossible for the involved actors to solve complex problems in isolation. 
The process of solving complex problems is an issue of mutual responsibility for 
establishing a peaceful interaction process among involved actors.
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3.6.3 The Associability Development Approach and Aid policy Implementation 
Foreign aid networks involve many actors with different political, social, and 
cultural or institutional backgrounds that cannot be easily altered (Burns and Flam, 
1987). Consequently, “especially cultural differences” often prevent adequate 
interaction. Actors may face difficulties since each will have their behavior guided by 
the tasks, opinions, rules and language of their own country organization and 
administrative network. Thus, interaction is subjected to clashes and conflicts 
between divergent organizational and cultural factions. The following section briefly 
considers the different factors that can influence the relationships and interactions 
processes, leading to conflicts within the aid programs network of actors because of 
institutional uncertainties: (1) building trust (2) commitment, (3) mutual 
understanding and (4) cultural differences.
The first factor is the trust and openness amongst actors. Trust can either make or 
break cooperative relations (Dasgupta, 1988). Especially in the foreign aid arena, 
actors have often not met previously, and thus cannot adhere to certain codified rules 
that were shaped informally in the past. The concept of trust among players is not yet 
established, so they are not inclined to share information. Everything is formulated 
in detailed contracts, which can significantly increase uncertainty within or between 
actors in the network. Other players may continue to experience substantial distrust. 
This makes interactions more problematic and generates uncertainty about the 
behaviour of other actors and of the processes of incorporating local knowledge and 
assuring effective outcomes (Joop Koppenjan and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2000). One of the 
most important configurations in the perceptions of actors is the trust that “actors 
have in other actors. We regard trust as a (stable) perception about the intentions of 
other actors. The trust of an actor concerns the expectation that other actors will 
refrain from opportunistic behaviour even when there is occasion for such behaviour. 
When that trust is mutual, network patterns of actors with weak trust relations may 
emerge. This does not only distinguishes networks for other, but it also means that 
actors can play the policy making game based on other expectations” (Joop Koppenjan 
and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2003: 175). In foreign aid projects, mutual understanding and 
trust between consultant and clients is essential. “This requires both sensitivity by the 
consultant to the peculiarities of the local situation, and well-managed personal 
contacts. The latter takes time to build up. Unhelpful discontinuity is sometimes 
deliberately programmed in” (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 80).







condition to have a successful interaction and harmonious relations. The author 
points out that “positive attitudes in managing the alliance, and actions to stimulate 
bonding and organizational learning during the evolution of the alliance, were 
strongly associated with its effectiveness” (1995: 186 cited in Vartiainen, 2002: 34). 
Trust has a critical role to play in the success of alliances of all kinds. The interesting 
question is how trust is defined in literature and if the definitions are applicable to our 
analysis. Faulkner (2000) says that there are three types of trust. The first is calculative 
trust, which is risk taking, the second is prognostic trust, which is the trust which has 
been constructed over a period of successful interaction, and the third is affective 
trust which is interaction that turns into friendship between the partners (2000:341). 
Sako (1998, 1992) also provides a useful definition of trust that includes three 
categories. The first is contractual trust that means that the partners are expected to 
fulfil their contractual agreements, resting on a shared moral norm of honesty and 
promise keeping. The second is competence trust, which means that the partner is 
capable and willing to do what it has promised to do. This requires that partners share 
an understanding of professional conduct and technical and managerial standards. 
The third is goodwill trust, which means that partners make a commitment to take 
initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from taking unfair advantage of the 
other partners. Goodwill trust can exist only when there is consensus on the principles 
of objectivity (also see: Sako, 1992; Vartiainen, 2002). 
Kanter (1989) stresses that running associations requires very different attitudes 
and behavior from running hierarchies. Building harmony changes decision-making, 
and respect in alliances comes not with rank, but with knowledge and the ability to 
get things done. Sako (1998) puts this as follows: “trust is a social norm which lessens 
the need to use hierarchy to attenuate opportunism… here, trust tends to be 
conceptualized as a substitute for various governance mechanisms... whatever the 
formal governance structure, the higher the level of mutual trust, the better the 
performance is likely to be”(1998: 90-91). These tools are useful for analyzing the 
selected cases in the sense that this interaction is managed and coordinated by 
traditionally hierarchical government administrations.
Mutual understanding and trust during the interactions is essential for exchanging 
ideas and information on local knowledge. This requires both sensitivity by the 
consultant to the peculiarities of the local situation and well-managed personal 
contacts and commitment. The latter takes time to build up. According to Faulkner 
and de Rond (2000) commitment differs from trust. It is possible to be very committed 
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to co-operation with partners, but still not trust them. Conversely, it is possible to 
trust the partner, but at the same time be committed only to a limited degree. 
Commitment can be signaled in many different ways. It may be shown by investments 
in projects which can be either material (financing, equipment and technical 
assistance) or ‘knowledge-based’ (education, advice and guidance). According to 
Spekman and Isabella (2000), commitment is a virtual cycle. When one partner 
demonstrates commitment, there is often a similar response from the other. To put it 
simply, we can state that commitment is a partner’s willingness to devote time, energy 
and/or resources to the alliance. Commitment is also a signal which can tell us how 
well the interaction is functioning. Committed partners are willing to work together 
so that the interaction functions well and the potential problems and risks can be 
solved. The commitment cycle demands shared information between partners.
As we see in Chapter 4 of this study, the culture of any formal institution, be it a 
business corporation, a government department or a whole state - can be difficult for 
outsiders to understand. The culture has a profound influence on the ways in which 
the formal institution functions and on attempts to change those ways. Klitgaard has 
suggested that the power of program or policy effects may depend on aspects of the 
sociocultural context. Citing Putnam (1993), Klitgaard draws an analogy between 
this context and the soil in which a gardener has to work: “Policies and projects may 
work better or worse, depending on the soil conditions; if we understood the soil 
conditions better, we might choose a different kind of policy or project” (Klitgaard, 
1998: 6). 
The interesting work of Bovaird (2002:50) describes four key areas in which 
culture and tacit knowledge can play a major area in knowledge transfers in a cross-
cultural context:
(1) National culture - tacit knowledge about behavior or attitudes important in 
forming successful relationships in a country e.g. when to use the familiar second 
person form of the verb in Germany or France to a person of similar age and standing 
(Hofstede, 1994; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993).
(2) Sector culture - the set of beliefs, values and norms of an industry or a sector 
– which has been termed the ‘sector recipe’ (Spender, 1989) or ‘industrial wisdom’ 
(Hellgren and Melin, 1992).
(3) Organizational culture - tacit knowledge about the underlying norms and 
assumptions of the organization e.g. whether it is strongly advisable to contest 
organizational policies or strategies with the Chief Executive or Director of a public 
enterprise in an interview or seminar (Trompenaars, 1997; Johnson, 1992)
(4) Craft/professional culture - tacit knowledge about how an activity can and/or 
should be carried out successfully, according to the accumulated experience of the 







measurement in a particular service in such a way as to attract interest from 
practitioners. (Mintzberg, 1983).
The dark side of the interaction consists of off-loading risks and costs onto the 
environment, and unequal representation. Therefore, there is a need for guarantees 
that limit these negative effects (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 187). Cultural differences 
between actors within a network are likely to be the greatest sources of difficulties 
and conflicts. Poor interpersonal interactions can damage the relationship between 
donor and recipient for far longer than the duration of one individual’s time in the 
country, and affect directly how that donor is regarded. Differences in transparency, 
flexibility, working styles and management styles can lead to many conflicts in the 
actors’ interaction processes. Conflicts points to existing different visions, 
expectations, objectives, and understanding of the projects
3.6.4 Problems Which Aggravate Interactions during Aid Policy Implementa-
tion 
The main idea is that the LKS can take come into play, because many factors are 
involved in the interaction process and there is a need for greater attention by the 
network management to avoid such factors. A problem can be that recipient actors 
rarely express their opinions and concerns thus marginalizing local ideas and 
expertise. The network within foreign aid programs includes a large number of actors 
which makes it more complicated to manage such a network. There is an important 
role for the management of the network as the learning process does not emerge 
spontaneously. It is important to support interaction for discussing complex issues 
through a strong management structure. 
If we take the example of the Netherlands and its related programs in higher 
education like the NPT, the actors consist of the following: 
(1) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs – both in The Hague and abroad through the 
Dutch embassies in the countries eligible for NPT. The Ministry in The Hague is 
responsible for policy making, financing, supervision and external monitoring and 
evaluation, while the embassies have a role in monitoring and liaison with government 
and other donors in setting priorities.
(2) Nuffic, which is responsible for NPT management, including decisions on 
funding and awarding grants on behalf of the Ministry, (financial) administration 
and accounting, internal monitoring and evaluation, and program-level financial 
and progress reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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(3) Dutch contractors, who are responsible for project implementation in 
accordance with the project description, (financial) administration and accounting 
and reporting to Nuffic.
(4) Relevant line and/or sector Ministries in NPT countries. 
(5) Beneficiary organisations/institutes in NPT countries, who are tasked to 
implement the NPT projects together with partners from the Netherlands, like Dutch 
students/trainees and their employers (MinBuZa, 2012). 
Many institutional problems can influence the process of interactions between 
actors in the established network. For example, problems can arise when too much 
time has elapsed between the initial visit to define the project, and the awarding of 
the contract. If the contractor has found it necessary to recruit expert subcontractors, 
they may be unavailable by the time the contract is actually awarded. Another issue 
is the selection process of the contractor by the donor organization, as most agencies 
inform bidders of the weight that will be attached to the several characteristics sought, 
which do not give attention to local knowledge. The empirical evidence is that most 
donor agencies only attributed 5% to 10% of the total marks for a bidder to local 
knowledge (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006).
Rapid rotation of staff is a problem that influences the process of actor network 
interactions for the start of the project. High staff turnover in addition to short-term 
assignments to field offices and a growing number of temporary contracts in most 
development agencies, make it difficult for staff to engage and interact with local 
actors and to absorb sufficient knowledge about the formal and informal organizations/ 
institutions where their projects are going to be applied. It can lead to a “limited 
institutional memory and internal bureaucratic imperatives which militate against 
learning and flexibility, dependence on external resources (such as consultants) 
resulting in a fragmentation of responsibility” (OECD 2000, as cited in Jenkins and 
Plowden, 2006: 120). In most cases, there is no effective preparation for contractors 
about the local context before sending them to the field. This is due to a lack of 
institutional memory on the part of donors, or at least a reluctance to draw on it. The 
rapid rotation of staff increases the distance between donor agencies and local actors 
who require their support. Furthermore, gaining trust is a much harder task than 
losing/ruining it. Change of personnel or change of contractors on both sides can 
create a less trustful situation. (Jan Olsson and Lennart Wohlgemuth, 2003:13). In 
addition, there are rarely effective mechanisms in place to ensure post-field knowledge 







time in their offices in the capital city, under pressure to be “strategic” and with little 
time to connect with poor people. In addition, they tend to be rewarded more for the 
financial management of funds than for the actual performance of what is funded 
(Jan Olsson and Lennart Wohlgemuth, 2003). 
Before we conclude this chapter, it is worth noting that there are a number of ways 
that the associability approach can be applied to different levels within foreign aid 
systems. It is a flexible approach of analysis and can be used as a grand theory and 
persuasive ideal for unpacking the whole concept of ‘development’, or it can be applied 
to a particular small project, focusing on the network with its limited actors (Scott-
Smith, 2013: 6). 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the theoretical framework of the study. We started 
with a basic definition for the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” and its relation to foreign 
aid effectiveness. Many authors consider that the LKS appears when foreign aid 
agencies design and implement aid policies, which are trying to impose formal and 
prescribed institutions and ignoring the role of the informal structure, the métis. 
Informal institutions and organizations or “implicit-knowledge” are as important, if 
not more, than formal institutions and organizations’ “explicit-knowledge” for the 
effective promotion of public sector reforms in developing countries. The informal 
structure represents the main rules of the game, by which most of the recipient 
government bodies are administrated and controlled. Aid participants must design 
and promote reforms with a comprehensive understanding of institutions and 
“institutional change” in non-transparent environments.
Several theories have been examined to consider why the LKS is still downplayed 
in foreign aid at the level of aid policy design and implementation: public policy 
making and implementation theory, bounded rationality approach, the institutional 
theory, the development associability approach derived from the Actor-network 
theory and cultural theory. Based on these theories, it is argued that donors mostly 
adopt central planning, a blueprint approach of policymaking and a top-down 
approach of policy implementation. This is a serious problem because blueprint 
approaches do not consider LKS as part of the equation. In analyzing the factors that 
influence the process of incorporating local knowledge, “policy design” is one of the 
key issues. There is hope to incorporate the practical knowledge gained in the policy 
implementation stage that might lead to results not foreseen in the design. However, 
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donors often use the “synoptic view” of policy implementation or the top-down 
approach of policy implementation, which both ignore the relative ease with which 
implementers and interest groups can work to subvert the originally established 
goals. 
Following our discussion of the theoretical issues in this chapter, we can put 
forward two main hypotheses to consider how the incorporation of local knowledge 
influences the success of policy design and/or implementation of donor-promoted 
public sector reform programs in developing countries:
1. If local knowledge in policy design is increased, by integrating formal and informal 
institutions and organizations in recipient governments or organizations, more 
successful aid programs can occur. Less integration of local knowledge will likely lead 
to more failing programs.
2. If more local knowledge is incorporated during the implementation stage, more 
attention is paid to results that are not foreseen in the initial design, therefore 
preventing costs of redesigning aid programs.
If we establish an effective model that ensures the incorporation of local knowledge, 
the aid policymaking and implementation must be more closely integrated or linked 
in order to reduce uncertainties and the unknowns of local settings in the recipient 
countries. However, I want to emphasize more that LK only manifests itself during 
the interactions at the implementation stage. The associability development approach 
offers a particularly useful tool for showing and understanding the factors that may 
influence the process of interactions during policy implementation. The interactions 
in the foreign aid arena involve many actors with different political, social, cultural 
and institutional backgrounds that cannot be easily altered. Consequently, “especially 
cultural differences” often prevent adequate interaction. Actors may face difficulties 
since each will have their behavior guided by the tasks, opinions, rules and language 
of their own country organization and administrative network.
The next chapter addresses local knowledge in the case of Yemen, which is then 
used as a background to our analysis of the Dutch NPT program in the coming 
chapters. The chapter provides information to an outsider who is trying to conduct 
aid intervention in Yemen with facts on how donors can interact and associate with 
the Yemeni counterparts, and a clear view of the essential needs of the capacity and 




SOME ASPECTS OF THE LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN YEMEN 
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4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter hypothesized, that any reform agenda aiming to build capacity 
and capability of the civil service system in traditional countries like Yemen, has to 
consider informal institutions and organizations at the core of its policy design and 
implementation process. These considerations make or break the outcomes of reform 
agendas. This hypothesis is tied to strands of institutional theories1 and public policy 
theory. To incorporate local knowledge during the policymaking and/or policy 
implementation, we made use of some ideas of the network perspective, and especially 
the actor network approach, which suggests following a ‘development associability’ 
approach. This means engaging in effective interactions between the donor and 
recipient stakeholders, and creating sound associations around the project (see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). 
This chapter explores informal behavioral and management aspects within the 
Yemeni civil service system by considering interaction between formal and informal 
institutions. Despite the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, a clear understanding 
and positive interaction between formal and informal institutions is a pre-condition 
for identifying the problems and formulating sound policies for building, and im-
proving the managerial capacity of the administrative system in the Yemeni public 
sector. Such information on local knowledge has been missing in all three waves of 
donor-promoted public sector reforms in developing countries over the last five de-
cades, and has affected their outcomes (Baimyrzaeva, 2010). 
In this chapter, we generate practical insight to be used as a conceptual back-
ground to analyze the Dutch NPT program for capacity building of the higher educa-
tion sector in Yemen, and to examine how such donor-promoted reforms are playing 
on the ground. Furthermore, the insights are applied to show different aspects that 
donors need to be aware of during policy design and implementation. Managers and 
organizations do not function in line with the skills, styles and techniques needed to 
perform their mission in uncertain situations (for donors) in Yemen. This chapter 
shows how dynamics rather than stable relationships and interactions between do-
nors and recipients are regarded as a main condition to incorporate local knowledge 
during policy implementation.
Following the introduction of the chapter, there are seven sections. The second 
1 - As we saw in Chapter 1, most of  these theories are largely based upon Western ideas assuming formal and informal 
institutions, grounded in relatively stable institutional frameworks. The role of  informal institutions and organizations 
in public administration systems in developing countries has not yet been sufficiently explored. For example, there is an 
abundance of  theory about networks in Western nations but there is limited insight into the actual dynamics of  network 







section briefly presents aspects of the social structure of Yemeni society, focusing on 
the tribes as the key element of social structure. The third section briefly discusses 
fragmentation in the social structure and state power, showing the political influence 
of Yemen’s social structure. The fourth section discusses the social groups within the 
civil service system, with a brief introduction to the competing and primordial ties. 
The fifth section explores the interaction between informal and formal institutions 
within the civil services sector and thus explores the main aspects of civil servants’ 
functions in Yemen. Based on information of local knowledge explored in the pre-
ceding sections, section six provides useful information for a donor expert or man-
ager who is working in Yemen so they can cope with the rule of the game that are 
operative within the civil service and other sectors. Section seven reviews informa-
tion about the status quo of the public sector in Yemen, in addition to the informa-
tion explored in the functions of the civil servants, we develop an ideal model for 
capacity building within public sector in Yemen in section eight. The last section 
provides the main questions for public policy analysis of the Dutch NPT program for 
higher education capacity building in Yemen. 
4.2 The Social Structure in Yemen 
Similar to many other tribal nations, the most notable feature of Yemen’s local 
knowledge is a relative lack of salience of formal institutions and organizations 
compared to informal institutions and organizations within the public sector. Neither 
the rules of the game (North, 1990) within the Yemeni public sector, nor wealth is 
generated, transmitted or practiced predominantly through the state’s formal 
institutions and organizations. The power of Yemen’s formal state institutions and 
organizations is far less than it appears on paper, and is broadly subservient to the 
interests of informal institutions and organizations(Phillips, 2011: 11). In other 
words, to understand the dynamics of the Yemeni public sector one must look beyond 
written laws and regulations and institutional rules and procedures to examine the 
informal rules of the game that govern organizational and individual behavior. The 
influence of informal institutions and organizations is reflected in Yemeni 
governmental officials’ distinctive and informal style of decision making, management 
functions, interpersonal relations and so on (Muna, 1980). The informal institutions 
and organizations within the public sector are heavily influenced by socio-political 
factors such as tribal social structure and its traditional culture, values, norms and 
expectations. This is the local environment or the deep-rooted implicit/local 
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knowledge in the Yemeni society. Therefore, policy makers have to ensure that policy 
reforms have to be coherent with the existing social structures of the society (Jütting 
et al, 2007). The first question is thus: what is the social structure of Yemen? 
Social structure is how social institutions such as clans, tribes, family, educational, 
religious, economic, and political institutions organize a given society. These institu-
tions have a certain degree of consistent and stable relations among individuals who 
belong to it. In Yemen, tribes are a key element in the social structure of society, as 
they constitute 85% of the population (Al-Thahery, 1996: 21). Although in other so-
cieties the tribe is no longer an important phenomenon, it is still dominant in all 
spheres of Yemeni life: political, economic, administrative, and cultural. According to 
Al-Thahery, tribes are ‘the soul of the Yemeni society’ (Al-Thahery, 2004: 36) and 
Qaba’il (tribal) peoples form the mainstream of Yemeni society in both cities and the 
countryside. The tribal people in the cities usually retain ties to a rural village and 
own property in the village as tribal honor is vested in land ownership.
The definition of tribes in Yemen is often overlooked or misrepresented in West-
ern scholarship and sometimes Arab researchers, media and policy analyses too. 
Therefore, to illuminate the nature of the Yemeni tribal social structure, it is useful to 
first put forward a brief definition of the Yemeni tribe (“Gabilih”, in the Yemeni dia-
lect). Yemeni tribes are social-economical organizations that are significantly inde-
pendent (Al-Dawsari, 2012). They are a particular community that has its own lands, 
sources of water, boundaries, and markets. The tribesmen believe that they are de-
scended from the same root. This belief has formed tribesmen’ general awareness. 
The tribe can be seen as a nearly homogeneous and distinct organization (Al-Sharja-
by, 1990: 57). Tribes can be described as “groups organized along kinship ties and 
whose members claim a common ancestor, whether imagined or real” (Ronsin, 
2010).
In addition in Yemen ‘the tribes share a form of common law (‘urf or hukm ‘urfi), 
leadership rules (especially sheikhs), and a sense of identity for members, and a code 
of ethical behavior (qabyala). They implement this law in their territories, dealing 
with their own affairs as this helps them organize production, group protection, 
dispute management, and relations with non-tribal groups (Al-Obdoly, 2003). The 
most important common aspects among Yemeni tribes are the following: 
(1) Solidarity: they share the same functions in terms of their role in promoting the 
welfare of their members; 








(3) Culture and traditions: the tribesmen have the same culture, customs and traditions; 
(4) Specific territory: every tribe often lives in a specific land; 
(5) Specific social, political, economic and military organizations for every tribe. 
A tribe in Yemen is not ethnically diverse but rather a culturally homogenous 
unit. In other words, “a tribe in Yemen can be defined as a social organization that 
gains its legitimacy from a set of traditional rules that constitutes a social contract 
among the tribe’s members as well as between them and their sheikhs and other 
tribes. This social contract, or customary Law, governs public affairs, protects 
common interests, and extends protection and economic support to tribal members” 
(Al-Dawsari, 2012: 5). In the numerous definitions of tribes or tribalism, two main 
characteristics are worth discussing: (1) the mechanic “asabiyya” (group solidarity) 
among their members and their fluidity, and (2) their ability to change and adapt to 
economic and political situations through alliances and feud. Tribalism thus defines 
the intervention of tribes in the public sphere (Ronsin, 2010). 
It is estimated that there are more than 200 big tribes in Yemen,2 141 of which 
occupy the northern mountainous region. These tribes are stronger than others as 
there are insufficient agricultural products in this region. Those in the northern part 
of Yemen try both legally and illegally to meet their basic needs through waging wars 
against each other, armed robbery and interceptions3. The other 59 tribes inhabit the 
west coast, and southern and eastern regions. They live on agriculture and that is the 
main reason for their more peaceful existence (El-Maori, 1999: 134-135). The 
standing and power of a sheikh and a tribe really depends on the geographical features 
of a tribe’s land. The sheikhs in the mountainous areas are more powerful than sheikhs 
that are located tribe in the plains or valleys areas. This is because it is difficult for the 
state to reach the tribes located in the mountainous regions who have traditional 
weapons. Based on origin there are three major tribal gatherings in Yemen: Hashid 
and Bakeel (both inhabiting the mountainous regions) and Madhaj (inhabiting the 
coastal areas). The religion of the Yemeni society is Muslim. However, the Yemeni 
society is divided into Shi’ite, ‘Zadea’ sects, and Sunni, ‘Shafi’ sects, both with 
comparable number of followers. Due to the strong tribal links in this community, 
‘Zadea’ has enjoyed greater political power throughout history (Al- Salaihy, 2005).
The tribe is the center of reference, loyalty, and belonging for individuals. 
Moreover, sheikhs of the tribes have various degrees of power, influence, and wealth 
2 - The big tribes includes some smaller tribes. The estimated number of  small tribes is presented in the coming sections. 
3 - Nowadays, most of  these tribes live using the state and public money, I discuss this point later in this chapter. 
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and are usually “chiefs”, who have authority over their “followers or individuals.” “The 
status of a sheikh is not automatically passed from father to son, and a person’s efforts 
to be a sheikh are not necessarily respected by tribesmen or other tribes” (Al-Dawsari, 
2012:4). The process of sticking to tribal norms and customs is the key factor 
contributing to the power of the sheikh and the tribe in general (Al-Obdoly, 2003: 
33). If people stick to tribal norms this means that they obey and respect the sheikh, 
and therefore they will be ready at any time to fight and die for him and for the tribe 
regardless of the personality, tribe or entity they face. The more the sheikh is dedicated 
to the tribal norms and traditions, the more tribesmen obey to tribal customs and 
norms and vice versa. Tribal customs and norms are the regulations that control the 
different features of tribes and if any of the tribesmen disrespects the regulations he 
will be disparaged, blamed, scolded or even abandoned if the violations are major 
(Mojalli, 2012).
The sources of tribal leader’s power also lie in the fact that he is the most 
sophisticated and cunning in the tribe, and the most aware of a tribe’s own traditions 
and customs. He is owner of a large part of a tribe’s wealth and lands, and he is the 
client of the political-ruling elite in most cases. The authority of a Sheikh takes 
precedence over state authority among tribesmen. He has the power to solve the 
conflicts that occur between members of the tribe, and to implement his demands on 
the members of his tribe even by force. He is the protector of the rights and justice for 
his tribesmen, according to tribal custom and rules and penalty systems recognized 
by the traditional tribal value-system in Yemen (Al Theeb, 2010). 
The Sheikh decides what is wrong or right for his tribe. The trust and last word is 
for the Sheikh. He is the protector of the interests of members of the tribe and knows 
what is harmful and what is beneficial to them. “In some areas of the country 
particularly in the middle parts and far northern areas (where most of the ruling elite 
comes from), the social influence of the sheikh is huge as all problems, marriage, 
selling and purchasing land, can never take place without the permission from or the 
supervision of the sheikh, if someone has a problem, no one else has the right to 
punish or to forgive but the sheikh and only the sheikh…”4.
The level of a sheikh’s power varies from place to place in Yemen. In some tribes 
like those located in the western Ibb, Al-Baida’a and Hashid, sheikhs have a high level 
of power and are acting as kings for the tribes. Some of them have jails to imprison 
4 - A depth interview with different Yemeni social figures has been done by Mojalli tilted: “Power of  tribal leaders in 








any tribesman who does not obey them (Al-Salahy, 2001). In contrast, the power of 
the sheikh in the tribes of the north and east, particularly around Sana’a, Marib, and 
Shabwah is based on mutual respect: the sheikh does not have a jail and people are 
free to do whatever they want without needing to resort to him unless they have a 
problem or he summons them for an issue that concerns the tribe. Tribesmen in 
these areas usually respect and obey the decisions taken by the sheikh as these 
decisions are taken through consulting tribesmen and heads of villages.
The Yemeni social structure does not only consist of tribes. There are several other 
social groups and classes, which have different social, political, economic, educational 
and administrative characteristics5:
Table 4.1: The Different Yemeni Social Groups and their Characteristics
This table was compiled by the researcher using quotes from Al-Theeb (2006: 101,103). There are also 
many sources in addition from the researcher experience about the social structure in Yemen.
Akhdams and ‘Abids represent about 4% of the total Yemeni population. The 
Akhdam form the lowest social strata in Yemeni society. Their origins are traced back 
to East Africa. Walters (1998) views them as a racial minority (1998:75). The Akhdams 
were originally most prevalent in the southern regions of Yemen and the Red Sea 
5 - These groups exist next to tribes, but tribes/social groups can be mixed.
Social Groups Percentage in Society Location of Housing
Political and 
Administrative Roles
How they Obtain 
the Social Status
Rate of Educated 
People 
Alsaadah 2% Cities Strong Heredity 95%
Judges’ families 1% Cities Strong Heredity 95%
Elders 0.1% Countryside Strong Heredity 85%
Senior traders and 
owners 0.003%
Cities and the 
countryside Strong Heredity 95%
Tribesmen  85% Countryside Weak Heredity 20%
Small traders 1% Cities and the countryside Weak
Heredity and 
Acquisition 80%
Traditional crafters .05% Cities and the countryside Weak Heredity 20%
Intellectuals 0.01% Cities Weak Acquisition 100%
Governmental staff 4% Cities Strong Acquisition 55%
The Army 3% Cities Strong Acquisition 50%
Khadam and 
ervants(Muzayyinah) 4%




Total Percent 100% The men’s category has 48% of the total percentage




coast, where they were the servants for wealthier houses. Only within the last few 
decades have the Akhdam moved into Sana’a where they liv in shantytowns and often 
work as street sweepers. Akhdams have the lowest position in the Yemeni social 
hierarchy. In terms of size, they do not exceed 2% of the total Yemeni population. The 
Akhdam tribes are socially shunned and live in social, economic, political and 
cultural isolation. In addition, all segments of society despise them and some do not 
buy food or drinks from them. There is no a social group in Yemeni society that has 
accepted to initiate a relationship in the form of a marriage or a simple dinner with 
them. The ‘Abid are also of African origin. They were the former slaves, again 
historically located in the southern and coastal regions, and they are actually higher 
up the social ladder than the Akhdam (Walters 1998; Menely 1996). Moreover, the 
lowest social class that is traditional to Sana’a and other cities of the central and 
northern highlands are the Muzayyinah – people who have historically performed 
services such as butcher, barber, innkeeper, wedding entertainer, and Hammam 
(public bath) operator. Within the Mazayinah social class, women have always 
worked in these urban occupations. A majority of Muzayyinah are landless, unable to 
defend themselves by arms and dependent on tribesmen for protection (Hawkins, 
2007: 305).
A narrow translation of Qadhi is ‘judge’. However, the term in Yemen also 
designates a pre-revolutionary social class of high social standing. The Qadhis were 
the educated class; the men were the judges, religious teachers, and government 
officials for the Imamate. The Sadah class claims that their roots go back to the 
Prophet Mohammed; hence, they consider themselves blessed and distinguished 
from the public. They are an elite and a highly educated people (95% of them 
educated), they are the families from whom the Imams were chosen. The Sadah also 
served as judges, government officials, and teachers as well as religious scholars 
(Hawkins, 2007: 305)6. However, the Sadahs do not derive their legitimacy from 
affiliation with any particular tribe. They arrived in Yemen only after Islam’s advent, 
mediating between local tribes. They derive their legitimacy from a religious faith, as 
it is in Islam that Muslims should respect and obey the Prophet Mohammed’s families. 
The belief is that respecting and obeying them is like respecting and obeying the 
Prophet Mohammed himself. 
6 - Between 1918 and 1962 Yemen was a Kingdom (Mutawakkalite Kingdom) and its king, named Imam, belonged to 







There is a part of the ZAKAH (Tax) which is a duty to give to the Prophet 
Mohammed’s families.7 It seems that even the Sadah derive their power from the 
power of the tribes. The tribes in Yemen are considered as the main influential social 
power in all spheres in the Yemeni society. 
Understanding the different aspects of the tribes is crucial to designing an 
approach to reform the public sector in Yemen. I argue that it would be a mistake to 
abandon the informal system offered by the tribes and its impact on state power, 
control of society, the behavior and attitudes of the civil servants and thus on any 
transition initiative within the public sector in Yemen. There needs to be awareness 
that Yemen’s managers and organizations do not function in line with formal 
institutions and rules, but mostly based upon the informal norms, values and 
institutions as reviewed above. Therefore, for promoting the capacity within public 
sector in Yemen, the policy makers have to analyze the impact of the informal system 
on both political and administrative aspects of the Yemeni State. 
4.3 The Fragmentation in Social Structure and State Power 
Yemen is diagnosed as a weak state with fragmented social control. Certainly, the 
State of Yemen is unable to apply the rule of law in its own territory. “Yemen’s tribes 
are often referred to, and often consider themselves, as a State within a State. Tribal 
leaders do not always grant the government access to the territory under their control, 
and the number of government soldiers killed for entering an area without the 
permission of the tribe provides good reason for the state to heed these restrictions” 
(Phillips, 2007: 19). Thus “the challenge for government then becomes one of 
maximizing the contribution of tribes while minimizing the dysfunctional side of 
tribal behavior. Tribal leaders must develop a sense of awareness of their role in 
building the Yemeni State. This is a difficult undertaking. Managing expectations in 
all tribal areas in Yemen essentially means dealing with sheikhs because in the end, 
they operate in a patronage situation” (Jones, 2005: 304). Indeed, a sheikhs’ word is 
final in their local communities. They protect and provide and in return people 
7 - More Sayyids in northern came from the Hejaz (now Saudi Arabia), Iran and Iraq and joined the ranks of  the Sayyids 
class in North Yemen. According to Gochenour 1984, the Sayyids “… entered first into the tribal society of  the North-
ern Highlands through the traditional tribal institution of  hijra [a protected enclave]. That is to say, they settled in tribal 
lands by invitation from the tribes. In return for performing ‘high-culture’ duties for the tribesmen – namely scribal work, 
calibrating calendars and star charts, reading and drafting documents – and acting the same way as Imam al-Hadi had – 
namely as mediators, arbiters and negotiators – the Sayyids and Ashraf  were honored by the tribesmen and given lands 
sufficient to guarantee them an income.” (1984: 9 as cited in Hawkins, 2007). The Shafi’i Sunnis of  southern Yemen and 
the Tihama also followed this social class system and had Sayyid families. But the Sayyid class in these non-Zaydi regions 
was not automatically invested with rights to political leadership by birth.
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pledge their allegiance. When speaking of ‘community’ in this scenario, one might 
see the voice of the community as that of the Sheikh (Jones, 2005: 304). As a result, 
the governing power in Yemen is under the mercy of the tribal elders and the other 
symbols of power within society. “The weakness of the State and the plurality of 
alternate social organizations (fragmentation in social control) make it difficult for 
the government to impose reform without first building a solid consensus. 
Consequently, what has occurred is the announcement of numerous reforms, and a 
failure to implement the measures fully” (Kaufman, 2004: 7). 
The fragmentation in social structure, consisting of an unsystematic web of small 
tribes (more than 50,000 tribes) has forced the Yemeni ruling elites to put this political 
game before public interest to preserve their power, expand their legitimacy, and 
weaken their rivals. Such a situation allows the tribal elders, strongmen, and 
sometimes sectarian and religious elite to penetrate the Yemeni State’s public 
administration. In other words, ‘Yemeni sheikhs’ depend on the State’s financial and 
moral support as well as government appointments to strengthen their control over 
local communities. In turn Yemeni leaders are dependent on them for keeping them 
in power. Tribal sheikhs misuse the State’s support, which results in corruption, 
favoritism, and incompetent leadership of the State (Migdal, 1998:35). Migdal has 
written that under the previous social status (fragmented social control), the leaders 
in the third world have adopted a particular management and political style for their 
countries, the politics of survival, which is the core of how the administration is 
managed in the State of Yemen (1988: 225-226).
The survival politics of the former neopatrimonial system in Yemen has been 
widely studied and produced extensive investigations by many researchers from 
inside and outside of Yemen. For example, in 2008, I wrote a Master’s Thesis about the 
politics of survival of former president Saleh and his techniques of surviving in ruling 
the country. Sarah Phillips received her Ph.D. from the Centre for Arab and Islamic 
Studies, Australian National University, in 2007 with a thesis entitled Yemen’s 
Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized 
Authoritarianism. This study examines the nature of changes to Yemen’s power 
structures, political dynamics and institutions since the intention to democratize was 
announced in 1990. In February 2011, Sarah Phillips wrote an interesting article 
about the “Key Players and Yemen’s power Elite and Developmental Dysfunction”. 
Moreover, by using the case study of Yemen, April Longley Alley received her Ph.D. 







Qamariyya the Reinvention of Patronage Networks in Contemporary Yemen. Her study 
aimed to answer the questions: “Under what conditions do elites in neopatrimonial 
regimes, who are included in networks of patronage, defected by building formal 
political institutions? Why do these elites defect? And finally, what impact do their 
actions have on the institutions under negotiation and on the survival of the 
neopatrimonial system?”(2008: 5). She argues that in contemporary Yemen, “elites 
are deeply embedded in networks of patronage and sometimes choose to build formal 
political institutions. The embedding of elites is puzzling because their actions would 
at first appear to undermine the informal system of politics that provides for their 
position of privilege. The elites under consideration are not outsiders left to languish 
in the wilderness, but instead they are privileged benefactors of informal avenues to 
power. They risk losing their favored status if formal political institutions infringe 
upon existing informal arrangements” (2008: 6). 
There are many studies about Yemen, which deal with the tribal-politics 
phenomenon, and how the tribal social structure forms the political life of the 
country. However, the literature revealed that scholars inside or outside Yemen paid 
little attention to the study of leadership and organizational practices, and 
interpersonal interactions in Yemeni public sector organizations, which are formed 
on the basis of such overlapping social context. This could be partly due to the 
difficulty of studying the cultural and values and customs generated by the local 
environment and their links to the organizational and managerial behavior and the 
function of the civil servants in the country (Abdalla, Ikhlas and Moudi Al-Homoud, 
2001). In the coming sections, I present some of these informal organizational and 
managerial practices. Before engaging in this debate, it is important to show the 
distribution and the influence of these social groups over the administrative hierarchy, 
and how they have been accommodated and appointed in office. 
4.4 The Accommodation Map of the Social Groups within the Civil Service 
System 
The accommodation of the social groups within the civil service system can be 
divided into three levels. The first level includes the senior civil servants, belonging to 
ranks ranging from the Director-General to the rank of Vice Minister and Minister. 
This level represents the bureaucratic elites who are often the intellectuals and non-
intellectuals from the Alsaadah social group, families of ‘judges’, and some of the 
strongest tribes’ elders. Most of the Alsaadah and Judges’ families inherited the top of 
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the bureaucratic positions, a custom that dates back many centuries8. This group is 
almost 2% of the total population of Yemen, and claims to be descendants from the 
family of the Prophet Muhammad. The majority of them are well-educated. They 
monopolize power in Yemen and acquire the best lands in society. They are 
characterized by close solidarity among themselves, regardless of their political 
affiliation and economic and administrative status. It often appears on the surface 
that they have a high level of coordination and understanding amongst themselves in 
public bodies and organizations. Indeed, Alsaadah are the backbone of the Yemeni 
state’s administrative system and own its political decisions (Al-Theeb, 2006: 33).
The second level includes the middle management civil servants who occupy the 
positions of managers and heads of departments and branches. These account for 
more than 15% of the total number of the civil servants in Yemen. Most of the general 
managers belong to the strong men in the society, and they also belong to tribes. The 
third level is personnel, specialists and technicians as well as military soldiers, and all 
those represent the broad segment in society, accounting for up to 80% of the total 
number of civil servants in Yemen. The mid-level leaders in the second level have 
been appointed in the office as part of the politics of a survival agenda adopted by the 
political and bureaucratic elites to survive in ruling the country. The same mid-level 
leaders have appointed the low-level personnel as part of this survival policy to 
maintain and preserve their positions (Al-Theeb, 2006).
It is important to note that for our purpose we will just focus on the traditional 
social classes: Sadah, Qaddhi, and Gabilih. We have to isolate the other social factors 
as they do not have that big role in the public life (see Table 4.1). Other social groups 
like Khadam, Muzayyina, and women belong to the third level of administrative 
hierarchy as personnel, specialists, technicians, and military soldiers, and account for 
up to 3 % of the civil service (Al-Theeb, 2006).
The civil servants in all administrative hierarchy levels and the different social 
groups (Sadah, Qaddhi, and Gabilih) have been accommodated in office by primor-
dial ties such as family/kinship, tribal associations, friendships, and regional and re-
ligious affiliation, or by competing ties such as a political party, private sector organi-
zation, NGO or profession (Geertz, 1963). The importance of those ties differs from 
according to the type of public organization, the place and the time (cf. place and 
time knowledge as the argued by Hayek, 1945). In other words, the primordial ties in 
one place [organization] could have more influence than competing ties and vice 







versa or both types of ties are active in one place. 
The concentric circles in Figure 4.1 below are a simplified visual representation of 
the complex interactions of these two kinds of ties within the Yemeni civil service 
system. It shows that tribe and tribalism have the leading role in influencing the oth-
er ties, factions and actors, but their manifestations vary in the public life of Yemen. 
For example, the influence of the tribes in the public sector can be different based on 
the reign and geographical location. The tribes close to Sana`a city are critical players 
in the public sector but the tribes of the eastern desert are isolated groups that have 
little to do with the government. Most Yemeni tribes are sedentary and traditionally 
agriculturalists whereas some of the eastern tribes are more mobile and raise live-
stock (Schmitz, 2011; Al-salahy, 2004): 
Figure 4.1 Concentric Circles of the Patterns of Relationships between 
the primordial & competing ties and the Yemeni Civil Service 
The tribes of the Hadramawt region are like community associations who manage 
the affairs of local merchants. These tribal groupings, limited in their geographic 
reach, pursue mainly local interests. The level of regional ties of tribesmen and their 
leaders, or that of employees within the public sector, are often best understood 
through a comprehension of the local power balance. This power structure depends 
on the village, directorate and province of the civil servant on the administrative 
level (Schmitz, 2011). 
“Tribalism” is integrated into the political and economic systems in Yemen. De-
spite political constraints, political and business organizations across the nation have 
flourished and capitalized the family, the tribe and the individual (Dadfar, 1993, as 
cited in Sabri, 2011). To understand Yemeni public life, it is essential to be far more 
specific in the use of the word “tribe” when writing about its influences. A unique 
political feature of Yemen is that of the tribal-political party, where the definition of a 
tribe is linked to the concept of a political party. The political party map in Yemen 
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consists of different political parties, which are established to support the political 
role of some elders of the tribes. Sometimes one is not able to differentiate between 
tribes and political parties. Therefore, the level of interaction and influence of the 
party on the civil service system are different from one political party to the other, 
depending on which tribe has formed the party. If the party is formed by a tribe (or a 
group of tribes) from the northern areas, the ties among its members will be stronger 
than a political party established by a tribe or a group of tribes from the east of Ye-
men. The members from the most powerful tribes are key players, who employ the 
rules of the game within a political party and its relations with the state and its public 
sector and civil service system. 
With the democratic transition that took place in 1990, the sheikhs adapted, 
maintained their primordial power, and gained new positions in the state and society. 
Some of them went to the top of trade unions and NGOs and others formed political 
parties such as the Republican Party, led by Sheikh Mohammed Abu Lahoom, the 
NLD party of Yemen, led by Sheikh Awad Alaptrh, and the Arab Ba’ath Party led by 
Sheikh Abdel Wahab Mahmoud. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein Al-Ahmar and a 
number of sheikhs within the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Islah Islamist party. 
The sheikhs continued holding the senior leadership of the General People’s Con-
gress party, which was the former ruling party for almost 20 years. They hold almost 
90% of the parliament sets and the government and military positions, and some 
have become owners of the largest economic institutions (Al-Theeb, 2006).
With the beginning of the democratic transition and political pluralism, the tribal 
sheikhs realized that their power would not be influential unless it is supported by 
substantial power, so they started thinking of gathering money and having as much 
revenue as possible (Muna, 1980). Many tribal sheikhs hurried to establish big firms 
in different fields to adventure their authorities and to avoid payment of taxes and 
customs, accordingly damaging the countrywide budget. Many tribal sheikhs have 
many firms and most of them evade payment of taxes and customs either by gaining 
exemption from taxes and customs or by using their direct authority (Mojalli, 2012)9.
The greed of tribal leaders led them to reach out to international investors to share in 
their business. Many investors stopped investing in Yemen because of some tribal 
leaders and high ranked officials who wanted to share the profits. For the past five 
decades, the political and economic influence of tribal leaders has largely hindered 
9 - A depth interview with different Yemeni social figures has been done by Mojalli in 2012 which tilted: “Power of  








the development of the country. With the revolution against corruption, it seems that 
tribal sheikhs are carrying the flame. 
Religious organizations in Yemen are largely decentralized with small local actors 
managing mosques, schools or judicial Islamic courts. These informal organizations 
are mostly linked with the Islah Islamist party, and seem able to combine a religious 
tradition and tribal tradition. The capacity of religious actors in connecting with 
political organizations is in itself an interesting fact, which might explain the 
persistence and dynamism of the traditional/tribal civil society in contemporary 
Yemen. Much like the tribal system, religious organizations “represent an effective 
counter-power. Through the systems of religious taxation and religious endowments, 
as well as through a very dense network of mosques inside the country and through 
various transnational networks, the Islamic realm appears as largely independent 
from the state and able to grant many social services to the population either through 
welfare, education or Islamic justice” (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2009:8).
Primordial ties are generally the most pervasive and most important in Yemeni 
formal and informal institutions and organizations, generated by sharing several 
socio-cultural values and norms within the Yemeni tribal society (both in strong and 
weak tribes). These values and norms influence the behavior and expectations of 
leaders and their followers as well as managers and their subordinates. Indeed, social 
values and norms have significantly influenced not only the process and methods of 
decision-making, but also the power tactics used in the management process. The 
interpersonal styles among leaders and their subordinates are characterized by a 
strong preference for personal and informal (rather than impersonal and formal) 
approaches of conducting work. It is not unusual to find out that the interpersonal 
styles of interaction are used by managers and employees to organize the relationships 
within an organization as well as with people outside the organization (Ali, 2009; 
Sabri, 2004). 
In this context, several authors have come up with a model of Arab management 
that mostly originates in the tribal culture and provided ‘Bedou-cracy’ (Abdel-
Khaleq, 1984) and ‘Sheikho-cracy’ (Al-Kubaisy, 1985) models that manifest in 
traditional bureaucratic design and prevailing social power-culture. The ‘tribal’ 
orientation can be explored in the sense of family commitment and loyalty to the 
tribe, over-centralization of power in the hands of the tribe’s chief, relationships with 
others, bravery, rivalry, male domination, desire for status within the social class and 
formality. These tribal models demonstrate Yemeni management practices as a mix 
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of…“hierarchical authority, rules and regulations contingent on personality and 
power of individuals. The personnel has to work in a context of inefficient personal 
relations and connections, uncertainty in decision making, nepotism and a generally 
patriarchal approach. Nepotism is also often evident in assigning relatives or clan 
members to senior positions in organizations and in the government” (cited in Sabri, 
2011: 216).
4.5 The Functions of the Civil Servants in Yemen
The function of the civil servants in Yemen features six important behavioral 
aspects which are discussed in turn below: (1) the top man syndrome; (2) the 
decision-making process; (3) conflict management; (4) interpersonal style; (5) 
attitudes towards time and managerial behavior; and (6) attitudes towards women in 
management. 
There are many other aspects that could be considered, but these are, to my 
knowledge, the most important aspects that can influence the interactions between 
donors and their agents working on capacity building within the public sector in 
Yemen. These aspects, as we mentioned earlier, reflect the most important norms and 
values transplanted from the social environment surrounding the civil service system 
in Yemen, which make this system very weak and incapable of conducting its 
functions. After presenting these six behavioral aspects, we look at the most important 
problems facing the public sector in Yemen at the present time, giving a lot of 
information on local knowledge for future policy makers to formulate and implement 
sound reform policies aimed at promoting the public sector reform process in the 
country. 
4.5.1 The Top Man Syndrome in Yemeni Organizations
The top man syndrome is reflected in the organizational leader as the owner of the 
public organization and as the prime agent of influence and control within his own 
organization. By virtue of his position in the organization, the top man sees himself 
as the head of a tribe and not a formal organization that has formal rules and regula-
tions. Employees are perceived as members of that tribe. This influence is reflected in 
the style of decision making, management, planning, organizing, controlling and di-
recting, staffing, coordinating, and so on. The top man is the ultimate decision-mak-
er.







employees trust the interference of the top man and his actions are crucial to solve 
many problems. This situation is very common not only to the insiders of organization, 
but there is a feeling among outsiders - clients and suppliers to the public organizations 
- that “only the top man of an organization can get things done: their trust and 
confidence is often in persons rather than in an organization” (Muna, 1980: 32). The 
second aspect is the managerial behavior of the top man within an organization. The 
top man is unable to escape from his many administrative duties to insiders and 
outsiders of the organization. He is obliged to attend social events, conventions, and 
various other ceremonies. He accepts his role as a formal representative of his 
organization. It causes excessive pressure on his time and efficiency that troubles him 
in many regards (Muna, 1985: 32). He sees himself as the head of ‘a family’, irrespective 
of the size or type of the organization, and often describes himself as ‘father’ or, in the 
case of a younger top-man, the ‘elder brother’ (Scott-Jackson, 2008). For example, as 
there is a strong societal norm of hospitality, the top man is overburdened with social 
visits to his office every day. Close friends, family and tribe members, government 
and the top man’s organization officials all come by for non-business related chats. In 
addition, the phenomenon that trust and confidence is invested in the top man rather 
than in the organization goes further when the head of the organization is the only 
one dealing with the daily problems of both outsiders and insiders. Formally the 
main responsibility of the top man should be how to behave strategically as an agent 
of change in his organization, but instead, he is a social worker and an agent of his 
tribe men, family members, and friends and so on.
The top man syndrome is also a leader’s high expectations for success. Cruthirds, 
Kalliny and Minor (2006) suggest that “some Arabs recognize success, in general, as 
“what one does for one’s family rather than individual earnings or achievement. 
Therefore, as noted by Abdalla, Maghrabi and Raggad (1998), one tends to feel 
obligated to help the family including by hiring a relative for a position available in an 
organization for which he/she works” (as cited in Suwaidi, 2008: 24). In Yemen, the 
person who is corrupt is “red eyed”. Yet the concept of the “red-eyed” in Yemen also 
refers to a person who is smart and able to build a successful career, without 
consideration that his money is stolen money10.
The top man requires a strong commitment of all individuals to their tribes, which 
consequently allows and encourages nepotism. The top man wants to gain the loyalty 
10 - Corruption is standard in Yemen. The top man is under great pressure from, family, friends, colleagues, and gov-
ernment officials who expect them to succeed in developing themselves as fast as the others did. Thus, corruption is 
inevitable. 
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of members of his tribe and/or other important tribes, and thus he may select 
employees who would more likely strengthen his position among tribesmen and in 
his organization. This pleases the members who then declare their loyalty to the top 
man (Hagen & Amin, 1994 as cited in Suwaidi, 2008). The top man has to accept this 
strong socio-cultural value to hire relatives and other trusted people. Nepotism in 
Yemen is practiced along different family lines. For example, Sadahs can always be 
recognized from their surname. As they assert that they are a (noble) social faction, 
they usually choose a fellow Sadah to take a job, thereby monopolizing the senior 
public jobs. Regionalism also plays a big role in practicing wasta (favoritism) and 
nepotism. When a top man in any administrative level recognizes that a person 
originates from a city or village that is close to his own, he begins building trust 
connections before starting the business relationship. Once trust is established, 
business is practiced on an informal level with high valued social commitments11 
(See Figure 4.1).
In this section, we have seen that the top man in a Yemeni organization has the 
ability and the capacity to employ influence and sustain control over the actions of 
actors in his organization, which is one of the common explanations of the power 
concept in public administration theory. To link our argument to the theoretical 
debate, I found a very interesting notion suggested by Leadwood and Jantzi (2000) 
that “leadership can be seen as the exercise of influence: as socially constructed, 
rather than structurally defined on the basis of one’s formal position in the 
organization. All that is needed for its existence is for it to be recognized by others. 
Leadership is exercised when others who consent to be led recognize someone as a 
leader” (2000: 32). They refer to Hallinger and Heck (1998) who argue that leadership 
is located in organizational roles and the network of relations between them” (cited 
in Bennett et al, 2003:32). Regardless of the quality and the effectiveness of the Yemeni 
top man’s leadership, the power of the top man is not derived from formal choices at 
a senior level in the organization intended to smooth wider distribution of control. 
Instead, it is derived from the ‘bottom’ of the hierarchy as social value, where 
individuals choose to admit a legitimate top man (see also Barnard, 1965). We now 
turn to consider decision-making and how the top man uses his power in the 
decision-making process. 
11 - In a study entitled “Combating corruption in Yemen” conducted by an anti-corruption organization, respondents 
from Yemen’s elite said that 82.7% of corruption in public sector is due to exploiting public office, followed by bribery 
with 50%, then wasta (favoritism) and nepotism with 46.3% and the process of brokerage with 33.6%, whereas the 
practices of corruption which involve blackmail and fraud scored 26.3% and 15.4% respectively (Al-Hamami, 2012, 







4.5.2 The Decision-Making Process in Yemeni Organizations 
There is a huge amount of literature on decision-making. The common declarations 
among many scholars and researchers in different disciplines of social sciences are 
based either on the arguments that decision-making is the distinctive managerial 
activity (Weber 1972 in Boussif, 2010), or that the decision making process is simply 
an integral part of the management process within every organization and at every 
level (Ali, 1993). 
From scholars of organizational behaviour there is plenty of literature on 
leadership and leadership styles, which often incorporate and/or discuss the decision-
making process. One feature of this extremely multifaceted phenomenon is the 
leader’s choice about how much and in what ways to include subordinates in decision-
making processes (Barnard, 1965; Simon, 1947). Unfortunately, some individuals 
enjoy more success than others in making decisions. Recognition of this fact has led 
to substantial interest in variables (ranging from the physiological to the psychological) 
that affect decision-making (Taggart & Robey, 1981 as cited in Boussif, 2010:3). In 
this section, the intention is to understand the extent to which the Yemeni 
administrative leader shares his power of decision-making with subordinates in 
various situations. We are also interested to find what effects, if any, socio-cultural 
factors have on the decisions-making styles of Yemeni administrative leaders.
In Yemen, there are strong socio-cultural factors for consultation in decision-
making processes. Tribesmen usually respect and obey the decisions taken by the 
sheikh as these decisions are taken in consultation with tribesmen and heads of 
villages. The ‘custom’ applies not only to the higher levels of family, clan, tribe, or 
nation, but also at the level of administrative organizations. Neither the sheikh of a 
tribe, nor a leader of an organization adopts a collective process of decision-making, 
but normally they follow a somewhat autocratic style, where decision-making is 
highly centralized. Consultation is nevertheless an activity that is commonly applied, 
and not just to ensure the decision is correct and based on good data, but because 
people expect to be consulted. The procedure helps to avoid conflicts and allows for 
a ‘face-saving’ mechanism. Ismaily (2004) found that “consultation did include actual 
participation, rather than the somewhat passive consultation reported by others” (in 
Scott-Jackson, 2009: 7).
One can argue that the consultation process used by Yemeni administrative 
leaders is a human relations technique. It is used for several occasions and situations: 
“to please, to placate, to win over people who might be potential obstacles to one’s 
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ideas or actions, and to allow the person being consulted to reply, ‘Yes, I was consulted 
on ...”, if he is ever asked. On the other hand, it must be stressed that only a few 
‘selected’ people are generally consulted in a public/business organization, family, 
tribe, clan and so on. Understandably, there is no hard and fast rule for specifying 
who these selected few are; it is dictated by the situation and the circumstances” 
(Muna, 1980:60). Even when decision-making takes place in a consultative setting, 
informality does not go away. This consultation is usually carried out on a person-to-
person basis whereas group meetings are strongly avoided. 
4.5.3 Conflict Management within Yemeni Organizations
There is a huge literature on conflict management by scholars from different 
disciplines, such as global, social, organizational, and departmental, covering many 
types of conflict at many levels, even conflict between individuals. There is, however, 
little accessible literature on handling conflict in traditional organizational contexts. 
We would suppose that methods of handling conflicts are influenced by societal 
values and norms, which we now look at in this section. 
Scott-Jackson (2009) argued that administrative leaders in tribal countries are 
always “concerned with non-verbal cues for conflict, third parties (mediators), 
procrastination. Consultation is normally used to reduce the chances of conflict in 
the first place” (2009: 7). Tribesmen do not stray far from the tribal norms and 
customs of conflict management. The tribal conflict management system normally 
deals with conflicts at an early stage, when they are not yet aggressive. The tribes also 
have other conflicts management mechanisms in place to resolve conflicts when they 
become violent. The tribal system relies heavily on arbitration methods as well as 
negotiation and mediation. When tribes sense a conflict brewing between families or 
individuals, sheikhs (the top men) from the two tribes rush in to contain it before it 
escalates. They reconcile parties in the conflict to negotiate and settle their differences. 
Sheikhs or social figures that each party authorizes as their representative (Al-
Dawsari, 2012) usually facilitate negotiation. 
Most of the tribal conflicts relate to personal interests and not the collective or 
organizational affairs of the tribes. Personal issues are often a harbinger to conflict 
occurrence within Yemeni public organizations. Conflicts within Yemeni 
organizations likely occur over personnel issues, and then lead to organizational 
conflicts. This point is explored during the analysis of the selected case studies in the 







conflicts that happened during project implementation were caused by personal 
interests, rather than collective interests about how the projects should be executed 
and how they could be locally valuated and realized. The conflicts were about who 
gets the higher share, and not about how the higher share can be obtained.
The tribal system has a strong enforcement mechanism mainly based on 
cooperative tasks and actions. Every stage of conflict management involves parties 
bringing guarantees forward under the auspices of the mediator. This could be in the 
form of daggers, guns or money that are presented as a symbol of the parties’ 
commitment to implement the arbitrator’s verdict. In addition, parties are also 
required to obtain the support of a respected tribal sheikh who will serve as a 
guarantor. Any offense committed by any of the parties to the conflict is an insult to 
the arbitrators and guarantors and comes with a high penalty. Ultimately, the tribes 
are responsible for the acts of their members and for forcing the members to 
implement verdicts. If a member of a tribe does not abide by the verdict, he might be 
denied his rights, including protection and support of his tribe (Al-Dawsari, 2012).
In the Yemeni administrative organizations, most of the leaders and employees 
deal with the organizational conflicts in a delicate manner. They refer to the famous 
words in Arab history attributed to the founder of the Umayyad Caliphate, Mu’awiyah. 
The Caliph Mu’awiyah, known for his political finesse, was reported to have declared: 
“I apply not my sword where my lash suffices or my lash where my tongue is enough. 
And even if there be one hair binding me to my fellow men, I do not let it break: when 
they pull I loosen, and if they loosen I pull” (Muna, 1980:63). The top man always 
receives respect due to his position and power or the norms of the society. He should 
not be opposed by his subordinates, because the latter believe that they will lose 
personal interests like their jobs. In general, experience in Yemeni organizations 
shows that there is relatively little opposition and resistance from top-level managers 
to their leaders. Top men use many tactics to deal with top-level managers in the case 
of increased ‘constructive’ resistance, like the consultation approach for decision-
making or by sending the General Managers for training outside the country, in 
which case they can earn U.S dollars to improve their lives. 
It is worth noting that sending employees out for training is not part of an 
upgrading policy of the organization. Instead it is used by the top man in order to 
avoid potential conflicts in the organization. The main aim of the training circles 
around the question of how to get travel allowance for places outside of Yemen 
reaching an amount up to US$5000. General Managers prefer to be trained outside of 
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Yemen than in Yemen12. The Dutch-Yemeni NPT program established different 
training centers for the top and mid-level managers. However, there was a lack of 
attendance, as we see in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Training inside Yemen is free and no 
personal interests are involved in this regard. Many participants said ‘Let’s go outside 
Yemen to breathe the breeze’. Such a training approach is not part of training and 
upgrading policy in an organization in order to promote the institutional capacity 
and capability. It is a policy of sharing interests and avoiding conflicts. It is in fact a 
way of practicing corruption in the Yemeni civil service system. 
In addition to the power tactics described above, the Yemeni top man can use 
other behavioral tactics for conflict management such uttering “Insh’Allah” as a face-
saving and promising mechanism (just promising and keep promising). This 
mechanism is also inherited from collective norms, customs, and system values. In 
Yemeni tribal customs of face-saving processes are about honor and dignity. “Losing 
your face” means losing your tribal and social respect. Such symbolic meanings are 
illustrated in daily conversation where one describes experiences or incidents and 
mentions the effect of it on their status. For example, a description of a positive and 
proud experience may include that it “whitened their face.” If the experience was 
negative and one felt humiliated, the language used describes how it “blackened their 
face”, (Patai, 1983: 102 as cited in Suwaidi, 2012). The recognition of the concept is 
cemented into the daily lives of Yemeni people, as well as in decision making in public 
organizations. A Yemeni who wishes to give support and concurs with his superior 
will usually respond “Yes” when he is asked something. It is difficult for him to say 
“No”, because the expression may cause loss of face. Therefore, to avoid this insult, 
and to shift ownership of the matter beyond oneself, it is common to say “Insh’Allah” 
meaning, “If God wills.” This prevents both members of the conversation from “losing 
face” (Suwaidi, 2012).
The use of the word Insha’Allah is a mere tactic to delay the work, or to discard 
made promises, in order to safe one’s reputation and to avoid direct confrontation. It 
is also the case that we can use the concept of “Insh’Allah” as a vague signal of 
confirmation and agreement or rejection. Hence, it might mean “Yes”, “No” or 
“maybe” (Patai, 1983) depending on the context and the way it is articulated, but 
more often, it just means “No”. In this regard, Hutchings and Weir (2006) summarize: 
It should be noted, though, that while the word of an Arab is his/her bond, the 
12 - People go on training outside to earn money from their organizations. Moreover, it is about getting money for 







phrase ‘Insha’Allah’, literally “if God wants it” can be a simple statement or a form of 
words covering the strong possibility of inaction or even a negative outcome to 
apparently agreed courses of action. The author added that, by its very nature, this is 
an indefeasible expression, for all outcomes represent the will of God and what 
eventually happens, or does not happen, is equally an expression of divine will. The 
successful international manager is one who recognizes this and who works slowly 
but surely towards gaining the trust of his/her Arab counterpart” (2006: 279 in Al 
Suwaid, 2008:20 ).
4.5.4 Interpersonal Style within Yemeni Organizations
Interpersonal communication is the process by which individuals exchange 
information, feelings and impart through spoken and non-spoken reporting 
messages. This definition highlights “the crucial fact that interpersonal communication 
is not only apprehensive about ‘what’ is pronounced, i.e., the language employed, but 
also ‘how’ it is pronounced, e.g., the nonverbal messages sent, such as tone of voice 
and facial expressions” (Sethi and Seth, 2009: 32). The typical feature of the 
interpersonal style in Yemeni organizations is personal or person-oriented approach 
in conducting managerial activities (Hartley, 1999: 20). Everybody will act based 
upon his personal framework of references and not on a general corporate or other 
mutually agreed framework. In fact, this aspect stems largely from the power of the 
primordial ties within Yemeni public life. Because of the heavy emphasis on the 
personal approach there is an “informality” in communications both in the structure 
of the organization and in dealing with others (Mahjoub at el, 1997).
The first aspect of the interpersonal style in communication within Yemeni 
organizations is al wasta (connections and mediation) as a main tactic of socializing 
and association. The term wasta stems from attempts made by tribes in ancient times 
to develop a system of law that would protect their members and help them make 
peace and truces with other tribes. It could also mean paying or demanding blood 
money or other compensation, as well as managing scarce resources and solving local 
disputes at a time when nation-states as such did not exist. It can also be described as 
an intermediary process that is colloquial for a go-between, or the process of 
employing an intermediary, “a process of mediation” in almost all types of activity. 
Wasta is a measure of influence through interconnected social networks based on 
kinship but extended to trusted individuals in the wider society (Farsoun, 1970: 269).
Al wasta has transferred to the public sector of the Yemeni state and seems part of 
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the clientelist phenomena in the administrative field. This clientelistic/administrative 
approach goes against reliance on official, institutional, or formal working channels, 
and is an important means of running state affairs. The use of personal (Wasta) ties 
and connections is not only widespread but evident in a wide range of activities. 
Some examples provided by Muna (1980) are: “(a) expediting and getting a work-
permit, a passport or a visa, and generally bypassing or expediting most governmental 
formalities and speeding up one’s paperwork by a third party; (b) obtaining referrals 
or employment; and (c) knowing about, negotiating, and eventually securing a multi-
million dollar business contract” (1980: 74). We can also add a (d) which is that wasta 
is valued for resolving conflicts and obtaining benefits (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 
1993).
The informal ties lead to entrenched patron-client networks that limit the function 
of the Yemeni government. The use of personal (family and friendship) ties reflects 
powerful informal channels for obtaining services. This is partly due to the inefficiency 
and absence of institutional systems and procedures, and partly due to the importance 
of family and friendship ties which are usually more powerful than institutional rules 
and procedures” (Muna, 1980: 74). For example, “large numbers of provisional 
government employees – political hacks hired outside the civil service system – 
transformed core functions of government into personal fiefdoms” (Root and 
Bolongaita, 2008: 118). In Yemen, the high performers are not rewarded and therefore 
unlikely to enter government service or even to remain in the country. As one official 
said, the biggest weakness of the civil system is the failure to attract talented people. 
The way in which notable individuals are recruited is ad hoc and lacks transparency. 
In fact, one of the Yemen government’s greatest strengths is attracting the wrong 
people (Root and Bolongaita, 2008:8) 
Furthermore, the top man, the leader of the public organization, plays the 
intermediary role, because of his high position in a tribe and in an organization. He 
is expected to wield his power to influence the course of events in favour of relatives 
and friends. The intermediary role is characterized by its reciprocal nature. It is 
almost as if reciprocal behavior leads to a `combination’ of institutional inefficiency. 
The strength of family and friendship ties leaves the top man without a viable 
alternative. Time and effort will be minimized if the leader uses his personal ties and 
connections instead of the formal channels. Of course, this sort of activity is a vicious 
circle, only increasing the inefficiency of formal systems – or at least for those who 







We regard the wasta approach as nepotism and cronyism. However, from the 
ideas of the actor network perceptive, such criticism ignores “the benefits of working 
through a trusted network and the general exhortations of Western management 
experts to strive for good actor networks and associability practice. Simplistic 
criticism of this age-old and well-tried system, fails to distinguish between its more 
negative effects (e.g. promoting someone unfairly despite unsuitability) and its many 
benefits in building trust through strong social networks. Strong ‘wasta’ is perhaps a 
competence in itself ” (Scott-Jackson, 2009:6). It is crucial for Western experts and 
managers to understand the importance of social connections in Yemen. Wasta, or 
mediation, is actively applied in many important decisions. Therefore, it is 
recommended to have strong connections to ensure successful networking and 
interaction. In addition, it would be naive to ignore the significance of connections in 
Yemeni culture. In initiating personal relationships, individuals from different worlds 
will be able to establish mutual trust and ensure a strong actors network in order to 
fruitfully exchange ideas and to incorporate local knowledge.
Of course, developing such trustful personal relationships with Yemeni 
counterparts might require efforts over the long term, but as soon as they have been 
developed project activities will move very easily and smoothly. It is not recommended 
to only focus on the donor project formal activities and ignore the personal side of 
activities in the Yemeni culture, because Yemenis tend to value the personal 
relationship they deal with more than formal relationships. By confining themselves 
to formal relationships, as most donors do in their dealing with Yemenis, local 
partners fail to play by the rules of the game. Culturally, Yemenis can only show their 
desires, expectations and intentions in informal settings, and bring them in line with 
the interests of their development partners. Based on the ideas of the network 
perspective, successful development projects align all of these interests and re-
inscribe them in new ways. A complex process of refined personal relations will 
determine what other actors want to do, and what they will be capable of (Scott-
Smith, 2013: 8).
For example, one expert who went to Yemen to conduct aid project activities 
observed that the ideas and intentions that can ensure a successful aid project did not 
come up through formal meetings in a work environment. He realized that during 
the Qat sessions in the afternoon when the informal gatherings take place, he could 
understand better what was going on, and which interests and expectations the 
project should take into account. He added that the Qat sessions are the best way of 
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getting along with Yemenis and that it is important to develop mutual trust 
mechanisms13. Qat sessions are an integral part of Yemeni society and a place for 
communication between Yemeni men. Information and ideas are exchanged and 
even work activities are arranged during these sessions.
In many Yemeni public and private organizations, it is difficult for staff to have 
weekly meetings to discuss the problems or the plans of the future work. Important 
issues are informally discussed during the Qat sessions and organizational problems 
are solved. For a good understanding and integration of the views, interests, and 
expectations about the donor project of the targeted community, it is extremely 
beneficial to use this informal channel. 
The second aspect of the interpersonal style is the open door tradition or policy. 
The open-door policy is another deep-rooted tribal tradition that has found its way 
into today’s organizations. It also influences the management style within the Yemeni 
organizations. In tribal customs, the norm prevails that the door of the elder should 
be open for the tribe men and outsiders; otherwise, he is not regarded as a real elder. 
In the village, the elder’s home, especially his Diwan (a meeting room for chewing 
Qat or a visiting room), is the place for receiving outsiders. The elder who maintains 
an open door policy will receive great respect from his fellow tribesmen. An open 
door policy promotes the standing and reputation of both the sheikh and the tribe, 
which consequently raises the status of the individuals and families belonging to this 
tribe. For example, people who belong to a strong tribe of strong sheikhs are more 
respected than those of weak tribes and with weak sheiks are. If someone or a group 
of people faces a problem of any kind and the government did not solve it, they look 
for a powerful sheikh from a strong tribe to resort to and to solve the problem14.
These characteristics relate to the top man syndrome as he is facing pressures 
from both formal and informal organizations (his tribe). The top man cannot 
compartmentalize his work life, his social life, and his personal life: they are often one 
and the same. The leaders ought to keep their door open because they feel compelled 
to accept the pressure in order to remain successful. They lead the organization by 
generating social acceptance inside.
It is still possible for any Yemen national to walk into the sheikh’s, governor’s, or 
president’s Diwan and pay his respects, request a favour, or air a grievance and 
13 - One of  my interviews conducted during the fieldwork. 
14 A depth interview with different Yemeni social figures has been done by Mojalli tilted: “Power of  tribal leaders in 
Yemen is growing”. Available in three parts at http://www.lightstalkers.org/posts/power-of-tribal-leaders-in-yemen-is-
growing-part-1







comment on an issue. While it is easier for the elder to control the frequency and 
timing of his Diwan meetings, he will probably find it harder to do so with his 
employees because of the integral open-door tradition (Muna, 2003). 
A relevant question here is whether there is any relationship between the open-
door tradition and the performance of the organizations. To consider this question, 
we need to know what issues are raised when the employees cross the leader’s doorstep 
on a daily basis. Many studies refer to two kinds of issues: (1) work related, which are 
listened to, but referred back to the relevant manager, and (2) issues related to 
personal problems, in which case the executive might take action or refer the matter 
to the appropriate department. The Diwan open door tradition provides a useful 
counter to the preference for centralized decision-making and the scalar principle. 
The Diwan works best in an environment that prefers to avoid conflicts, maintains 
personal relations and entertains a culture in which it is normal to take problems to 
the Diwan (Scott-Jackson, 2009: 8).
It is interesting to observe how often Yemeni administrative leaders bypass their 
subordinates by issuing instructions to employees at the middle or lower levels. The 
disadvantage is related to dysfunctional communication. Communication can 
become distorted when going up and down the hierarchical levels. However if civil 
servants decide to break the chain of command they face two disadvantages. One is 
about the detrimental influence on “the moral and effectiveness of their middle 
managers who are being bypassed. The other disadvantage is the bad example and 
precedent which actions of this kind could create for employees” (Muna, 1980:82). 
Employees are not accustomed to organization charts and job descriptions. Even 
if there are some written rules and procedures (which often do exist), they are not 
used in reality and are mostly neglected (Dadfar, 1987). Most of the employees view 
the organization as a tribe; they ought to worship their leaders as long as they are in 
power. A similar construction is not present in the West. For example, Dorfman & 
House (2004) argued that the Dutch place emphasis on egalitarianism and are 
skeptical about the value of leadership. Terms like leader and manager carry a stigma. 
If a father is employed as a manager, Dutch children will not admit it to their 
schoolmates. In Yemen, personal relationships within an organization are preferred 
over formal structures, rules and procedures. The formal systems provide for flexible 
and tentative guidelines to action if that is necessary or convenient. There is a 
preference for person-oriented office ethics that values loyalty more than efficiency. 
This is not to say that efficiency is not valued however. The ideal employee is both 
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loyal and efficient (Scott-Jackson, 2009: 9). 
It is worth noting that in Yemen management styles vary between Yemeni regions 
and sub-cultures. Therefore, managers adapt different styles depending on the 
situation and context. The managers that come from the strong tribal areas like the 
northern areas of Yemen give priority to personal considerations over organizational 
goals and performance. It is part of their strong tribal values that are part of their 
entire identity. It was discussed earlier in this chapter that managers who come from 
the southern and western areas seem to be less prone to a personalized style of 
management as the tribal values seem to be less strong in these areas. However, in 
general top men in Yemeni organizations demand complete submission from their 
employees who, in return, do not take initiative and expect to be ordered around. As 
a means to control uncertain situations, Yemeni managers adopt a highly personalized 
management style, and assert their reliance on rules and regulations to avoid 
unpredictable situations. However, they assign duties according to their personal 
judgment, calling on rules and procedures that are generally neglected as a protective 
tactic to reinforce their power (Sabri, 2004). Sulaiman (2007) believes that Yemeni 
managers are more prone to follow the trend of the day than to educate and lead (as 
cited in Sabri, 2011). Furthermore, the orientation towards high power is manifested 
in the strong authoritative and paternalistic styles of management, resulting in high 
centralization of decision-making (Hofstede 1984, 2001 & 2004, as cited in Sabri, 
2011).
Reviewing details of the management of public organizations will not be complete 
without taking into account the Yemeni civil servants’ attitudes towards time and 
change. The next sections focus on this, exploring the value for time as well as the 
attitudes of civil servants towards women as change agents in management. These 
two crucial elements are a static cultural trait in Yemen (Al-Jawfi, 1992). 
4.5.5 Attitudes towards Time and Managerial Behavior 
Spending time to achieve the objectives of the organization is like personal capital. 
If it has not been invested it will be lost, but if it is invested, it will continue to grow 
and bear fruit in the future. We must be aware that there are cost implications if we 
waste time and invested poorly (Alsarayreh, et al. 2012: 2). However, in the Yemeni 
tribal-organizational setting of the civil service, the management of time is “as much 
a management of social relations problem as it is proper utilization of one’s working 







complicate management of time. Skills must be learnt to deal with both facets of this 
problem” (Muna, 1980:119).
It is widely recognized in Yemen that time is ‘money’ or ‘gold’. However many 
competing factors often overtake the effective management of time. As a top man in 
an organization, tribal and social norms of hospitality and reverence to others prevent 
him taking actions that save time. The civil servant has a double role in the community-
tribe and the organization, and has to succumb to heavy commitments to the 
extended family tribesmen, friends, and employees. Because of traditional parental 
behavior in management, it is unethical to tell an unexpected guest or visitor: “Sorry 
I have an appointment or urgent work”. Similarly, it is difficult for the top man to 
shorten a guest’s visit even though the workload justifies doing so (Muna, 1980). The 
Diwan tradition forces him to leave his door open for the public to enter at any time, 
because the tradition also applies to public and private organizations. Again, top men 
are spending most of their time in seemingly non-productive activities. They view it 
as an investment in friendships and personal ties, both highly valued elements, 
whether or not future benefits are forthcoming. According to Muna, one must temper 
this attitude whenever human relations and personal problems are involved (Muna, 
1980).
Senior government leaders fear relying on their subordinates. Therefore, they take 
up all sorts of activities and tasks which in fact are not part of their terms of reference, 
such as writing letters, inspecting the transportation system and answering the 
phone,. Indeed, a lot of time is wasted at all administrative levels. Time management 
in Yemen implies adherence to a concept of time that is not convenient for foreigners 
working in the country. They bring their own view on obstacles during interactions 
with Yemeni counterparts. For example, when scheduling or planning work activities 
according to specific timetables, we calculate double or three times the time needed. 
If an appointment is scheduled at a certain agreed time, it is not unusual to wait 
almost three hours before something happens. In the Yemeni culture, it is expected 
that the deadline is a flexible time frame. In this respect, missing a deadline does not 
entail the serious pain of delay, while foreigners view it otherwise (Mahjoub at el, 
1997).
It is only when the deadline for agreed plans and activities of work approaches 
that; Yemeni civil servants begin the process of decision-making. Foreigners who 
deal with the civil servants are very strict in deadlines and will ask for the reasons of 
delay of the work, for changing the deadline and for delays in obtaining approvals for 
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overdue affairs. This situation creates potential conflicts between the donors and 
their counterparts in Yemen. The conflicts could cause the networking between 
actors to deteriorate, which can reduce the effective process of exchanging ideas and 
experiences about what the activities of the aid project should look like, especially as 
regards to the harmonization of these activities with local knowledge. 
Next to the cultural discourse, another important problem that creates ineffective 
time management is the lack of leadership skills among most civil servants in Yemen. 
Most of them perform based on the reaction method and not self-motivating factors. 
Prepared project plans are supposed to be implemented in accordance with time 
schedules and strategies, but these time frameworks are normally on paper, which is 
not suitable for a culture that accomplishes targets through the means of personal 
moods and appreciation (Al-Jawfi, 1992). 
Thus a particular problematic cultural phenomenon in Yemen is the lack of time 
management. However, the planning ahead strategies used in the West would not 
work in Yemen, because society itself lacks the necessary social conditions. One has 
to be flexible by working with different scenarios and adapting to the flow of local life 
in order to deal with Yemenis. The nice aspect of the flexibility of Yemen society is 
that whenever something is not working you will find unexpected support on the 
spot. Yemenis are good at firefighting, the practice of dealing with problems as they 
arise. Consequently, they are able to finish things at the last moment. That is their way 
of interpreting ‘just in time’ management (MSM, 2009).
The two concepts of time and leadership are very important related concepts. 
Leaders must have more interest in time as it is a scarce resource involving other 
various resources of the organization. If time is not managed, nothing else will be 
managed. A good management of time is useful in providing the resources and the 
costs of the organization; the time element is “the only productive component that 
can be fairly distributed among organizations, unlike other production elements, 
therefore if this element is used efficiently and effectively, the functioning of the 
organization will run more efficient and focused. With proper time management, the 
organization is set to achieve specific objectives by devoting all resources, possible 
investment and available abilities at hand including time” (Alsarayreh, et al. 2012: 2). 
An insufficient economic and organizational infrastructure can cause problems of 
ineffective time management. The absence of good transportation, housing facilities, 
communication channels, technology, human resources, efficient government 







communication channels, especially from the lowest level to the highest level, are 
important for effective decision-making processes at all administrative levels. Top 
men at the highest levels do not have the slightest idea about the communication 
system within their institution and between the lower levels. The managerial behavior 
is dominated by the need to take quick decisions that interfere with the monitoring 
process. As mentioned before, there is a lack of communication and trust from the 
higher functional levels to the lower ones. The decisions are taken by higher functional 
levels without consulting any of the middle levels and operational levels.
4.5.6 Attitudes towards Women in Management 
To explore the attitudes of the Yemeni civil servants towards women in 
management, we can first of all say that the worst place in the world to be a woman is 
Yemen. Until today, tribal and traditional cultural attitudes, patriarchal structures 
and Islamic fundamentalism prevail in society, allocating women a low status in the 
family and community and a limited participation in society (Al-Bnan, 2003). 
Women are subjected to various forms of violence and discrimination, including 
domestic abuse, deprivation of education, early or forced marriage, restrictions on 
the freedom of movement, exclusion from decision-making roles, denial of 
inheritance, deprivation of health services, and female genital mutilation (Cooke, 
2008). 
Therefore there is discrimination towards women by management. It might be 
because “women are excluded from participating in informal networks, or have no 
voice and limited influence in appropriating the accrued benefits of collective action” 
(Jütting, 2007: 13). In Yemen, ‘tribal honor’ plays its role in this aspect. Tribal elders 
want to increase and enforce tribal culture among their communities. Therefore, they 
are doing their best to avoid any effective attempts by the state or international 
organizations to change the paternal attitude towards women and their lack of 
representation in the civil service. The majority of women in tribal areas are not 
allowed to work in the government. Women in these regions do not hold positions 
outside of the home, because it is against the ‘tribal honor’ (Al-Sherif) for women to 
go outside a home alone. Girls are educated until grade six, and after that, they are 
relied upon for household chores (see the indicators relating to the education sector 
in Table 4.1 above). Cooke (2008) describes that an absence of citizenship rights for 
women is horribly combined with crushing poverty, creating a society in which 
women are the property of men, unable to leave the house without the permission of 
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a male relative and vulnerable to arbitrary arrest on the street even when they have 
permission to be there. They are also likely to be illiterate, to be “married before they 
reach puberty, and to die in giving birth”15.
For those women who are working, they have highly variable statuses in 
management depending on the socio-economic class as discussed in the beginning of 
this chapter. The families of the lower middle class in today’s mainstream population, 
whether urban or rural, have less access to wealth and benefits provided by the state 
and private economic institutions such as professional civil service or private sector 
jobs (Hawkins, 2007). The women from Alsaadah families and the women in the 
family of judges do have leadership positions in the government and always have the 
right to be employed in the government, compared to normal Yemeni women of the 
lower middle class (85 % of the total population) who have less chance to get employed 
in the government. Women have even more reason to uphold and defend their 
traditional rights within their marriages and households. It is true that women make 
up about 50 percent of Yemeni citizens at an age of potential employment (between 
18-50 years), but form only 23 percent of workforce and this means that most women 
are not participating in the country’s development. About 72.1 percent of women are 
economically inactive. They stay home and supported financially by either their 
parents or husbands (Al-Haj, 2012). 
In public and private offices, most women are subject to harassment by male 
employees, especially those who work in male-dominated environments. In male-
dominated society where men define what is and what is not acceptable behavior 
women fully depend on their fathers, husbands and brothers. A women “is very 
worried to carry the responsibility of a leadership position, hence losing trust in her 
self-confidence and trust in her capability to make the decisions and to carry 
responsibility” (Al-Shehabi, 2001 as cited in Zubaidi et al, 2011:9). The social norms, 
combined with limited education and work-related opportunity, keeps women far 
away from obtaining the required skills and resources to compete successfully with 
men for leadership positions (Zubaidi, et al, 2011).
To sum up, we have explored six aspects of the functions of the civil servants in 
Yemen. Our approach has been to view the civil servants as part of the social system, 
which, in turn, is embedded in the wider environment. This environment is made up 
of socio-cultural values and norms and social structural elements (institutions, 
groups and sets of social relations and roles). In each of the preceding sections, we 








have witnessed how the environment (despite its diversity and variety) influences the 
behavior of the civil servants. I would like to make it clear that this work brings just a 
little light to a very dark cavern, as they are many other aspects that need to be 
explored, and the aspects that are explored here need to be discussed in more detail. 
This is a future work for me or other researchers who are interested in the topic. 
Throughout the earlier sections, I have attempted, whenever feasible, to point out 
some features of the informal system (the implicit local knowledge and unwritten 
rules of the game) at stake within the Yemeni civil service system. There are different 
advantages of having this chapter in this stage of our enquiry. Firstly, I use this 
information as a conceptual background for the analysis related to the Dutch-Yemen 
NPT programme in the coming chapters. We analyze if Dutch policy makers and 
implementers could incorporate such information on local knowledge during the 
policymaking or/and implementation. Secondly, the information reviewed above can 
have an implication in identifying the problems facing the civil service system in 
Yemen and to formulate sound policies to deal with those problems. Thirdly, the 
information on local knowledge in the earlier section and in the coming section can 
be used as a backdrop for the several practioners, experts or partners to whom my 
study may be of interest, especially a donor expert or manager who is working for the 
promotion of public sector reforms in Yemen.
4.6 Reflection for Donor Experts 
The information provided here on local knowledge may help outsiders such as 
donors to overcome difficulties in dealing with their Yemeni counterparts during the 
implementation of their aid programs in the field. The donors apply Western 
management principles, practices, managerial styles, skills, and knowledge, which 
differ from those applied in the Yemeni civil service system that are based on informal, 
traditional and specific managerial functions. Donors need to be aware of those 
managers in Yemen who might disagree with their skills and styles but perform 
functions and techniques needed for performing their mission. The donors’ lack of 
knowledge of the rules of the game could lead to potential conflicts during the aid 
policy design and/or implementation. This conflict can lead to different expectations 
and ideas about what the aid intervention should look like. The presumption is that 
the absence of such a conflict influences an aid intervention in a specific time and 
place. The third implication of this chapter emphasizes local knowledge as essential to 
capacity and capability aid programmes as part of a wide reform process in the Yemeni 
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civil service system.
Accordingly, the information on LK in Yemen is merely a start to understand the 
necessary and valuable cross-cultural local knowledge that can be used as a background 
for donors and which can make or break foreign aid interventions. This is not only 
within the civil service reform processes, which are the main example of intervention 
in this study, but also in other sectors and missions. In every donor intervention, we 
are dealing with policy makers, leaders and employees - the role of humans as 
explained in the ‘development associability’ approach. Therefore, differentiation in 
working styles and organizational culture and the lack of knowledge about reforms 
can damage aid interventions.
The outsider who is going to help reform the public sector in Yemen should be 
aware that the traditional social structure affects the civil service system. If one is 
willing to understand Yemen’s public sector, it is essential to be far more specific in the 
use of the word “tribe” when writing about its influences. Social structure in Yemen 
designates a pre-revolutionary social class of high social standing. These social classes 
have different positions in the Yemeni civil service system. The civil servant can be 
characterized on three levels, as we saw above. To an outsider, an expatriate manager 
who has never worked in a Yemeni organization, the first few months in their new 
assignment may be traumatic. This is not only due to the expected culture shock, but 
due to the manner in which their new organization functions. Civil servants in Yemen 
normally engage in prolonged practices when starting a work discussion; they use 
personal ties and connections extensively and they value loyalty over efficiency. This 
strong emphasis on personal relations and the human side of business may seem 
incompatible with the rationale of formal organizational structures, rules and systems. 
For instance, the function of the civil servant within their community and organization 
is shaped to a considerable extent by the expectations of tribesmen, relatives, friends 
and employees. The top tribal leader, by virtue of his position in the organization, sees 
himself as the head of a tribe and not a formal organization that has formal rules and 
regulations. Employees are perceived as members of that tribe. The influence is 
similarly reflected in the style of decision-making, management processes in daily life, 
and interpersonal relations. There are many implications of this social-political 
structure for the environment of civil servants, which we look at in the following 







4.7 The Status Quo of the Public Sector in Yemen
Any reform policy for capacity building in Yemen should keep into consideration 
that the formal administration system in Yemen is very fluid and elastic, often used 
only as a tentative guidelines for action if and when necessary or convenient (Al-Jawfi, 
1994). There are different formal, viable aspects of the Yemeni public administration 
that must be considered when developing the capacity of the civil service system. The 
first is that Yemeni civil servants enter the civil service for life and the Yemeni system 
is by default a career-based system. Normally, career-based systems are characterized 
by strict entry mechanisms such as pre-service training and examination in order to 
ensure both the quality of the entrants as well as their induction in the civil service 
corps. After entrants become fully-fledged civil servants they receive additional 
training during their career to prepare them for the various posts they will occupy 
(Shamsan, 2007). Career-based systems invariably feature strong central control on the 
organization and management of the civil service. 
The second aspect is that the civil service system in Yemen does not have these 
characteristics. There is no pre-service training, no mandatory examination, no 
induction mechanisms and no in-service training. In addition, the system does not 
feature any civil service management mechanisms to ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the civil service apparatus. Instead, the current modus operandi of the 
system in Yemen is one where the central ministries themselves execute most HR 
functions, even though they lack the capacity and expertise as well as standardized 
procedures, regulations and template documents to carry out this function adequately. 
Measures and decisions from the top men of the government are often stopgap in 
nature.
The third aspect is that the civil service in Yemen has no strategy for management 
and development. Currently there is no vision on how the civil service should be 
organized and according to what model. Nor is there a strategy outlining the model to 
be in place for decentralized government
The current situation in the Yemeni civil service is a result of the traditional public 
administration in Yemen, as the public sector in Yemen suffers from the absence of 
clear philosophy for its government administration system. There are ongoing conflicts 
in the processes of developing public policies and their operational programs or tools. 
There is no a clear approach on how to align these policies and their operational 
programs in a specific direction. Second, the traditional methods of ruling have been 
deeply rooted deeply within the public administration system in Yemen (Shaif and Al-
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Shaddadi: 2013). For example, the political decision downplays the administrative 
decision, where the administrative decision has been associated with the political 
decision. Political influence directs the government’s administration behaviour. There 
is a clear absence of standards and administrative controls in government decision-
making processes. The size of the organizational structure of government institutions 
varies hugely, with a single mission scattered widely across more than one sector, 
department or unit. There is a lack of attention paid to organizational development, 
which leads to an inertia within government institutions in response to ongoing 
changes. The system of public administration has a large number of employees who 
have been employed by social and political ties and are an added burden on the 
administrative system of government. Therefore, most government administrative 
units suffer from weak human capacity, particularly in areas that require high skills, 
like planning, higher education and finance. A 2008 survey showed that the employees 
who have university qualifications form only 16.3% of the total staff ’s 504,522, while a 
high proportion of staff (56.6%) have no qualifications(Shaif and Al-Shaddadi, 2013).
Additionally there is a clear failure to define the roles of government institutions. 
There is instability of the institutional structure of the state and the continuing changes 
in the shape, and the roles of government agencies. This is also reflected in the poor 
distribution of state functions and services geographically. There is more focus on the 
major cities, especially in the education and health sectors. In turn, there is a decline in 
the state’s functions and services in secondary cities and in the countryside. Conflicts 
between institutions will continue as long as there is no a job description system and 
no clear term of reference to guide the functions of the different government institutions 
(GOY, 2001).
The organizational culture in Yemeni organizations is in a dreadful situation as 
there is a clear decline of the living conditions of the administrative personnel. There is 
no fair application of the criteria for recruitment and promotion and there is no 
performance evaluation system for staff. All of these problems have created 
organizational cultures with negative aspects such as administrative corruption and a 
resistance to accepting change (Shamsan, 2007).
The process of analyzing public policy also suffers from many problems. There are 
weaknesses and shortcomings in the availability of data and information needed to 
analyze public issues and problems, and create treatment policies. There is a clear 
failure in the application of research and analysis methodologies to address the issues 







among most administrative leaders in government institutions about the public policy 
analysis methodologies, because of a lack of relevant training and qualification 
programs. It was found that among the one hundred administrative leaders (the rank 
of director general and Undersecretary of the Ministry) only 5% had taken a course in 
the field of public policy (GOY, 2001). There is a lack of coordination in the process of 
policy analysis and in the process of developing policy alternatives proposals, both 
within government institutions and with respect to the participation of civil society 
organizations and the business sector. There is also a lack of coordination among the 
administrative units, which engage in complementary activities which disable 
government activities and freeze policies (Shaif and Al-Shaddadi, 2013).
Furthermore there is a clear lack of control of public policy-making process at the 
level of the Council of Ministers. For example the coordination unit for the adoption of 
public policies in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers is weak. There are 
no integrated standards for government agencies to submit a policy for approval by the 
Council of Ministers. There is conflict and overlapping activities in public policy-
making process at the level of the Council of Ministers, because of the weakness of the 
coordination process, and this can be confirmed by the duplication of the same decision 
many times in successive governments (Al-shamy, 2004). A number of studies point 
out that the heads of administrative agencies in ministries and government agencies 
usually issue some decisions and policies without prior coordination with the concerned 
sectors, both within their organizations and with other relevant institutions. Then a 
lack of coordination leads in many cases to a freeze on the implementation of such 
decisions and policies because of the potential differences that could be created. 
Moreover, there is no reporting and publishing of policies that are created and adapted 
by the House of Representatives, the Council of Ministers or at the ministerial or 
agency levels. This situation confuses those who are involved in the implementation 
process or community groups who are targeted by the approved policy, which can also 
lead to a freeze or cancellation of the policy or the policy not being applied properly 
(Shaif and Al-Shaddadi, 2013).
4.8 The Ideal Model for Capacity Building within Public Sector in Yemen 
Using the above-presented local background information, an outsider who is trying 
to conduct aid intervention to prompt the public sector reform process in Yemen, 
especially in human capacity building, should be aware of the essential needs of training 
and capacity building of the Yemeni public sector. Since there is a lack of local theories 
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of public sector change (a component of capacity building), the ideas in this section 
may be implicitly based on the well-developed theories in public administration. I 
propose at least four basic managerial skills that could be useful for the development of 
Yemen’s civil servants. These proposals keep in consideration the role of the informal 
institutions as explored in the earlier sections. These skills would lead and encourage 
civil servants to improve corporate policies, strategies, effective human resources 
management and communications that are in line with the local environment16.
These public servants, both employees and managers, need to be well educated and 
well-motivated, capable of not only administering, developing and analyzing public 
policies fairly and appropriately but also capable of making effective and participatory 
decisions, developing a strategic plan for an organization and developing a plan of 
actions and a basic budget based on the strategic plan (Shaif and Al-Shaddadi, 2013). 
They should also be capable of assessing the effectiveness of their own strategy by 
developing indicators to measure the successful implementation of the strategy, and 
organizing the organization according to the strategy (Selden, 2003).
Leadership development is neither new nor unique to the public sector. When we 
say we want more leadership in the public sector, what we are really looking for, is for 
individuals who will encourage institutional adaptations in the public interest. 
Leadership in this sense is not value neutral. It is a positive espousal of the need to 
promote certain fundamental values that can be called public spiritedness. The most 
important role of public sector leaders has been to solve the problems and challenges 
faced in a specific environment (OECD, 2001). Based upon the explanation of the top 
man syndrome and his style of managing his organization, it seems very important to 
develop the leadership skills of public servants, both employees and managers, in order 
to create an effective public sector responsible for achieving real development. Due to 
collectivist values, teamwork skills and values outside the circles are not developed, 
leaders tend to subordinate their organizational missions to those of their circles, and 
favoritism and nepotism are quite common (Abdalla and Al-Homoud, 2001). There is a 
clear need to: stimulate and implement team-building exercises; share the responsibility 
of activities and put quality first; set up and implement a monitoring and controlling 
system for change processes; establish reference groups to discuss and defend visions 
within an organization; establishing reference groups to discuss and defend visions with 
16 - Many studies and international reports argued about these important needs to develop the public and private sectors 
reform processes e.g. Said Shaddadi and Labib Muhammad (2013), Morhib Al-Asad, (2009), Ahmed Al-shami, (2008), 








the beneficiaries of the interventions; and most importantly to introduce and maintain 
ethics and values such as transparency and accountability. It is clear that most Yemenis 
spend most of their work time out of the office nourishing their socials networks and it 
is very common to see people chatting over a cup of tea, chewing Qat, visiting the sick 
or paying condolences during working hours (Ali and Wahhabi, 1995). In addition, in 
regards to the open door policy presented in the earlier sections, there is a need to build 
skills related to time management in order to close the open door tradition. 
Furthermore, it is frequently observed that newly-appointed mangers remove, 
distance, or freeze out the inner circle of their predecessors and appoint their own 
people. It is not uncommon to find in a specific ministry a considerable number of 
people who carry the same surname or tribe name as that of the senior manager/
administrator, which can lead to a difficult climate of interpersonal conflicts between 
many different circles within the organizations. At the same time, most of the 
organizations use a traditional approach of managing organizations (Abdalla and Al-
Homoud, 2001). In the process of training staff, there is a need to promote those 
employees and managers with pronounced leadership skills such as: ability to manage 
conflicts and settle disputes effectively based on the formal rules and regulations; vision 
to set up and implement a reward and punishment penalty system within an organization; 
being creative in solving problems; and being a critical and/or analytical thinker.
Good communication skills are also very important, because every administrative 
function and activity involves some form of direct or indirect communication, be it 
planning, organizing, leading or monitoring (Lunenburg, 2010). We have seen that in 
Yemeni organizations the interpersonal relationship is the main mechanism of 
communication between and among the different levels and leaders and their 
subordinates. There is a need to develop the capacity and capability of the employees 
and managers in terms of being capable to set up and implement a communication 
system within the organization, to develop meetings skills, to set up a reporting system, 
and to develop reporting skills. Furthermore, there a need to develop the capacity and 
capability process of employees and managers to deal with physical barriers by ensuring 
that they make use of modern technology (e-mails etc.) to communicate with different 
organizational levels, and to read and comprehend information (Lunenburg, 2010).
Human resources management is poor in Yemen due to the absence of both a 
strategic vision on civil service management and development, and a vision of civil 
service training delivery within Yemen’s organizations. The public administration in 
Yemen has no effective and efficient feeder organization to provide high-grade civil 
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servants and in-service training. This gap needs to be remedied by: devolving the 
capacity of the leaders and their subordinates to define the functions and job descriptions 
of the organization; introducing and implementing an evaluation system of functions 
and jobs; setting criteria for evaluating the performance of the employees in the present 
situation; developing an employees’ upgrading programme; identifying the shortcomings 
of the present employees to fulfill new jobs and functions; and setting up and 
implementing a monitoring and controlling system of change processes. Other human 
resources management tools should also be improved, in particular period civil servant 
assessment and the drafting of career paths (Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993; 
Czaputowicz, 2002; Grindle, 2007; Macuane, 2006).
Informal institutions in Yemen are relevant in the framework of gender equality. In 
this chapter, we have presented several different types of interaction between formal and 
informal institutions which oppose gender equality. The capacity building process 
should make the leaders aware of the specific institutional set-up and adapt their policies 
to be effective in supporting and enhancing involvement of women in different 
organizations. Engaging women in public organizations and other local initiatives is 
crucial to enhancing gender equality, as is changing norms and attitudes by designing 
appropriate formal institutions (Gita Sen, 2007).
These skills are emphasized, because of their relevance to the current situation and 
local environment of the civil service system in Yemen. Clearly, there are many other 
managerial skills and functions of equal significance ranging from public relations skills 
to financial skills, as well as capacity and capability-building needs like managerial 
knowledge and skills. It would be impossible for a donor intervention to set up a self-
sustainable civil service training system by merely tackling the supply side or focusing 
on building skills for civil servants. There should be a rational and strategic approach for 
the civil service training sector that shows who the civil servants are and which 
administrative level they belong to. It would be irrational to leave the decisions on 
training to an individual civil servant on the basis of their own interests and whether 
they can get the Ministry or their employer to finance the training (Shamsan, 2007).
The capacity building policy process should be based on meeting the needs of the 
country through the development of civil servant cadres within the civil service. This 
strategy will provide structure and guidance for subsequent implantation and budget 
allocation discussions. This should occur alongside a strategic human resource 
management framework guiding the development of the civil service in Yemen. It would 







other central ministries in Yemen as well as possibly agencies and decentralized 
government institutions. Each ministry could then build its plans and activities 
according to the overall strategy. The strategy must develop coordination mechanisms 
between the high levels of Yemen’s public administration system and its direct 
organizations to ensure effective use of inputs and good outcomes. This strategy should 
include an effective training process with quality training methods (incorporating case 
studies form the Yemeni public sector daily practice) done by trainers with knowledge 
of the theory and practice of public administration in Yemen (Wexley and Latham, 
1991; Lynton and Pareck, 1967). Finally, the strategy should meet the requirements of 
transferring process of training in-work settings. “Broad and Newstrom (1992) defined 
the transfer of training to the workplace as the effective and continuing application, by 
trainees to their jobs, of knowledge and skills gained in training-both on and off the job” 
(as cited in Machin, 2002:2).17 Capacity building processes will not be complete until the 
transferring process is achieved (Healy, 2001).
4.9 The Main Questions Evoked for Public Policy Analysis
In such a backdrop, a logical and interesting yet largely unexamined question is to 
what extent an aid program like the Dutch NPT program can be seen as a challenge to 
the higher education sector in Yemen. Were the Dutch policy makers aware of the local 
knowledge outlined in this chapter and did they try to identify the problems of capacity 
building within the public sector, formulating sound policies that fitted with the local 
environment? Alternatively, did they go along with the global donor approach of 
downplaying local knowledge during the policy-making process and adapting complex 
and unpredictable policies as presented in Chapter 3? To what extent did the Dutch 
NPT program implementers deal with the social relationships and institutional 
contexts in which they operated? Were they aware of the public sector aspects in 
Yemen, and could they incorporate information on local knowledge during their 
interactions with their Yemeni counterparts, to ensure a high level of effectiveness?
Empirical investigation regarding these questions is conducted in the coming 
chapters. The next chapter deals with the methodology in this research, which presents 
a description of the procedures used for collecting and analysing the data to assess the 
level of effectiveness of the Dutch NPT program in Yemen. 
17 - Different local aspects about ensuring the effectiveness of  this strategy requirement of  transferring process and 
to meet high level of  effectiveness in building the capacity within the public sector in Yemen are presented during the 





5.1 Introducing the Research Argument 
A methodology is a strategy that helps a researcher to systematically study a 
research phenomenon. In social research, examples of methodologies are positivism 
using quantitative methodology and qualitative methodology, which is often 
concerned with inducing hypotheses from field research. In addition, there is a mixed 
methodology approach, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
methods are research techniques including quantitative techniques like statistical 
correlations, as well as techniques like observation, interviewing and audio-recording. 
In themselves, techniques are not true or false. They are more or less useful, depending 
on their compatibility with the theories and methodologies used in the tested 
hypothesis and the selected research topic (Silverman, 1993).
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the adopted mix-
research method in this study and to explain the procedures that were followed to 
collect data. This is needed to investigate the straightforward and primary question 
“why are foreign aid programs ineffective in prompting public sector reform in Yemen 
despite all the involved resources?” The answer to this question is not limited to the 
Yemeni context only, but applies to many poor nations where the effectiveness of 
foreign aid activities is equally unsettling. 
To address the main question, I have used literature on the justification and 
effectiveness of donor aid programs in developing countries. As we outlined in 
Chapter 1 this study is will be undertaken in three stages. The first stage includes the 
literature review of foreign aid effectiveness in Chapter 2. In that stage, we saw two 
contradictory approaches to aid. The PIP approach argues that foreign aid does work 
and that it should be continued to solve the “poverty trap” in developing countries. 
The PCP approach on the other hand argues that foreign aid does not work and 
moreover that it harms developing countries instead of helping them; and so it should 
be stopped to avoid future harm. The factors of aid ineffectiveness provided by many 
leading scholars of the PCP approach was reviewed and the argument of the PIP 
approach was isolated.
PCP approach scholars have divided the factors of why foreign aid is ineffective 
into two main strands. Firstly, much of the focus of macro studies argue that the poor 
policy environment, such as weak and corrupt policies and institutions in developing 
countries, is the main cause of the shortcomings of foreign aid programs (see for 
example: Burnside and Dollar, 1998; Ear, 2006; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Secondly, 







tying their aid to egoistic interests that can be characterized as political, strategic, 
commercial, cultural, and religious. They are highly motivated to achieve those 
egoistic interests and less interested in holding recipient countries accountable for 
achieving anything productive with the aid. The egoistic interests of donors often 
works against the altruistic objectives of aid assistance and might lead to corruption 
of the aid projects’ outcomes, reducing the effectiveness of aid interventions (e.g., 
Lancaster, 1999, 2006; Easterly, 2006; Lindsay Whitfield, 2009). 
This study attempts to argue against the PCP approach and its presupposed theory 
of aid ineffectiveness, by presenting an alternative explanation of aid programs (in)
effectiveness. As discussed in previous chapters, one purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine the prevalence of the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” as a potential factor in 
the low effectiveness level of foreign aid programs for promoting the public sector 
reforms in recipient countries. The proposition is formulated thus: 
(I)	 Aid	programs	and	projects	could	certainly	work	and	achieve	satisfactory	results	
in	 host	 countries	 with	 poor	 governance	 and	 a	 complex	 set	 of	 multiple	
development	 goals.	 Nevertheless,	 aid	 practitioners	 in	 the	 field	 and	 those	 in	
charge	of	development	policies	at	the	highest	institutional	levels	should	be	in	
touch	with	reality	and	incorporate	“local	knowledge”	in	the	project	design	and	
implementation	 process,	 as	 well	 as	 adopting	 delivery	 mechanisms	 to	 insure	
effectiveness.
Chapter 3 defined the concept of LKS and its implications for foreign aid 
effectiveness. LKS is conceptualized as the lack of adequate knowledge of social, 
cultural and political aspects of a society in which aid programs act. This syndrome 
may affect the processes and the methods by which development aid programs and 
projects are formulated and implemented. The ability of development planners to 
predict and control the outcomes of their programs under conditions of uncertainty 
is quite limited. International assistance agencies use rationalist planning and 
management procedures, which often require knowledge and data that are simply 
not available in most developing countries. To reduce “uncertainty”, the demands of 
rationalistic planning have forced administrators to use whatever data is at hand, 
regardless of its appropriateness or accuracy1.
To deal with factors influencing the process of incorporating local knowledge 
during policy making and implementation, practitioners and policy makers have to 
increase the success of donor-promoted public sector reform by taking into account 
some of the obvious dimensions by which recipient countries, or host organizations 
1 - Before the end of  this stage, we intend to review some aspects of  the local knowledge in Yemen (Chapter 4) to be 
used as a background for the analysis in the coming chapters. 
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within these countries, can be distinguished from each other. It is also crucial to 
avoid any reform attempts or aid interventions based on components copied from 
elsewhere, or to change the ways in which specific components of host organizations 
function along lines which seem successful elsewhere. Accordingly, this study is 
mainly concerned with testing two main hypotheses that can elaborate how LKS 
could substantially contribute to the failure of development programs: 
(I) Incorporation of local knowledge in the policy design stage, that integrates 
formal and informal institutions and organizations in host governments 
or organizations, increases the effectiveness of aid programs. Reduced 
incorporation of local knowledge based on this integration increases 
ineffectiveness of aid programs. 
(II) Incorporation of local knowledge during the implementation stage leads 
to greater openness to local realities not foreseen in the design stage and 
reduces the probability that aid programs or projects need redesigning, 
and increases their effectiveness. 
The independent variable is drawn from the two main hypotheses of the study, 
based on the theoretical paradigm presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, the 
independent variable is the process of incorporating local knowledge in policy design 
and implementation of donor-prompted public sector reform programs. The 
dependent variable is linked to the outcomes of aid programs. However, we could 
achieve different results or outcomes, ranging from projects results, partial success 
(outcomes falling short) to programs, that failed in their entirety to achieve any 
significant outcomes. 
Before explaining the empirical methodology of how we deal with the main 
argument of this dissertation, it is important to keep in mind the following issues. 
First, this study defines the concept of the aid project by making use of two approaches, 
the ‘development associability approach’ and the ‘validity development approach’.2 
The latter attributes the success of development projects to the inherent value of the 
project. In other words, it draws attention to the connection between success and 
aims (Scott-Smith, 2013). The former focuses on the process more than the outcomes 
(see section 2.2.2 of this study). It is critical to note that for one or more of the aid 
2 - It is the main idea of  the actor network approach (see Chapters 1 and 3) as it was applied in this study, which describes 
human interaction, providing a better understanding for aid programs involving actors on how to incorporate local 








projects under investigation in this study, the generative mechanisms of LKS may 
change as a result of some degree of changes in the implementation process. Secondly, 
place and time knowledge can differ among aid recipients, aid organizations and 
individuals, which influences the process of designing and implementing aid 
programs and projects. Thirdly, perhaps the policy design of aid programs, which 
was previously inadequate, was promptly corrected or incorporated local knowledge 
during the implementation stage of aid programs. 
This chapter deals with methodological issues. It shows how I undertake the 
analysis and investigation in order to test the above-mentioned main hypotheses. The 
chapter provides a description of the research design, population and sample, 
instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis methods, validity issues and 
the problems that emerged conducting the research. In the final section, a summary 
is presented.
5.2 The Research Design
The research design started by setting up the first empirical response to the PCP 
approach using the case of the Dutch-Yemen development co-operation, in order to 
support or reject the corresponding hypothesis. By providing a brief historical 
background of the Netherlands development aid history, determinants and its role in 
Yemen; the empirical results support the hypothesis that the existence of multiple 
egoistic goals of aid assistance from a donor country to a recipient country, may not 
be the main reasons for ineffective aid interventions in poor nations- which was 
mainly argued by the Public Choice Perceptive (PCP) approach. The strategic interest 
of the Netherlands in aiding Yemen is to achieve security and stability in the country. 
The Netherlands has a long history of funding development programs in Yemen, 
especially in the focal sectors such as water, health, and basic and higher education, 
with a focus on cross-cutting themes like gender, governance and capacity building. 
We assess if development efforts can stimulate improvements in terms of development 
outcomes that have a meaningful impact on security and stability in Yemen in 
Chapter 6.
Some projects in poor policy environments will have consequences for the 
resilience of the analysis based on the second argument of the PCP approach, which 
states that foreign aid does not work in a poor policy environment. By using the 
example of the Dutch-Yemen NPT programme, our empirical work explains the “aid 
programme effectiveness” dependent variable as fully as possible, by controlling at 
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both policy design and implementation levels all independent variables that may 
positively affect the process of incorporating local knowledge and aid program 
effectiveness. At the same time, the investigation includes other explanatory variables 
that may reduce aid program effectiveness and increase the LKS in a poor policy 
environment.
It should be made clear, that this study seeks to gain insights on the influence of a 
single causal variable (incorporating local knowledge in policy design and policy 
implementation) on the outcomes of interest (the successes or failures of aid 
programmes in Yemen). To investigate this causal relationship, it is logical to adopt a 
research design that includes some cases which clearly reflect the dependent variable 
of this study: successful and failed aid projects. This means that the study employs a 
mixed study method, including a qualitative and comparative case study method to 
show which aid projects succeeded and which projects failed. This leaves room for 
local knowledge explanations and arguments against the explanation of the PCP 
approach, as we mentioned before.
Yin (1994) identified three types of research projects that may use the case study 
methodology. First, there is the exploratory case study, which intends to develop 
theory. Then there is the explanatory case study, which intends to test a hypothesis by 
demonstrating its applicability either in specific circumstances or in general. The 
third type, the descriptive case study, refers to unstudied situations under a well-
theorised area. This study has been designed on the basis of explanatory purposes as 
long as there is a hypothesis based research. Furthermore, an extensive theoretical 
background (Patton 1990) does not support the subject under investigation. It is 
expected that testing the study hypotheses will, in some scope, bring hope for 
theoretical improvement (in an inductive manner). Extensive preliminary work is 
needed to get sufficient understanding of the research problem before we can proceed 
to the hypothesis testing stage. The hypothesis testing stage is where the researcher 
examines whether or not the hypothesized relationships have been substantiated 
(Sekaran, 1992, as cited in Elbana, 2008). 
Four aid projects or case studies (n=4) are researched and compared in this thesis. 
All four projects are funded by the bilateral3 donor agency Nuffic, which is the 
3 In the context of  foreign aid, we have two main channels of  aiding poor nations. The first is the bilateral channel: the 
individual donor country. The major bilateral donors in volume terms are the United States, Japan, France, Germany, 
Britain and the Netherlands, followed by Italy, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Spain. The second is the multilateral aid or-
ganizations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union 








Netherlands organization for international cooperation to promote the capacity of 
post-secondary organisations in Yemen. Nuffic works on behalf of the Netherland’s 
bilateral aid Programme for Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary Education 
and Training Capacity (NPT) in developing countries. The overall objective of the 
NPT program in Yemen is to strengthen the teaching learning conditions, the higher 
education system, and the institutions which are part of the system. It aims to raise 
the capacity and quality of higher education (HE) to provide services for promoting 
border capacity development within the Yemeni public, private and non-governmental 
sectors (Visser and Almoassib, 2008:1). As we mentioned before, the main reason to 
select The Netherlands from the donor countries is that it is the second biggest 
bilateral donor in education sector reform in Yemen. Furthermore, I selected the 
education sector reform in particular, because more than 40% of foreign aid is going 
directly to the education sector at all levels (MOPIC of Yemen, 2009). The projects 
under investigation are:
(1) Establishment of an Executive Masters in Public Administration (MPA) degree 
at the Faculty of Commerce, Sana’a University. The project was implemented by the 
Dutch Institute for Public Administration (Dutch acronym ROI), the School of 
Public Administration of Leiden University, the Department of Political Sciences and 
Public Administration at Sana’a University, and the National Institute of Administrative 
Sciences, Yemen. The overall aim of the project was to assist the Government of 
Yemen in the process of restructuring its public administration through increasing 
the capacity and capability of the higher education sector in Yemen. The specific 
objectives of the project were: (1) to have a viable Executive Master Degree programme 
in Public Administration, for senior and mid-level civil servants at management 
positions. The MPA was designed to offer the opportunity for civil service managers 
in the various public administration institutions, to obtain the necessary skills to help 
them in further strengthening the organization and management of their respective 
departments. (2) To have a renewed Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS) in 
charge of the development and implementation of the human resource training 
within the government structures at central, regional and local level. 
(2) Establishment of an executive Masters in Business Administration at the Faculty 
of Commerce, Sana’a University. The Maastricht School of Management, the Institute 
of Social Science (ISS) and Sana’a University implemented the project. The project 
targeted the development of an MBA delivery capacity at the Department of Business 
Administration of Sana’a University. It met the need for management education in 
188
Yemen, as it was evident that there is no comprehensive in-country training available 
to cater for the emerging private sector needs. The project envisaged the establishment 
of an MBA programme, through the strengthening of the staff base, supporting the 
development of the curriculum and educational infrastructure. In parallel, 
institutional development was foreseen, gearing up the Department to operate in a 
market-driven environment.
(3) Developing a diploma programme in Gender Studies at the Women’s Research 
and Training Centre (WRTC) of Aden University. The project was funded by Nuffic 
and implemented by Wageningen University and Aden University from 1 July 2004 
to 31 August 2008. The overall objective of the WRTC project was to contribute to the 
improvement of the status of women and their participation in the development of 
Yemen., by increasing the employment of women, their occupation of management 
positions, women’s participation in politics, fostering growing readiness to address 
gender issues in policy making at various levels of the Yemeni government, and a 
greater knowledge of how to do that by way of consultancies and dissemination. The 
specific objectives of the WRTC project were to strengthen the WRTC to become a 
sustainable organisation that had the capacity and capability to (i) teach and train 
present and future gender practitioners; (ii) conduct consultancies on gender issues 
to organizations and institutions engaged in gender and development; and (iii) 
manage an information and communication system for distribution of relevant 
materials to organizations, institutions and individuals on gender and development 
issues.
(4) Strengthening the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University and its 
Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management (WEC). The project, from 
August 2004 to July 2008, was funded by Nuffic and implemented by seven actors: the 
Water and Environment Centre at Sana’a from the recipient side and Wageningen 
University, Delft Technical University, Cairo University, MetaMeta, Arcadis-
Euroconsult and WaterWatch from the donor side. The overall idea and objective of 
the WEC project was to support the reform process of Yemen’s major water and 
environmental sector organisations, mainly in human resources development. This 
was needed to strengthen their institutional and technical capabilities in order to 
facilitate effective water resources management in the country. The WEC was 
undertaken to help alleviate the water crisis in Yemen and to help achieve ‘water 
security’, which has been identified as Yemen’s second priority next to national 







SU to be a sustainable centre providing diploma course in IWRM for mid-level 
managers and policy decision-makers; to create an MSc course in IWRM with 
different specializations for BSc students; and to foster high-level consultancy services 
that will act as an information centre on IWRM developments. The emphasis in all of 
this was on the sustainability of the centre in providing these services, which meant 
that a sound business approach was necessary. In other words, the project was not 
only about education but also about creating an entity that is able to continue to 
provide services – and even expand these - beyond the closing date of the project. 
Strengthening skills in the water management of the Yemeni government has become 
very important. There is a severe lack of capacity in water resource management, 
planning and participatory development – but also in some of the supporting 
technical fields. In developing this program, it was proposed to liaise closely with 
employers of the course participants, such as government staff, to ensure that the 
course fulfilled the requirements. It was also proposed to include a practical element 
in the training course inviting mid-level managers to study or to review a real-life 
problem related to IWRM in their organizations (Wageningen University, 2004). 
This research is an empirical enquiry and theoretically-guided examination of 
selected small-N cases. John Gerring (2007) argues that in case study methods with 
small samples the randomization in selecting cases is problematic. He argues that the 
cases will be unreliable and the researcher will not avoid the selection bias many 
scholars have warned against (see King et al, 1994; Achen and Snidal, 1989; Collier 
and Mahoney, 1996). The author’s proposed solution is to use purposive (non-
random) selection procedures that help to pick cases that are appropriate to particular 
research objectives. Consequently, the selection of cases in this study was guided by 
what is known as a Most Similar Case Selection strategy, exemplifying and vindicating 
the case study methodology used in this study (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Gerring, 
2007). According to the basic logic of this method, the cases under study generally 
deal with similar circumstances, but have experienced significantly different 
outcomes. This logic of research design allows us to select cases based on the 
dependent variable (success or failure of aid programmes) and then working 
backwards to see if the independent variable (incorporating local knowledge) has the 
right or predicted value of the dependent variable (Cook and Campbell, 2002; Tarrow, 
2010: 244):
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Table 5.1 Research Design
The research design provides for a sufficient basis to test the hypotheses, as it has 
effectively controlled for country-donor side-affects and reduced many entries. The 
case study includes two projects that achieved desirable outcomes, as specified by the 
evaluation records; and two other projects which have not achieved the desirable 
development results and impact, as was specified by the evaluation records and the 
researcher’s participant observations. The viability of these cases lies in the fact that 
they were implemented by the direct beneficiaries: governmental bodies and higher 
education organizations. Moreover, there were two programmes (MBA and MPA) 
implemented at the same sub-organization, namely the Faculty of Commerce and 
Economy at Sana’a University, of which the MBA was more successful. The same 
argument applies to the donor side: the Dutch Nuffic aid agency was responsible for 
designing and selecting the Dutch contractors to implement all the selected aid 
programmes. Furthermore, the majority of Dutch contractors were organizations in 
higher education. They have either individually carried out these aid programmes or 
in cooperation with other Dutch specialist organizations within the Dutch higher 
education system. This confirms that the research population has similar aspects, as 
we have adapted similar case selection method as a prerequisite of small-n design, 
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public sector, namely Yemen’s higher education sector. 
The selected cases share a number of important similarities and they are sufficiently 
comparable to allow for a reasonably controlled comparison. The projects have either 
ended or are in their final stages, thus making it possible to study causal explanations. 
The projects allow for a complete picture of the various stages. In other words, they 
are recent enough for the respondents to remember the project, but sufficiently 
advanced (or even completed) to allow for a proper analysis. These four cases were 
implemented approximately in the same time-frame, a ten-year period from 2003 to 
2011. They all focus on public sector reform, especially strengthening and upgrading 
capacity of the local education organizations and institutions; an effort that is also 
referred to as ‘institution building’. 
5.3 Forms of Enquiry
To gain an understanding about the effectiveness or failure of the projects in 
achieving their overall and specific objectives, a survey questionnaire was used as the 
main data source of evidence. In this stage of enquiry, we adapted a quantitative 
method for the analysis. The quantitative analysis allows the researcher to meet the 
first research objective and provides important links making conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the selected projects. The question why two cases might be perceived 
as more effective than the other two is left to the second stage of quantitative analysis, 
in Chapters 7 and 8. This second stage of quantitative analysis describes the extent to 
which the selected projects were able to build capacity in the targeted organizations 
of the higher education sector. This is in order to determine whether these projects 
promoted public sector reform or achieved the overall objective of the Dutch NPT 
program in Yemen (see Chapter 9). 
The third stage of our enquiry investigates why two cases were more effective than 
the other two in building capacity in the Yemeni higher education sector. This 
question is investigated through qualitative analysis, using the LKS explanation as the 
independent variable that can vary among the selected projects. At this stage, the 
underlying causes of the barriers and constraints that limit the effective incorporation 
of local knowledge in policy design and/or implementation of aid projects are 
consider. Multiple sources of evidence will be employed for this purpose; mainly 
primary sources such as key qualitative and semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation, as well as secondary sources (see Chapters 9 and 10): 
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Figure 5.1 Forms of Enquiry Based on Three Stages
This study adopts a mixed methods analysis. The roots of mixed methods can be 
traced back to the multi-trait, multi-method approach (Campbell and Fiske, 1959, 
cited in Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p.31). It is considered a relatively new 
methodology, which has evolved its key philosophical and methodological founda-
tions and practice standards since the early 1990s (Harwell, 2011: 151). The mixed 
methods research merges qualitative and quantitative methods and draws on the 
strong aspects of both traditions (Harwell, 2011). Therefore, the qualitative case study 
approach is critical to this dissertation, because it employs an intense investigative 
process that compares, classifies and contrasts events and subjects to provide decision-
makers and policy-makers with the information needed to improve program 
implementation and policy choices. Qualitative approaches are generally useful to 
study the particular context in which the participants act and the influence this 
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only the physical events and behavior that is taking place, but also the way the 
participants make sense of the events and how their understandings of their mission 
influence their behavior in policy design and implementation of aid programmes 
(Bredo & Feinberg, 1982; Geertz, 1973; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979, in Maxwell, 2008). 
Qualitative approaches typically study relatively small-N case studies of individuals 
or situations and preserve the individuality of each of these in their analysis, rather 
than collecting data from large samples and aggregating the data across individuals 
or situations. Thus it enables us to understand how events, actions, and meanings are 
shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur (Maxwell, 2005:22). In 
other words, qualitative approaches can help to develop a causal explanation for what 
outcomes of aid programmes occur under different values. Although qualitative 
research is not unconcerned with outcomes, a major strength of qualitative studies is 
their ability to target the causal inference that leads to these outcomes (Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002: 389). In this study, the main concern is to investigate the causal 
effect of incorporating local knowledge in outcomes of selected aid programmes 
rather than simply demonstrating regularities in the relationships between variables 
(Maxwell, 2005 & 2008).
The research is empirical in that direct observation of the world is seen as the way 
to generate and validate truths. Only through ongoing interaction between theory 
and data can we expect to generate a knowledge base that is solid and enduring. 
Qualitative analyses tend to be grounded in the empirical world and the problems 
apparent in the empirical world often require different approaches in order to gain 
understanding and reach conclusions (Patton 1990). Furthermore, “quantitative 
methods of data analysis can be of great value to the researcher who is attempting to 
draw meaningful results from a large body of qualitative data. The main beneficial 
aspect is that it provides the means to separate out the large number of confounding 
factors that often obscure the main qualitative findings.”(Abeyasekera, 2008:2). 
The focus of the research is on the process, implementation and development of a 
program and its participant’s qualitative approaches are used. To complement the 
qualitative approach, a quantitative evaluation was used for evaluating the effectiveness 
of the selected projects, i.e. the dependent variable, in capacity and capability building 
processes in a specific skill area. This was done by a survey among the direct 
beneficiaries of the aid projects within the Yemeni government and the private sector. 
Additional quantitative measure indicators supplement the survey to analyze whether 
foreign aid projects succeed in poor policy environments, which is a theoretical 
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challenge to the PCP approach. 
The justification for mixed methods research in this study tallies with the assertion 
of Johnson and Turner (2003), that the fundamental principle of mixed methods 
research is that multiple kinds of data are collected with different strategies and 
methods in ways that reflect complementary strengths and non-overlapping 
weaknesses; thus providing insights not possible when only either qualitative or 
quantitative data are col lected. Put another way, mixed methods research allows for 
the “opportunity to compensate for inherent method weaknesses, capitalize on inher-
ent method strengths, and offset inevitable method biases” (Greene, 2007: xiii as cited 
in Harwell, 2011: 152). 
5.4 The Sources of Data
As was mentioned earlier, the adopted mixed methods research merges qualitative 
and quantitative methods. Therefore, primary data was collected for the literature 
review, by applying a cross-sectional data collection method using survey 
questionnaires. The data collection was arrived at through the secondary data method 
and the primary data method. The first method includes published data such as 
papers, documents and other literature, for example reports related to the NPT 
program and its related projects, and research published online. The primary method 
is related to the empirical work and includes three main streams: questionnaire, 
interview, and observation:
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5.4.1 The Secondary Sources
Most of the secondary data gathered for this research originates from the selected 
policy setting (the higher education sector in Yemen) and the organizations involved 
in the study, as well as from publications of the Nuffic and MinBuza. For secondary 
data, it is necessary to recognize, categorize and analyze all documentation related to 
the selected projects, including: policy declarations and strategic plans for donor and 
recipient, project documents, funding proposals, progress and evaluation reports, 
press releases, archival records, memoranda and timetables. 
For an understanding of the donor perspective, I first analyzed those documents 
that identified and described the objectives of aid programs at all levels, including the 
budget justification. Project documents are produced by donor agencies, often in 
cooperation with the recipient government. These documents describe objectives, a 
plan of implementation, management arrangement, time frame, terms and conditions 
and confirm expected outcomes. The middle agency donor (Nuffic) or the project 
directors, mostly the implementers or the contractors of the aid project, deliver 
progress reports and evaluation reports. To understand the recipient side, I gathered 
information by looking at the strategic plans for improving higher education sector 
and development needs. The funding proposals from the relevant government 
institutions or ministries were analyzed and compared to the initial objectives, plans 
and expected outcomes. 
Looking at the secondary data is important to provide blueprints and evidence on 
what was planned and intended. It is also important to consider the way LKS is 
incorporated through institutional landscapes and organizations of public sectors 
that aid programs aim to reform. Documentation of aid programs can also help us to 
ensure that we have selected the relevant staff for conducting interviews.
5.4.2 The Primary Sources of Data
•	 Semi-structured Interviews
To provide an insight into what was actually happening during the process of 
implementation, considering the matter of incorporating local knowledge, this study 
investigates aid policies, practices and management, mainly through the experience 
of the people involved in planning, design and implementation. Qualitative interviews 
provide the researcher with the opportunity to have an intimate, recurring and 
prolonged involvement in the life and community of the respondents. Typically, the 
interviews are conducted with an unstructured or minimally structured format. The 
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questions tend to emerge as the researcher is sensitized to the meanings that the 
participants bring to the situation (Mertens, 1998: 321). For the interviews in this 
study, the researcher chose to provide some structure to assist with the gathering of 
specific knowledge, pertaining to the barriers and constraints of incorporating local 
knowledge in policy design and implementation of the selected aid projects. 
Qualitative interviews are conducted with different categories of participants to 
capture a range of relevant viewpoints, at all levels of the administrative process of aid 
programs. The first category of people are actors who were responsible for setting up 
policies and aid program plans at the policy making level, to discover if and how they 
incorporated local knowledge to execute their tasks. The second category consists of 
participants from the middle management level who carried out the design and 
implementation of aid programs. The third category includes key participants who 
were responsible for the actual execution of aid programs. They are the players at the 
heart of the aid game: intermediaries who are connected to recipient countries, donor 
countries, agencies, and beneficiaries. Their comparative advantage is to solve the 
local knowledge problem.
The participants selected for the donor’s perspective, included officials from top 
and middle management who represent the donor organizations in Yemen and who 
were responsible for setting and implementing aid policies. In addition, in order to be 
able to measure process directly against results, we included experts, consultants, 
field officers, coordinators and trainers from donor organizations to allow us to 
triangulate the collected data, and capture the different aspects of the intervention 
throughout the process of design and implementation of selected aid programs.
From the side of the recipient government, participants were selected from all 
administrative levels, including senior government officials and policy makers from 
the related ministry and institutions, top and intermediate management officers, 
experts, consultants, coordinators, field officers and workers. Furthermore, project 
directors, contract and direct-hire staff were also selected, in addition to the private 
sector companies that were directly involved in the projects and grassroots 
beneficiaries.
The actual number of participants selected depended mainly on the scale and 
complexity of the particular aid programs. For example, in some cases the donor or 
recipient had only one person responsible for project management and design. We 
tried to conduct the first interview with the project director, who in turn helped us to 







designing and implementing aid programs. To make the process of conducting 
interviews clearer and easier, I started the interview process with one pilot case study 
from the selected cases. The idea behind this was to ensure that all those involved 
with project design and implementation processes were interviewed.
To assess the reliability of the information that was collected from the interviews, 
the following points were considered. Firstly, to ensure that the direction of a certain 
topic was not lost, and to prevent the interviewee from digressing to a different topic 
not relevant to the objective of the interview, the researcher developed an interview 
guide to help the interviewees understand the main argument of the research. 
Secondly, the researcher used the content analysis structure to evaluate the data. The 
expert interviewees were informed and the common representative statements, 
secondary data, relevant structures, constructs of reality and interpretations were 
thus analyzed. Thirdly, the study analyzes similarities and differences through a so-
called thematic comparison based on typical statements, and it stresses thematic 
focus (Katharina, 2009: 26). 
There are other steps to ensure the reliability of the information collected from the 
interviews. As we mentioned before, the interviews on the donor side dealt with the 
different policy levels: policy-making, middle management, and operational level. At 
every level, questions were asked about the role of the interviewee and their evaluation 
of the other management levels in the Dutch context. For additional checks, the 
donors were asked about the role of the participants in the whole process. These 
different checks served as a technique to avoid any ethical issues, as asking the 
participants about their role might often prove sensitive. The respondents were given 
the space to speak freely about their ideas on the subject matter. This procedure was 
also followed for the recipients. In addition, two conferences, five group discussions 
and six expert meetings were organized. I organized and arranged the raw empirical 
material such as photos, observations, recorded interviews and transcriptions by 
writing memos of my thoughts and by defining, categorizing and coding data and 
constructing meanings. All of this was in line with the working procedures of the 
theoretical perspective in my study (Charmaz, 2003, as cited in Voeten, 2012). I 
worked in the academic year 2008-2009 as a teacher in the MPA project and was also 
involved with some activities in the MBA project as they are in the same building. 
This increased my understanding of the training processes in these projects, and 
provided me with reliable information about the problem that I am dealing with.
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•	 Observation
Qualitative observation should take place in naturalistic settings without 
predetermined categories of measurement or response (Patton, 1990). The data collected 
through observation should be regarded reliable and valid only if the methods for 
collecting them are value neutral (Kawulich, 2005). The level of participant observation 
is what is defined in Mertens’ text as moderate participation, whereby the researcher 
attempts to balance the insider and outsider roles by observing, and participating in 
some, but not all of the activities (Mertens, 1998: 317-318). Through the use of 
observational reporting, the researcher will be able to cross-check findings and eliminate 
inaccurate interpretations. Through observations in different settings, at different times 
of the day and year, the reliability of the data will be improved. This is in line with the 
suggestions made by Adler and Adler as presented in Mertens (1998).
In the present study, the observation constituted a very important method of 
collecting data, as the researcher was part of the plan for implementation of at least two 
of the selected projects as case studies (MPA and MBA) at Sana’a University. This offers 
greater opportunity for the researcher not only to adopt a direct observation approach 
during moments of fieldwork, but during the whole process. It is a structured method 
that is pest described, and valuable for mapping any informal organizations and 
institutions of a specific time and place. In addition, the nature of the problem regarding 
local knowledge and the effectiveness of foreign aid needs to be studied by a researcher 
who is preferably familiar with such local knowledge. The fact that I am a Yemeni 
researcher with more than six years’ experience working as a teaching assistant in the 
political science department at Sana’a University, is very advantageous to the study. My 
cultural and social background opens up greater opportunities to gain information 
about the formal and informal institutions and organizations in a specific place and 
time. 
•	 Questionnaire
The questionnaire is a convenient and an efficient technique of gathering data and 
measuring the impact of the selected projects in reality. It is difficult to use a qualitative 
technique to measure the impact of selected projects, because of the large population in 
the selected cases involved and the difficulty to control or cover all target groups. The 
written questionnaire is typically more efficient and practical and allows for the use of a 
larger sample, a method that is widely employed in educational research (Ary, et al, 







effectiveness of the selected projects in achieving their overall and specific objectives. 
For this purpose, it was divided into four categories: (I) information related to the 
demographic profile and work background (II) Evaluation of the capacity building 
projects in the education sectors (III) Evaluation of the transfer of training skills to the 
work setting. (IV) The level of effectiveness. This section (IV) could reflect the obstacles 
that these Yemeni higher education organizations face in the process of capacity building 
of their participants and in the process of transferring the trained skills back to the 
respective organizations.
It is difficult to fully claim that we have ready and available variables that are useful 
to measure the level of effectiveness of the selected aid projects in achieving the overall 
objective of the NPT program in Yemen. Instead, we used variables or proxies that 
explicitly capture a fragment of the level of effectiveness achieved through these aid 
projects for reforming the public sector. 
One variable of the survey is the demographic profile of the participants, which 
provides critical information about institutions. The analysis of the demographic profile 
shows something about the success and failure of the selected project in accomplishing 
the overall objectives of the NPT program. The enrollment process of participants 
[students] should be based on the priorities of the human development plan, identifying 
its vision and goals of “quantity” in promoting the public sector reform agenda. This 
human development plan should be responsive to the needs of current and future public 
sector reforms agenda. Based on the literature reviewed in earlier chapters of this study, 
and the researcher’s own knowledge and experience, the project will better reflect the 
local need for public sector reform (1) when there is orientation towards the promotion 
of female enrolment, (2) when there is a geographical and an organizational prevalence 
in the participation process across different organizations and cities ,(3) when the 
enrolment of the participants is primarily focused on the age group 30-35 years and 
below, and (4) when the enrolment of the participants focuses on the low-career and 
(mid) level civil servants to develop a new breed of leaders and managers.
Another variable is capacity building of the participants. This variable can be linked 
to the first variable, because as we select appropriate participants, the chance of 
developing their capacity and capability will be higher and vice versa. ‘In Chapter 4 we 
used the “ideal model” for capacity building in public sector in Yemen, that reflects the 
managerial skills that are needed to develop the capacity within human resources in 
Yemen. The managerial skills introduced at the end of Chapter 4 helps to evaluate the 
extent to which the selected project will effectively develop the capacity of the 
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participants. The managerial skills are: (1) Strategic management (2) Human resources 
(3) communications and (4) leadership skills.
The effectiveness of this training is related to the status of the strategic transfer of 
skills back to the office (Kirkpatrick, 1967). In this respect, the third variable has been 
developed to measure the efforts made by the selected projects to transfer the developed 
skills of their participants back to their work settings. Several predications are used as 
proxies to measure this variable, and are included in the following table: 
Table 5.2: The Developed Variables and Measured Items to Evaluate the Level 
of Effectiveness of the Aid Projects in Achieving their Overall Objective




of items in 
scales)
Place in the 
questionnaire
1-The demographic 
profile of the 
participants and the 




•	 Involvement of female participants
•	 Involvement of participants from outside the main 
cities
•	 Involvement of young participants





2- The achieved 






1. Strategic management skills developed: 
•	 Developing and analyzing policies for your organi-
zation
•	 Developing a strategic plan for your organization
•	 Developing a Plan of Action and a basic budget 
based on the strategic plan
•	 Developing indicators to measure the successful 
implementation of the strategy





2. Human resources management skills developed:
•	 Defining the functions and job descriptions of the 
organization
•	 Introducing and implementing an evaluation system 
of functions and jobs
•	 Setting criteria for evaluating the performance of 
the employees in the present situation
•	 Developing an employees’ upgrading programme
•	 Identifying the shortcomings of the present 
employees to fulfil new jobs and functions
•	 Setting up and implementing a monitoring and 
controlling system of change processes
•	 Establishing reference group to discuss and defend 
your visions within the organization
•	 Establishing a reference group to discuss and defend 
your visions with the beneficiaries
•	 Making and executing effective and participatory 
decisions
•	 Introducing and maintaining ethics and values such 




3. Communications skills developed: 
•	 Setting up and implementing a communication 
system within the organization
•	 Developing meeting skills
•	 Setting up a reporting system
•	 Developing reporting skills
0.884
(4 items)
4. Leadership skills developed:
•	 Getting a better understanding of English
•	 Promoting technology literacy
•	 Reading and comprehending information
•	 Being creative in solving problems
•	 Being integratieve in thinking
•	 Being a critical/analytical thinker
•	 Setting up and implementing a reward penalty 
system within your organization
•	 Managing conflicts and effective dispute resolution
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training back to the 
workplace in order 
to promote the 
public sector reform 
process
1. The selection process of the participants 
•	 The method of involving in the Education Centres 
(ECs) as participants
•	 The method of paying the fees of the master degree 
•	 Involving in the training process as part of the 
upgrading plan of the related organization 
•	 The competition policy of selecting the participants 
within the specific organizations 
•	 The criteria of selecting the participants by the re-
lated organizations





2. The teaching methods used
•	 Lecture technique
•	 Case Study
•	  Role Playing
•	  Business Games
n.a
3. The relevance of the curriculum and course 
training for the Yemeni context 
•	 Overlapping in course materials
•	 The courses are relevant to the special needs of the 
Yemeni related sector
•	 The master degree is focusing on how the manager 
should manage rather than what management is in 
general
•	 Good balance between theory and practice 
•	 Case studies presented in the courses are based on 
the daily practice of the Yemeni sectors
0.837
(5 items)
4. The application of training knowledge and skills in 
the job-setting:
•	 Describe your position in your organization before 
attending the education center. 
•	 Describe your position in your organization after 
attending the education center
•	 Promotion of function in an organization. 
•	 Receiving a salary increase after obtaining the 
master degree. 
•	 Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies 
to handle your work in the short term (day-
to-day work) based on the local organizational 
environment.
•	 Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to 
handle your work in the long term (strategically) 
based on the local organizational environment. 
•	 Developing a new breed of managers/specialists in 
the related organizations. 
•	 The role of education centers for promoting the 
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training for the Yemeni context 
•	 Overlapping in course materials
•	 The courses are relevant to the special needs of the 
Yemeni related sector
•	 The master degree is focusing on how the manager 
should manage rather than what management is in 
general
•	 Good balance between theory and practice 
•	 Case studies presented in the courses are based on 
the daily practice of the Yemeni sectors
0.837
(5 items)
4. The application of training knowledge and skills in 
the job-setting:
•	 Describe your position in your organization before 
attending the education center. 
•	 Describe your position in your organization after 
attending the education center
•	 Promotion of function in an organization. 
•	 Receiving a salary increase after obtaining the 
master degree. 
•	 Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies 
to handle your work in the short term (day-
to-day work) based on the local organizational 
environment.
•	 Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to 
handle your work in the long term (strategically) 
based on the local organizational environment. 
•	 Developing a new breed of managers/specialists in 
the related organizations. 
•	 The role of education centers for promoting the 
related organizations as a whole.
0.70
(8 items)
Results may differ among the selected projects in achieving the overall objective 
of the NPT program (promoting the capacity and capability of the respective sectors). 
This is based on the above-elaborated variables and the predications or proxies used 
in every variable. To explain the variation among the selected projects in achieving 
their overall objective, we developed other variables that measure the level of the 
effectiveness. The specific objectives as described in the table are related to the 
capacity building of higher education organizations. To develop the capacity of the 
organizations, as we mentioned before, the Dutch NPT projects aimed at strengthening 
the staff base and supporting the development of the curriculum and the educational 
infrastructure, developing course and training materials, training administrative and 
teaching staff, implementing scholarships to augment staff and equipping libraries 
and information centres with relevant materials. In parallel, organizational 
development was foreseen, giving the higher education organizations the tools to 
provide training services for the respective sectors. 
Based on the development validity approach of evaluating aid projects by focusing 
on the results- in other words the success of development projects attributed to the 
inherent value of the project, (see for example Scott-Smith, 2013 and chapter 2)-we 
developed three constructs to measure the level of effectiveness among the selected 
projects in achieving their specific objectives. These variables, as outlined in Table 5.3 
below are:
(1) the quality of the organizational and administrative settings, (2) the quantity 







Table 5.3 The Constructs to Measure the Level of Effectiveness Among 
the Selected Projects in Achieving the Specific Objectives 
(Building the Capacity within the Higher Education Organizations)
The inter-item consistency and reliability: nothing in quantitative investigation is 
more important than reliability (Bernard, 1995: 38) due to the fact that if the reliability 
of measuring instruments is weak it could jeopardize drawing good conclusions. This 
study started measuring the level of the inter-item consistency reliability of the 











• Effective organization and management
• Everything is easy to carry out your study 
• Effective operation procedures
• Admin functions and duties are clear
• The rules and regulations do not cause delay
• The admin staff within  the education center deal 
with all students in the same manner
• The academic staff within the education center deal 
with all students in the same manner
• The tuition fee is reasonable considering what the 
students learn from the master degree
• The particular wishes of the students in terms of the 
time to follow the master programme are consid-
ered 
0.920
(9 items) Section Two 
2. The quantity of 
the staff members
• There are qualified teachers who are able to teach 
the characteristics particular to Yemen
• Sufficient teachers who are able to teach the charac-
teristics particular to Yemen
• There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practi-
cal work or thesis of the graduate students
0.878
(3 items) Section Two
3. The quality of 
the staff members
• The attitude and working style of  teachers are 
unique in Yemen 
• Teachers have almost the same level of understand-
ing, skills and practical experience of education and 
research; work as a team in the EC
• Teachers have the same awareness and agreement 
about common vision of the EC’s functions
• Teachers are very committed and eager to work for 
the education center
• Teachers have enough time to be available to the  
students
• Teachers have access to the latest theoretical and 
practical developments in related subjects 
• Teachers are working to the highest standard
• Teachers show that they have experience of working 
with the relevant sectors in Yemen






consistent results (Gatewood and Field, 1990). The key measure and most commonly 
used statistic for multi item scales reliability is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Bagozzi 
et al., 2003; Dean & Sharfman, 1993; Snyman & Drew, 2003, in Abdeldayem, 2003). 
This coefficient alpha can show the correlation average between all the entered items 
in order to structure the measure instrument. The values of the measurement range 
from zero to one. When analyzed the data indicated a higher correlation, the reliability 
venture is higher. 
The nature and purpose of the scale are the main conditions that limit the different 
levels of reliability, as was shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above. The most commonly 
used significance alpha value, which is the minimum level and recommended, is 0.70 
(Nunnally, 1978). It is important to note, that the values of Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha are responsive to the number of entered items for analysis: the more items 
entered for analysis, the more reliable the test values will be. Thus, when there are a 
small number of items in the scale (fewer than ten) Cronbach’s alpha values are 
relatively small. If alpha is less than 0.70, Pallant (2001) recommends removing items 
with a total correlation of less than 0.30. This is because an item with low values in the 
total correlations scheme indicates that the item is measuring something different 
from the scale (in Al Banna, 2010).
The creation of the questionnaire has taken into account many particular 
considerations. For example, it was designed to achieve the objectives by avoiding 
any ambiguous questions or statements. A fair variety of thoughts and judgments of 
the participants in the selected projects were targeted, because there is no former 
research in Yemen to build on (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Five versions of the 
questionnaire were produced, first in English and then translated into Arabic, because 
most of the respondents in the selected projects only speak Arabic, apart from the 
MBA/CBA students who also speak English. 
As suggested by Bagozzi (1994), there are three parts in the critical review process 
of the questionnaire. The researcher himself should perform the first critical review. 
A group of experts, who are knowledgeable about the theory and the general methods 
used in the study, should perform the second review. The third part is a pilot test of 
the questionnaire on a small number of respondents (as in al-Banan 2008: 178). 
The questionnaire used for this study followed the same process. It was firstly 
critically reviewed. Secondly, some scholars from Leiden University and Sana’a 
University peer-reviewed the questionnaire and gave advice. For the Arabic version, 







participants was held, to make sure that the questionnaire was understandable. This 
was arranged through the organizing of semi-official workshops, which included 
participants from the different NPT-projects. The questionnaire had nearly 30 
participants.
As a result of such validity reviews, many things changed in the questionnaire 
survey. For example, at the beginning, the Likert-scale questions had a three-response 
choice. However, some respondents became confused because both three-point 
Likert-scale questions did not give them the opportunity to answer without restraint. 
Therefore, in the second stage, I unified the number of scale items to a five-point scale 
throughout the questionnaire, which gave more options for the respondents to choose 
from and to answer freely. 
It is worth noting here that selecting a sample is a fundamental aspect of the 
questionnaire design. Some issues which the researcher needs to decide about are the 
target population, the sample type, sample size and informants and the questionnaire 
administration. Those issues are addressed in Chapter 7 of this study. It is also relevant 
to mention that the target population for this study was limited to the participants 
(students) in the selected projects, who were administered into four groups: 
(1) Randomly selected public officials who were involved in the MPA & NIAS 
projects at Sana’a University
(2) Randomly selected employees from the private sector who were enrolled 
at the MBA project at Sana’a University
(3) Randomly selected students from the Women’s Research and Training 
Centre (WRTC), Aden University.
(4) Randomly selected students from Sana’a University, Water Center (WEC). 
This population consists of participants with high-level career positions, mid-
level career positions, and low-level career positions from different sectors such as 
the civil servant sector, the private sector, the water sector, and non-governmental 
organizations who are related to the WRTC project. This validates the several 
predictions’ that are used as proxies to measure the contribution of the NPT program 
in promoting the public sector in Yemen. 
5.5 Method of Quantitative and Qualitative Data Analysis
The discussion now turns to the analysis methods of the collected data. Any 
scientific study demands appropriate analytical procedures to analyze the collected 
data. To analyze the level of effectiveness of the selected NPT projects in terms of 
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achieving their overall and specific objectives, we used both descriptive and inferential 
statistics for analysis. This means in this study we prefer not to use hard statistical 
measures to perceive value of effectiveness among the selected projects. It is wise to 
keep the statistics simple so they are understandable for the target groups in our 
investigation and for others. The descriptive analysis was used to “summarize, 
organize, and make sense of a set of scores or observations. It is typically presented in 
tables and histogram graphs, or as summary statistics (e.g., an average)…For example, 
the number of times each individual fidgeted is not all that meaningful, whereas the 
average (mean), middle (median), or most common (mode) number of times among 
all individuals is more meaningful. Tables and graphs serve a similar purpose to 
summarize large and small sets of data” (Carlson and  Winquist, 2013). Descriptive 
analysis was used in this study to display the quantitative data and draw and verify 
conclusions among the selected projects (different groups). A one-way ANOVA test 
was used to interpret the results.
Frequency tables were used to show how often different values occur in the data. 
They can also be used to obtain summary statistics that describe the typical value and 
the spread of the observations. Tables display all the code numbers that occur for 
each variable and the number of cases in each of the code-number categories, 
including the value, the frequency of that value, and the percentage of the total 
responses for that variable. The valid percentage takes into account-missing variables 
and the cumulative percentage (Mallah, 2003). In addition, we used the cross-
tabulation as part of the analysis. The purpose of using the cross-tabulation procedure 
is to indicate whether there is variation among the selected projects in certain 
variables and measured items.
The histogram graph is a relative frequency distribution as it is shows the manner 
of the data distribution. It is very useful to provide information to describe the 
population. An important point to note here is that different samples from the same 
population will result in different sample histograms, even when class boundaries 
remain fixed. However, it is expected that “sample and population histograms are 
similar, [and] the degree of resemblance will increase as more and more data are 
added to the sample. A histogram can be used in any situation in which it is reasonable 
to group adjacent values. It presents data in pictorial or graphical forms.” (Mendenhall 
and Beaver, 1991, cited in Mallah, 2003).
The mean and standard deviation were used to determine the measure of central 







was used to further analyze the means between and within the selected aid projects. 
An ANOVA is an inferential statistic used as a test of statistical significance, resulting 
in an F-value (Timothy Hatcher, 2011). It is helpful in making comparison of two or 
more means, enabling a researcher to draw various results and predictions about two 
or more sets of data. Thus a one-way ANOVA test was conducted to examine any 
differences in opinions among the participants in the different aid projects. These 
differences could be important because some aid projects may have more participants 
who are satisfied with the training programmes than others. The .05 level of 
significance was used to evaluate the association between aid projects and opinions 
of the participants about their actual impact.
The respondents were asked to indicate their agreement in the questionnaire on 
five-point Likert-type scales: 1= strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 4= disagree, and, 5= strongly disagree. The number of the responses for 
each of the five points was then multiplied by its respective level of effectiveness, 
rating, 1 = strongly effective, 2= effective, 3 = neutral, 4 = ineffective, and, 5 = strongly 
ineffective. The result of the mean scores in the selected projects was averaged to 
construct a composite measure of the level of effectiveness of the aid project in 
developing managerial skills of its participants (doing cross case analysis). In other 
words, in calculating a mean score, a response of “strongly disagree” should be given 
a mean score of 5, and “strongly agree” should be given a mean score of “1”. The 
neutral point is “3.0”, and similarly, a response of “agree” should be given a mean 
score of 2 and “disagree” should be given a mean score of “4”. This composite measure 
reflects an aggregate view of each aid project based on the values of the total mean 
scores. 
Based on the structure of the data, we have combined similar categories of 
response and removed the neutral category when presenting the frequency 
distributions as one analysis method. Thus, we would expect 50% of the responses in 
each of the two categories, assuming that those categories make up 100% of the 
responses. For some questions, this may give us a clearer picture of differences in the 
response. We have combined the categories of “Yes” as one group and” No” as another 
group for answers to some questions. 
Method of qualitative data analysis: the current study adopted a small-N case 
study methodology, which “is often opaque, and must therefore be supplemented by 
another form of analysis that has come to be known as process tracing” (Gerring, 
2007: 173). Alongside Gerring, other scholars like Tarrow (2010) and George and 
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Bennett (2005), assert that process tracing is an essential method for data analysis, in 
a study that selects case studies based on a similar case research design, which can be 
referred to as “controlled comparison.” The form of process tracing adopted in this 
dissertation can be described as an analytic narrative, engaging attempts to identify 
the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an 
independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 206). Thus, process tracing provides supporting evidence that helps to 
verify data obtained through other methods and sources. It is more convincing when 
multiple links are explicitly formalized and each micro-mechanism is proven. By 
generating and linking many observations to explain a case, the process tracing 
method contributes to hypothesis testing research. It is particularly useful for 
addressing the problem of equifinality by showing different outcomes for the same 
cause (Gerring, 2007:18; George and Bennett, 2005: 223-224).
The method of process tracing serves to examine the topic under investigation by 
collecting, clustering and analyzing data from a case at policy decision-making level 
and implementation level, from the perspectives of both donor and recipient. This 
examination consists of generating and linking observations to test the three main 
hypotheses of the study. I will trace the following steps in the form of a causal chain: 
 Step 1: The first step of process tracing is to examine policies and delivery 
mechanisms which comply with a donor’s thoughts, assumptions and stated 
objectives. At this stage, the donor’s policies and strategies were obtained 
from publications and documents. These were scrutinized in order to 
investigate the extent to which they incorporated local knowledge during the 
process. With regard to policy design, the focus was on the donor’s main 
mission statement and strategic objectives, its general policy and its specific 
policy towards Yemen, its regional approach, development targets and 
priority areas, country strategy papers, and white papers on development. 
With respect to the specific selected projects, this documentation was 
supplemented by material containing the particular project objectives and 
outlines. 
 Step 2: The second step of process tracing is to investigate, through interviews 
with policy makers and senior officials on the donor side, the written data 
provided on policies and the donor’s approaches in dealing with the project. 
This provided an opportunity to explain the disparity in the policies applied 







 Step 3: It focuses on the government’s own analysis of to what extent their 
missions, priorities, and national policies are reflected in the formal and 
informal institutions and organizations that promote public sector reforms. 
Some of these documents were not available however.
 Step 4: Is semi-structured interviews with relevant government officials to 
get their views on their interactions with donor contractors. In addition, this 
step was also needed to investigate if there is a process that ensures a 
systematic incorporation of local knowledge, and reflects their objectives, 
policies and priorities that leads to applications for foreign funding. 
 Step 5: Compares the data obtained from the interviews with decision-
makers with what is stated in the available official documents about 
development policies, project planning, design, structure and management. 
The data from documents and interviews is compared with the actual 
implementation in order to determine the extent of efficiency, consistency 
and ‘truthfulness’ of aid policies for both the donor and recipient, and to 
check if there are any changes during the implementation stage that 
incorporate local knowledge. 
 Step 6: This is a cross-case analysis addressing the objectives of the research 
in the light of the findings drawn from the integration of the case studies and 
the foreign aid literature. The different aspects of each objective were 
addressed through a cross-cutting analysis of evidence from interviews, 
documentation and mainly the findings of all case studies. By seeking 
confirmation from various data sources we get more reliable outcomes4.
5.6 Validity Considerations
Validity considerations are still a major issue for researchers who are adopting 
mixed method approaches. Creswell and Clark (2007) noted that “the very act of 
combining qualitative and quantitative approaches raises additional potential validity 
issues.”(2007: 145) Some of the questions raised by Creswell and Clark are (1) how 
validity should be elaborated in mixed methods research. (2) How and when to 
report and discuss validity for qualitative and quantitative strands of mixed methods 
research. (3) Whether researchers should follow the “traditional validity guidelines 
and expectations; and (4) how to minimize potential threats to the validity related to 
data collection and analysis issues in mixed methods research?” (As cited in Venkatesh 
4 - Regarding to these steps of  data analysis, I partly adopted the ideas of  Jaradat, 2008. 
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et al, 2013:14). To overcome these problems, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003, 2009) 
proposed a solution by using the term “inference quality” to “refer to validity in the 
context of mixed methods research”. In contrast, Creswell and Clark argued that, 
because the term validity is “extensively used in quantitative and much qualitative 
research, it may be used in mixed methods research and thus making new terminology 
not essential” (as cited in Venkatesh et al, 2013, p15). This study is consistent with 
Creswell and Clark’s argument and uses validity in the way it is traditionally used in 
the qualitative and quantitative strands of research.
Accordingly, the validity considerations in this study should be related to the 
quantitative investigation and the qualitative investigation. Finlay (2009) argued that 
“qualitative researchers contest and reject the criteria used by quantitative researchers 
when evaluating their work: those of reliability, validity and generalizability. Instead, 
qualitative researchers have developed alternative criteria responsive to their specific 
research ideals. These criteria encompass various dimensions of ‘rigour’, ‘ethical 
integrity’ and ‘artistry’.” (2009: 1) 
Before turning our discussion to these two views of validity considerations, it is 
worth defining the concept of validity. Campbell and Cronbach (2002) viewed the 
term validity as referring to the approximate truth of an inference or a property of 
inferences: “When we say something is valid, we make a judgment about the extent 
to which relevant evidence supports that inference as being true or correct. Usually, 
that evidence comes from both empirical findings and the consistency of these 
findings with other sources of knowledge, including past findings and theories. 
Assessing validity always entails fallible human judgments” (2002: 34). 
The concept of validity is related to the process to which research truly measures 
what it is meant to measure. This criterion rests upon the assumption that the 
phenomenon being investigated possesses ‘reality’ in an undisputed, objective sense: 
Qualitative researchers in general view this as inappropriate. Given the diversity 
of the social world, they argue, it is erroneous to assume the existence of one 
unequivocal reality to which all findings must respond. They ask instead: whose 
reality is the research addressing? Moreover, qualitative research – by definition – 
involves subjective interpretations (often delivered by both participants and/or 
researchers). “If one accepts that interpretation cannot be excluded from the research 
process, it follows that any one analysis can only be presented as a tentative statement 
opening a limitless field of possible interpretations” (Churchill, 2000: 164 as cited in 
Finlay, 2009: 6). 
Indeed, maximizing the validity consideration is a real problem that researchers 







(Patton, 2002). There is a wide range of evaluative criteria available to assure the 
quality and trustworthiness of the qualitative research. The test of validity is usually 
further divided into four types: internal validity, external validity, face validity, and 
construct validity (Dey, 1993; Lecompte & Goetz, 1982; Yin, 1994, 2003). These four 
kinds of validation provide a basic framework for conducting and evaluating the 
validation of the qualitative approach in this study. Thus we look at them in detail 
below. 
5.6.1 Internal Validity
Internal validity is an approximate truth about inferences regarding causal 
relationships in a scientific inquiry. Therefore, internal validity is only relevant in 
studies that try to establish a causal relationship. It is for instance not relevant in most 
observational or descriptive studies. However, for studies that assess the effects of 
social programs or interventions, internal validity is perhaps the primary consideration 
to resort to. It is the degree to which a casual relation can be established, whereby 
specific conditions are proved to lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994: 35). The key 
question in internal validity is whether observed changes can be attributed to the 
program or intervention and not to other possible causes, sometimes described as 
“alternative explanations” for the outcome (Shadish et al. 2002). 
Internal validity is related to a specific study problem or question. In other words, 
it cannot be generalized. According to Shadish “all that internal validity means is that 
you have evidence that what you did in the study (i.e., the program) caused what you 
observed (i.e. the outcome) to happen. It does not tell you whether what you did for 
the program was what you wanted to do or whether what you observed was what you 
wanted to observe -those are construct validity concerns. It is possible to have internal 
validity in a study and not to have construct validity” (Shadish et al. 2002:34)
Voeten (2013) reviewed two definitions of the concept internal validity. The first 
definition was cited from Sumner and Tribe (2008) who viewed internal validity as 
critical to the credibility of the research design and its findings. They argue that 
internal validity concerns the explicit correspondence, coherence and consistency 
between the data, interpretation and the writing-up. The second definition of the 
concept is taken from Benz and Newman (1998) who proposed several strategies for 
maintaining internal validity, including evaluating the reliability and quality of the 
data and the internal line of reasoning towards conclusions (2012: 17). 
It is clear that our study intends to provide an insight in the ‘why’ question; it is a 
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causal investigation. Different essential aspects of internal validation have been 
realized in this research. The first validity consideration is that our study adopts case 
analysis methods, which leads to improvement of internal validity (Gerring, 2007). 
However, a specialist reader may note that because a small-N case design was adopted 
internal validity is at stake. This is partly overcome by adopting process tracing for 
data collection and analyzing stages (see previous section). Process tracing allowed 
this investigation to have multiple types of evidence for the verification of a single 
inference (incorporating local knowledge) and pieces of evidence that embody the 
unit of analysis on different levels (policy-making and implementation levels). The 
information from observations is gathered by unique populations from different 
levels and institutional landscapes (Gerring, 2007). As I am studying in The 
Netherlands, part of the population is from The Netherlands. By doing this, I gained 
further experience about the social, organizational and cultural aspects of Dutch 
society. My Yemeni background/heritage affords me insight into organizational and 
cultural aspects of Yemen, which is helpful for understanding the second Yemeni 
study population group in this study. The different backgrounds of the involved 
actors in the networks prevented those actors from having effective interactions, 
from transferring ideas and knowledge that could be useful in the processes of 
designing and implementing aid projects. I found that many of these helpful 
practicalities were reflected in the literature on logistics and research practice (Murray 
and Overton, 2003).
After presenting here most of the internal validity issues and their solutions, it is 
useful to apply Mofakkarul’s (2007) overview of the different studies that describe the 
threats to internal validity which qualitative researchers face, and advocate possible 
remedies to circumvent the threats (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1999; Lecompte & Goetz, 1982; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1989, 1994, 2003). Mofakkarul 
summarized these threats and applied them in his research. I have applied them in 







Table 5.4 Important Threats to Internal Validity of Qualitative Research, Tactics 
Advocated in the Literature to Minimize Threats, and Tactics Applied in this Study
Source: entirely adopted from Mofakkarul (2007: 106) and applied in my study. 
5.6.2 External Validity 
This study conceives external validity as a “determination of whether the study 
was credible, accurate, and useful to others outside the participant group (Roberts et 
al., 2008). Making explicit statements and acknowledging subjective judgments 
ensured a study’s validity (Ashworth, 2008)” (as cited in Odemba, 2010: 81). This 
definition is also confirmed by Cooper & Schindler, (2008), Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005), and Bacal (2008) who regarded external validity as the transferability process 
of the study’s conclusions and findings: the capability to deal with the same problems 
in other situations. Ray (2003) and Churchill et al. (1998), as cited in Voeten (2012), 
argued that, in qualitative methodologies, “it is important that data collection and the 
line of reasoning that leads towards the conclusions can be validated by external 






•	 Long term residence in the field 
•	 Retrospective tracing of phenomena 
•	 Time-sampling procedure 





Threats relating to 
observer effects or 
misinterpretation
•	 Triangulate:




•	 Gradually disengage from informal relationships, periodically withdraw 
from field (i.e. don’t ‘go native’)
•	 Extended fieldwork to understand people and setting 
•	 Code participant responses according to situations expected to elicit 
contrived responses 
•	 Be reflective, that is, engage in self-critical reflection, monitor own bias and 
try to control
•	 Have case summaries checked by participants 
•	  Use verbatim when writing research reports to let readers understand 
subjects’ viewpoints and emotions
•	 Perform pattern matching 
•	  Select and study negative cases
•	 Peer review (e.g. discussion with colleagues) 

















Mortality •	 Identify and record loss or gain in group membership; collect baseline data 
to compare activities and events over time
N/A
Reactive effects •	  Compare with already documented cases 
•	  Record reactive effects on respondents 





reviewers. Transparency in the line of reasoning is essential. Churchill et al. (1998) 
suggests that this can be judged by the coherence criterion; the coherence between 
the raw data and the identified patterns and conclusions. The cases should be 
described in a common format that facilitates identification of the patterns described” 
(2012: 20). 
It is worth noting that according to Leedy & Ormrod (2005), generalizations of a 
qualitative study can be limited. The uniqueness of the study might hinder a direct 
replication in other contexts. 
Denzin (1982), Guba & Lincoln (1985), Lecompte & Goetz (1982) and Yin, (1994, 
2003) have presented the key threats to external validity and the tactics used by 
qualitative researchers to minimize those threats (cited in Mofakkarul, 2007), which 
we present in Table 5.5 below. This study tried to deal with such threats during 
different stages of research, especially as I am trying to construct a theoretical 
generalization that is related to the LKS. 
Table 5.5 Important Threats to External Validity, Tactics Advocated in the Literature 
to Minimize those Threats, and Tactics Used in this Study
Source: Mofakkarul (2007). * I used a multiple-case design within a country. All my small N or cases 
form the same country setting, which can represent a threat for the replication logic. However using rival 
theories is a solution to this threat. 
The study addresses general and external validity threats by providing a detailed 
description of the context of the case study, people, and organizations. Furthermore, 
a description of the main causal mechanisms of the local knowledge syndrome at the 




	Provide a detailed description of the context, characteristics of the 
people and groups and other necessary information needed to 
demonstrate typicality 
	Use theoretical sampling 
	In a multiple-case design





Selection effects 	Collect evidence from different perspectives (e.g. participants versus non-participants)
YES
Setting effects 	Beware of over-saturation of settings and avoid subjects that have been under repeated investigation YES
Historical effects 	Describe influence of historical factors on target groups YES
Construct effects
	Explicitly define constructs 










policy design and policy implementation level is provided to serve other researchers, 
who can compare their own work with the findings of this study (Chapter 3). 
When we see the case-study design in a global perspective, this study has a single 
case nature. On a country level, our case design is a multiple-case design that 
increased the external validity within the Yemen context, because comparing four 
cases or organizations from different areas in Yemen ensures external validity. Sana’a 
University is located in the north of Yemen and Aden University is located in the 
south. The design included two cases that succeeded and two cases that failed. Three 
of the cases belong to the same organization (Sana’a University). That means the 
research’s findings can be generalized at the Yemen level. 
Generalizability also refers to possible implications of this study’s findings to other 
settings outside of Yemen. Despite the single-case design, this study can be generalized. 
To overcome the generalizability or external validity threat, this study builds on 
multiple theories such as the explanations of LKS from the viewpoint of rational 
choice institutionalism, political anthropology, economic and development theories, 
network perspective, including the actor network approach, policy design and 
implementation theories, and those originating in the field of aid project management 
(Chapters 1, 2 and 3). To review the conceptualization of LKS, this study analyzed the 
problems that came up in different studies related to foreign aid ineffectiveness in 
recipient countries that have more or less similar economic, political, social, and 
administrative structures as Yemen.
This study also addressed other specific threats to external validity such as the 
effects of selection, setting effects, historical effects and construct effects. To minimize 
selection effects, data was collected both from people who were directly involved 
with the policy design and implementation, and those who were not involved in the 
process, such as the external evaluators of the NPT, some experts and senior officials 
from the Yemeni government and university scholars. The setting effect was clearly 
evident in some of the projects investigated in this study. Some of the projects were 
not doing well and the teams were afraid of giving the right information especially 
during the interviews. This threat was minimized by asking the recipient about the 
role of the donor contractors and by asking the donor contactors about the role of the 
counterparts in the recipient side. In addition, the findings of a number of subjects in 
the study were crosschecked. 
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5.6.3 Face Validity and Construct Validity
According to Dey (1993), “face validity refers to the degree to which there is a fit 
between the observations of a researcher and the concepts used by the person. 
Construct validity, on the other hand, is the degree of fit between the definitions of 
the concepts used by a researcher and the “previously established” and “authoritative” 
definitions of the concepts in the literature” (1993: 255). Face validity and construct 
validity thus “refer to the adequacy of the definition of a concept and how a concept 
is embedded, or can be traced back, in a network of theoretical associations” (Dowling, 
1986, as cited in Voeten, 2012: 17). However, “fuzziness is a frequently recurring issue 
in the social sciences. Once a definition or construct has been proposed, it must be 
validated as a theoretical concept or as a fundamental unit of thought with a 
meaningful role within existing theoretical systems.” (Voeten, 2012: 17) To ensure 
face and construct validity of qualitative research in this study, we adopted the 
techniques presented in Table 5.6 below, based on Dey, 1993; Yin, 1989, 1994, 2003:
Table 5.6 Techniques Advocated in the Literature to Ensure Face and Construct 
Validity of Qualitative Research and those Applied in this Study
 Source: Mofakkarul (2007) according to Dey, (1993); Yin, (1989), (1994), and (2003), and reapplied in this study. 
Techniques in the literature Applied in this study?
Use multiple sources of evidence YES:  This study adopted a mixed study method, qualitative and 
quantitative, with multiple sources of evidence: interviews, 
questionnaire, observations, external evaluation reports of the projects 
based on empirical work and related project documents. I also used 
secondary resources such as books, articles, and internal reports related 
to the subject.
Use concepts from the literature YES: These were explained in Chapter 1, and at the beginning of every 
chapter, I have explained the related concepts. The LKS is a new concept 
in this study that I have linked to many theories and different 
explanations. The operationalization of the LKS is presented in Chapter 
3. 
Maintain a chain of evidence YES: I have done this by using the tracing process of collecting data and 
analysis. It was explained in this chapter. 
Demonstrate the criteria by which 
the data was categorized and exhibit 
how the connections between the 
concepts were identified and made 
explicit
YES: discussed in this chapter 
Provide both typical as well as 
negative or extreme instances
YES: the design of this study adopted two negative examples and two 
positive examples of cases
Have  key informants to review draft 
case study reports
NO: but interview summaries were discussed with some of the key 
informants of NUFFIC and the ECs involved with the study as well as 







The main concern in this study is conceptual fuzziness, because many of the terms 
used in this study are broadly applied and have multiple definitions, such as 
institutional development, capacity and capability building, public sector reforms, 
administrative reforms and poverty reduction. This problem is minimized by linking 
the theoretical elements to the empirical side of the aid project, namely policy design 
and implementation. The analytical process is provided in Chapter 10. However, 
conceptual fuzziness is a problem within any social research and it is difficult to solve 
completely.
I used multiple sources of data and established a chain of evidence through the 
comparison of data from various interviews and documents. I crosschecked 
information and conclusions to ensure constructive validity (Leonard-Barton, 1990 
and Yin, 1994) and also internal validity (Flick 1992). According to Yin (1994), “the 
use of multiple sources of evidence in a case study makes the conclusions more 
convincing and precise. It is a question of developing convergent lines of research. 
The triangulation also makes it possible to improve constructive validity, because the 
different sources contribute to additional measurements of the phenomenon” (as 
cited in Leonard-Barton, 1990: 12). In this study, a triangulation technique was used 
to compare data from different sources including observations, interviews, secondary 
resources, survey-questionnaire and official and semi-official reports published by 
related actors from both the Dutch side as well as the Yemeni side. We have to check 
if the interview guide is fully reflective of the information that was needed from the 
field. In the next step, the findings were linked to the theoretical perspective of this 
study. I formulated interview guides for the conduction of interviews with participants.
 
5.6.4 Objectivity of the Researcher
Before turning to a discussion on the problems I encountered during the 
investigation, it is important to briefly address the objectivity of the researcher. 
Objectivity is critical for any type of research. However, no research is value free. 
Every researcher has some personal motives, issues or bias toward the subject being 
studied. In qualitative research there is a term for this: conformability. This describes 
the extent to which the researcher has controlled the intrusion of his/her personal 
values (Voeten, 2012: 17). When I was part of the MPA project, it was logically to be 
biased towards the outcomes of the project, but one year after the closure of the 
project and having discussions with former long-term manager of the NPT program 
in Yemen, I felt I had enough distance to take an objective point of view on the 
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research idea.
I hope that as a researcher from the global south conducting this research I show 
how we can realize an institutional change in the poor nations by solve the local 
knowledge problem. I have put my focus on input from the government of the 
developing country that is receiving the foreign assistance, and not merely on 
development theories that are presented by researchers from the developed world or 
the donor countries. Most of these western theories of development are used by 
donor agencies to inform their development approaches, while these theories are 
actually downplaying the local knowledge and the local perceptions in the recipient 
countries.
5.7 Encountered Problems 
There were several problems related to the interviews. Due to the sensitivity of the 
subject, and as a result of the political and personal interests of some participants, it 
was difficult to record a few interviews without affecting the participant’s interest. 
Many of the participants who function in high government positions at both donor 
and recipient sides asked me not to quote them directly. The Yemen specific context 
also makes this increasingly difficult. I held interviews with different academic staff 
of several departments who belonged to the same institution. Conflicts of interests 
seemed to be always present, because of the Dutch project. Fear of relative deprivation 
seemed pervasive. The researcher’s position as a colleague also made it sensitive for 
them to expose their ideas freely. However, this problem was overcome by asking 
respondents for information about the role of the different levels. For example, I 
would ask the policymaking level about the role of the middle management and the 
operational level officials. I asked the middle management about the role of the 
policymaking level and operational level. I asked the operational level about the role 
of the middle management and policymaking levels. At the end, I asked all the levels 
about the role of the donor contractors and policymakers in the process. The problem 
was treated carefully by taking written notes during interviews in some interviews 
(but the other interviews I used an audio recorder), thus protecting anonymity and 
confidentiality, as well as making the respondents more forward in their answers.
Another difficult problem was making appointments with contractors, 
counterparts and policymakers on both donor and recipient sides. On the donor side, 
contractors are generally busy and some of them reside in different recipient countries 







difficult to contact (certainly for interviews) due to scheduling and travel restrictions. 
In many cases, the researcher had to go through intensive government procedures of 
writing letters and overcoming bureaucratic obstacles to get to the officials. The 
Yemen specific context proved an additional challenge during the field study, as 
Yemen is (still) suffering from political, social and security unrest, which prevented 
the researcher from reaching potential respondents. Despite the difficulties, I 
managed to meet almost 85% of the participants, mostly in informal or personal 
settings (e.g., during the Qat5 sessions or in their homes). In one year of field study, 
this research engaged 65 respondents of interviews, from both donor and recipient 
sides and presentations at 2 conferences in Yemen.
Another problem was related to the availability of the official documents produced 
by the involved actors. In most cases, there was little if any documentation on projects 
provided by the recipients. Donors usually generate more of the documented material, 
as they are obliged to report to the stakeholders who invest in their aid programmes. 
Yet Nuffic and MinBuza made it very difficult to get such documents, indeed it was 
necessary for my doctoral supervisor to get involved to acquire the solicited 
documents. This problem was also partly circumvented by informal ways of getting 
the documents through colleagues in Yemen, and by placing more weight on the 
interviews with respondents on the recipient side, which proved to be a more 
productive source of data than documentation.
5.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I describe the research strategy that investigated the reasons why 
aid projects aimed at promoting public sector reform in Yemen succeeded or failed. 
This question demands a theoretical framework that explains how and if unsuccessful 
aid programs occur as a result of a failure to incorporate local knowledge in policy 
design and/or implementation. The theoretical perspective of the LKS is a new 
approach that challenges the PCP approach.
In this research, the case of Yemeni-Dutch cooperation was studied to challenge 
this main argument of the PCP approach that aid interventions in poor nations are 
ineffective. The PCP approach claims that that the existence of multiple egoistic goals 
of aid assistance may be the main reason. The Netherlands also has strategic interests 
to give aid to Yemen: for security and stability. In the next chapter I assess if these 
5 - Yemenis spend almost six hours a day chewing Qat in special places called Diwans. Qat is a white-flowered evergreen 
shrub, Catha edulis, of  Africa and Arabia, whose leaves have narcotic properties. It is traditional for most people in Ye-
men to chew the leaf. 
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development efforts led to improvements in terms of development outcomes that 
have meaningful impact on security and stability. 
A comparative case study approach with small-N design was used to develop an 
in-depth understanding. The selection of cases was guided by what is known as a 
“Most Similar Case Selection Strategy” that exemplifies and vindicates the case study 
methodology used in this study. According to the basic logic of this method, the cases 
under study possess generally similar circumstances, but have nevertheless 
experienced significantly different outcomes. This logic of research design allows us 
to select cases based on the dependent variable (success or failure of aid programmes) 
and then working backward to see if the independent variable (incorporating local 
knowledge) has the right or predicted value of the dependent variable. 
This study adopted a mixed methods research that combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods and draws on the strengths of both traditions of inquiry. As I 
showed, the quantitative analysis allows the researcher to meet the first research 
objective and provides an important link making conclusions about the effectiveness 
of the selected projects and the question of why cases differ in their (in)effectiveness 
of completing their mission is dealt with qualitatively. Qualitative analysis is based 
upon the LKS explanation as the independent variable in this study. A qualitative and 
theory-building or theory elaboration approach was also adopted for the research 
because there has been no prior theory developed on the explanation of the LKS for 
aid projects’ ineffectiveness. The adoption of the mixed methods research allowed us 
to use multiple data collection methods: interviews, focus group discussions, 
document analysis, and participant observation. The questionnaire was the main 
method of quantitative data collection.
Following the logic of enquiry in this methodology chapter, the next chapter 
presents the macro analysis of Dutch development efforts in Yemen, in order to show 
that the multiple goals of donors are not the main cause of ineffective aid projects, but 
that applying local knowledge is important to reach the set goals. Then in Chapters 7 
and 8 I conduct a microanalysis of selected Dutch NPT projects to conclude which 
projects were most effective. The answer to the question of why certain projects were 
more effective than others were, the relation to the LKS and the response to the PCP 
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In chapter 5 we discussed the methodological issues of this study. It highlighted 
how we can undertake an empirical analysis and investigation in to the main argument 
of this dissertation. The overall motivation for this dissertation is built on the 
following proposition. (1) The existence of multiple and egoistic aid goals of providing 
aid by donors and (2) a poor policy environment of a recipient country (the PCP 
public choice perspective’s argument)1 may not be the main reasons for ineffective aid 
interventions in poor nations. Foreign aid can effectively contribute to the 
development of poor and traditional countries, but those who are in charge of the 
design and implementation of aid programmes have to be in touch with reality. They 
may carefully plan and implement sound policies that take into consideration local 
knowledge from a specific “place and time”. That means the Local Knowledge 
Syndrome explains causes of foreign aid ineffectiveness.
The main objective of this chapter is to provide an empirical response to the PCP 
approach, by using the case of Dutch-Yemen development co-operation and to find 
out if the existence of multiple and egoistic aid goals from donor countries is the 
main cause aid projects’ ineffectiveness. To do so, it is useful to study The Netherlands›s 
development role and aid history in Yemen. There are several reason why we study 
the Netherlands’ development aid efforts in Yemen. The country stands out because 
it is one of the three largest donor countries in Yemen. It has a long history in funding 
development programmes in the country, especially in the focal sectors: water, health 
and basic and higher education, with a focus on crosscutting themes like gender, 
governance and capacity building. The strategic or egoistic interest of the Netherlands 
is to develop the capacity of the Yemeni state, to enable the government to deliver 
services to its citizens, to control its lands and to reduce poverty. Poverty is considered 
as the main source of social unrest and a condition for growing terrorism on the 
ground, especially after 9/112. 
The coming chapters will look in detail at the NPT program in higher education 
in Yemen. We consider the motivation of the Netherlands for their investment in this 
program, and in doing so we see whether the PCP approach offers an appropriate 
framework to understand if the foreign aid projects do not work in a poor policy 
environment. In this chapter, we only introduce the Yemen-Dutch NPT programme 
1 - See Chapter Two of  this study. 
2 - Terrorism is a word that came in only after 9/11. Before that, reduction of  poverty was mainly based on human 
rights and access to education, health and other services. Fighting against social unrest was much more than the word 







by looking at four selected projects and unravel their main objectives and 
implementation plans.
After this introduction in section 1 there are a further five sections in this chapter. 
The second outlines the Dutch aid policy determinants to Yemen, focusing on three 
components: attention for solidarity, trading relations between the Netherlands and 
Yemen and the political / security dimension. The third section summarizes the 
volume of Dutch aid to Yemen, compared to other major donors in the country. The 
fourth section presents an overview of the Dutch aid allocation in Yemen, and gives 
a macro analysis of effectiveness. The fifth section is an introduction to the Yemen-
Dutch NPT programme in the higher education sector, focusing on the four key 
cases that have been chosen for deeper investigation in this study: (1) Establishment 
of an MBA Degree Programme at Sana’a University; (2) Establishment of an executive 
MPA Degree Programme at Sana’a University, in partial partnership with the National 
Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS), Ministry of Civil Service; (3) 
Strengthening the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University Graduate 
Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM); and (4) the 
Women’s Research and Training Centre (WRTC), Aden University. The final section 
presents the summary of the discussions in this chapter.
6.2 Dutch Aid Policy’s Determinants in Yemen: the Egoistic Goals
In the mid-seventies, The Netherlands started to carry out development activities 
in Yemen. According to former Dutch Ambassador in Yemen (2007-2011) Harry 
Buikema3, the Minister of Dutch International Development and Co-operation Jan 
Pronk, agreed to put Yemen on the list of recipient countries of Dutch aid programmes. 
The Netherlands’ foreign policies on aid assistance to Yemen have multiple 
determinants that primarily consist of poverty reduction and trade export. The 
political and security dimensions are also significant. The desire of the Dutch 
government to reduce poverty thrives on human solidarity. Moral duty and 
international solidarity were considered sufficient determinants for development 
assistance to Yemen. The Dutch leftist political coalition in 1974 had identified Yemen 
as one of the seven poorest countries in the world. Due to its proximity to Africa, 
3 -Dr. Harry Buikema worked in various capacities at the Dutch Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, as Head of  the Department 
for South Asia (1989-1992). He has been seconded to the institute for international and diplomatic studies Clingendael. 
More recent positions in the Foreign Service include the Director of  the Directorate for Personnel Affairs in Interna-
tional Co-operation from 1997 to 2000, Director of  the Directorate for Social and Institutional Development from 2000 
to 2003, Ambassador in Bamako, Mali from 2003 to 2007 and finally from 2007 to 2011 Ambassador in Sana’a, Yemen 
(Yemen Observer, 2011).
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Yemen shares certain characterics and should be treated in a similar way. The country 
has to deal with a lot of challenges including widespread poverty, high population 
growth, poor economic prospects, political tensions, conflicts and weak governance. 
The desire/need to reduce poverty and overall development of the country, are still 
one of the basic underlying objectives of Dutch development policy in Yemen 
(Yemen— NAPA, 2006; Cooper and van Themaat, 1989).
The second determinant for aid assistance relates to trade. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, some donor countries tie their aid to certain conditions. The recipient 
country is bound to promote donor’s export industries and to guarantee an increase 
of the foreign product sales in the country – allowing these companies to penetrate 
their markets. The Dutch government has interests to cooperate closely with Yemen 
in order to open that country’s markets for goods and services from Dutch markets. 
Recently, the volume of Dutch trade export to Yemen has witnessed significant 
growth. Yemen’s imports from The Netherlands jumped to YR 157.9 billion in 2011, 
compared to YR 116, 6 billion in 2010, YR 66.7 billion in 2009 and YR 80,100 million 
in 2008. According to the data of the Yemeni Central Organization of Statistics 
(COS), The Netherlands ranked number 4 among the top 20 exporting countries to 
Yemen in the 2011. According to the data in Table 6.1 below, the total volume of 
Dutch trade exports to Yemen were, 459 billion Yemeni Real between 2003 and 2011. 
The total volume of Dutch trade export to Yemen indicates, that trade export is also 
a likely determinant of the Dutch aid policy towards Yemen. The Netherlands is one 
of the main European countries that exports products to Yemen, and this has grown 
significantly in the last three years.
Table 6.1 NL among the Top 20 Exporting Countries
to Yemen (2003-2011) Million YR










Total 458.950 million YR







The political dimension to development assistance is about maintaining good 
relations with the Middle East. The Netherlands’ foreign policy focuses on oil imports. 
In 1974, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced a boycott on oil exports to western 
countries. The Netherlands was affected by this boycott. With the aim to avoid future 
problems and to secure the continuing import of oil, the Dutch government extended 
its economic relations with the Middle East, by broadening its development 
cooperation to Yemen, the poorest country in the region (Yemen Observer, 2011)4. 
Cooper & van Themaat (1989) in their article about “Dutch Aid Determinants” 
identified the factors that explain the geographical distribution of Dutch aid. The 
authors mention several examples in Dutch foreign policy that determined the course 
of aid assistance. Firstly, “the phasing out of aid to Vietnam was a direct consequence 
of the new policy objectives that explicitly condemned Vietnam for its invasion of 
Cambodia. The wish to strengthen political relations with the rest of Asia also played 
a major role. Secondly, the incorporation of Egypt and North Yemen as recipient 
countries after the oil crisis in 1974 was a clear attempt to improve relations with the 
Arab members of OPEC. Thirdly, the increased aid to Surinam after its independence 
was the price to be paid for a relatively smooth transfer of power in 1975” (1989:135-
136).
The Dutch efforts to open the door for development cooperation with Yemen was 
formally signed through a technical cooperation agreement on 3rd October 1978 
between the two countries (MinBuZa, Traktatenblad, (23) 1978. Nr.8). The agreement 
had a positive impact on the strengthening of mutual relations and development 
cooperation, while the signatories maintain a bilateral development co-operation 
arrangement that aims at assisting Yemen to achieve sustainable economic and social 
development.
With the increasing threat of terrorism at the start of the 21st century, Dutch 
foreign aid towards Yemen has had to adapt. Events such as September 11, the 
bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and the 7/7 Bombings in the UK, shifted the 
focus of the Dutch government towards establishing a stable and secure Europe as 
part of its coordination policies with the European Union (Jolyon Howorth, 2006). 
There is now a greater urgency to counteract terrorist threats, as well as to contribute 
to global stability.
4 - The political motivation behind this “the whole idea” is what Minister Pronk said: “We should not fight with the Ar-
abs? We should join them in one way or another, because it is better to participate in a political process than staying aside 
and wait for what’s going on. So he had a political reason; he said “I want to start at least a dialogue that involves coun-
tries in the Arab world about what is going on in the moment and our relationship”( Yemen Observer journal, 2011).
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The Dutch government believes that Yemen has a strategic geographical location, 
where it overlooks the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. It controls the Strait of Bab El 
Mandeb, one of the most important corridors in the world for sailing ships between 
the East and the West. On the other side, Yemen has more than 2000km of coastline. 
It is close to the Horn of Africa, which consists of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and 
others. These countries, especially Somalia, are home to terrorist groups who could 
easily penetrate Yemen’s borders. EU member states are concerned with the Yemeni 
government’s inability to secure its borders. The country is a safe haven for terrorist 
groups, a transit point for fighters and equipment. Weak governance enables a greater 
threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, Yemen is a unique case, 
because of its very poor conditions and its fragile state. It can easily explode into 
violence or collapse altogether .which can crush livelihoods, jeopardize the citizens, 
regional neighbors and the wider world. Yemen is fertile ground for global threats - 
not only terrorists, but also drug trafficking, environmental devastation, and disease 
(Brainerd and Chollet 2007).
Let us consider the example of the failed al-Qaeda bombing attempt of Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253, an international passenger flight from Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol, The Netherlands, to Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Michigan, United States. 
The flight was the target of a failed bombing attempt on Christmas Day, 2009, when 
a passenger tried to set off plastic explosives sewn into his underwear. Reports 
indicated that US intelligence officials had received key information on suspected 
bomber; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab supposedly received training by al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) located in Yemen5. Such an event highlights the 
potential for terrorism that emanates from Yemen, a potential that periodically 
emerges to threaten U.S. and other western countries’ interests both at home and 
abroad (Sharp, Jeremy, 2010).
In 2006 and in 2010, the EU countries and the US discussed the need for more 
cooperation with Yemen in the promotion of necessary political, economic, and 
administrative reforms through financial and non-financial assistance. The priorities 
were “political and fiscal reforms and meaningful attention to legitimate internal 
grievances; better governance through decentralization, reduced corruption and civil 
service reform; economic diversification to generate employment and enhance 
livelihoods, and strengthened natural resource management.” (Benjamin and 







Feltman, 2010, in Mahanty, 2010:32) For donors dealing with these priorities, means 
tackling the root causes of instability, conflict, exclusion, and poverty. It is a strategic 
way of drying out the sources of terrorism on the domestic level (Benjamin and 
Feltman 2010). Especially in an era where boundaries and borders are blurred and 
where global instability and terrorism prevail, the need for good governance is very 
important as a condition for developing the economic and social structures, and for 
reducing security concerns. Fighting against global poverty through sustained 
economic development in Yemen has thus become increasingly necessary not just, 
because morality demands it, but for reasons of global security. If a sustained 
economic success flourishes in Yemen, it could expand into neighboring regions and 
other parts of the Middle East (Brainerd and Chollet 2007). This vision reflects in the 
commitments of donors to foreign aid for Yemen, which rapidly increased after 2001. 
The aggregated volume pledged by donors during the Yemen conference in New York 
(2012) and London conference (2006) reached US$7.8 billion and US$5.7 billion 
respectively, compared to US$500 million pledged by donors during the conference 
of The Hague in 1995:
Figure 6.1 Aggregate Volume of Donors’ Commitments to Yemen 1996-2012 (M $)6
Source: self, according to Ana Echagüe, 2006, Researcher, FRIDE: 154-162; ROY: MPIC, 2005-2012; 
ROY: CB, 2009; ROY: COOAC, 2001-2009. These figures are self— estimated, but the total amount of 
development aid allocation to Yemen is completely correct according to many sources
The question is how Yemen is using the received aid. For example, until 2010, 
Yemen utilized only 5.6% (US$320.29 million) of the aid pledged by donors during 
the 2006 London conference, because the ‘patient’ lacked knowledge and was unable 
to manage aid funds. This inability is the result of weak Yemeni government 
institutions (CESD-Yemen, 2012). In addition, the ‘doctors’, the donors, have a lack of 
local knowledge that is needed to understand how to help these government 
6- This aggregate volume is included the share of  the Arabic donors countries and organizations like the GCC. 
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institutions to be effective in better utilizing aid resources. This is still a major problem 
in the case of Yemen, as illustrated by the poor aid policy making and implementation.
 
6.3 How much Dutch Aid Goes to Yemen? 
Yemen has not been a major recipient of overseas official development aid and 
humanitarian aid worldwide. To date it has received a total of 282 million USD. Aid 
to Yemen has remained relatively low with peaks in contributions in 1999, 2001 and 
2009. In 2009, levels reached US$513 million and are expected to rise further due to 
growing media coverage and political interest in the Arab spring stream and al-Qaeda 
activity in the region”(Development Initiatives (DI):Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009):
Figure 6.2 the (Real) Aggregate Volume of Foreign aid to Yemen (1996-2009 MUS$)
Source: Development Initiatives (DI): Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009
Yemen is still outside the top twenty recipient countries worldwide, ranking in 
2009 number 26 out of 189 recipient countries of the overseas development assistance 
(Development Initiatives (DI): Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009):
Table 6.2 Yemen among the Top Recipient Countries of Foreign aid Worldwide 
(2009)
Rank Recipient Total ODA excluding 
debt (US$ bn)
Rank Recipient Total humanitarian aid 
(US$ bn)
1 Afghanistan $602 1 Sudan $103
2 Ethiopia $309 2 Palestine/OPT $102
3 Vietnam $307 3 Ethiopia $007
4 Palestine/OPT $301 4 Afghanistan $006
5 Tanzania $300 5 Congo, Dem. 
Rep.
$006
6 Pakistan $209 6 Pakistan $006
7 Iraq $208 7 Somalia $005
8 India $205 8 Iraq $005







10 Congo, Dem. Rep. $203 10 Zimbabwe $004
50 Yemen $005 26 Yemen $001
All other recipients $5500 All other 
recipients
$305
Total all recipients $8802 Total all 
recipients
$1004
Source: Development Initiatives (DI): Yemen aid factsheet 1995-2009
Yemen is not in the top ten recipients of Dutch official development aid. Most 
Dutch official aid (2009) goes to the old-Dutch colonial countries, like Suriname, 
Indonesia, and the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (see below figure 6.3):
Figure 6.3: Top Ten Recipients Countries of the Dutch-OSA (US-M, 2009)
Source: self - according to the (OECD, 2012: 224)
However, between 2000 and 2010, The Netherlands has been one of the most 
generous overseas aid donors in Yemen, featuring amongst the top three overseas 
government donors in the country with a total aid of US$ 486.3 million (see Table 6.3 
below):
Table 6.3 Netherlands and the Top three Overseas Government Donors 
in Yemen (US Million Dollar 2003-2010) 
Source: self-based on the data of OECD and DI: Yemen Factsheet 1995-2009, and WB
Most Dutch overseas aid to Yemen is channeled as a bilateral financial allocation. 
There are also some funds from so-called central budget lines for Yemen, which are 
channeled through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. Other agencies 
include the United Nations Country Team consisting of FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
US NL NL GER US GER GER GER GER GER GER   
69.3 53.7 69.9 44.5 48.5 50.5 49.2 65.0 67.2 85.1 83.0
NL GER GER NL GER NL NL NL NL UK UK
65.9 47.6 46.4 40.2 43.6 39.3 34.4 37.8 37.8 41.1 63.9
GER Poland EU EU NL EU US UK UK NL NL
54.7 47.2 30.0 37.2 37.7 33.5 33.4 23.2 33.2 40.1 29.5
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UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and EU institutions, as part of the contribution to the EU 
budget. For example, based on the data of the Financial Ministry of Yemen, The 
Netherlands has channeled around US$ 118.7 million through the World Bank 
between 2003 and 2011 to support projects in the Yemeni public and private sectors 
and non-governmental organizations (GOY- MOF, Years 2002-2012).
6.4 Brief Overview of the Dutch Aid Allocation in Yemen
The Netherlands’s bilateral aid in Yemen is mainly directed to the focal sectors: 
water, health and education7. A quick review of these development areas is necessary 
and helpful for a better understanding of the development programs and the 
effectiveness of the Netherland’s development efforts in Yemen at the macro level.
The Netherlands has a long history in development assistance to the Water Sector 
of Yemen, especially in regards to the support for the rural water supply that was 
labeled as the highest area of priority for development. In 1978 the Dutch government 
started to implement two projects, (1) a technical assistance project aimed at 
strengthening the Rural Water Supply Department (RWSD) and (2) a project 
supporting the completion of water supply schemes. Following a devastating 
earthquake in the Dhamar area on 13 December 1982, it was decided to merge these 
two funded projects to share in the international efforts of the re-construction of the 
Dhamar area. Three phases of the SURWAS (Support for Rural Water Supply Project) 
were implemented in 1983-1985, 1985-1987 and 1988-1991, respectively. Another 
two phases of SURWAS started after 1991, shifting the focal area from Dhamar to 
Hodeida Governorate (Carapico, 2006; MinBuZa, 2008).
The SURWAS project finished in 2001. Between 2001 and 2007, The Netherlands 
allocated most of its support to projects that were related to rural water supply and 
sanitation, like the Public Works Project and to the World Bank Rural Water and 
Sanitation Supply Project (GARWSP). Since 2005, after an initial cutback of support, 
The Netherlands also supported the aid program for the Water Sector. In 2005, The 
Netherlands, with other bilateral donors like Germany and Japan and multilateral 
donors like World Bank and UNCIEF, started to shift their efforts from specific areas 
in Yemen to implement a Sector Support Programme to cover most of the Yemeni 
territories. By using the adopted modality of The Netherlands, the new sector 
7 - In 2000, Dutch aid allocations in Yemen dramatically steered away from a project-based portfolio approach towards a 
sector wide approach (SWAP).The concept of  the ‘sector-wide approach’ has emerged in the Dutch policies worldwide, 
to encompass a range of  changes in the practice of  development co-operation (MinBuZa, 2011). Discussion of  this 







approach funded urban and rural infrastructure projects for water and sanitation, 
irrigation, water resources assessment and management, but also capacity 
development and organizational and institutional strengthening in order to promote 
the whole Water Sector Reform process (MinBuZa, 2008). A considerable amount of 
grants were allocated to fund the above mentioned projects. Figure 6.4 shows the 
total volume that has been funded by The Netherlands to the water sector in Yemen 
between 1995 and 2010: 
Figure 6.4 Total Dutch aid to the Yemeni Water Sector during the Years 1995 – 2010 
(US.M)
Source: self - based on the OCED Database (1995-2012). 
The Netherlands also has a long-standing history in supporting health, nutrition 
and population in Yemen, starting with the construction of a hospital in Dhamar in 
1978. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, various Dutch health programs took place 
in rural areas of Yemen, which aimed to increase both access to and the quality of 
health services, with an emphasis on health promotion and community health. In the 
1990s Dutch aid programmes refocused their attention to institutional development, 
like the organization of the health system and health finance. From the year 2000 
onwards, the Netherlands started to adopt a sector-wide approach in assisting the 
Yemeni health care sector reform process (MinBuZa, 2002). Between 1995 to 2012 
the total Dutch bilateral aid expenditure and commitments to the Yemeni health 
sector, amounted to around US$83 million (OECD, 1995, 2012; WB, 1995, 2012).
The Netherlands is also active in reforming the Yemeni education sector. Dutch 
overseas aid aims to support Yemeni public education, higher education and technical 
education. In the past thirty years, most of the Dutch aid to general education has 
been channeled through central budget lines, like the World Bank, UN institutions 
234
and the Yemeni Social Fund. The Netherlands was one of the core partners of the 
World Bank, alongside Germany and the UK, in supporting two main projects: the 
Basic Education Development Project, and the Secondary Education Development 
and Girls Access Project. Both built on the success of the Basic Education Expansion 
Project of 2001-2007. The Netherlands was also active in the World Bank by 
supporting the development of sector strategies, including through the following 
analytical and advisory services: The National Basic Education Development Strategy 
(2002), National Strategy for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education 
(2004), National General Secondary Education Strategy (2007), Yemen National 
Strategy for Children and Youth (2007), Higher Education Strategy (2006) and the 
Yemen Education Country Status Report (2010) ( see for example WB, 2012). Since 
1978, The Netherlands has financed some 65 projects in the Yemeni education sector. 
And over the period 1995-2012, total Dutch bilateral aid expenditure and 
commitments to the education sector amounted to around US$135 million (OCED, 
1995-2012; WB 1995-2012). 
The Dutch government has tried to ensure that cross-cutting themes like gender, 
governance and institutional development received special attention. For 
governmental reforms, emphasis was placed on public finance management and anti-
corruption activities, civil service reform, decentralization, and capacity building. 
Other areas include human rights, democratization, civil society support, economic 
environment and business climate. 
6.5 Dutch Aid Effectiveness in Yemen
The Dutch government and the other bilateral and multilateral donors have long 
considered the provision of water supply and sanitation services to be the domain of 
the urban, rural, semi-rural, and semi-urban areas in Yemen. These efforts have not 
been successful in meeting more than a small portion of the demand for water and 
sanitation by residential and commercial users, and there is still a critical shortage of 
services. For example, in 2010, of the 20 million people (85% of the total population) 
living in rural and semi-rural areas, only 35 % had reasonable access to adequate 
amounts of water from a source such as a household connection, public standpipe, 
borehole, protected well or spring, or rainwater collection. Many rural families, often 
the poorest, end up purchasing water from private sellers that is more expensive than 
the public supply of water. Alternatively, they are forced to drink dirty and impure 







million people) had access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source 
(UNGASS, 2012: 23). 
It is already clear that Yemen is unlikely to meet the MDG target of providing 
quality water supply and sanitation services for its whole population by 2015. The 
situation in sanitation service supply is not very different from the situation in water 
supply services. In 2010, access to improved sanitation facilities like excreta disposal 
facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta, 
was as low as 35% of the total population in the rural areas and 53% of the whole 
population in the country. The current water and sanitation supply services in both 
urban and rural areas are unreliable and of low quality. They are not sustainable, 
because of difficulties in management, operation, pricing and a failure to recover 
costs (WB, 2012). The water sector, that includes water and sanitation services 
delivery in the whole country, is suffering from extensive deterioration of water and 
poor utilization of existing capacities, due to under-maintenance, a lack of funds for 
operation and a lack of institutional capacity. In the end, water resources and 
sanitation services management are still Yemen’s number one development challenge 
(ROY- NWSSIP, 2006). 
During the last fifteen years, Yemen has made very limited progress in health. 
What we know of development indicators in Yemen is that Yemen has been plagued 
by a high population growth rate of more than 3% per year, with a poor standard of 
public health. It has an increasing rate in infant and child mortality. In 2009, the rate 
of infant mortality was 74.7 per 1000 births and by 2010 it had increased to nearly 
76.77 per 1,000 (see Table 6.5). While this sudden rise might appear to be an anomaly, 
what makes this trend reliable is the continuous rise for the years between: 1995, 
2000, and 2005.
Table 6.4 Mortality Rate per 1,000 Live Births for Infants and Children
Note* under five years of age. Source: self, based on World Bank (1995-2012) 
On the other hand, child mortality (children below the age of 5) has declined 
during the last 15 years. In 1995, 125 children in every 1,000 died before their fifth 
birthday, compared to 110 in 2000, 99 in 2005, and 93 in 2010. Yemeni infant and 
Indicator 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010
Mortality rate, Infant 55.28 71.20 73.30 74.7 76.77
Mortality rate, Child* 125 110 99 92 93
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child mortality rates are the highest in the region, higher than Jordan, which in 1995 
had a child mortality rate of 25 per 1000, and 15 per 1000 in 2010.
The statistics presented above have been collected based on the reported cases by 
the Yemeni Government, or by different local civil society organizations and 
multilateral donor organizations. However, there are many cases of infant and child 
mortality, especially in the rural and semi-rural areas, that have not been reported. 
These areas do not have the basic infrastructure like hospitals, telephones, and roads. 
The high illiteracy rate amongst the people who are living in these areas correlates 
with an increase in the mortality rate8. In some rural areas, the culture of shame 
among people prevents them reporting such cases to the official authorities. There is 
no mechanism in place to report information about infant and child mortality in 
daily life. Therefore, the above statistics are not entirely accurate and the problem 
could be worse in reality. 
In Yemen, the maternal mortality ratio was 3.65 in 2009, with an extremely high 
rate of births per woman of 4.7 in the same year. The proportion of births that was 
attended by skilled health personnel was 36% in 2009. The proportion of children 
under the age of five that weighed below the standard for that age was 42.9% percent 
in the same year. Once rather rare, malnutrition now plagues nearly half of the young 
children. There is a serious deterioration of nutritional standards from a generation 
earlier when indigenous grains, vegetables, and dairy products were dietary staples 
(Carapico, 2006).
Based on the above substandard statistics about infant and child mortality in 
Yemen, international specialized reports such as the United Nations Development 
Programme indicate that between 2007 and 2010 Yemen ranked 153 out of 177 
countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), a score comparable to the poorest 
sub-Saharan African countries. The problem is even more complex, as Yemen also 
faces one of the largest gender gaps in human development in the world (UNDP, 
2010).
Aid Effectiveness in Education Sector: the poor education system is problematic 
for the whole of Yemeni society. In 2005, 1.8 million children that should have 
followed basic education age were not enrolled in school. These children are likely to 
be girls from poor households and come from concentrated rural areas of populous 
governorates (UNESCO, 2008). The average proportion of children, who enrolled in 
primary school in 1997 was 61.1%, while 38.9% of the children who should have 







enrolled did not. Even though the percentage of children who enrolled in primary 
school increased in 2008 to 80.4%, the Yemeni population increased from 17 million 
in 1997 to 24.7 million in 2008 and the 20% that missed out on school in 2008 is an 
enormous number compared to the number who did not enroll for school in 1997. 
The annual population growth rate between 1997 and 2009 was almost 3% (WB, 
2009:15). Furthermore, there has been a substantial increase in the young population 
of primary school age over the last five years. The World Bank’s data stated that: 
“nearly 70 percent (or 15 million) of the 22 million people in 2007 were less than 25 
years old. Over a third of these (around 5.6 million) were 6 to 14 years of age, i.e., 
primary school-age children” (WB, 2009: 15). Second, the primary completion rate 
for school is also a problem. “In 2006/07, the primary completion rate (PCR) 
(equivalent to the first six years of primary education in Yemen) was 60% overall, 
70% for boys and 49% for girls. About 40% of children, who entered school, did not 
complete primary school” (cited in Abdulmalik, 2009; see also WB, 2009).
The challenges ahead relate to the high number of dropouts in secondary schools: 
41% do not graduate. For those who do graduate, it is hard to find work. We notice a 
similar level of drop out for graduates from university. Educated Yemenis have some 
of the highest unemployment rates: 44% with an intermediate level of education and 
54% of the university graduates are jobless (ROY and ILO, 2010). There is no capacity 
in the public sector or the private sector to absorb the new graduates. Above all this 
is because of the fast population growth, which has led to increased numbers of 
students, especially male students, who enrolled school in all levels. Overall and 
especially in the urban areas, unemployment has increased over time from 9% in 
1994, to 11% in 1998 and 22% in 2009. This reflects the terribly slow growth in the 
demand for labour and of the narrow job chances in the private sector. Secondly, the 
government is saturated with employees because Yemenis regard a position in the 
government as a social security net and therefore assume that they have a right to 
claim other jobs within. A position within different departments of the government 
is the first and final route for jobseekers (ROY and ILO, 2010). 
The reasons for the lack of employment opportunities in Yemen is not limited to 
the shortage of job growth in existing establishments as the labour demand survey of 
2003 indicated that Yemen needs more than 188,000 new jobs per year to meet the 
annual increase of labour force. The problem extends to the qualification of the labour 
force itself. Most jobseekers do not fit with the requirements of the local and the 
external labour market. In order to enhance the educational quality of the young 
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graduates, Yemen needs to widen and strengthen not only vocational training 
programmes and specialized university education, but also the development of 
managerial and administrative skills through special training programmes, as these 
are in particular the areas that graduates lack, as reported by establishments. They 
perceive it as a mismatch between the finished education and the vacant occupation 
(ROY, LLO, 2009).9
Gender Inequality: Gender inequality is still one of the core obstacles to a holistic 
development of Yemen. The country, according to HDI (2010), ranked number 165 
in gender equality out of 177 countries. In Yemen, women “fall short of men on 
several development indicators including access to education, participation in the 
workforce, political participation and access to law” (UNDP, 2012:15). For instance, 
only 40% of Yemeni women vote during elections. Moreover, they have no autonomy 
in deciding whom they should vote for. In most cases, the majority of women vote for 
a candidate who is the favorite of their husbands, fathers and brothers. Women also 
do not have the full right to be a candidate in elections. Yemeni law does allow women 
to participate in the elections as a candidate, but in reality it does not happen. 
Generally, a man does not allow a woman to go out of her home, not even to fulfill 
her essential daily needs. A seat in Parliament is therefore out of question; in fact, 
seats are not even reserved for women in local council and parliamentary elections.
A second example concerns the general empowerment of women in the country. 
The draft of the Gender Assessment Report shows that women in Yemen constitute 
only 10 percent of entrepreneurs and 6 percent of the workforce with no preferential 
treatment in wage or government employment (Poortman et al, 2009, p.18). 
Traditionally, women are entirely responsible for rain-fed agriculture, which yields 
are limited in most rural areas (Muhith et al, 2005: 42).
A third example is the vast gender problem in school enrollment at all levels of 
education. In gross primary enrollment rates, Yemen has the fifth largest gender gap 
in the world. Only 42.9% of girls enrolled in primary school in 1997, compared to 
78.9% of boys. In 2009, the Yemeni nation was still facing the same problem it was in 
2005, where girls make up only 5.1% more of the total enrollment in primary school, 
compared to 9.1% more boys. With such low enrolment rates, it is not surprising to 
note that illiteracy is high in Yemen (66.6% of Yemenis are illiterate). An estimated 
42% of the population aged 10 and above are illiterate. Unsurprising, illiteracy is 
9 - As we have seen in Chapter 4 the main focal managerial skills needed for the civil servants’ capacity and capability 
building are: policy making skills, strategic management skills, human recourses management skills, communication skills, 
and, most urgently, leadership skills. To introduce such skills, there is a need for reformers to be aware of  the current 







higher among Yemeni females, estimated at 72% compared to 23% for men in 2010 
(UNDP, 1995-2011).
Yemen and the Failed State Indexes: Bad governance is still one of the core 
factors for poor development outcomes in Yemen. There is a bewildering “paradox” 
as described in the Yemeni governance indicators. The country has significantly 
deteriorated in percentile rankings on all governance indicators between 1996 and 
2011 (see Figure 6.5 below). This is despite the good governance “panacea” over the 
last 15 years as applied by donors to overcome the bad governance problem and 
related issues in Yemen.10
Figure 6.5 Yemeni Governance Indicators in the World Bank Reports(1996-2011)
Source: WB -Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996-2011
10 - The literature has identified several governance indices to be used in the analysis of  the quality of  governance in any 
given country. One of  the most common is the Governance Indicators developed by World Bank officials Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). These indicators are: government ineffectiveness, the lack of  regulatory burden, the 
lack of  rule of  law, the lack of  independence of  the judiciary, the lack of  controlling corruption, and political instability 
and violence. Leiftwish (2000) argues that those dimensions of  governance concern the processes by which “authority is 
exercised in the management of  a country’s economic, and social resources for development and the capacity of  govern-
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Yemen’s control on corruption significantly decreased. The country ranked in the 
41.0 percentile ranking in 1996 compared to an 11.0 percentile ranking in 2010, 
meaning that corruption is widespread in Yemen. This is in spite of the efforts of 
donors and the government to reduce corruption in the same period. The indicator 
of political stability continued to deteriorate during the last 15 years and reached the 
lowest rate percentile ranking of 2.4 in 2010 compared to 10.1 in 1996. The government 
effectiveness indicator has also slipped steadily, from 30.7 in 1996 to 18.0 in 2005 and 
just 14.4 in 2010. This was probably due to worsening corruption and political 
instability. The low attention paid to voice and accountability has seen poor 
performance during several periods, hitting the highest point in 1996 at the 38.2 
percentile, but the lowest percentile was 11.8% in 2010. The only exception is that the 
rule of law indicator improved somewhat. The country got a 14.4 percentile in 2010 
compared to a 9.6 percentile ranking in 1996. 
Other international reports further support the World Bank’s statistics about bad 
governance indicators in Yemen. The international transparency report regarded 
corruption, as one of the primary obstacles to developing the Yemeni nation. The 
same report ranks Yemen number 112 among 145 countries in fighting corruption in 
2005, 113 in 2006, 133 in 2010, and 156 among 174 in 2012. Moreover, Yemen’s 
capability in controlling corruption was at -0.29 in 2009, but 0.6 in 1996,on a scale 
from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher is better (Transparency International Annual 
Reports-1996-2012). Yemen’s position on the economic freedom directory fell from 
132 in 2005 to 139 in 2006.
Based on UNDP reports, Yemen’s percentage on the government’s effectiveness 
and impact indicator ranged from -0.55 and -0.95 between 1996 and 2006. Even more 
shocking, from 1995 to 2009 the government’s success indicator gave Yemen a -2 
percentile. (UNDP, 1995-2010). Yemen’s ranking on the rule of law indicator retreated 
from -1.15 in 1996 to -0.98 in 2006, and according to the accountability indicator 
Yemen remained at -0.95 during the years up to 2006 (UNDP, 1995-2010). In addition, 
the International Security Report on Property Rights in 2006 gave Yemen 103rd place 
because of corruption. The deterioration manifested in the government’s failure to 
meet minimum transparency standards, to improve investment conditions, and to 
fight corruption. Moreover, Yemen also scored very poorly on the investments 
freedom indicator. The report indicated that investors are afraid of losing their money 
in Yemen as long as the judiciary branch is weak and the ministers fail to solve 







Yemen is still suffering from a terrible poverty and economic adversity. Given the 
situation in Yemen as discussed in the above sections, the basic human needs’ 
measurement of The World Bank estimates that five out of ten people in Yemen live 
on less than $1 a day (Whitaker, 2005: 1). Over 48.6% of Yemen’s population live 
below the poverty line and 38.8% are unable to satisfy their basic needs like food, 
clothing, shelter, education, transportation, and health. Yemen is one of the poorest 
seven countries in the world (EU, 2007; Sharp, 2010). 
Yemen poses an entirely different development challenge to other Arab countries 
in the region. The country scores the lowest rankings in the region of all social-
development indicators such as poverty. For example, in Jordan, the poverty rate 
decreased from about 80% in 1992, to 30% in 1998 and 9% in 2009. Conversely, 
Yemen observed a steady increase in poverty, from 19% in 1992 to 45.2% in 2003 and 
52% in 2010 (CIA, 2011). Moreover, the average income per person is only $500 a 
year, a number that is remarkably low compared to other Arab countries with low 
resources such as Jordan, where the average income per person is $4700 a year (EU, 
2007).
6.6 Synthesis: The Egoistic Goal of Donors is not the only Cause, linking the 
Argument to LKS
Our empirical work attempts to explain briefly the level of effectiveness of foreign 
aid in Yemen, with the main focus on the historical background of Dutch development 
projects in the country as a dependent variable, and as fully as possible, controlling 
the independent variables listed by the public choice perspective (PCP). It might be 
the case that the LKS played a critical role in the failure of Dutch development efforts 
during the last period, in other words, there were good intentions to help Yemen, but 
there was no clear understanding of the local environment to ensure the effectiveness 
of the aid interventions. The strategic interest of donors, including the Netherlands, 
is to achieve security and stability in the country. Nevertheless, despite the efforts to 
focus on security and stability, donors have not prevented Yemen falling back 
tremendously. Yemen has yet to witness any dramatic improvements in terms of 
development outcomes that tend to cause positive and meaningful impacts on the 
population. Many of the social and economic indicators have not reflected encouraging 
results on the ground level.11. It is clear that these bad outcomes in development form 
the major cause of the Yemeni people’s revolution that is still ongoing despite the 
11 - It was also a critical reaction to the final evaluations/reports of  the Dutch development projects in Yemen that 
showed extremely impressive outcomes, as eloquently stated by the other donors’ final project reports. 
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signing of the political agreement by different political and social factions in Yemen12.
To substantiate the above argument, one policy area selected for empirical analysis 
is the Dutch NPT program to promote the capacity development process for the 
higher education sector in Yemen. The empirical analysis provides evidence to 
support the existence of a “Local Knowledge Syndrome” and rejecting the public 
choice perspective’s (PCP) explanation of aid ineffectiveness which is the existence of 
multiple and egoistic aid goals in a poor policy environment of a recipient country. 
Despite the weak results of Dutch development activities and other donors in 
Yemen, foreign aid projects can be effective in a poor policy environment such as 
Yemen. The way forward in establishing aid effectiveness, is the incorporation of local 
knowledge in the specific place and time of that aid intervention during the policy 
design and the policy implementation, with special regard to capacity, cultural and 
environmental constraints of aid recipient organizations (see Chapter 4). The premise 
is that the integration of specific local knowledge can develop through active 
interaction between the donors and recipients, as well as the successful creation of 
actor networks that connect the main stakeholders (see Chapters 3 and 4). By 
analyzing the Yemen-Dutch NPT programme, this study provides a further empirical 
test of the LKS hypothesis and its related implications on the effectiveness of aid 
programs. We further this argument over the next four chapters. The following 
section provides an introduction of the four key cases for this study, showing their 
main objectives and plan of implementation, as a background for the four upcoming 
empirical chapters. 
6.7 Introducing the Yemen-Dutch NPT Program to the Higher Education 
Sector
The higher education sector in Yemen has been a major recipient of Dutch aid, 
primarily in the field of capacity building. This is due to a longstanding history since 
the 1960s of the Netherlands implementing a variety of higher education reform 
programs in many developing countries (MinBuZa, 2007). These programmes 
denominated by such acronyms as PUO, SV, MHO (1993-2004), SAIL, NPT (2002-
2010), and currently NICHE (2009-2012) (Visser et al, 2008)13. Among these Dutch-
12 - The political agreement was designed by major donors like the US , UK and NL as well as the GCC countries. This 
was in order to solve the political crisis during the Arab spring in 2011. This agreement forced the president to step 
down and hand over the power to his vice-president and the opposition parties. 
13 - 1)SV is Samenwerkingsverband (Collaborative Partnership - one of  the early predecessors of  NPT), 2) PUO is 
Programma Universitaire Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (University Program for Development Cooperation - one of  the 
early predecessors of  NPT); 3) Netherlands Financing Programme for Cooperation in Higher Education (MHO); 4) 







funded programs there were two allocated to reform the Yemeni higher education 
sector, namely NPT and NICHE. Only NPT met the criteria for inclusion in this 
study. First, the implementation of NPT was fully completed almost three years ago, 
which allows us to assess its effectiveness, whereas the NICHE projects only started 
in 202, and it would therefore be too premature to present a definitive conclusion on 
the level of effectiveness. Second, this study seeks to investigate the relationship 
between the LKS and the effectiveness of the donor-prompted public sector reform 
process The NPT program fulfills this condition since the overall objective of NPT is 
to promote public sector reform in participating developing countries. (MinBuZa, 
2012).14.
6.7.1 General overview of the NPT programme 
The Netherlands’ Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education 
(Nuffic) was the responsible organization for implementing the NPT program in 
developing countries on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of International co-operation 
(MinBuZa).15. Between 2002 and 2010, the NPT program targeted 15 developing 
countries: Benin, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and 
Zambia. The total budget for NPT programme amounted to €267.8 million. Yemen 
was one of the countries that received the largest budget (9.6%) of the total budget for 
NPT, at €25.7 million (Visser and Almoassib 2008, Aa et al. 2007, and MinBuZa, 
2012). 
The overall aim of the Dutch government’s involvement in NPT is to help reduce 
the quantitative and qualitative shortage of trained professional staff in developing 
countries and to build capacity that is sustainable. It is globally recognized that 
education is a powerful leverage tool for poverty alleviation and economic growth, as 
considered in the International Education Policy Framework, February 2001 
(MinBuZa, 2011, p.5). NPT is especially directed at individuals and organizations of 
higher education in developing countries to give them a better chance of generating 
their own training institutes and staff in the long term (MinBuZa, 2011, p.5). 
tion of  five specialized Dutch centers of  higher learning - with MHO an immediate predecessor of  NPT, now absorbed 
into NPT) 5) Netherlands Programme for Institutional Strengthening of  Post-secondary Education and Training Capac-
ity (NPT); and 6) the Netherlands Initiative for Capacity development in Higher Education (NICHE) (See Visser and 
Almoassib 2008). 
14 - More information about the criteria for the inclusion of  the NPT program investigated in this study is provided in 
the Chapter 5. 
15 - MinBuZa is an abbreviation of  the name of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affaires in Dutch: Het Ministerie van Buiten-
landse Zaken (BuZa of  BZ). 
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Developing higher institutions is a first step in the strategy to promote public sector 
reform, through training and extending the expertise, know-how and skills of senior 
officials in the public, private, and non-governmental organization sectors. 
To build the capacity and capability of the higher education sectors in participating 
countries, NPT aimed, at the policy level, to develop their sectoral policies and 
training provisions. On the organizational level, NPT aims to improve the performance 
and the professional standing of the organizations within the higher education 
system, like universities. Consequently, the program surpassed the level of department 
and sometimes reached the inter-department level within the faculty. The direct 
beneficiaries of these higher education organizations or other relevant sectors receive 
the necessary training and consultations for capacity and capability building. Most of 
the aid projects of the NPT program that were directed at higher education 
organizations (university faculties or departments) are directly relevant to the 
traditional and focal sectors of the Dutch overseas development aid such as water, 
education, and health sectors, and crosscutting themes of gender, good governance, 
and institution building. On the inter-institutional level, the NPT aims to embed the 
organizations within the higher education sectors and increase the level of 
harmonization among the departments within the Yemeni universities that were 
supported by the NPT, as well as between the departments and their beneficiaries in 
the public and private sectors. Furthermore, NPT develops accredited academic and 
vocational training programmes that incorporate the needs and demands (local 
knowledge) of the specific and related focal sectors and organizations (MinBuZa, 
2012).
The preparation and implementation processes of the NPT program include a 
wide network of actors. On the donor side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuZa) 
and The Netherlands Embassies in the participating countries are responsible for 
policy making, financing, supervision and external monitoring and evaluation. The 
embassies have a role in monitoring and liaising, with the government and other 
donors in setting priorities for the NPT program. Nuffic is an intermediating 
organization, responsible for managing the design of the NPT and the execution in 
each country, by making funding decisions, awarding grants and providing 
accounting, internal monitoring and evaluation support. Nuffic is responsible for 
selecting the Dutch intermediate/beneficiaries of the NPT and the Dutch organizations 
or contractors that benefit directly from the projects. The latter were responsible for 







contractors, mostly Dutch universities or related institutions, signed the contract to 
implement the NPT projects together with their respective partners and direct 
recipient organizations from the participating countries. The direct recipient 
organizations can be simultaneously indirect beneficiaries (like higher education) 
who demand interventions in order to build their capacity. As a consequence, they 
are receiving a better education and/or training and are available for work in the 
relevant focal sectors in the supported country. (MinBuZa, 2012; MinBuZa, 2011). 
It seems that the overall and specific objectives of the NPT programme as well as 
the actors-network structure are described in flowery language. It is difficult to realize 
an objective or to create an effective actors-network within a full NPT-country 
programme or even a single project. NPT that is built on an ideal and simple model 
with objectives, outputs and outcomes, but the reality is much more complex. They 
may face difficulties in incorporating the needs and demands (local knowledge) of 
the focal sectors and organizations or the direct beneficiaries of the NPT projects. 
Donors may be confronted with an unknown local situation and therefore unable to 
integrate the local knowledge into the models that have been applied successfully in 
other countries. The same problem applies to the adoption of local knowledge in 
actor networks. These two points will be carefully discussed in the coming Chapter 9 
of this study where we explain both effective and ineffective projects within the 
Yemeni NPT programme. 
6.7.2 The Key Four Cases of this Dissertation 
The Yemen NPT program fits into the overall and specific NPT objectives and has 
the same actors-network structure for its programs and projects. Essentially, the Yemen 
NPT was specifically aimed to reform the focal sectors of the Dutch bilateral aid 
programmes worldwide: water, education, health, good governance and gender. The 
Yemeni government also included subjects on basic and administrative sciences and 
ICT development. Seven universities, three community colleges and the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR) of Yemen participated and were 
thus the institutional beneficiaries of the Yemen NPT effort (Nuffic, 2003).
The Yemen NPT was distributed across fifteen projects that were designed to 
achieve the priority areas for capacity development of higher education institutions in 
the country. One project was relevant to the water sector. Three projects were allocated 
to develop the capacity and capability of the centralized administration of MoHESR. 
Four projects were in the area of ICT, which aimed at increasing the capacity of 
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MoHESR’s institutions to plan internet use, provide greater integration of internet in all 
aspects of the universities (administration, teaching and research), and to promote 
greater access. Another project was related to gender with the intention of establishing 
and supporting women’s centers, increasing the capacity of the staff of these centers, 
integrating gender concepts into the general curriculum, and drafting gender policies 
for the universities. In the field of public and business administration (Good Governance 
& Administrative Sciences), there were two projects to establish new departments and 
programmes and to increase the capacity of the faculty and staff of these new 
departments. One project was aimed at improving the basic sciences and led to the 
improvement of teaching and research laboratories, staff upgrading and the forging of 
plans for shared research efforts in a limited number of areas. The other project 
strengthened basic education, especially in mathematics and science teacher education 
reform in Yemen. The last project strengthened the Ministry of Technical Education & 
Vocational Training (MTEVT), Sana’a Community College and the Industrial Technical 
Institute, Mukala and Aden (Nuffic, 2003; Visser and Almoassib 2008).
Four key cases or projects have been chosen for deep investigation in this study. 
These are: (1) the establishment of an MBA Degree Programme at Sana’a University; 
(2) the establishment of an executive MPA Degree Programme at Sana’a University, 
with partnership of the National Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS), Ministry 
of Civil Service; (3) the strengthening of the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a 
University Graduate Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM); 
and (4) Women’s Research and Training Centre (WRTC), Aden University16. 
MBA project (2004-2008): There was a need for management education in Yemen, 
as there were no qualified training programmes available in the country to meet 
emerging private and public sector needs and to change traditional administration and 
management styles in order to achieve their objectives more readily17. Thus the MBA 
programme was established with an overall objective of improving the management of 
the private and public sectors through the training of professionals, with the aim of 
developing capacities and capabilities to solve problems that sectors face as a result of 
the Yemeni local environment 18(Nuffic, 2003). In order to benefit the direct beneficiaries 
of the MBA training programme, Nuffic choose MsM, ISS and AUC as the Dutch 
contractors, which led the consortium to establish an advanced degree programme in 
16 - The reasons why we chose these four key cases was outlined in Chapter 5. 
17 - Chapter 4 provided rich information about the local conditions and the administrative aspects of  both public and 
private sectors in Yemen. Social, political and administrative indicators have been presented in the sections above. 







business administration at the Department of Business Administration (BA) of the 
Faculty of Commerce at Sana’a University (SU). With a total budget of EUR 1,900,000, 
the MBA programme specifically focused on developing the capacity and capability of 
the academic and administrative staff of the BA department by training them to 
effectively teach and manage an MBA degree programme. This included the preparation 
of a full curriculum, with course and training materials that included the needs and 
demands (local knowledge) of the Yemeni private and public sectors, as well as 
implementing scholarships to decrease staff shortages and equipping the library and 
the information centre with relevant materials (Visser and Almoassib 2008; MSM, 
2004). 
In parallel to the process of implementing the MBA project, the Center for Business 
Administration (CBA) was established at the University of Sana’a. The CBA became 
financially and administratively independent from the direct recipient organization of 
the NPT-MBA project: the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of 
Commerce and Economics. The latter was under direct control of the rector of the 
University of Sana’a. 
Now, CBA provides an internationally-accredited Executive Master of Business 
Administration Program (EMBA), attracting participants from the Yemeni business 
and public sectors as well as from international companies in the region. It has also 
become an outreach program for a well-known European school, the Maastricht 
School of Management (MSM) in the Netherlands.
MPA project (2004-2008): The main intention of the MPA project was to promote 
the public administration reform process that started in 2000. It was clear that Yemen 
was in need of “the development and implementation of a human resource strategy on 
civil service (re)training to equip senior and mid-level civil servants at management 
positions with the necessary management skills, scientific and practical methodologies 
and leadership styles that enables them to perform their roles and duties more efficiently 
and effectively in the changing political, economic, social, legal and technological 
environment in Yemen” (ROI, 2008:7). In order to promote public sector reforms, 
Nuffic chose the Dutch Institute of Public Administration (ROI) and Leiden University 
as the Dutch contractors. They led the consortium for the establishment of an advanced 
degree programme in public administration at the Public Administration Unit within 
the Political Science Department (PSD) of the Faculty of Commerce at Sana’a University 
(SU), and a diploma in public administration at the National Institute of Administrative 
Sciences (NIAS). The MPA project provided a unique opportunity for civil service 
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managers and low-level employees in public administration institutions to gain 
qualifications to help them manage and strengthen their respective departments and 
services. 
With a total budget of EUR 2,100,000, the MPA project was specifically focused on 
strengthening the organization and management of the Unit of Public Administration 
at Sana’a University and NIAS. It aimed to develop the capacity of their academic and 
administrative staff by training them to effectively teach and manage an MPA degree 
programme (Diploma for NIAS), including having a curriculum in place, developing 
course and training materials including the needs and demands (local knowledge) of 
the Yemeni public sectors, and equipping the library with relevant resources and 
materials (Visser and Almoassib 2008; ROI, 2008). 
In 2007, the Center for Public Administration Development (CPAD) was established 
as part of the MPA project. This center became an institutional foundation of the 
Executive Master of Public Administration program (EMPA). Like CBA, CPAD is also 
financially and administratively independent from the direct recipient organization of 
the NPT-MPA project, namely the Department of Public Administration Unit within 
the Political Science Department (PSD). The PSD is administratively and directly 
under control of the rector of the University of Sana’a. 
The other contribution of the MPA project was the establishment of the specialized 
unit in public administration within the National Institute of Administrative Sciences 
(NIAS). This PA unit provides the High Diploma and attracts lower-level governmental 
officials in coordination with the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance and the 
Ministry of Finance’s Training institute. 
WEC project (2005-2008): It is evident that Yemen faces an enormous water 
resources crisis, as discussed in the sections above. Major cities such as Sana’a and Taiz 
already suffer from a shortage of water, and the aquifers in the vicinity of Sana’a will be 
exhausted within the next 10 to 20 years. Aquifers near other major cities (Taiz, Sada’a, 
Rada, Marib, Abyan and Hadramout) are also running low. In 2002, citizens of Taiz 
were receiving drinking water only once every 40 days. The crisis will become larger as 
the estimated population of 24 million is likely to double in the next 20 years (Sana’a 
University team, 2002). Recently, it became clear among Yemeni governmental 
institutions and donors like UNDP, the World Bank, The Netherlands and Germany, 
that Yemen needs greater experience in water resources management, in the form of 
knowledge and skills that is based on technical expertise19. Yemen continues to fail in 
19 - International donors have been assisting the Yemeni water sector for more than thirty years on the technical side but 







effective management of its water resources because of weak water and environment 
sector institutions, caused by the lack of well-trained professional staff. Therefore, the 
overall objective of the WEC project was to support the reform process of the major 
water and environment sector organisations, mainly in human resources, thus 
strengthening institutional and technical capabilities and capacities. 
With a total budget of EUR 2,000,000, the WEC project focused on strengthening 
the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University Graduate Programme in 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Wageningen University, the Dutch 
contractor, led a consortium to establish a Diploma Course in IWRM for policy and 
decision makers as well as for managers from Yemen that have working experience in 
water and environment. The immediate goal of the program was to establish a course 
programme that would lead to an MSc in IWRM. The programme also helped WEC 
to become a sustainable centre offering a qualitative high IWRM Diploma and an MSc 
course in which teachers are trained in the latest IWRM knowledge by senior staff 
using up-to-date adult teaching methodologies and techniques (WU, 2004; Visser and 
Almoassib 2008).
WRTC project (2004-2008): Although gender and women’s empowerment was one 
of the sub-objectives of all of the above-described projects, the Yemen NPT included 
a special project that dealt with gender issues. Gender inequality is still one of the core 
obstacles to the comprehensive development in Yemen. Based on the WRTC project’s 
documents, the main problems that hinder progress in gender empowerment are: (1) 
entrenched societal attitudes, (2) limited support from policy makers and the legal 
system, (3) the general economic situation of the country, and (4) lack of advocates 
and native development experts that are capable of work effectively to bring changes in 
gender issues in key development areas (WRTC, 2004). Therefore, the overall objective 
of the WRTC project was to deal with these problems of gender empowerment, by 
improving the status of women and their participation in the development of Yemen. 
With a total budget of EUR 1,800,000, the Dutch contactor (Wageningen University) 
led the consortium with the ISS and implemented the WRTC project with a specific 
aim to strengthen the WRTC, making it a strong and sustainable institution that is able 
to further develop or extend its core activities in the area of gender empowerment in 
the water resources management approach.“Conflict prevention and solution is, for example, an important aspect of  
water management, which can occur at multiple levels. Water demand management between sectors (urban, industry, 
agriculture, environment and recreation) is a continuous state of  potential conflicts, which are often discussed at the 
governmental levels (e.g. ministries, governorates), as well as in society as a whole (e.g. environmental action groups, 
NGO’s, research institutes) while water distribution in an irrigation system can have potential conflicts between neigh-
boring farmers. Through good management, especially under water scarce conditions, these conflicts can be avoided or 
diffused.” (Soppe et al, 2005: 3)
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Yemen. It focused on three main components. The first was organizational capacity 
building through the development of an organisation plan and a (financial) management 
plan for the WRTC, as well as training of the management and support of staff in 
strategic planning, programme management and finance. The second component 
was about improving human capacity through the strengthening of both existing 
staff and qualified new staff in applied research skills, adult education methodologies, 
course development, writing, policy development and analysis, as well as up-to-date 
knowledge on gender issues. The third component focused on the establishment of a 
new MSc Programme on Gender and Development for BA graduates, preferably with 
work experience. In addition, the component included efforts for the development of 
an active consultancy unit within the Centre, an active applied research agenda, and 
the implementation of a basic course on Gender and Development for all students of 
Aden University. (WRTC, 2004; Visser and Almoassib 2008). 
There are several objectives and methodological considerations for selecting these 
four projects as key case studies for the present analysis. In the first place, all the projects 
were funded and implemented by the Dutch government for the same recipient, the 
higher education sector in Yemen and in particular Sana’a University. They were all 
done in approximately the same time frame. Additionally, the projects were development 
programs designed to promote the public and private sectors reform process. These 
projects are comparable in such a way that allows some level of control of other 
variables. A detailed discussion about the methods of analysis and selection of the key 
case studies, as well as the justification therein, can to be found in Chapter 5.
Although all of the selected projects established education centers (ECs) in order to 
promote capacity and capability building as part of public and private sectors reform, 
the level of effectiveness of these donor-established ECs is questionable, and forms one 
of the main subjects of analysis in this study. The other main objective is to investigate 
the relation between the LKS and the effectiveness of donor-promoted public sector 
reform programmes in recipient countries. As the public sector reform process in 
Yemen started at the close of the Dutch-Yemen NPT implementation (in 2000), it 
provided a unique opportunity for this study to choose projects that had close relations 







6.8 Summary of the Discussion
In conclusion, this chapter provides a brief historical background of the Netherlands’ 
development aid history in Yemen. The empirical results support the main proposition 
of this dissertation that the existence of multiple egoistic goals of aid may not be the 
main reason for having ineffective aid interventions in poor nations, which is one of 
the main arguments of the Public Choice Perceptive (PCP). The strategic interest of the 
Netherlands for assisting Yemen is to achieve security and stability in the country. 
However, the Netherlands does not have the “local knowledge” to accomplish this 
strategic aim and they have not prevented Yemen from turning into an almost failed 
state. Yemen has yet to witness dramatic improvements in terms of development 
outcomes that have meaningful impacts on security and stability. It is clear that these 
bad development outcomes have formed the major roots of the Yemeni people’s 
revolution that is still ongoing, despite the signing of the political settlement agreement 
by the different political and social factions in Yemen. 
In the coming chapters, we give evidence in support of the “Local Knowledge 
Syndrome (LKS)” that can perhaps explain why Dutch foreign aid has not been more 
effective in promoting development activities. The primary reason to focus on the LKS 
explanation is that without “local knowledge”, you cannot design and implement sound 
development polices. If the objective is to maximize the effectiveness of aid, it would 
appear essential for us to consider the factors which prevented local knowledge being 
incorporated during the policy design and/or implementation. In other words, we 
should try to understand the poor policy environment of a recipient country, instead 
of arguing that the poor policy environment and the existence of multiple egoistic goals 
of aid donors are explanations of the aid project ineffectiveness. For conducting this 
theoretical and empirical analysis, we will take the Dutch-Yemen NPT programme as 
evidence in support of the “Local Knowledge Syndrome Argument”. This argument 
could help explain why certain projects on public reform are more or less effective. I try 
to discover controlling variables at the level of policy design and implementation which 
may positively affect the process of incorporating local knowledge and aid effectiveness. 
In the chapters 7 and 8, we conduct quantitative analysis of the four selected NPT 
projects. This is to understand the variation among the selected projects in the level of 
effectiveness. This logic of the research design allows us to draw attention to the 
connection between the aid projects’ effectiveness and their objectives, and then 
working backward to see if the independent variable (incorporating local knowledge) 
has the right or predicted value of the dependent variable, in Chapters 9 and 10. 

CHAPTER 7
THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE AND 
THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE ECS IN ACHIEVING THE 




In the previous chapter, the overall and specific objectives of the Dutch-Yemen 
NPT program in Yemen were introduced. As we have stated, in this study four Dutch-
Yemen NPT projects are evaluated as cases studies to test our hypothesis. The 
argument is that foreign aid projects can be effective in a poor policy environment 
but we need to incorporate local knowledge in a specific place and time of the aid 
intervention to understand this poor policy environment. This argument has 
consequences for the second argument of the PCP approach, which argues that aid 
projects do not work in a poor policy environment.1. The objective of this chapter is 
to present a descriptive analysis, giving the exploratory demographic profile of the 
participants in the four NPT selected aid projects.2. Based on the ‘development 
validity’ approach, we draw attention to the connection between the level of 
effectiveness of an aid project and the level in achieving its original aims and 
objectives. In this chapter and the subsequent one, we attempt to quantitatively 
measure the level of effectiveness of the selected aid projects. Given that actual 
measurement of the impact that is currently available or impossible, we developed 
‘objectively verifiable indicators’, which were used as proxies that explicitly capture a 
picture of the level of effectiveness of these aid projects. These indicators are derived 
from the literature briefly reviewed below and the local knowledge aspects of the 
public sector of Yemen presented in Chapter 4 and in this chapter. 
To have a successful training process aimed at capacity and capability building, 
many scholars including Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2010), Athouman Kahri 
(2009), Ibtisam Haluani (2011) and Yukl (2002) consider it critical to follow systematic 
steps. The first such step is to determine the training needs and the subject content for 
a training program. In this regard, the question to be addressed is: what are the 
capacity and capability needs (applied managerial knowledge and skills and state-of-
the-art) that we seek to develop according to the local conditions of the targeted 
organizations? If we correctly answer this question, we will have conclusively 
identified the extent of success in achieving the goals of the capacity and capability 
building process, in other words, the extent of our ability to achieve the key objectives 
of the proposed program. From this main question we can derive important sub-
questions, the most important are: (1) what is the target group(s) and which 
1 - The explanation why we could not understand the poor environment is presented in Chapters 9 and 10 in terms of  
qualitative analysis. Here the main intention is to vary the selected projects based on the level of  effectiveness and after 
that to work backwards to explain why we have more or less effective projects. 
2 The concept of  aid project can be used in this chapter as ECs, which means that every project has established its own 







administrative level should they belong to that is locally required for the capacity and 
capability building process? (2) What are the appropriate criteria for participants’ 
enrollment in a capacity and capability building process, depending on the place/
time circumstances of the respective organizations?.3. We answer the first question in 
the next chapter, and focus on question (2) here. Therefore, we must now consider 
the process of identifying participants who are the most appropriate to enroll in the 
process of capacity and capability building; and who may determine the process of 
creating a new generation of leaders and managers in Yemen’s public sector, which is 
the overall objective of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program
The analysis of the demographic profile is very informative and important to 
measure the success or failure of the selected ECs in accomplishing the overall 
objective of the NPT program. To do so, as we mentioned before, four “specific 
measures or criteria” are analyzed in this chapter: 
	(m=1) the project will be more successful when there is orientation 
towards the promotion of female enrolment; 
	(m=2) when there is a geographical and an organizational prevalence in 
the participation process throughout the different organizations and 
cities in Yemen; 
	(m=3) when the enrolment of the participants focused on the age group 
30-35 (and lower) more than other age groups, especially the age group 
45+, and 
	(m=4) when the enrolment of the participants is focused on the low-
career and (mid) level civil servants it is more successful to develop a 
new breed of leaders and managers than focusing on the high-career 
level managers with ample experience.
Following the introduction of the topic, this chapter is divided into three sections. 
Before dealing with the first objective of this chapter in section 7.2, to present an 
explorative and descriptive analysis of the demographic profile of the participants, 
sampling and response rate will be discussed in section 7.2. Section 7.4 presents a 
summary of this chapter. 
3 - It is worth noting as these “universal questions may have some universal answers, but the circumstances of  every 
country, every public sector within a country, and every public organization within the public sector is such that most 
answers need to be tailored to specific place and time.”(Caiden and Sundaram, 2004: 374). Moreover, based on the four 
criteria we have used to reflect the local knowledge aspects in Yemen, the analysis in this chapter is applied to the pos-
sibility of  reforming the public service of  Yemen by the efforts of  the capacity and capability building, and the lessons 
to be gleaned from the functions of  the selected ECs in terms of  selecting appropriate participants to attend the training 
processes.
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7.2 Sampling and Response Rate
The introduction to the survey questionnaire explained to the respondents the 
importance of the study, emphasized voluntary participation and anonymity, and 
introduced the instructions for completing the survey. The study population or unit 
of analysis is the students or the participants of the different selected projects or ECs, 
who are from different organizations within the private and public sectors in Yemen. 
This population has three levels: the ministerial level (ministers and deputy ministers), 
the managerial level (general managers) and the unit level (department heads and 
employees).
I used a stratified random sampling strategy in selecting participants from the five 
ECs in order to provide the smallest sampling error. It is an effective and easy method 
to get unbiased and accurate results from a population and its sub-groups (Sudman, 
1976). Through this useful sampling method, I randomly selected the participants 
based on the “single number” (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11….etc) in the students’ lists in the five 
selected ECs (subpopulations) separately. Due to females being in the minority in all 
ECs, I included all female students in the students’ lists of the selected ECs. This was 
to ensure that all categories of the research community were reasonably represented 
in the sampling and to increase the internal validity of this survey questionnaire’s 
results: 
Table 7.1 Students Size and Sampling Size in the Different ECs
ECs The total students 
in all ECs
Students who had 
quit the ECs




Sample size Usable 
returned 
questionnaires
ECs F M Total F M Total F M Total Total Percent Total Percent
MPA 16 232 248 3 36 39 13 186 199 120 60% 102 85%
NIAS 12 118 130 1 14 15 11 104 115 80 70% 42 53%
MBA 30 82 112 3 6 9 27 74 103 55 63% 31 56%
WEC 10 38 48 - 6 6 10 32 42 35 83.4% 26 74%
WRTC 51 4 55 11 2 13 41 2 43 35 81.4% 27 77%
Total 119 473 592 18 64 82 102 398 500 325 65% 227 70%
The total number of students in the different education centers is 592, as Table 7.1 
shows, with 374 males (80% of the population) and 119 females (20%). The number 
of students who drop out from study or stop studying temporarily are 82 (14%): 18 
females and the remaining 64 males. The number of available students for the survey 
in all selected ECs was 500, of which 102 were females (21%) and 398 were male 
(79%).
The sample size was 325, 65% of the total. 120 students are from MPA, which 







represents 70% of the total students in this EC; 55 students are from MBA, which 
represents 63% of the total students in this EC; 35 students are from WEC, which 
represents 83% of the total students in this EC; and 35 students from WRTC which 
represents 81% of the total students of this EC. The size of ECs in the sample differs 
significantly in the selected ECs. This may be due to the effect of the difference of the 
enrolment size of the education center itself, for example, MPA has nearly 199 
students (participants) while WEC has only 42 students. That means the sample size 
in each EC is representative of its population, because of our special attention of 
using stratified as sampling method (Pennings, et al, 2006). This can give us 
confidence, as it means there is no problem in the degree of variability in the 
population among the selected ECs. 
The overall response rate was statistically acceptable, and a total of 227 (70%) 
questionnaires were returned acceptably answered and usable for the analysis. This is 
because we used the drop-off delivery, where the typical response rate is around 70% 
(Lovelock et al. 1976). The response rate represented 39% of the whole population in 
selected ECs (227 out of 592 participants). Performing statistical tests such as factor 
analysis traditionally requires a minimum of around 150 participants to get a reliable 
solution. However, there is variation in the response rate among the selected ECs: the 
respondents in MPA were 102 out of 120; thus, they make 85% of the sample total size 
in the level of this EC. The respondents in WEC were 26 out of 35; therefore, they 
make 74% of the total sample size in the level of this EC. The same for WRTC, the 
respondents are 27 out 35, representing a 77% of the total sample size in this EC. The 
lowest response rate was in MBA and NIAS, who made 56% (31 respondents out of 
55) and 53% (41 respondents out of 80) respectively.
There is a concern regarding the generalizability of the findings from the sample 
to the population, because of a low-level response rate (non-response bias) in some 
selected ECs (NIAS and MBA). However, the internal variation within the data 
collection from the different ECs can overcome this problem and the findings from 
the whole sample are acceptable to be generalized to the whole population at the level 
of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. The non-response bias in this study survey, as it 
may have become apparent at this point, is expected because of five reasons: 
1. The questionnaire for MBA was in English, and most of the students of MBA 
have a good level in English to answer the questionnaire but because the 
majority of them are businessmen, it was difficult for them to set a long time 
and answering the questions For the other ECs, the questionnaires were 
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translated into Arabic because the study programs in those ECs are in Arabic 
and the students have no skills in English. 
2. The low response rate with NIAS was because the study process had completely 
stopped, and the center was beginning to be closed, so it was difficult to reach 
all the students. 
3. The sensitivity of the questionnaire for the heads of some of the selected ECs, 
prevented students from participating. This is why we have a problem of a 
total non-response bias which happens if none of the questionnaires is 
returned. 
4. The poor political and security situation in Yemen at the time of the survey 
influenced the process of reaching participants and getting good responses. 
Some people were not able to go out of their homes, which might have made 
them less willing to participate in the study, as I had to contact them via cell 
phones. 
5. For the female students, the problem was part of Yemeni cultural, as a man is 
not allowed to phone a woman or even to get her email address. Thus, it was 
difficult to reach the female students, especially as I followed a drop off and 
pick up method. 
One of the important issues which should be addressed here is that item non-
response, which occurs if not all the questions are answered, was not the case in this 
questionnaire. Almost 98% of the returned questionnaires were usable. Usable 
questionnaire’s in this study means that there is an answer to more than 75 % of the 
included questions and items. It is worth noting that the questions with the missing 
data are the last two and sometimes three questions in the questionnaire. This may be 
due to the length of the questionnaire although efforts were made to minimize the 
effect of this problem (see Chapter 5)4.
7.3 Demographic Profile and Work Background of the Participants 
It was highlighted in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 of this study that the key constraints in 
Yemen and the biggest challenges to effectively and responsibly moving public goods 
and service delivery forward, at both national and the local levels, are lack of capacity 
and corruption (weak and corrupt leaders- the top men syndrome). Several senior 
government officials and representatives of the private sector were identified as the 
4 - I have also put some open questions in the questionnaire to ensure the participants understood the questions correctly. 
They are not included in the quantitative analysis in these chapters but sometimes appear in the qualitative analysis which 







key challenges to institutional capacity building, where planning and implementation 
of public sector reforms take place in consultation with international development 
partners (donors). These senior government officials, are the normal results of the 
local environment including “economic, social, cultural and political factors that 
influence power structures and national institutions in the private and public sectors” 
(OECD, 2005). They are already part of the political-social coalition, supporting the 
politics of survival of the ruling elite. Even after the political change in Yemen that 
took place in late 2011, they are still the strong men in society, at the center of the 
political-administrative ruling network. Most of them were appointed in their 
positions by political, family and social favoritism, and thus are not managing their 
institutions on the basis of qualifications and capability. Furthermore, some of them 
have been in office for a very long time, over thirty years in some cases. 
In order to strengthen and promote capacity and capability in key institutions, any 
initiative like the Dutch-Yemen NPT program should be aimed at training people at 
lower career levels, and minimizing risks of political and administrative corruption. 
Yemen suffers from the corrupt activities of (over-aged) leaders and managers, and if 
you train them, you give them a green line, for the political and administrative 
corruption to be expanded. The young low-level managers that the ECs train should 
have ample experience in the job, so they can better relate to the training exercises 
and better integrate the lessons learned into practice. They should also believe in the 
important traditional role Women in Yemen play. Senior government officials in 
Higher education in Yemen, regard the concept of gender presented by the Dutch-
Yemen NPT program as Feminist and thus negative. It is associated with aggressive 
women, free women, sexually promiscuous behaviour and homosexuality (One of 
the interviewees notes).
This study has used several indicators to identify if the selected ECs have achieved 
success in reaching their basic objectives. The first objective is for ECs to be established 
to promote the status of women at both public and private sectors (the gender 
criterion). Therefore, the EC which has a reasonable number of female participants 
will be more successful than the other ECs which have few, or no female participants. 
The second objective is that the ECs under investigation in this study promote the 
reform processes of both the public and private sectors in the whole of Yemen. It is 
natural that the participants should be related to different organizations and cities in 
Yemen in order to convey that they are successful in achieving this objective (the 
geographical criterion). Therefore, the EC which has participants based in different 
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organizations and cities in Yemen, will be more successful than the other EC, which 
has partially, or no such as geographical distribution. 
The third objective is to develop a “new” breed of leaders, managers and specialties 
in both public and private sectors. To achieve this strategic endeavor, the ECs should 
be very strict in selecting young participants with enough expertise, in order to reflect 
their training programmes over the long term (the age and expertise criterion). In 
other words, an EC will be more successful than another when it meets these four 
criteria. The absence of all these criteria make it difficult to measure the development 
of these institutions, the development of their outputs, and to measure the selected 
ECs’ level of participation in the education and training process as part of broad 
process of prompting administrative reform in Yemen. 
Before I conduct the descriptive analysis of the operationalized variables of the 
characteristics of the participants, it is so important to show if the items are assumed 
to measure the same thing and hang together with what is called the “internal 
consistency” or homogeneity5. The identified four measures that may be interpreted 
as information related to the ECs’ efforts to enroll participants with characteristics 
that fit with their ultimate objective as mentioned above: the total Cronbach alpha 
coefficient value across all criteria is (α=0.682), Measures 1 (α=0.595) is the involvement 
of female participants; Measures 2 (α=0.616) is involvement of participants from 
outside the main cities; Measures 3 (α=0.570) is involvement of young-aged 
participants, and Measures 4 (α=0.564) is the involvement of low-career participants. 
The results of alpha coefficients range between α=0.564 and α=0.616 for all scales. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to remove any item from this scale. These results suggest 
that there is a satisfactory degree of internal consistency among the items used to 
measure the study variables.6.
7.3.1 Involvement of Female Participants
From the available data, the number of females joining the ECs does not seem 
5 -As it was explained in the Chapter 5 internal consistency can be measured by a number of  methods. Cronbach’s coef-
ficient alpha, which was used in this study, is the most commonly-used statistic for multi-item scales at the interval level 
of  measurement. The levels of  reliability based on the alpha test can be different as it is required that depends on the 
nature and purpose of  the scale. The recommended minimum level of  Cronbach alpha value is α= 0.70. This is in order 
to conduct the different methods of  analysis (Pennings et al. 2009). However, some researchers have used measures with 
alpha coefficients ranging between α=0.50 and α= 0.70. Salvucci et al (1997) confirmed this assertion as they argue that 
“the range of  reliability measures are rated as follows: a) less than α= 0.50, the reliability is low, b) between α=0.50 and 
α=0.80 the reliability is moderate and c) greater than 0.80, the reliability is high” (as cited in Tan, 2009:102).
6 - In addition to the presented argument in this section, these variables were derived from various scholars including 
Athouman Kahri (2009), Ibtisam Haluani (2011), Yukl (2002), Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, (2010), Voeten (2012), Karin 







encouraging. The overall analysis shows that around 25% of the respondents (56 out 
of 225) are female. This clearly shows that males are dominant at the participant level. 
However, there may be a difference in the females’ involvement in the level of a single 
case study or the level of a single EC, which we look at in the figure below: 
Figure 7.1 Relative Involvement of Female Participants (N=225)
As we can see there is a big difference in the enrollment of females from one EC 
to another. WRTC ranked first place. 88% of the students there were female, followed 
by MBA with 32%, WEC with 31%, and NIAS with 12%. MPA has the lowest 
percentage (8%) of female’s.7 It is clear that the WRTC, MBA and WEC were more 
successful in attracting females to participate in training processes than the other 
selected ECs (NIAS and MPA). The results suggest there is more awareness in MBA 
and WEC, than in MPA and NIAS to involve women in the training programme or 
process.
Despite the great care and attention given to the selected ECs by the Nuffic-NPT 
program, they still require more care and attention in order to improve the 
involvement of female participants. Chapter 4 highlights the level of complexity 
involved in forcefully changing established cultural patterns and attitudes of how 
women and men perceive each other’s roles in society and in relation to each other in 
public and private organizations. Most of the actors involved in the designing phase 
and implementation phase of the NPT program were not gender sensitive. “Apart 
from a weak mandate, Nuffic does not have a gender policy of its own or a vision or 
mission statement on how to treat gender. At the same time, the Yemeni direct and 
7 - The story of  WRTC is quite different in this factor compared to the other ECs. This project was established to train 
participants about the gender theme, therefore, almost all the enrolled participants are females and the concept of  gen-
der is still misunderstood among men, as their participation in WRTC was only 12%.
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indirect recipient organizations have no or have a little awareness of and alignment 
with the national gender policies and Nuffic feels powerless in bringing about this 
gender perspective” (Verbaken, Karin, et al, 2009: 9). At program level, the absence of 
a Nuffic vision geared towards gender issues, prevented them from including 
documents in the NPT program that give clear guidelines on gender mainstreaming 
8. When selecting an international or local implementer, the organizations’ gender 
sensitiveness and expertise do not feature in Nuffic’s criteria. Most implementing 
organizations have little gender awareness, or expertise from both Yemen and Dutch 
sides. (Verbaken, Karin, et al, 2009). There was a difference at the project level as we 
have some evidence of gender mainstreaming in some of the selected ECs (MBA and 
WEC as well as WRTC). Most of the selected ECs have not developed the gender 
issue into specific objectives, expected results, activities and/or impact. These issues 
seem more the initiative of local implementers than of Dutch counterpart institutions. 
However, in the case of MBA the Dutch local manager was female and the vice-
director of the WEC was also female . Both of whom had personal interests in 
attracting women to be involved in the training process in their respective ECs. It 
helps from a Yemeni perspective that the private sector is more open to women and 
most of the participants in the MBA are from the private sector. Generally speaking 
however, the projects are locally or internationally managed by male directors/
coordinators and local implementers, who do not consider women’s involvement in 
the training process as a priority, because there is neither a personal attention nor 
institutional policy for attracting females (One of the interviewees notes)9.
7.3.2 Balance of Participants’ Involvement from Outside the Main cities 
Yemen still suffers from qualitative and quantitative deficiency concerning 
capacity and capability building efforts in the different organizations around the 
country, especially small cities and semi-rural and rural areas located outside of the 
primary cities (Sana’a and Aden). In other words, there is a particularly urgent need 
for reform efforts on all levels outside of the major cities. 
It is worth mentioning that the objective of this section is to determine the 
percentage of the participants who came from the outside of the two major cities 
8 -“Gender mainstreaming” is the public policy concept of  assessing the different implications for women and men of  
any planned policy action, including legislation and programmes, in all areas and levels. Mainstreaming essentially offers 
a pluralistic approach that values the diversity among both women and men.
9 - In Yemen the NPT program includes a special project on the strengthening of  a national women’s organization, aim-
ing directly at gender and women’s empowerment and including a clear gender perspective. However, the project has a 
very limited “gender radiation” effect towards the other NPT projects, in the sense of  supporting them in the develop-







(Sana’a and Aden) by presenting variation among the selected ECs. It should also be 
mentioned here that, the analysis in this item followed the geographic locations based 
on where the ECs were established, and seeing if they contained different participants 
from different related organizations and locations in Yemen. Sana’a city is the capital 
of Yemen where the central government of Yemen is located and where MBA, MPA, 
NIAS and WEC are based. WRTC is based in Aden city.
Figure 7.2 Balance of participants’ involvement from outside the main cities (N=227)
Looking at Figure 7.2 above, a huge imbalance and defect can be seen in terms of 
participation in the training process from areas outside of the major cities. With 
relation to each individual EC, WEC ranked first place with a rate of 31%, MPA in 
second with a percentage of only 4%, and MBA, NIAS, and WRTC were joint last, 
with zero (0%) participation. Thus, WEC is the most successful in attracting 
participants from outside the central government. The participants in WRTC were 
totally from Aden City which prevented participation of women from the rural and 
countryside areas. It is also clear there is a preponderance of Sana’a city participants 
in the other ECs. 
It was noted by one of my interviewees that there is no national geographical 
research map and no coordination between ECs and the respective organizations, in 
areas outside of the main cities on capacity and capability building. Each organization 
should have its training priorities developed by the selected ECs. One of the 
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interviewees notes, the another reason for this geographic skew, is the restrictions 
imposed by the Ministry of Civil Service and its informal and formal policies of 
attract participants from its central level and from specific groups within the ministry, 
especially those who closely related to the top man of the ministry. For example, 28% 
of the participants in MPA come from the civil service ministry itself. In NIAS, 39% 
of the participants come from the civil service ministry and in WRTC it is 41%. 
It is important to note here that these ECs are not offering a regular training 
program. They have been established by the Dutch-NPT program to offer an 
exceptional training program, aimed at capacity and capability building within public 
and private sectors in the whole Yemeni nation. They should have strategic link with 
the target groups from both central administration and local administrations under 
the coordination of the government cabinet, and they need to understand how to 
organize the participation process. There should be there a large percentage of 
participants in different ECs that can cover most of the related organizations from 
different sites in Yemen. 
7.3.3 Involvement of Young-aged Participants 
Following the approval of the Dutch-Yemeni NPT program, which is committed 
towards providing capacity and capability building aimed at generating a new breed 
of young managers at both public and private sectors, the age range is a very crucial 
indicator for measuring the level of success of the selected ECs in attracting 
appropriate participants. It is not efficient to train older participants (outputs), as 
they will retire or possibly die after a short time. The CIA World Fact Book for the 
year 2012 indicates that life expectancy in Yemen for men is around 62.05 and for 
women around 66.27. The pensionable age in the Yemeni public-sector system is 60 
for men (with at least 15 years of contributions) and 55 for women (with at least 10 
years of contributions).In the Yemeni private-sector system, the pension is received 







Figure 7.3 Balance of Involvement of Young-aged Participants (N=227)
Figure 7.3 above shows an obvious disparity with respect to the involvement of 
young participants. WRTC ranked first place, with participants under the age of 35 
amounting to 92%, followed by WEC at 83%, MBA in third place with 65%, NIAS 
with 44% and in last place MPA with 37%. Correspondingly, 63% of MPA’s participants 
are above 35 and 21% of them are 45 and above. Similarly for the participants of 
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NIAS, where 56% of them are above 40.10. There seems to be major differences in the 
balance of the age ranges between the selected ECs, as there is also a significant 
statistical difference between the mean scores (Mean), and standard deviation (SD) 
for the selected ECs. The data in Figure 7.4 below reveals that the mean score of age 
ranges for the MPA and NIAS are higher (MPA-mean = 4.12, s.d. = 1.34 and NIAS- 
Mean= 3.73, s.d. = 1.11) than the mean score of age ranges in the MBA, WEC and 
WRTC (MBA-mean= 3.22, s.d. = 1, 56; WEC mean=2.73, s.d. = 1.31 and WRTC 
mean= 1.92, s.d. =1.23):
Figure 7.4 Means of Involvement of Young-aged Participants (n=227)
The first observation to make is that these training activities are randomly based. 
This situation is due to those who establish the enrollment policy as well as he 
government of Yemen and donor contactors. Most Yemeni educational institutions 
operate what is known as an open gate policy, where enrollment has become a means 
of social promotion. Consequently no attention is paid to the needs of the society for 
capacity building activities, and the necessity to match them with the respective 
organizations’ requirements.
A second observation, as noted in one of my interviews, is that the majority of 
MPA and NIAS participants attended the study programs, because of a personal 
motivation. The World Bank has put a condition in Yemen that any official who is 
appointed as a deputy minister and above should have at least a master degree. 
Managers see these ECs as an opportunity to get a degree and hold onto their current 
positions. There is no need for them to lose their current positions by leaving Yemen 
10* - A one-way analysis of  variance (ANOVA) was conducted and shows that the difference across the age ranges of  the 







to study a master’s. Based on the functional level, the majority of the participants (128 
out of 225) in the case studies were at managerial or ministerial level. Moreover, the 
participants in MPA was another population than the MBA, in the case of the MBA 
the participants were more willing to work and to increase their capacity. While in 
the case of he MPA the enrolment process became a familized process, as the top man 
of the civil service ministry had aim to establish this project to protect his position by 
enrolling his friends and family regional and family members to just avoiding an 
future threats that can appear by developing different managers out of his circle of 
supporters. 
7.3.4 Involvement of Participants in Low-level Jobs 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, Yemeni institutions and organizations are still 
under the leadership of traditional leaders or ‘top men’. There is an irregularity 
between efficiency and merits when appointing leadership at all government levels. 
Most leaders are assigned, because of social, political or economical ties. A large 
proportion of them do not meet the job requirement/ or have the skills necessary to 
be successful in their role, thus have little chance of finding appropriate solutions for 
growth and development. The majority of leaders are very busy running ruling elite 
activities, and have no time to attend effective weekly or daily training courses to 
build their capacities and capabilities. ECs should focus on developing young officials 
at the unit level as part as the strategic capacity building process of the targeted 
organizations. The intention is to highlight that EC’s which have the majority of its 
participants coming from the unit level , will be more successful than EC’s with a 
majority of managerial/ministerial participants. We look at the data in Figure 7.5 
below:
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Figure 7.5 Involvement of Low-Career Participants (N=225)
It can be observed that WRTC is first among the selected ECs in terms of the 
involvement of participants with low-level jobs, standing at 92%. NAIS comes at 89%, 
then WEC with 81% and MBA with 36%. As in all indicators, MPA was at the bottom, 
with just 6% of its participants coming from low-level jobs. These findings suggest 
that WRTC, NIAS, and WEC were more successful than MBA and MPA as the 
majority of their participants have lower functional level with low political 







managers/specialties in the Yemeni public and private sectors11. 
The mean scores (Mean) and standard deviation (SD) for all ECs reveal a 
significant statistical difference among in participant enrolment based upon the 
functional level. The mean scores of MBA and MPA were high with values of mean 
=1.64 and s.d. =0.48637 and mean = 2.16 and s.d. = 0.52647 respectively. The mean 
scores of the others were low: WRTC had a mean =1.07 and s.d. = 0.26688, NIAS had 
a mean =1.17, s.d. = 0.49510 and WEC had a mean = 1.19 and s.d. =0.07882.
Figure 7.6 Means of Involvement of Participants in Low-level Jobs
As we mentioned before, it is significant to have young-aged participants with a 
low functional level. However, they should have sufficient experience to be trained as 
one of the new breed of managers who can incorporate the related problems of the 
public and private sectors or even the needs during their study, and try to find the 
solution in co-operation with expertise from the specialized staff in the ECs. 
It is useful to briefly show the distribution of participants based on length of 
experience. 35% (11) of the participants in MBA have between 1 to 10 years’ 
experience, which seems to be a reasonable percentage, especially since the other 
three experience ranges in MBA go from 19% (6) to 20 % (7). In MPA, participants 
who had 31 - 40 years’ experience constituted the smallest percentage (2%). 
Participants with 1 - 10 years’ experience constituted 58 %, 11-20 years 24.7 % and 
21-30 years 15.5%. For NIAS, 58.5% had between 1 and 10 years’ experience. The 
respondents with 11 to 20 years of experience were 9.8 %, and only 1 participant had 
experience ranging from 31 to 40 years. In WEC, the majority of its participants have 
experience between 1 to 10 years, 15 out of a total 26 participants (58%). Similarly in 
11 - A one-way analysis of  variance (ANOVA) was conducted and shows that the difference between ECs based on the 
participants’ involvement and the functional level is significant as: [F (4,220) =54,492, P=, 000].
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WRTC the majority of the participants have experience between 1 and 10 years 
(66.7%) The percentage of participants who had less than 20 years’ experience were: 
WEC 85%, WRTC 96%, MPA 82%, NIAS 88%, and MPA 60%. In MPA the problem 
is that 65% of the participants are aged above 45; so they are relatively old without 
having long experience. The possibility of developing new leaders and managers 
from these participants will be very little, according to the analysis in this regard.
Regardless of the efforts spent by the Dutch-Yemen NPT program in establishing 
those ECs, the number of participants in all administrative levels has only reached 
592 (the sample in this study is 227), of which 128 (57%) belong to the ministerial 
and managerial levels. Estimates say that the number of civil servants available for the 
capacity and capability building process is 31,260 at the ministerial level, 40,350 at 
the managerial level out of the 522,538 permanent staff of the government’s 
administration and legislation sector and both public & mixed sectors (COS, Yemen, 
2013). Only 43% of the total participants in the selected ECs have a functional level 
from heads of administrative unit-lower, comparing to their percentage of 86% 
(450928), out the total permanent staff of the government’s administration in Yemen. 
The low rate of enrollment at the unit level resulted from low awareness of the 
significance of these ECs and the absence of the strategic policy to organize the 
participation process (see Chapters 8 and 10 for more analysis about these results). 
Moreover, given that more than half of the population of Yemen is female, the ECs 
need to make a lot of efforts on all levels to enhance the rate of female enrollment at 
the unit level. The percentage of female government staff is 18% (92,594) and most of 
them are working in the education and health sectors as teachers or nurses (COS, 
Yemen, 2013)12. Besides expanding, the ECs need to end their geographic bias, 
spreading out to reach the countryside and remote areas in light of the scientific 
systematic view that this will lead to providing capacity and capability building efforts 
in the entire nation. 
7.4 Summary of Findings
This chapter has addressed two objectives. One objective was to discuss some 
methodological issues, especially related to the sampling and response rate of the 
study questionnaire survey. The second objective was to give an exploratory 
descriptive analysis of the demographic profile and work background of the used 
samples in this study. 
12 - An interview with Dr. Ali Qassem, who was the Yemeni coordinator of  the World Bank Project for modernization 







Regarding the first objective, we showed the sampling strategy used in our survey 
in selecting participants from the five selected ECs. We then saw that the response 
rate was statistically acceptable as 70% of the questionnaires, were returned acceptably 
answered and usable for the analysis. We also considered other issues concerning the 
generalizability of the findings from the sample to the population: non-response bias 
and the item non-response bias. The main suggestion based on this section is that our 
study met a satisfactory degree of both reliability and validity, and thus the data set 
can be used confidently for analysis. 
Based on practical knowledge aspects of the Yemeni public sector, we developed 
four measures or criteria to conduct exploratory descriptive analysis of the 
demographic profile and work background of participants or the characteristics of 
the participants: (1) involvement of female participants; (2) involvement of 
participants from outside the main cities (3) involvement of young-aged participants; 
and (4) involvement of participants with low-level jobs. These four criteria can be 
interpreted as information related to ECs’ efforts to enroll participants with 
characteristics that fit their ultimate goal, to develop a “new” breed of leaders, 
managers and specialties at both public and private sectors and putting gender issues 
into consideration. 
To do the descriptive analysis, we ensured the internal consistency or homogeneity 
among these four items or criteria by using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. The result of 
the coefficient alpha showed there was no need to remove any item from this scale, as 
there is a satisfactory degree of internal consistency among the items.  The results of 
the descriptive analysis based upon the above four measures or criteria reveal different 
ranks in the level of success among the five selected ECs, as we show in Table 7.2 
below: 
Table 7.2 Ranking of the Selected ECs on the Basis of the Four Criteria13
WRTC was successful (mean= 2.00) and ranked first among the ECs in terms of 
13 - For the purpose of  this study, two steps were used to rank the selected ECs on the basis of  the criteria of  identifying 
participants to enroll in the process of  capacity and capability building. First, we calculated sample mean for each EC 
based on the four used criteria following the mean formula: = x = (Σ xi) / n. Second, we used the mean score values of  
the five ECs or case studies and ranking them based on the “rank order method”: as mean score 1-2(++) = the highest 
level of  success and mean score 4-5(--) = the lowest level of  success.
EC Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Average(mean) Success
MBA 2 5 3 4 3.50 (-)
MPA 5 4 5 5 4.75 (--)
NIAS 4 5 4 2 3.75 (-)
WEC 3 1 2 3 2.25 (+)
WRTC 1 5 1 1 2.00 (++)
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selecting appropriate participants for attending the training process. However, WRTC 
was not spread well geographically as all the participants came from Aden city, where 
WRTC is based. The WEC was successful (mean=2.25) occupying the second rank 
regarding selecting appropriate participants for attending the training process. Both MBA 
and NIAS were to some extent unsuccessful as the mean scores were 3.50 and 3.75 
respectively, above the neutral point 3.0. MPA ranked last and was to a large extent 
unsuccessful as the mean score was 4.75. The results based on analysis across all criteria 
suggest that the WRTC and WEC are more successful than MPA, NIAS, and MBA in 
selecting appropriate participants for attending the training process. 
The analysis on the basis of a single criterion also showed widely-varying results 
among the selected ECs. Four aspects of the results can be noted. First, consistent with the 
results from criterion 1, WRTC, MBA and WEC were more successful in enrolling female 
participants than MPA and NIAS. The percentage of female participation in WRTC was 
88%; it was 32 % in MBA and 31% in WEC. In NIAS and MPA however the percentage of 
female participants was just 12% and 8% respectively. 
Secondly, regarding criterion 2, participants’ enrollment based on location showed a 
preponderance for Sana’a city, as this accounted for 83% of the sampled participation (186 
participants out of 227). All the selected ECs were unsuccessful in enrolling participants 
out of the two major cities (Aden and Sana’a), excluding WEC which was partly successful 
in this regard as 31% of its participants were from other sites in Yemen, outside the city 
where it is located. 
Thirdly, consistent with the results from criterion 3, WRTC, MBA, and WEC were to 
a large extent more likely to have young participants than the MPA and NIAS. 92% of 
WRTC’s participants were under 35, compared to 83% at WEC, 65% at MBA, 37% at 
MPA and just 15% at NIAS. The majority of the participants at MPA and NIAS are aged 
40 and above, which indicates that the young generation did get their chance to be trained 
in these ECs. 
Fourth, the findings from criterion 4 suggest that, with regard to the percentage of 
participants with lower functional levels, WRTC (92%), NIAS (89%) and WEC (81%) 
were more successful than MBA (36%) to a certain extent and MPA 6% to a large extent. 
The old-aged participants are those who are at the senior levels or are political and 
administrative leaders. Yemen suffers from their corrupt activities, and by training them 
you give a green light for political and administrative corruption to be expanded. 
The ECs, especially MPA, NIAS and MBA, need to make greater efforts towards more 







establishing locally based criteria, possibly through criteria analyzed in this chapter, and 
a rigid system of participant selection to attract appropriate participants based on practical 
knowledge of Yemen’s public and private organizations. This is as a condition for 
developing a new breed of leaders and mangers to increase the capacity and capability of 
the public and private sectors in Yemen. There also needs to be a systematic process to 
increase the enrolment of females.
The other key result in this chapter is the low level of enrolment capacity in all the 
selected ECs, which did not exceed 0.1% (N=592) of the total target group (N=522,538 in 
the public sector only). There is a need to develop strategy, and identify vision and goals 
of “quantity” in promoting the public sector reform agenda. There is a necessity for a 
national strategy for capacity and capability building that combines human development 
issues in the public sector with other areas relevant to human development such as in the 
private sector. This strategy needs to be responsive to current and future administrative 
reform agendas, and furthermore is forward-thinking and aims for comprehensive 
development. 
To sum up, the implication of the results obtained in this chapter is two-pronged. First, 
there is a variation among the selected aid projects, as we have more and less effective 
projects in selecting appropriate participants who are suitable to some degree with the 
place/time circumstances of the respective organizations. This means that some projects 
are able to work in a poor policy environment, which represents an empirical response to 
the argument of the PCP approach that argues that aid projects do not work in a poor 
policy environment like the one we have in Yemen. Therefore, we can say that some 
projects could contribute in achieving the overall objective of the Dutch-Yemen NPT 
program, by selecting appropriate participants to enroll in the capacity and the capability 
building process in order to create a new generation of leaders and managers, to be ready 
and qualified human recourses for promoting the public sector reform process in Yemen. 
The second implication is that the variation in level of effectiveness in selecting 
appropriate participants can have influence the process of capability building process 
itself, by developing the managerial skills of the participants. This is quantitatively 
analyzed in the next chapter. The current open-door policy, which left the freedom for 
participants to attend the training process, meant the enrollment of participants had no 
reference to the priorities of a development plan. Thus the possibility of failure in 
generating a new breed of leaders and managers in the respective organizations could 
simply be because of the absence of conditions in enrolment in these ECs.

CHAPTER 8
 THE CAPACITY BUILDING PROCESS 
WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN 
YEMEN AND THE LEVEL OF 
EFFECTIVENESS IN ACHIEVING 




In the previous chapter, the discussion was focused on some statistical justifications, 
and providing an exploratory descriptive analysis of the demographic profile and 
work background of respondents. The overall result shows that there are no significant 
efforts made by the selected ECs to select appropriate participants for enrolling in the 
capacity building process. It was clear, however, that MBA and WEC were more 
effective than MPA, NIAS and WRTC as the first two ECs have effective distribution 
of their participants based on gender, organizational and location background, length 
of experience and age ranges among their participants. The training efforts made by 
MBA and WEC seem to fit with the Yemeni local conditions and administrative 
reform requirements, especially in the component of human capacity and capability 
building. 
The objective of this chapter is to reveal the assessment of the respondents, about 
the contribution of the EC’s in developing their capacity, capability and the efforts 
made to transfer the trained knowledge and skills back to the work setting. By 
conducting this assessment and analysis, we can see which ECs contributed more in 
terms of promoting the public sector reform processes. However, the capacity 
building process will only be complete by transferring the knowledge and managerial 
skills learned back to the work setting. It is clear that the effectiveness of training 
effort is undeviatingly proportionate to the status of its strategic approach of transfer 
(Kirkpatrick, 1967). Broad and Newstrom (1992) defined the transfer of training to 
the workplace as “the effective and continuing application, by trainees to their jobs, 
of knowledge and skills gained in training-both on and off the job” (in Machin, 2002: 
2). 
The intention of the analysis in this chapter is to demonstrate that some aid 
projects can work in a poor policy environment like Yemen. This speaks directly to 
the analysis of the PCP approach that argues foreign aid projects do not work in a 
poor policy environment. The work done in this chapter allows us to work backward 
in the following chapters, to explain how LKS is the causal explanation of having 
effective or ineffective aid projects in a poor policy environment. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In section, 8.2, we discuss the main 
variables (proxies) and measured items, to evaluate the level of effectiveness of the 
selected aid projects in achieving the overall objective of the Dutch NPT program. 
Section 8.3 presents quantitative analysis of the level of effectiveness of the selected 







8.4 presents the quantitative analysis of the level of effectiveness of the selected aid 
projects in transferring the build knowledge and skills to the work settings. Section 
8.5 is a summary of this chapter.
8.2 The Main Variables and Measured items for conducting the Analyses 
As we argued in the former chapters and especially in Chapter 7 and will discuss 
at length in chapter 8, we use the “development validity approach” to develop criteria 
for examining the success of projects with focusing on their original aims and 
objectives. The level of effectiveness of an aid project is then measured by the nature 
of the objectives, and the extent to which these objectives have achieved. Based on the 
most prominent characteristics and traditional features of public administration in 
Yemen, reviewed in Chapter 4, there are at least four basic managerial skills that are 
well-known in the public administration and public policy theories, which can be 
useful for the development of Yemen’s traditional civil service system. These skills 
would encourage civil servants to improve corporate policies, strategies, effective 
human resources management and communications that are in line with the 
requirements of reforming the Yemeni local environment1. 
In addition to what we have explained in the methodology chapter, that several 
threats to validity in this study, in this section it is important to mention there is other 
concerns about the inadequate explanation of constructs (Perry, 1996). This is 
especially important as we used managerial concepts related to capacity building in 
another country (Yemen), with different local aspects which can be problematic if 
not taken into consideration. Taking this point into account and the fact that, so far, 
little or no research on capacity building within the public sector has been conducted 
in Yemen, especially in Arabic, I address this issue during the fieldwork by re-
operationalizing the main managerial concepts to be more applicable to the new 
context, and to take full advantage of different aspects of the validity and reliability of 
the constructs. For instance, I found in my fieldwork that there were still many 
interpretations of what the measured items meant for the participants. I discovered 
this during the conference that I organized for the participants, held during the first 
1 -It was clear that those managerial skills are so important to develop human resources, especially reproduction to help 
individuals acquire knowledge, skill, and capacity within public and private organizations, as Yemen still has a very tradi-
tional public administration system (Sharifritz, 2001). The development of  the indicated skills is acutely required for the 
Yemeni government as they represent the “component four” of  the Yemeni public service reform programme launched 
in the country by the World Bank in 2001 ( ROY. MOCSA, 2001). It is important to build human resources in order to 
“departure the Yemeni government from its old traditional method of  running administration and the urgent need for 
a renewed public sector to propel government in its quest for sustainable socio-economic, political, and technological 
developments”(Yaqoub, et al. , 2010). 
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stage of the field study. During this conference I invited more than 80 participants 
from the selected projects. They were given the questionnaires and we discussed the 
concepts. This process led to a revision of the questionnaires before conducting the 
actual fieldwork. The Arabic wording of items was based on how the participants 
understood the items. 
I operationalized the concept of managerial skills that any aid program like the 
Dutch NPT program, which aims at promoting the public sector reform process in 
Yemen, should try to develop in the following skills: (1) strategic management skills, 
(2) human resources management skills, (3) managerial communications skills and 
(4) leadership skills. Under the heading of these four main categories of constructs, 
we have derived different indicators (measured items) from the literature reviewed in 
the former chapters, reflecting the current needs for reforming the public sector in 
Yemen: 
Table 8.1 The Consistency and Reliability Among the Variables and Measured-Items 
Managerial Skills Developed (T-Alpha=.963)







Variable I– Analytical and strategic management skills developed:  
1. Developing and analyze policies for your organization α=.855 α=.887
2. Developing a strategic plan for your organization α=.856
3. Developing a Plan of Action and a basic budget based on the strategic plan α=.843
4. Developing indicators to measure the successful implementation of the  strategy α=.869
5. Organizing the organization according to the strategy α=.882
variable II –Analytical and human resources management skills developed:  
6. Defining the functions and job descriptions of organization α=.928
α=.931
7. Introducing and implementing an evaluation system of functions and jobs α=.925
8. Setting criteria for evaluating the performance of the employees in the present situation α=.921
9. Developing employees’ upgrading program α=.924
10. Identifying the shortcomings of the present employees to fulfill new jobs and functions α=.925
11. Setting up and implementing a monitoring and controlling system of change processes α=.923
12. Establishing a reference group to discuss and defend your visions within the 
organization α=.925
13. Establishing a reference group to discuss and defend your visions with the beneficiaries α=.922
14. Making—and executing—effective and participatory decisions α=.923
15. Introducing and maintaining ethics and values such as transparency and accountability α=.923
variable III– Analytical and managerial communications skills developed:  
16. Setting up and implementing a communication system within the organization α=.878
α=.884
17. Developing meeting skills α=.831







The operationalization of the concept of managerial skills raised the issue of 
whether the training course is trying to develop behavioral skills or just providing 
theoretical aspects of capacity building. This is because capacity building based upon 
skills of the civil servants is not a priority within the Yemeni government. The remedy 
was to deconstruct the concepts such as policymaking skills, as the training program 
intended to develop such skills of how to design public policy based on the reality in 
the Yemeni public sector, rather than giving information what public policy is. 
Explaining these questionable concepts and measured items during the different 
collective meetings with the participants helped to strengthen construct validity for 
my study. 
Another priority of construct validity is to develop the measurement scale to 
facilitate research and “the unidimensionality of the component constructs that made 
up the scale” (Perry, 1996: 8). A scale is always one-dimensional, which means it has 
construct and should be concise. I address this issue by determining that every 
construct included different items that have the same “dimension and direction”. For 
example, the communications skills construct includes more concise items such as 
(1) Setting up and implementing a communication system within the organization 
(2) Developing meeting skills (3) Setting up a reporting system, and (4) Developing 
reporting skills. Furthermore, the items share identical ordinal scale, which allows 
averaged mean scores to be calculated, and thus distribute the variable by the same 
ordinal scale as the separate items.
A final consideration was internal reliability and consistency of item scales. In this 
study, we have seen that the key measure and most commonly used statistic for multi 
item scales reliability is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011; 
Suleiman, 2007). These statistics can show the correlation average between all the 
entered items in order to structure the measured instrument. The value of the 
19. Developing reporting skills α=.869
Variable IV– Analytical and leadership skills developed:
20 Getting a better understanding of English α=.919
α=.932
21. Promoting technology literacy α=.922
22. Reading and comprehending information α=.927
23. Being creative in solving problems α=.923
24. Being integrative in thinking α=.930
25. Being a critical/analytical thinker α=.921
26. Setting up and implementing a reward penalty system within your organization α=.930
27. Managing conflicts and settling disputes effectively α=.925
28. Stimulating and implementing team building exercises α=.924
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measurement ranges from zero to one. When analyzed data shows a higher correlation, 
the reliability venture will be also higher. It is clear from Table 8.1 above that the 
reliability of the different construct and measured items used in the analysis is good 
as the alpha was above α= 0.70. This means all the used items or 28 measured items 
are reliable for the analysis (Suleiman, 2007: 176). In other words, there is no need to 
consider eliminating any of the measured items.
The assessment of the level of effectiveness, based upon the self-reported 
judgments of the individuals who responded to the survey of the selected ECs2 
regarding developing the managerial skills of the participants, can be used as a proxy 
to illustrate the level of effectiveness to which ECs contribute in promoting reform 
processes in the public sector; as they are the direct beneficiaries of the ECs. In 
addition, we can determine analytically the level of effectiveness of the selected ECs 
in transferring the skills developed to the work settings. Wexley and Latham (1991) 
suggest that the process of training transfer can be viewed as positive, negative and 
zero. Positive transfer occurs when learning in the training situation or the capacity 
and capability building process, results in better work outcomes performance on the 
job settings, reflecting a common statement behind most of the arguments of training 
transfer. Noe (2002) argued that the positive transfer of training can be measured in 
two stages, first when capacity and capability have been built for the participants, and 
second when positive changes are observed in work settings as a result of the capacity 
and capability building process. The author argued that the first stage is important, 
but the training process will not be complete until the second stage is achieved. The 
second stage reflects the strategic and overall objective of the training process as a 
whole (Noe, 2002). The negative transfer of training is when the capacity and 
capability building process results in poor performance in work settings. Finally, zero 
transfer is when the training or the capacity and capability building process among 
participants have no effect on the work settings in the related organizations (Wagner 
& Campbell, 1994). 
Four variables were set as proxies to implicitly measure the level of effectiveness of 
the selected ECs in transferring back the skills-developed to the work settings: (1) the 
method of selecting participants to attend the ECs for capacity and capability 
development; (2) the quality of the curriculum and course training, looking if they 
2 - As I mentioned in the methodology chapter, the variables and its related items are used here as proxies to measure the 
level of  effectiveness of  the selected ECs in promoting the capacity of  the respects sectors. It is difficult to have a real as-
sessment of  effectiveness as it can only be empirically established pre-, during and post- implementation of  such aid pro-
grams like the one under investigation in this study. Moreover, it is also important to note here that wherever we discuss 







are incorporating the demands and sector-related problems in the study program; (3) 
the focus on quantity of training based reform, how many participants enrolled in the 
ECs compared to the size of the targeted organizations, and the percentage of 
graduates from the different ECs in a specific time; and (4) the coordination between 
the selected ECs and the related organizations to transfer the training back to the 
workplace. 
Table 8.2: The Consistency and Reliability among the Variables and Measured-Items 
Transferring Knowledge and Skills to Work Settings







Variable I– The method of selecting participants
1. The method of involving the participants in the ECs α=.690 α=.707
2. The method of paying the fees of the master degree α=.705
3. Involvement in the training process as part of the upgrading plan of the related 
organization α=.693
4. The competition policy of selecting participants within the specific organizations α=.573
5. The criteria of selecting the participants by the related organizations α=.603
6. The criteria of selecting the participants by the selected ECs
Variable II –The quality of the curriculum and course training 
1- The teaching or training methods
     1) The case study method 
     2) The lecture method 
n.p n.p
2- The quality of the curriculum α=.830
     1) Overlapping in course materials α=.822
     2) The courses are relevant to the special needs of the Yemeni related sector α=.756
     3) The master’s degree is focusing on how the manager should manage rather than what is 
management in general α=.776
     4) The balance between theory and practice is good α=.786
     5) Case studies presented in the courses are based on the daily practices in Yemeni sectors α=.802
Variable III–Quantity of training efforts  
1- Finishing the training course on time n.p
n.p
Variable IV  Efforts made by the ECs and the respective organizations to achieve change: 
Part 1 
1. Describe your position in your organization before attending the education center α=,615
α=.70
2. Describe your position in your organization after attending the education center α=.585
3. Promotion of function in an organization. α=.667
4. Receiving a salary increase after obtaining the master degree α=.653
5. Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to handle your work in the short term (day-
to-day work) based on the local organizational environment. α=.695
6. Using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to handle your work in the long term 
(strategically) based on the local organizational environment. α=.560
7. Developing a new breed of managers/specialists in the related organizations α=.513
8. The role of education centers in promoting the related organizations as a whole α=.523
Part 2 α=.851
9. Upgrading program of your organization α=.830
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In Table 8.2 above, we have provided all the items derived from the literature and 
the documents of the selected aid projects, as well as knowledge of the researcher on 
the topic and the local context discovered during conducting the interviews and the 
observations in the field. I have also tried to minimize the threats to construct validity 
as deliberated above insuring the degree in which inferences are warranted from 
participants and setting tested within this study (i.e. measuring what are purport to 
measure). However, there are certain measured items that are inherently challenging 
to measure based on reliability and internal consistency. In level of the constructs, 
there is a high level of reliability as the Alpha was α= 0.70. This means all the used 
constructs are reliable. The threats are related to the values of Alpha in a level of a 
construct or the subscales that are below α= 0.70, and in this case there is need to 
delete some of them. This is because “an item with low values in the total correlations 
scheme indicates that the item is measuring something different from the scale” (Al 
Banna, 2010: 121). 
It is worth pointing out that Cronbach alpha values are quite sensitive to the 
number of items in the scale: the more items there are, the more reliable the test will 
be. The variables (I & IV) have small number of items in the scale (fewer than ten), 
and Cronbach’s alpha values are relatively small. There are no strong changes in alpha 
values if we exclude some items. To insure the robustness of the study findings, we 
follow the recommendation of Pallant (2001) that if the total Alpha of the scale is less 
than 0.70, items with a total correlation of less than 0.30 are excluded. In the above 
table none of the items get less than 0.30, and so we have decided to leave all items on 
the scales for further analysis (in Al Banna, 2010: 121). 
8.3 The Level of Effectiveness in Bundling the Capacity and Capability of the 
Participants
These components indicates the four variables may be interpreted as information 
related to four major aspects of the essential needs of capacity and capability building 
at the public sector in Yemen: the leadership skills (viable 1); the human resources 
10. Promotion in your organization α=.812
11. Your organization understands the importance of education; it is supportive and helpful to 
you α=.829
12. Your organization understands the importance of the education center; it is  supportive 
and helpful to the center itself α=.824
13. Improving your management skills quicker than work experience α=.830








management skills (variable 2); the strategic management skills (variable 3); and the 
managerial communications skills (variable 4). The main objective in this part is to 
specify the agreement or disagreement of the participants, about the role of the 
selected ECs in developing these clustered skills. To achieve this aim, the researcher 
will use the descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs, means, and percentages that 
were computed for each item of the survey, in addition to the One-Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) used as inferential statistic method to interpret the results. 
8.3.1 Descriptive Analysis and Leadership Skills Developed 
In this sub-section, we consider the variable that ought to measure of the contri-
bution of the ECs to leadership skills development. The total alpha was α=, 932 per 
group (see Table 8.1). It consists of 9 measured items or sets of appreciative charac-
teristics in relation to leadership skills developed. The participants were asked to 
which extent do you agree or disagree that the EC contributes in developing the fol-
lowing skills for its participants: (X1) getting a better understanding of English; (X2) 
Promoting technology literacy; (X3) Being a critical/analytical thinker, clear in your 
ideas and arriving at the correct conclusions; (X4) Reading and comprehending in-
formation, to express ideas effectively in written and spoken form, and to listen at-
tentively; (X5) Being integrative in thinking and able to see connections in disparate 
information; (X6) Being a critical/analytical thinker and clear in your idea and arrive 
at the correct conclusions; (X7) Setting up and implementing a reward penalty sys-
tem within your organization; (X8) Managing conflicts and settling disputes effec-
tively; and (X9) Stimulating and implementing team building exercises. The values of 
alpha are all closely grouped with the highest for ‘X6’ (.930), and the lowest ‘X1’ 
(.919). The responses of the participants to these items are registered and summa-
rized in Table 8.6. The distribution of the participants’ responses descriptive analysis 
of these questions is presented in the Table 8.3 (see Appendix 1.1). 
Based on the overall analysis of data presented in Table 8.3 (see appendix 1.1), 34% 
of responses (525) said that they “neither agree nor disagree”, that their leadership 
skills developed because of the EC’s efforts. Nearly 7% (111) strongly agreed that 
their leadership skills had increased, and 24% (375) agreed. Conversely, 27% (426) 
disagreed and 8 % (118) “strongly disagreed” that their leadership skills have been 
developed by attending the ECs. The total mean score is calculated by summing the 
mean score of all questions in this component and dividing by their number: 3.0416 
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(Total Mean Score of the whole component)3.
However, the frequency distribution of responses (Table 8.4) and the distribution 
of the mean scores, as related to the leadership skills developed (variable 1), appear to 
be different based on the cross-case analysis. Nearly two-thirds of responses at MBA 
strongly agree and agree (17.54% and 47.02% respectively) whereas nearly 9% “dis-
agree” and 25.26% “neither agree nor disagree”. On the other hand, only 3.06% at 
MPA strongly agree and 15.84% agree, whereas nearly 44.91% “neither agree nor 
disagree” and around 25.46% disagree and 10.71% strongly disagree. For NIAS the 
results are divided into three almost equal values: 34% of the responses strongly agree 
and agree, 35% strongly disagree and disagree, and 31% neither agree nor disagree: 
Table 8.4 Leadership Skills Developed (Cross-Case analysis) (N=225)
The data in Figure 8.1 below reveals that the mean scores of MBA for this compo-
nent are below 3.0 (at 2.0645) suggesting that the respondents perceive MBA as effec-
tive in developing the managerial skills of its participants. The mean score of MPA for 
this component is higher than MBA for nearly every item examined with a total 
mean score of 3.2970, suggesting that the respondents perceive the MPA was more 
ineffective in developing the managerial skills of its participants. Respondents in the 
NIAS suggesting that NIAS was partly effective in developing the leadership skills of 
its participants. The mean scores were below the value 3.0 in four items out of nine 
items clustered in this component with a total mean score of 2.8537: 
3 - As stated in Chapter 5 and in the introduction of  this chapter, any factor or item with a mean score above the neutral 
point of  ‘3.0’ suggests that the respondents perceive the EC less effective than effective. Scores of  ‘4.0’ or higher indi-
cate that the EC is more ineffective and less effective in developing the managerial skills of  the participants. Conversely, 
scores below ‘3.0’ means the EC is viewed as more effective. 
Response (Value) 
MBA MPA NIAS
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree (1) 50 17.54% 28 3.06% 29 7.57%
Agree (2) 134 47.02% 145 15.84% 101 26.37%
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 28 9.82% 411 44.91% 119 31.07%
Disagree (4) 72 25.26% 233 25.46% 21 5.48%
Strongly Disagree (5) 1 .003% 98 10.71% 113 29.50%
Total 285 100% 915 100% 383 100%
Averaged Mean scores 2.0645 3.2970 2.8537







Figure 8.1 Total Means of Leadership Skills Developed (Cross-case analysis) (n=225)
8.3.2 Descriptive Analysis and the Human Resources Management Skills 
This sub-section assesses the opinions of the respondents about the ECs’ 
effectiveness level in developing the human resources management skills of their 
participants. The total alpha was α=, 931 (see Table 8.1). This variable consists of 10 
measured items which were developed through the training efforts of the participants. 
The nature of these skills were: (X1) Defining the functions and job descriptions of 
organization; (X2) Introducing and implementing an evaluation system of functions 
and jobs; (X3) Setting criteria for evaluating the performance of current employees; 
(X4) Developing an employee upgrading program; (X5) Identifying the shortcomings 
of the present employees to fulfill new jobs and functions; (x6) Setting up and 
implementing a monitoring and controlling system of change processes; (X7) 
Establishing a reference group to discuss and defend your visions within the 
organizations; (X8) Establishing a reference group to discuss and defend your visions 
with the beneficiaries; (X9) Making—and executing—effective and participatory 
decisions; and (X10), Introducing and maintaining ethics and values such as 
transparency and accountability. The loading values of alpha are all closely grouped: 
with the highest X1=0.928 and the lowest X3=0.921. 
In Table 8.5 (see appendix 1.1), it appears there is an even spread amongst the 
participants at the EC’s about the impact of the efforts of the ECs in developing their 
human resources management skills: more than one-third of respondents (34%) 
reported “strongly agree and agree”; 37% reported “strongly disagree and disagree”; 
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almost equal values: 34% of the responses strongly agree and agree, 35% strongly disagree and disagree, 
and 31% neither agree nor disagree:  
Table 8.4 Leadership Skills Developed (Cross-Case analysis) (N=225) 
                    Response (Value)  MBA MPA NIAS 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree (1) 50 17.54% 28 3.06% 29 7.57% 
Agree (2) 134 47.02% 145 15.84% 101 26.37% 
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 28 9.82% 411 44.91% 119 31.07% 
Disagree (4) 72 25.26% 233 25.46% 21 5.48% 
Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
1 .003% 98 10.71% 113 29.50% 
Total 285 100% 915 100% 383 100% 
Averaged Mean scores 2.0645 3.2970 2.8537 
Effectiveness orientation More Effective  Partly Ineffective 
 
Partly Effective 
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and nearly 29% of indicated “neither agree nor disagree”. It seems that the mode of 
the frequency distribution was “neutral” which indicates the minimum level of 
agreement among the respondents, about the positive impact of the selected ECs in 
developing the human resources management skills of their participants. 
Different findings were revealed when respondents’ opinions were analyzed 
according to cross-case analysis among all selected ECs (see Table 8.6 below). The 
assessments of respondents are not the same at the selected ECs, based on cross-case 
analysis on the impact in developing the human recourses management skills. At 
MBA 22.00% of respondents strongly agree and 42.47% of respondents agree 
respectively whereas 28.47% indicated “Neither agree nor disagree” and 6.79 % 
indicated “disagree” (no one strongly disagreed.) At MPA however, nearly 30 % 
reported “Neither agree nor disagree”, 43% “Strongly disagree and disagree”, and only 
27% “Strongly agree or agree”. Respondents in NAIS had similar assessments to the 
respondents in MPA, as about 32% reported “strongly disagree and disagree”, 38.65% 
“neither agree nor disagree”, and only 29% “strongly agree and agree”:
Table 8.6: Human Resources Management Skills Developed (Cross-Case Analysis) 
(n=225)
It appears that respondents at MBA were more satisfied and think that the training 
they got developed managerial skills than at MPA and NIAS. This is confirmed by the 
total mean score of respondents at MBA, 1.8352, with all items under the neutral 
point of ‘3.0’. The total mean scores of respondents at MPA and NIAS were 3.09917 
and 3.01688, respectively, above the neutral point of ‘3.0’, suggesting that the 
respondents perceive the MPA and NIAS as ineffective in developing human resources 
management skills for their participants: 
 Response (Value) 
MBA MPA NIAS
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree (1) 68 22.00% 50 4.90% 20 4.98%
Agree (2) 132 42.72% 221 21.66% 97 24.18%
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 88 28.47% 306 30% 155 38.65%
Disagree (4) 21 6.79% 334 31.74% 97 24.18%
Strongly Disagree (5)) 0 0.00% 109 10.68% 32 7.98%
Total 309 100% 1020 100% 401 100%
Averaged Mean scores 1.8352 3.09917 3.01688







Figure 8.2 Total Means of Human Resources Management Skills Developed (Cross-
case analysis) (n=225)
8.3.3 Descriptive Analysis and Strategic Management Skills 
This sub-section is related to the factor of the strategic management, which 
counted alpha α=.887 (see Table 8.1). It consists of five items, which were developed 
through the training efforts for the participants in the selected ECs. The nature of 
these skills were: (X1) Developing and analyzing policies for your organization; (X2) 
Developing a strategic plan for your business; (X3) Developing a Plan of Action and 
a basic budget based on the strategic plan; (X4) Developing indicators to measure the 
successful implementation of the strategy; and (X5) Organizing the organization/
directorate/department/unit according to the strategy. The loading values of alpha 
are all closely grouped: with the highest at X5=0.882 and the lowest (X3=0.843).
Table 8.7 (see appendix 1.1) displays the descriptive statistics of all items related to 
this component, showing the frequency distribution, the mean scores (Mean), and 
standard deviation (SD). Based upon data presented in this table 8.6, the overall 
analysis seems to indicate that there were more responses of “Agree” (294), 
representing 34% of the sample, and “Strongly Agree” (106), representing 12%. There 
were fewer responses of “Disagree” (156), representing 18% of the sample and 
“Strongly Disagree” (58) representing 7% of the sample. The response to “neither 
agree nor disagree” (252), represented 29% of the sample. The mode of the frequency 
distribution indicates a reasonable level of agreement among the respondents about 
the positive impact of the selected ECs in developing the strategic management skills 
for their participants. 
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suggesting that the respondents perceive the MPA and NIAS as ineffective in developing human 
resources management skills for their participants:  
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closely grouped: with the highest at X5=0.882 and the lowest (X3=0.843). 
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showing the frequency distribution, the mean scores (Mean), and standard deviation (SD). Based upon 
data presented in this table 8.6, the overall analysis seems to indicate that there were more responses of 
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for their participants.  
        Similar findings were revealed when opinions were analyzed according to cross-case analysis among 
the selected key case studies. As Table 8.8 below shows, there is clear agreement among the participants 
at MBA regarding the development of their strategic management skills based on the EC’s efforts. Nearly 
81% of the MBA rticipants “strongly agree and agree” that their skills increased because of attending 
the study programme. Only 3.24% of respondents at MBA “strongly disagree and disagree” that the study 
course had developed their strategic management skills. On the other hand, less than half of respondents 
(46%) at NIAS reported “strongly agree and agree”, and nearly 43% “strongly disagree and disagree”. At 
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Similar findings were revealed when opinions were analyzed according to cross-
case analysis among the selected key case studies. As Table 8.8 below shows, there is 
clear agreement among the participants at MBA regarding the development of their 
strategic management skills based on the EC’s efforts. Nearly 81% of the MBA 
participants “strongly agree and agree” that their skills increased because of attending 
the study programme. Only 3.24% of respondents at MBA “strongly disagree and 
disagree” that the study course had developed their strategic management skills. On 
the other hand, less than half of respondents (46%) at NIAS reported “strongly agree 
and agree”, and nearly 43% “strongly disagree and disagree”. At MPA, nearly 35% of 
respondents indicated “Strongly disagree and disagree” and 31 % indicated “Strongly 
agree and agree”.
Table 8.8 Strategic Management Skills Developed (Cross-Case Analysis) (n=225)
As Figure 8.3 below shows, the total overall mean scores of MPA and NIAS were 
relatively close to each other, at 2.9321 and 2.8439 respectively, and both under the 
limit of the effectiveness scale “3”. In MBA, the total mean score was much lower, at 
1.9092 (see figure 8.3). The dissimilarity of the total mean scores and the distribution 
of the responses, indicate that respondents have different assessments about the 
impact of the selected ECs, indicating that MBA was more effective than MPA and 
NIAS in developing strategic management skills of their participants.
Response (Value) 
MBA MPA NIAS
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree (1) 48 31.16% 39 7.78% 19 9.26%
Agree (2) 77 49.67% 136 27.14% 75 36.58%
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
(3) 24 15.58% 174 34.73% 24 11.70%
Disagree (4) 5 3.24% 118 23.50% 63 30.73%
Strongly Disagree (5) 0 0.00% 34 6.78% 24 11.70%
Total 154 100% 501 100% 205 100%
Averaged Mean scores 1.9092 2.9321 2.8439







Figure 8.3 Total Means of the Strategic Management Skills Developed (Cross-Case 
Analysis) (N=225)
8.3.4 Descriptive Analysis and the Managerial Communication Skills 
Developed 
This sub-section or component, with alpha= .884, is related to communication 
skills, and consisting of 4 variables: (X1) Setting up and implementing a communication 
system within the organization; (X2) Developing meeting skills; (X3) Setting up a 
reporting system; and (X4) Developing a reporting skills. The loading values of the 
four variables are closely clustered with the highest being (X1) =, 878 and the lowest 
(X3) =, 821.
It is clear from Table 8.9 (see appendix 1.1) that all of the included items are related 
to the factor of managerial communication skills. Table 8.10 below highlights the 
overall assessments of respondents, about the level of effectiveness of the ECs in 
developing the managerial communication skills for their participants. About 36 % 
of respondents reported to “strongly agree and agree”, less than one-third (28%) 
reported “strongly disagree and disagree” and 36% of respondents reported “neither 
agree nor disagree”. The total mean score was 2.8947, close to the scale point of “3”. It 
appears there is no a clear consensus among the respondents that the selected ECs 
have effectively developed their managerial communication skills.
From Table 8.10 we can see that there is a good consensus among respondents of 
the MPA that the EC’s has developed their managerial communication skills. Nearly 







MPA, nearly 35% of respondents indicated “Strongly disagree and disagree” and 31 % indicated “Strongly 
agree and agree”. 
Table 8.8 Strategic Management Skills Developed (Cross-Case Analysis) (n=225) 
                    Response (Value)  MBA MPA NIAS 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree (1) 48 31.16% 39 7.78% 19 9.26% 
Agree (2) 77 49.67% 136 27.14% 75 36.58% 
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 24 15.58% 174 34.73% 24 11.70% 
Disagree (4) 5 3.24% 118 23.50% 63 30.73% 
Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
0 0.00% 34 6.78% 24 11.70% 
Total 154 100% 501 100% 205 100% 
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scores and the distribution of the responses, indicate that respondents have different assessments about 
the impact of the selected ECs, indicating that MBA was more effective than MPA and NIAS in 
developing strategic management skills of their participants. 
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8.3.4 Descriptive Analysis and the Managerial Communication Skills Developed  
       This sub-section or component, with alpha= .884, is related to communication skills, and consisting 
of 4 variables: (X1) Setting up and implementing a communication system within the organization; (X2) 
Developing meeting skills; (X3) Setting up a reporting system; and (X4) Developing a reporting skills. The 
loading values of the fou  variables are closely clustered with th  highest being (X1) =, 878 and the lowest 
(X3) =, 821.                     
            It is clear from Table 8.9 (see appendix 1.1) that all of the included items are related to the factor 
of managerial communication skills. Table 8.10 below highlights the overall assessments of respondents, 
about the level of effectiveness of the ECs in developing the managerial communication skills for their 
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“neither agree nor disagree”, and only 8.19% of respondents reported “disagree”. At 
NIAS, 46 % of respondents reported to, “Strongly agree and agree”, 24% “strongly 
disagree and disagree”, and 30.48% “neither agree nor disagree”. On the other hand, 
only about 25% of respondents at MPA indicated “strongly agree and agree”, 35% 
“strongly disagree and disagree” and 39.80% “neither agree nor disagree” that the 
efforts of the MPA have developed their managerial communication skills:
Table 8.10: Communications Skills Developed (Cross-Case Analysis) (N=225)
The above frequency distribution values indicate that MBA was the most effective 
in developing the managerial communication skills of its participants, and MPA the 
least effective. This is also confirmed by the total variation mean scores: MPA=3.1524, 
which are higher than the scale point of effectiveness “3”. NIAS= 2.7195, which is just 
under the scale point of effectiveness “3”, and MBA = 2.271, which is lower than the 
scale point of effectiveness “3”. The dissimilarity of mean scores indicates that there 
were greater internal variations in the assessment of the impact of MPA than in the 
other ECs, and the respondents believe that the MPA was not effective in developing 
their managerial communication skills. 
Figure 8.4 Total Mean of the Communications Skills Developed (Cross-case 
Analysis) (N=225)
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participants. About 36 % of respondents reported to “strongly agree and agree”, less than one-third 
(28%) reported “strongly disagree and disagree” and 36% of respondents reported “neither agree nor 
disagree”. The total mean score was 2.8947, close to the scale point of “3”. It appears there is no a clear 
consensus among the respondents that the selected ECs have effectively developed their managerial 
communication skills.   
         From Table 8.10 we can see that there is a good consensus among respondents of the MPA that the 
EC’s has developed their managerial communication skills. Nearly 59% of respondents at the MBA 
indicated to “strongly agree and agree”, a third “neither agree nor disagree”, and only 8.19% of 
respondents reported “disagree”. At NIAS, 46 % of respondents reported to, “Strongly agree and agree”, 
24% “strongly disagree and disagree”, and 30.48% “neither agree nor disagree”. On the other hand, only 
about 25% of respondents at MPA indicated “strongly agree and agree”, 35% “strongly disagree and 
disagree” and 39.80% “neither agree nor disagree” that the efforts of the MPA have developed their 
managerial communication skills: 
Table 8.10: Communications Skills Developed (Cross-Case Analysis) (N=225) 
                    Response (Value)  MBA MPA NIAS 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Strongly Agree (1) 27 22.13% 23 5.65% 16 9.75% 
Agree (2) 45 36.88% 78 19.16% 59 35.97% 
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 40 32.78% 162 39.80% 50 30.48% 
Disagree (4) 10 8.19% 102 25.06% 33 20.12 
Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
0 0.00% 42 10.31% 6 3.65% 
Total 122 100% 407 100% 164 100% 
Averaged Mean scores 2.2710 3.1524 
 
2.7195 





        The above frequency distribution values indicate that  was the most effective in developing the 
managerial communication skills of its participants, and MPA the least effective. This is also confirmed by 
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NIAS= 2.7195, which is just under the scale point of effectiveness “3”, and MBA = 2.271, which is lower 
than the scale point of effectiveness “3”.  The dissimilarity of mean scores indicates that there were 
greater internal variations in the assessment of the impact of MPA than in the other ECs, and the 
respondents believe that the MPA was not effective in developing their managerial communication skills.  
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Response (Value) 
MBA MPA NIAS
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree (1) 27 22.13% 23 5.65% 16 9.75%
Agree (2) 45 36.88% 78 19.16% 59 35.97%
Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 40 32.78% 162 39.80% 50 30.48%
Disagree (4) 10 8.19% 102 25.06% 33 20.12
Strongly Disagree (5) 0 0.00% 42 10.31% 6 3.65%
Total 122 100% 407 100% 164 100%
Averaged Mean scores 2.2710 3.1524 2.7195







8.3.5 Cross Cases and Variables Analysis: Managerial Skills Developed 
The objective of this sub-section is to examine the assessment of the sample, about 
the perceived level of effectiveness of selected ECs in developing the managerial skills 
of their participants. This is shown by doing a cross-factor analysis and presenting the 
specific conclusions drawn from the results of the four analyzed managerial skills by 
using the result of the loading frequency and the mean scores on each factor (see 
Table 8.11). The One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used as inferential 
statistic method to interpret the results. The frequency distribution method was used 
in this section to compare the assessments of the respondents from the selected ECs 
by showing how data is distributed. Although the data was on a five-point Likert-type 
scale (1= Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree and 5 
= strongly disagree), we have combined similar categories of response and frozen the 
neutral category when presenting the frequency distributions. Thus, we would expect 
50% of the responses in each of the two categories, assuming that those categories 
make up 100% of the responses. The aim is to multiply the number of responses for 
each of the four points by its respective level of effectiveness, with “Strongly Agree 
and Agree” being a high level of effectiveness, and “strongly disagree and disagree” 
being a low level of effectiveness. We have also reordered the places of the selected 
ECs in the below table from the least effective (MPA) to the most (MBA): 
Table 8.11: Managerial Skills Developed (Across Variables and Cases Analysis) 
(N=225)
Source: the results presented in the above-analyzed variables 
The overall results: the findings of the overall analysis show that there is no clear 
consistency among respondents regarding the perceived effectiveness of the selected 
Variables 
S. Agree  & Agree S. Disagree & Disagree Neither
MPA NIAS MBA MPA NIAS MBA MPA NIAS MBA
V V V V V V V V V
P P P P P P P P P
V1: Leadership skills 
developed
175 130 184 329 134 73 411 119 28
19% 34% 65% 36% 35% 26% 45% 31% 9%
V2: Human resource 
management skills developed
271 117 200 443 129 21 306 155 88
26% 29% 65% 44% 32% 7% 30% 39% 28%
V3: Strategic management 
skills developed
175 94 125 152 87 5 174 24 24




101 75 72 144 39 10 162 50 40
25% 46% 59% 35% 24% 8% 30% 30% 33%
Cross-case analyses 722 416 581 1068 389 109 1053 348 18025% 36% 67% 38% 34% 12% 37% 30% 21%
Overall analysis 1719 1566 158135% 32% 33%
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ECs, in developing managerial skills of their participants. Respondents were roughly 
split in three, with 35% (1719) of the responses “Strongly Agree & Agree”, 32% (1566) 
“Strongly disagree or disagree”, and 33% (1581) “Neither agree nor disagree”. The 
overall perceived value mean was 2.92041, very close to the neutral centre of the scale 
“3” and thus indicating an insignificant perceived effectiveness level of ECs in 
developing the managerial skills of the participants. 
Across case and variable analysis: the perceived effectiveness of MPA was less 
than MBA in developing the managerial skills. About 19 % (variable 1), 26% (variable 
2), 35% (variable 3), and 25% (variable 4) of responses at MPA reported “strongly 
Agree & Agree”. It is clear, however, that there is positive consensus among 
respondents at MBA as around 65% (variable 1), 65% (variable 2), 81% (variable 3), 
and 59% (variable 4) of the responses reported “strongly Agree & Agree”. The overall 
results of NIAS were similar to MPA, as 34% (variable 1), 29% (variable 2), 46% 
(variable 3) and 46 % (variable 4) indicated “Strongly Agree & Agree” that NIAS 
could develop their managerial skills.
It appears there is a wide consensus among respondents at MBA about the level of 
the effectiveness of the project in developing their managerial skills, as the overall 
perceived value mean was 2.174, significantly below the neutral centre of the scale 
point ‘3’ and thus, indicating effective perceived value of MBA. The overall mean 
score at MPA was 3.2205, somewhat above the neutral centre of the scale and thus 
revealing that, respondents have a negative impression about the effectiveness of 
MPA in developing the managerial skills of its participants. Finally, the overall mean 
score at NIAS was 2.9618, and all of the means in the four factors were close to the 
neutral point on the scales “3”, ranging between 2.7195 and (3.0168), suggesting that 
the NIAS was relatively more effective than MPA in developing the managerial skills 
of its participants. This is despite the fact that NIAS was established by the efforts of 
the same donor contractor of the MPA. 
The findings revealed that the evaluation of respondents towards training process, 
based on developing the managerial skills for the participants, differed among the 







Figure 8.5 Overall Means of the Managerial Skills Developed (N=225)
As we mentioned before, the one-way ANOVA is commonly used as an inferential 
statistic used as a test of statistical significance, resulting in an F-value. To interpret 
the results presented above, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, 
showing that the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in developing the 
selected managerial skills of participants is significant as [F=31,740; DF= (2/171); P=, 
000]. In one-way ANOVA, the total variation is partitioned into two components 
between groups and within groups. Between groups represents variation of the group 
means around the overall mean. Within groups represents variation of the individual 
scores around their respective group means. The significance value .000 <.05 indicates 
there are significant group differences, which was clearly shown in the Figure 8.5, 
namely that MBA differs from the other selected ECs. 
It is important now to analyze if there is also variation among the selected ECs in 
transferring knowledge and managerial skills developed to the work settings. This is 
in the line with the main argument of this study, as the capacity building process will 
not be complete and the NPT program will not achieve its overall objective if, there 
are no efforts made to use this human capital in the respective organizations. 
8.4 Transferring the Build-knowledge and Skills to the Work Settings
This section aims to analytically determine the level of effectiveness of the selected 
EC’s, in transferring the built knowledge and skills to work settings. The following 
four factors were considered: (1) the method of selecting participants to attend the 
ECs for capacity and capability development; (2) the quality of the curriculum and 
course training, looking if they are incorporating the demands and sector related 
problems in the study programme; (3) The focus on quantity of training based reform, 
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positive consensus among respondents at MBA as around 65% (variable 1), 65% (variable 2), 81% 
(variable 3), and 59% (variable 4) of the responses reported “strongly Agree & Agree”. The overall results 
of NIAS were similar to MPA, as 34% (variable 1), 29% (variable 2), 46% (variable 3) and 46 % (variable 
4) indicated “Strongly Agree & Agree” that NIAS could develop their managerial skills.  
        It appears there is a wide consensus among respondents at MBA about the level of the effectiveness 
of the project in developing their managerial skills, as the overall perceived value mean was 2.174, 
significantly below the neutral centre of the scale point ‘3’ and thus, indicating effective perceived value of 
MBA. The overall mean score at MPA was 3.2205, somewhat above the neutral centre of the scale and 
thus revealing that, respondents have a negative impression about the effectiveness of MPA in developing 
the managerial skills of its participants. Finally, the overall mean score at NIAS was 2.9618, and all of the 
means in the four factors were close to the neutral point on the scales “3”, ranging between 2.7195 and 
(3.0168), suggesting that the NIAS was relatively more effective than MPA in developing the managerial 
skills of its participants. This is despite the fact that NIAS was established by the efforts of the same 
donor contractor of the MPA.  
        The findings revealed that the evaluation of respondents towards training process, based on 
developing the managerial skills for the participants, differed among the selected ECs. MBA was more 
effective than MPA, while NIAS was partly effective:  
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          As we mentioned before, the one-way ANOVA is commonly used as an inferential statistic used as 
a test of statistical significance, resulting in an F-value. To interpret the results presented above, a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, showing that the difference or the variation among 
the selected ECs in developing the selected managerial skills of participants is significant as [F=31,740; 
DF= (2/171); P=, 000].  In one-way ANOVA, the total variation is partitioned into two components 
between groups and within groups. Between groups represents variation of the group means around the 
overall mean. Within groups represents variation of the individual scores around their respective group 
means. The significance value .000 <.05 indicates there are significant group differences, which was 
clearly shown in the Figure 8.5, namely that MBA differs from the other selected ECs.  
         It is importa t now to analyze if ther  is also vari tion among the selec ed ECs in transferring 
knowledg  and managerial skills developed to the work settings. This is in the line with the main 
argument of this study, as the capacity building process will not be complete and the NPT program will 
not achieve its overall objective if, there are no efforts made to use this human capital in the respective 
organizations.   
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how many participants are enrolled in the ECs compared to the size of the targeted 
organizations and the percentage of graduates from the different ECs at a specific 
time; and (4) the coordination between the ECs and the related organizations to 
transfer the training back to the workplace. Different set of items developed to 
measure these four selected variables are included in the analysis. 
8.4.1 The Level of Effectiveness in the Process of Selecting Participants in the 
ECs 
When starting a training programme for promoting the administrative reform 
process, four decisions within an action plan need to be made and carefully considered 
regarding the selecting process of the participants: “(1) who can benefit from the 
training? (2) What programs are required by law or by government edict? (3) Should 
the training be voluntary or compulsory? (4) Should the participants be segregated 
by level in the organization, or should two or more levels be included in the same 
class?” (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010:11).
The first and fourth questions were discussed in Chapter 7, which examined the 
relationship between the participants’ demographic profile, working background and 
the EC’s level of effectiveness. The result showed that significant efforts have made by 
the selected ECs and the related sectors, to ensure effective selection of the participants 
based upon the organizational level and location.
The two remaining questions will be examined by using different set measures, 
which consist of six items with total Alpha value=, 707, which are: (X1) the method 
of involving the participants in the ECs; (x2) the method of paying the fees of the 
master degree; (X3) involvement in the training process as part of the upgrading plan 
of the related organization; (X4) the competition policy of selecting the participants 
within the specific organizations; (X5) the criteria of selecting the participates by the 
related organizations; and (X6) the criteria of selecting the participants by the selected 
ECs. The loading values of alpha are all closely grouped: with the highest X2=0.705 
and the lowest X5=0.573 (See Table 8.3)4.
Before presenting the cross case analyses, it is worth noting here that the selected 
ECs were established to offer training for the participants, on a compulsory and not 
voluntary basis. It is not possible to have voluntary training programs as part of 
broader capacity and capability reform process. The selection of the participants 
4 - The findings of  this section are based on the table attached in the appendix 1.1, and the numbers of  these tables are 







should be part of the upgrading plan or policy of the targeted organizations or the 
entire government in order to deal with the questions what, who, and how. 
Unfortunately, the results of the frequency distribution for the six items show that the 
majority (54%) attended the ECs voluntarily. Furthermore, 57% of the participants 
(128 of a total number 227) paid the course fees themselves. 81% of participants (181 
of a total number 227) reported that they attended the ECs for training, which was 
not part of the upgrading plans in their related organizations. In addition, 79% of the 
respondents indicated that there were no more candidates within their organizations 
to attend the training process.
Accordingly, it appears there is a high degree of agreement among the respondents 
that that the criteria, in which they were selected by their organizations and by the 
ECs are not effective in successfully transferring managerial skills to the work settings 
or promoting the administrative reform process in the related organizations. Nearly 
56% said that the selection policies of their organizations were “very ineffective and 
ineffective” and 52% rated the selection policies of the ECs as “very ineffective and 
effective”. Only 19% rated their organizations’ policies as “very effective and effective” 
and 23%consider the policies of the ECs “very effective and effective”. The neutral 
category was removed as we combined similar categories of responses (see Tables 
8.12, 8.13, and 8.14).
It is important to conduct a variation among the selected ECs, in order to specify 
which EC was the most effective in selecting the participants. In the tables mentioned 
above, the results reveal differences in the assessment of respondents, about the 
effectiveness of the ECs in the selection process. Only 6% of respondents at MBA, 
20% at NIAS and 32% at WEC, reported they attended the ECs on a voluntary basis. 
Thus, the majority of the participants in these ECs attended on a compulsory basis. 
In MBA, around 51% of the respondents indicated that they paid the fees by 
themselves. This suggests that even the business companies, sent the participants for 
training without obligations and with no idea how the outcomes could be used after 
the training course. 52% of respondents at MPA and 93% at WRTC reported that 
they attended the ECs on a voluntary basis. It appears there is a wide consensus 
amongst respondents of these two ECs, that the minority attended the training 
process on a compulsory basis and as part of an action plan. It is clear from the results 
of the first and second measures of the first factor that MBA, WEC and NIAS were 
more effective than the other MPA and WRTC.
The results show shows that more than half of the respondents (55%) at MBA 
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disagree that their organizations developed an upgrading plan with the ECs for 
selecting participants for the training. In fact, 88% or respondents at MPA, 73% at 
NIAS, 92% at WEC and 87% at WRTC disagreed that they were selected for attending 
the ECs as part of an upgrading plan for their organizations. A majority at these four 
institutions (69%, 75%, 61% and 63% of respondents at MPA, NIAS, WEC and WRTC 
respectively) indicated that the criteria by which they were selected by their 
organizations and by the ECs for attending the training process were “very ineffective 
and ineffective”. Conversely, only 26% of respondents at MBA thought the same 
criteria “very ineffective and ineffective”.
Respondents’ opinion at all institutions reveal widespread displeasure at the 
methods adopted by their organizations and the ECs to select participants, and its 
relation to the process of transferring the managerial skills back to the work settings. 
Selection was mainly based upon a voluntary method; the decision on participants 
was very haphazard. Consequently, the participants may have had clashes between 
training and work time, a workload too heavy to allow for study, and too many 
procedures and bureaucracy. In addition, employees could have attended training 
programs not applicable to their job and stereotyping in terms of training content. It 
seems that the training was not based on systematic identification of needs of the 
related organizations. It appears that targeted or direct beneficiaries of the ECs have 
no recognition of their training services and objectives, thus influencing the 
effectiveness of training (Haslinda and Mahyddin, 2009). This point is discussed 
deeply below.
8.4.2 The Quality of the Curriculum and Course Training 
The main objective of this sub-section is to reveal the quality of the curriculum 
and course training, which implicitly can show the level of effectiveness of the selected 
ECs in terms of transferring the managerial skills to the work settings. For this, two 
variables were developed: (1) the training methods that the trainers usually used, and 
(2) the quality of the curriculum and courses, and the extent to which the curriculum 
and courses included and incorporated real life case studies of the related sectors. 
To find out which EC was the most effective in teaching methods and quality of 
courses, we employ the descriptive analysis method here, using score frequencies, 
mean scores to compare the assessments of the respondents based upon cross case 
analysis. 







training methods used, respondents in Question 6 were asked to number four 
training methods, ranging from 1=highest frequency to 4= lowest frequency use. 
There are many training methods, but the respondents were asked to indicate one of 
the following: role-playing, business games, lectures, and case studies. The total of 
four frequency scores can be seen in detail in Appendix 1.1. I reduce the analysis to 
two teaching methods: lectures and case studies, because these two teachings were 
indicated by respondents as the most used at the selected ECs.
Table 8.15 (See appendix 1.1) shows the overall assessments of respondents about 
the teaching or training methods used by instructors during the training process of 
the participants in the selected ECs. About 30% of respondents reported that trainers 
used case studies as their primary method; 50% gave this method fourth position. 
Regarding lectures, 40% of respondents answered that this was the primary technique, 
but 29% put this method fourth. Thus it appears there is no a clear consensus among 
the respondents that the selected ECs used the case study as a main training method 
for the participant, even though case studies improve the analytical and problem-
solving skills of the participants and incorporate the sector-related. 
Table 8.15 shows that the majority of the instructors at MBA (68 %) and at WEC 
(78%) usually, used the case study as a first training method, while just at MPA it was 
just 14% and at NIAS 27%. 73% of respondents at MPA, 44% at NIAS, and 70% at 
WRTC answered that the instructors used the case study as a fourth method, 58% of 
respondents at, MPA , 19% at NIAS and 77% at WRTC said that lecturers were the 
most frequent of the four methods. These results are confirmed by the results of the 
mean scores as table 8.16 shows (see appendix 1.1). The mean scores of respondents 
at MPA and WRTC, were lower (1.6987 and 1.5556 respectively) regarding use of the 
lecture method during the training process than the mean scores (3.5105 and 3.2593 
respectively) of using case studies. The mean scores of respondents at MBA and WEC 
were different to the other ECs, as they were lower regarding use of case studies 
(2.0645 and 1.2692 respectively) than the lecture method (2,6452 and 2.7692, 
respectively). Generally, the higher the score of the frequency distribution and the 
lower the value of the mean scores regarding use of the case study method as a main 
training method, the higher the effectiveness scale score supporting the idea that the 
training program promote the reform processes and improve the analytical and 
problem-solving skills for the participants.
Differences among the selected ECs were significant, indicating that participants 
in MBA and WEC believe that their training programs were more effective, than the 
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training programs in MPA and WRTC. The one-way ANOVA test showed the 
difference or the variation among the selected ECs in developing the selected 
managerial skills of participants as significant as case study = [F=12,589; DF= (4/219); 
P=, 000] and Lecture method= [F=12,282; DF= (4/215); P=, 000]. 
The quality of the curriculum and training course: Not only should case studies 
be included in the study programme is, but the case studies should be relevant to the 
local context, including the needs of the targeted sectors and organizations. In this 
sense, participants can learn how to deal with the problems that their organizations 
suffer from and that will reflect implicitly, a clear policy of transferring the skills 
learned to the work settings. Therefore, this factor shows the evaluation of the 
respondents towards training, based on the quality of the curriculum and courses 
and their relevance to institutional realities in Yemen’s public and private sectors. It 
has a total alpha = .830, and consisting of 5 variables: (X1)‘there is no overlapping in 
course materials’; (X2) ‘The courses are relevant to the special needs of the Yemeni 
related sector’; (X3) ‘The content of the master degree is focusing on how the manager 
should manage rather than what is management in general’; (X4) ‘The balance 
between theory and practice is good’; and (X5) ‘Case studies presented in the courses 
are based on the daily practice of Yemen’s sectors.’ The alpha values are all closely 
grouped, with the highest X1 =.822 and the lowest (X2) =.756. 
To measure the level of effectiveness of the selected ECs in incorporating local 
needs in their curriculums and courses, based on the opinions of the respondents, we 
use descriptive analysis such as the score of the frequency distribution and the means 
scores to show the variance among the selected ECs. The results reveal that there is no 
agreement among the respondents, that what they learn accurately reflects 
institutional realities on the ground. As shown in Table 8.17 and 8.18 (in Appendix 
1.1), more than a third (37%) of the respondents “strongly agree and agree”, that the 
content of the course is practical and related to the local needs of their organizations, 
but 34% “strongly disagree and disagree” and 29% “neither agree nor disagree”. 
As the ECs were established to promote public sector reform, the curriculum and 
courses of their training programmes should be well adapted to local conditions and 
have specific attention to their respective policy contexts. The main body of knowledge 
and ideas informing their participants during the capacity and capability building 
process (training process) is how to make public and private sector institutions 
effective and how to reform them. The results of the descriptive statistics, in Figure 







curriculum and courses. The mean score of MBA (mean = 2.451, s.d. = .64146) is 
similar to the mean score of WEC (mean = 2.237, s.d. = .5274). The means of these 
two ECs are below the neutral point on the scales ‘3’, which suggests that MBA and 
WEC were effective in having curriculum and courses well adapted to local conditions 
of the related sectors. In contrast, the means score of MPA (mean = 3.358, s.d. = 
.78469), NIAS (Mean=3, 0772, s.d. =, 59640) and WRTC (mean= 3, 0123, s.d. =, 
66172) are above the neutral point on the scales: ‘3’; and thus these three institutions 
were ineffective on this count.
Figure 8.6 Means of the Quality of the Curriculum and Training course (N=227)
To interpret the results of the descriptive analysis presented above, we use the 
one-way ANOVA test. The results show a significant difference among the selected 
ECs with respect to variables used in this component. There are no equal level of 
effectiveness among the selected ECs in the quality of the curriculum and courses as 
[F=19,596; DF= (4/222); P=, 000].
8.4.3 Quantity of the Training Efforts 
Based on the literature related to the LKS in Yemen which we reviewed in Chapter 
4, it is clear that the current situation at both public and private sectors requires a 
systematic capacity and capability building process, focused on quantity as well as 
quality. Therefore, the quantity of the training outputs is another measure of the 
effectiveness of the selected ECs. 
To carry out the measurement of the ECs’ effectiveness in this regard, respondents 
were asked if they finished the training course on time, indicating on a two-point 
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learned to the work settings.  Therefore, this factor shows the evaluation of the respondents towards 
training, based on the quality of the curriculum and courses and their relevance to institutional realities in 
Yemen’s public and private sectors. It has a total alpha = .830, and consisting of 5 variables: (X1)‘there is 
no overlapping in course materials’; (X2) ‘The courses are relevant to the special needs of the Yemeni 
related sector’; (X3) ‘The content of the master degree is focusing on how the manager should manage 
rather than what is management in general’; (X4) ‘The balance between theory and practice is good’; and 
(X5) ‘Case studies presented in the courses are based on the daily practice of Yemen’s sectors.’ The alpha 
values are all closely grouped, with the highest X1 =.822 and the lowest (X2) =.756.  
       To measure the level of effectiveness of the selected ECs in incorporating local needs in their 
curriculums and courses, based on the opinions of the respondents, we use descriptive analysis such as 
the score of the frequency distribution and the means scores to show the variance among the selected 
ECs. The results reveal that there is no agreement among the respondents, that what they learn accurately 
reflects institutional realities on the ground. As shown in Table 8.17 and 8.18 (in Appendix 1.1), more 
than a third (37%) of the respondents “strongly agree and agree”, that the content of the course is 
practical and related to the local needs of their organizations, but 34% “strongly disagree and disagree” 
and 29% “neither agree nor disagree”.  
       As the ECs were established to promote public sector reform, the curriculum and courses of their 
training programmes should be well adapted to local conditions and have specific attention to their 
respective policy contexts. The main body of knowledge and ideas informing their participants during the 
capacity nd capability building process (training process) is how to make public and private sector 
institutions effective and how to reform them. The results of the descriptive statistics, in Figure 8.6 
below, show differences among the selected ECs based on the quality of the curriculum and courses. The 
mean score of MBA (mean = 2.451, s.d. = .64146) is similar to the mean score of WEC (mean = 2.237, 
s.d. = .5274). The means of these two ECs are below the neutral point on the scales ‘3’, which suggests 
that MBA and WEC were effective in having curriculum and courses well adapted to local conditions of 
the related sectors. In contrast, the means score of MPA (mean = 3.358, s.d. = .78469), NIAS (Mean=3, 
0772, s.d. =, 59640) and WRTC (mean= 3, 0123, s.d. =, 66172) are above the neutral point on the scales: 
‘3’; and thus these three institutions were ineffective on this count. 
 
Figure 8.6 Means of the Quality of the Curriculum and Training course (N=227) 
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scale with 1=Yes and 2=No. The total of two were then multiplied by their respective 
importance ratings. The resulting two totals were averaged one = effective efforts and 
two= ineffective efforts. It was also intended to get a better understanding of the 
aggregate view of performance, based on the level of efforts made by the selected ECs 
in attracting participants from the related organizations. This is measured by 
comparing the size of the targeted organizations and the size of the participants in the 
ECs. 
It is interesting to observe that even though the ECs were established by the same 
donor aid programme (the Dutch-Yemen NPT) and almost all at the same recipient 
institution (Sana’a University); their efforts on quantity of training based reform are 
somewhat different. First of all, based on the overall analysis, the majority of the 
participants (83%) in all the selected ECs have not finished their courses at the time 
of writing. 
Table 8.19 Training Course Finished in Time
It is important to conduct a variation among the selected ECs in order to specify 
which EC was the most effective in the quantity of its training efforts, by considering 
the assessment of the research respondents. In above table 8.19 and table 8.20 (see 
appendix 1.1), the results reveal small differences in the assessment of respondents 
about the quantity of training efforts. More than half of respondents (58%) at MBA 
and around 38.5% of respondents at WEC indicated that they graduated on time. On 
the other hand, only 6% of respondents at MPA, 17% at NIAS, and 7% at WRTC 
reported they that graduated on time. These findings suggest that MPA, NIAS, and 
WRTC were more ineffective than MBA and WEC in capacity and capability building 
process. These findings are confirmed by the results of the means scores. In MBA, the 
mean score is 1.4194 (s.d. =.50161), a little below the scale point of the value of 
effectiveness =1.5, and in WEC the mean score is 1.6154 (s.d. =.49614), which is a 
little above the scale point of the value of effectiveness =1.5. In the other ECs the 
mean scores are below the scale point of the value of ineffectiveness =2: the mean 
score of MPA is 1.9804 (s.d. =, 13933), NIAS is 1.8293 (s.d. =.38095), and WRTC is 
ECs ResponsesYes No
MBA Count 18 13% 58% 42%
MPA Count 6 94% 6% 94%
NIAS Count 7 34% 17% 83%
WEC Count 10 16% 38,5% 61,5%
WRTC Count 2 25% 7% 93%








Figure 8.7 Means of the Training Course Finished in Time
To interpret the result of the descriptive analysis presented, we use a one-way 
ANOVA test. The results of the ANOVA show a significant difference among the 
selected ECs with respect to variable used in this component. There is no an equal 
level of effectiveness among the selected ECs in the quantity of training efforts 
[F=21,372; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]:
The aggregate view of performance is really gloomy, based on the level of efforts 
made by the selected ECs and by the related organizations in attracting participants 
to attend the training process. Let’s look at the institutions in turn. Since the MBA 
opened in 2007, only six intakes have taken place, with a total of 146 students, 25% of 
whom were government officials, 10% from the international and 65% from the 
private Yemeni businesses. At the time of writing, four intakes have graduated and 
two intakes are still in the study process. Since the establishment of MPA as centre for 
public administration development in Yemen (CPAD) in 2007, five intakes have 
taken place with a total of 239 participants (public managers). The distribution of the 
participants based on gender is 92% males and 8% females. Only six participants 
finished their studies on time and the others are still studying or, have stopped 
without finishing their final paper for the graduation. Four intakes have taken place 
in the PA-NIAS unit since 2008, with a total of 85 participants. Two intakes have 
graduated and the other students are still studying (see table 8.21 in appendix 1.1). 
Since the MSc programme at WEC started in February 2006, four intakes have taken 
place, with 75 participants in total. Most of the students have completed the one year 
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and WEC in capacity and capability building process. These findings are confirmed by the results of the 
means scores.  In MBA, the mean score is 1.4194 (s.d. =.50161), a little below the scale point of the value 
of effectiveness =1.5, and in WEC the mean score is 1.6154 (s.d. =.49614), which is a little above the 
scale point of the value of effectiveness =1.5. In the other ECs the mean scores are below the scale point 
of the value of ineffectiveness =2:  the mean score of MPA is 1.9804 (s.d. =, 13933), NIAS is 1.8293 (s.d. 
=.38095), and WRTC is 1.9259(s.d. =.26688). 
       
 
Figure 8.7 Means of the Training Course Finished in Time 
         To interpret the result of the descriptive analysis presented, we use a one-way ANOVA test. The 
results of the ANOVA show a significant difference among the selected ECs with respect to variable used 
in this component. There is no an equal level of effectiveness among the selected ECs in the quantity of 
training efforts [F=21,372; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]: 
      The aggregate view of performance is really gloomy, based on the level of efforts made by the 
selected ECs and by the related organizations in attracting participants to attend the training process. 
Let’s look at the institutions in turn. Since the MBA opened in 2007, only six intakes have taken place, 
with a total of 146 students, 25% of whom were government officials, 10% from the international and 
65% from the private Yemeni businesses. At the time of writing, four intakes have graduated and two 
intakes are still i  the study process. Since the establishment of MPA a  centre for public administration 
development in Yemen (CPAD) in 2007, five intakes have taken place with a total of 239 participants 
(public managers). The distribution of the participants based on gender is 92% males and 8% females. 
Only six participants finished their studies on time and the others are still studying or, have stopped 
without finishing their final paper for the graduation. Four intakes have taken place in the PA-NIAS unit 
since 2008, with a total of 85 participants. Two intakes have graduated and the other students are still 
studying (see table 8.21 in appendix 1.1).  Since the MSc programme at WEC started in February 2006, 
four intakes have taken place, with 75 participants in total. Most of the students have completed the one 
year diploma course and more than 20 have finished the other year for the MSc. Finally, at WRTC, five 
intakes have taken place, with 85 participants in total, since the MSc programme started in 2007. Of these, 
only three participants have graduated.  
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diploma course and more than 20 have finished the other year for the MSc. Finally, at 
WRTC, five intakes have taken place, with 85 participants in total, since the MSc 
programme started in 2007. Of these, only three participants have graduated. 
Mr. Yaqoub, Deputy Finance Minister in Yemen said that: “the first priority lies in 
improving the efficiency of the civil service by attracting new talent. One hundred new 
recruits for senior governmental positions will be identified through a transparent 
and merit-based selection process” (Yaqoub, et al., 2010: 2). Although the selected 
ECs should have generated a new breed of senior governmental officials, over a 6 year 
time period they provided training for only 635 people, of which only 39 graduated. 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship between the level of effectiveness of 
the education center in prompting the administrative reform process in the related 
organizations and the quantity of training efforts. 
8.4.4 The Efforts Made by the ECs and the Respective Organizations to Achieve 
Change 
The objective of this sub-section is to discover the efforts made by the ECs and the 
related organizations, in the process of achieving a real change as part of transferring 
the managerial skills to the work settings. Different sets of variables are used to assess 
the validity of this variable. Respondents were asked to two questions. 
The first question (Q1) had eight variables. These variables gave an alpha =.860, 
and thus have a significant relationship and can be used as indictors to measure the 
effectiveness of the process of training transfer. These eight variables are (X1) describe 
your position in your organization before attending the education center; (X2) 
describe your position in your organization after attending the education center; 
(X3) promotion of function in an organization; (X4) receiving a salary increase after 
obtaining the master degree; (X5) using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to 
handle your work in the short term (day-to-day work) based on the local organizational 
environment; (X6) using the skills, knowledge, and competencies to handle your 
work in the long term (strategically) based on the local organizational environment; 
(X7) developing a new breed of managers/specialists in the related organizations; and 
(X8) the role of the education centers in promoting the related organizations as a 
whole.
The second question (Q2) had six variables and was used to assess the validity of 
the corresponding research aims. The overall alpha =.851 and thus these variables 







of the process of training transfer. These six variables are: (X1) upgrading program of 
your organization; (X2) promotion in your organization; (X3) organization 
understands the importance of education and is supportive and helpful to you; (X4) 
organization understands the importance of the education center and is supportive 
and helpful to the center itself; (X5) improving your management skills quicker than 
work experience; (X6) your organization gives you (or you give yourself) sufficient 
time to follow the training process. The Alpha values are close in all items in this 
group, with the highest = .834 and the lowest =.812. 
The mean based on the overall analysis score is lower than the scale point of “3” at 
2.7275(Q1) and 2, 2395(Q2) (s.d. = .79946 and, .90924 respectively). This means that 
there are very small internal variations and very small differences, in the assessment 
of respondents about the ineffectiveness of the selected ECs in applying of training 
knowledge and skills in the job setting (see Tables 8.22 and 8.23 in the appendix 1.1 
and Figure 8.8 below):
Figure 8.8 Efforts of the ECs and the Respective Organizations to Achieve Change 
(n=227)
The depressing results are also found in the cross-case analysis, as all the 
respondents in the selected ECs concur that they could not apply what they learned 
in training (knowledge, skills, behaviors, cognitive strategies) to their job-settings. 
Respondents in all ECs apparently have similar assessments, as the mean scores at all 
ECs were skewed toward the lower than the middle scale point (3.0). The mean score 
of respondents in the MBA was 3.2064(Q1) and 3.3495 (Q2) (s.d. =. 53832 and, 
.72310), which is a little higher than the mean scores of respondents at WEC with 
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Figure 8.8 Efforts of the ECs and the Respective Organizations to Achieve Change (n=227) 
           The depressing results are also found in the cross-case analysis, as all the respondents in the 
selected ECs concur that they could not apply what they learned in training (knowledge, skills, behaviors, 
cognitive strategies) to their job-settings. Respondents in all ECs apparently have similar assessments, as 
the mean scores at all ECs were skewed toward the lower than the middle scale point (3.0). The mean 
score of respondents in the MBA was 3.2064(Q1) and 3.3495 (Q2) (s.d. =. 53832 and, .72310), which is a 
little higher tha  the mean scores of respondents at WEC with 2.7788 (Q1) and 2, 5185 (s.d. =.67575 and 
.70918 respectively) and at WRTC, with 2.6481(Q1) and 2.9259 (Q2) (s.d. =.83568 and .73368). The value 
of the mean scores of respondents did not show a large internal variation within MPA and NIAS as the 
results were very much similar: 2, 3885(Q1) and 2, 4510 (Q2) for the former (s.d. =.67530 and .78755) 
and 2.5945 (Q1) and 2.3862 (Q2) for the latter (s.d. =.53966 and .73368).
      To interpret the result of the descriptive analysis presented above, we use the one-way ANOVA test. 
The results of the ANOVA show a significant difference among the selected ECs with respect to variable 
used in this component. There is no equal level of effectiveness among the selected ECs in the efforts 
made by the ECs and the respective organizations to achieve change as [F=28,027; DF= (4/222); P=, 
000] for Q1 and as F=22. 696; DF= (2/172); P=, 000] for Q2.  
     Thus, the process of transferring skills and knowledge developed was not that effective in some of the 
selected ECs. The related organizations in the public and private sectors, which are the supposed direct 
beneficiaries, in fact experienced no effects on their work performance from this training. It appears that 
the ECs and the related organizations, especially the Yemeni civil services ministry, have no strategies to 
enhance the transfer of training to the workplace. They must introduce such strategies to ensure a high 
level of co-ordination and harmonization, between training programmes and workplace situations 
(Campbell, 1995). Co-ordination and harmonization are so important for ensuring effective inputs and 
effective utilization of the outputs of the training process itself.       
8.5 Summary of the Findings  
            As we stated in previous chapters, the overall objective of the Dutch/Yemen NPT programme is 
to help Yemen to strengthen its institutional capacity for post-secondary education and training in order, 
to meet its needs for training and manpower to promote public sector reform. The proposed approach 
focuses on the build-up of a sustainable delivery capacity at the host organizations, through a mix of 
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2.7788 (Q1) and 2, 5185 (s.d. =.67575 and .70918 respectively) and at WRTC, with 
2.6481(Q1) and 2.9259 (Q2) (s.d. =.83568 and .73368). The value of the mean scores 
of respondents did not show a large internal variation within MPA and NIAS as the 
results were very much similar: 2, 3885(Q1) and 2, 4510 (Q2) for the former (s.d. 
=.67530 and .78755) and 2.5945 (Q1) and 2.3862 (Q2) for the latter (s.d. =.53966 and 
.73368).
To interpret the result of the descriptive analysis presented above, we use the one-
way ANOVA test. The results of the ANOVA show a significant difference among the 
selected ECs with respect to variable used in this component. There is no equal level 
of effectiveness among the selected ECs in the efforts made by the ECs and the 
respective organizations to achieve change as [F=28,027; DF= (4/222); P=, 000] for 
Q1 and as F=22. 696; DF= (2/172); P=, 000] for Q2. 
Thus, the process of transferring skills and knowledge developed was not that 
effective in some of the selected ECs. The related organizations in the public and 
private sectors, which are the supposed direct beneficiaries, in fact experienced no 
effects on their work performance from this training. It appears that the ECs and the 
related organizations, especially the Yemeni civil services ministry, have no strategies 
to enhance the transfer of training to the workplace. They must introduce such 
strategies to ensure a high level of co-ordination and harmonization, between training 
programmes and workplace situations (Campbell, 1995). Co-ordination and 
harmonization are so important for ensuring effective inputs and effective utilization 
of the outputs of the training process itself.
8.5 Summary of the Findings 
As we stated in previous chapters, the overall objective of the Dutch/Yemen NPT 
programme is to help Yemen to strengthen its institutional capacity for post-
secondary education and training in order, to meet its needs for training and 
manpower to promote public sector reform. The proposed approach focuses on the 
build-up of a sustainable delivery capacity at the host organizations, through a mix of 
activities, including: staff development; training of academic, management and 
administrative staff; development of course curricula and materials; the innovation 
of educational approaches; broadening the training and consulting base; and building 
up an educational infrastructure. 
The main objective of this chapter was to evaluate the level of effectiveness of the 







for doing so was two-fold. The first is to demonstrate that some aid projects can work 
in a poor policy environment like Yemen, which is a contradiction to the analysis of 
the PCP approach that argues foreign aid projects do not work in a poor policy 
environment. The second was to look how effective the projects were so in subsequent 
chapters we can work backward to explain the LKS as the causal explanation. 
To measure the level of effectiveness of the selected projects in achieving the 
NPT’s overall objective, we used the literature reviewed in previous chapters to derive 
two main factors to be analyzed in this chapter. The first is the level of effectiveness of 
the capacity and capability building of the participants within the selected projects. 
To analyze this, we developed four main variables, used as proxies that implicitly 
reflect the key needs for training and human power in the Yemeni public sector: (1) 
leadership skills, (2) human resources management skills, (3) strategic management 
skills, and (4) managerial communications skills. Different set of measured items 
were selected under the heading of these four main variables. The second factor is the 
process of transferring knowledge and skills learned back the work settings. The 
training process will not be complete, if this process of transferring skills has not 
taken place. To analyze this second factor, we developed different variables also used 
as proxies that implicitly reveal the variation in the level of effectiveness among the 
selected projects or ECs: (1) the selection process of participants, (2) the teaching 
methods used, (3) the quality of the curriculum and courses, (4) the quantity of 
training efforts, and (5) the coordination between the ECs and the respective 
organizations. 
In this chapter, the researcher conducted overall analysis and cross-case analysis 
to show which EC was most effective. This was done by using different analytical 
methods such as the ANOVA test, frequency distribution, mean scores, and by 
finding out and analyzing the main independent variables that affect the dependent 
variable (the level of effectiveness in the training process). Table 8.25 below 
summarizes the main results of the overall analysis and the cross case analysis.
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Table 8.24 Summary of Assessing the Effectiveness of the Selected ECs
Source: data analysis 
(* with)Eff= Effective & (**) IN= Ineffective 
(ü) Evidence of the impact
The findings in Table 8.24 indicate that the selected ECs were not effective in 
developing managerial skills for their participants. According to respondents, there 
was not a significant relationship between the contribution of the selected ECs to 
participants’ managerial skills development and their level of effectiveness. However 
this cannot be generalized for all selected ECs. In MBA there was a general consensus, 
that it was effective in developing their selected managerial skills. On the other hand, 
there was a clear consensus among respondents at MPA and NIAS, that these ECs 
were not that effective in developing their selected managerial skills. The cross-case 
analysis results suggest that MPA and NIAS must give a higher priority to developing 
the managerial skills of their participants, as well as eliminating the obstacles which 
are hindering the training process.
There is evidence that the selected ECs and target organizations made no efforts 
to promote boarder capacity and capability reform process, in both public and private 
sectors. Respondents’ opinions of all ECs, “excluding the MBA and WEC”, reveal 
widespread displeasure at the methods adopted by their organizations and the ECs to 

























Measured Variables Overall Analysis 
Cross Case Analysis
MPA NIAS MBA WEC WRTC
EFF* IN** EFF* I N EFF I N EFF I N EFF IN EFF IN
Leadership skills ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a n.a n.a n.a
Human resources 
management skills ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a n.a n.a n.a
Strategic management 
skills ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a n.a n.a n.a
Managerial 










































     Impact on Dependent Variable
Selection process of 
participants ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Teaching methods 
used ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Quality of the 
curriculum and 
courses
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Quantity of training 
efforts ✓ ✓ ✓ ü ✓ ✓
Transferring of 
training back in the 
work settings







select training participants. It appears that the targeted or direct beneficiaries of the 
ECs have no recognition of the ECs’ training services and objectives. The selection 
process was based upon a voluntary method, and thus the selection of participants 
was very haphazard. Consequently, the participants may have had work clashing with 
allocated training time, may have had a workload which does not allow for training 
time, and too many procedure and too much bureaucracy. Furthermore, employees 
may have attended training programs that were not applicable to their job and 
stereotyped in terms of training content. It seems that the training was not based on 
a systematic identification of the related organizations’ needs regarding capacity and 
capability building. Furthermore, it appears that the ECs and the related organizations, 
especially the Yemeni civil services ministry, have no strategies to enhance the 
transfer of training to work settings. These must be strategies in place which create a 
high degree of co-ordination and harmonization between training programmes and 
workplace situations.
From the results presented in this chapter, there is no a clear consensus among the 
respondents of which selected ECs, excluding MBA and WEC, effectively used the 
case study as a main training method, thereby improving the analytical and problem-
solving skills of the participants and incorporating sector-related problems during 
the training process. The curriculum and courses of their training programmes were 
not well adapted to local conditions and lacked specific attention to their respective 
policy contexts. 
Although the selected ECs could or should have been a great opportunity to 
generate a new breed of senior governmental officials, there were only 635 participants 
in 6 years. Moreover only 6% of these participants graduated. The results related to 
the quantity of training and the process of transferring training efforts back to the 
work settings, are important for the effectiveness of the training process as a whole. 
Such efforts should be realized at the policy design stage, which should deal with 
macro level of the civil service system in Yemen. In other words, more responsibility 
should be placed on actors at the policy design level. In the coming chapters we 
perform analysis at two levels: policymaking and policy implementation. 
The main implications of this chapter to the our main argument in this dissertation: 
The first implication is an empirical response to the PCP approach, which argues that 
foreign aid projects work do not work in poor policy environments. The results of the 
quantitative analysis of the four selected case studies, show that MBA and WEC were 
effective in building the capacity and capability of their participants from the public 
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and private sectors. The second implication is that, given that while MBA and WEC 
were effective MPA-NIAS and WRTC were not, there is good reason to believe that a 
high degree of “Local Knowledge Syndrome” in a poor policy environment will 
contribute to aid ineffectiveness; the lower the LKS, the greater the effectiveness of 
aid interventions. 
By using the four selected case studies, it important to discover and analyze the 
controlling variables in both policy design and implementation that affect the process 
of incorporating local knowledge and thus aid programs’ effectiveness. In aid 
programs aimed at capacity and capability building within the public and private 
sectors of poor policy environment, donors experts (doctors) have to realize that 
their Western management principles, practices and knowledge are different to the 
managerial functions of their patient (Yemeni civil service system, in a specific place 
at a specific time). They need to be aware of those functions performed by managers 
and organizations in Yemen that are in disagreement with their skills, styles and 
techniques. It is vital for the LKS aspects of the direct recipient organizations to be 
incorporated in the interactions and relationships between the actors in a specific aid 
intervention. This is based on the ideas of development associability approach, which 
was explained in previous chapters. The coming chapters explore this explanation 
with questions such as: Do donors really know enough about the management 
process within the Yemeni social values and norms and culture, in order to justify 
and exporting their ideas of development reforms? Moreover, if so, do we know 
enough about these social aspects to judge which development management practices 
are applicable and which are not? Before qualitatively analyzing why we have more 
and less effective aid projects in a poor policy environment and the relation with LK, 
it is important to first analyze the efforts made by the Dutch contractors to build the 
institutional capacity for post-secondary education and training in Yemen. We 
assume that in some of the selected projects the process of institutional capacity 
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In the previous chapter, the discussion focused on the effectiveness of the selected 
ECs in achieving the overall objective of the Dutch NPT program, to develop the 
capacity and capability of participants in both the public and private sectors. The 
investigation went one step further to evaluate the efforts made by the selected ECs 
and by related organizations, in transferring the trained knowledge and skills back on 
the job settings as part of a broad-based capacity and capability building process to 
promote administrative reform in both public and private sectors. The results showed 
that MBA and WEC were more effective in developing the capacity and capability of 
participants (individuals) than the other selected ECs: MPA, NIAS, and WRTC. The 
same results showed that the process of transferring training back to work settings as 
MBA and WEC was more effective than the other selected projects. The aim of the 
chapter was to follow our methodology approach of investigation to illustrate which 
EC is most effective, and then provide the causal explanation based upon the LKS as 
one of the main hypotheses of this study.
It seems that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program did not provide all the necessary 
conditions for effective capacity and capability building process, within the contexts 
of (all) selected ECs. The capacities and capabilities which the NPT ought to have 
reformed or developed still represent the obstacles and weaknesses for some of the 
ECs. Some of the targeted organizations of the NPT program in Yemen fall back on 
earlier practices (Weick, 2000), so that change fails to occur. 
We argue that there is a local knowledge deficiency, a lack of clear understanding 
by donors and their counterparts in recipient institutions about how institutions 
change. The main objective of this chapter is to examine practically, the validity of 
this hypothesis using the Dutch-Yemen NPT program as an example. Here I employ 
the conceptualization of local knowledge in Yemeni public sector institutions which 
we outlined in Chapter 4. Accordingly, the focus in my analysis is on the specific 
objectives of the NPT projects and investigating how the problem of local knowledge, 
is the causal mechanism of the success or failure of this aid program in achieving its 
objectives on the ground. This way of testing the effectiveness of international aid 
programs is known as the validity approach.1
1 - In Chapter 10, we use “the associability approach” of  measuring the effectiveness of  aid programs, and we show 
why such local knowledge was downplayed or not incorporated during the policy design and implementation of  the 
Dutch-Yemen NPT program. In Chapter 2 we talked about several factors that prevent local knowledge from being in-
corporated during the policy design and /or implementation. It is possible that the different results of  the NPT projects 
in Yemen are due to varying associations and interactions between people in incorporating LK during the policy design 
and implementation processes of  these projects, or according to the different actors-networks creation processes around 







Following the introduction of the topic, the chapter is divided into six further 
sections. The second and third sections, present analytical background for the chapter 
and develops the main constructs and measured items related to the main objectives 
of the selected projects. The fourth and fifth sections provide the statistical analysis 
(quantitative analysis), as related to the main objective of this chapter. In section six, 
we trace the influence of knowledge and the existence of the “Local Knowledge 
Syndrome” within the practices of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. In this section, 
we try to show how the LKS prevented the Dutch-Yemen NPT program from 
achieving its objectives. It elaborates on the key local knowledge aspects (deficiency 
of practical knowledge), neglected by Dutch contractor at all three levels: operational, 
middle management and policymaking. The final section of the chapter presents a 
conclusion.
9.2 Analytical/Background Standings 
There is a substantial body of literature on the effectiveness of donors’ institutional 
developments programs, as part of promoting public and private sector reforms in 
developing countries. In this chapter we limit ourselves in presenting only some 
related ideas and arguments. Previous research theoretical chapters have examined 
this important area. However, there is still a need for more theoretical and policy 
research into this vital area, to take into account both the explanation of the aid 
ineffectiveness (LKS) and the hypotheses of this chapter. For this reason, this section 
addresses the main objectives of the Yemen-NPT program and the related concepts 
used as a theoretical basis for forming the main hypotheses of this chapter.
There is a clear indication that the Dutch-Yemeni NPT program in general and 
the selected ECs in particular, have a practical philosophy to develop the Yemeni 
respective sectors on its basis or objectives. As we discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
Dutch-Yemen NPT program supported Yemen in order to help alleviate qualitative 
and quantitative shortages of skilled staff in both public and private sectors, and to do 
so within the framework of sustainable development directed towards reducing 
poverty. The Dutch-Yemen NPT program is an attempt to develop sustainable 
capacity and capability in the higher education sector which in turn provides for all 
the other public sectors and communities in the country. The specific objectives of 
network. These two levels were responsible in designing the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. On the operational level, 
there were different networks of  actors which carried out the implementation processes of  the different Dutch-Yemen 
NPT projects. One can argue that the differences of  actor networks in the implementation process of  these projects 
led to different results. 
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the selected projects of the NPT program (ECs) in this study typically included a set 
of interrelated approaches. Firstly, strengthening the organizational capacity through 
the development of an organization and (financial) management plan for the host 
organization, as well as training management and support staff in strategic planning, 
program management and finance, and leadership development. Secondly, improving 
human capacity through strengthening both existing staff and qualifying new staff in 
applied research skills, adult education methodologies, course development and 
writing, policy development and analysis, as well as by upgrading knowledge on the 
subject of the aid project. Thirdly, establishing an executive master program in public 
administration, business administration, and water management to offer civil service 
managers in the various public and private administration institutions, the possibility 
to obtain a university degree that will help them strengthen the organization and 
management of their respective department. Fourthly, establishing a new diploma 
programme on gender and development for BA graduates, preferably with working 
experience. Then establishing active consultancy units within the selected ECs, and 
finally developing local based-curricula, teaching/learning methods, and course and 
training materials, and equipping libraries and information centres with relevant 
materials (see the program documents).
Reading the Dutch /Yemeni NPT program´s basis, the reader will have the 
impression that the program has beautiful objectives as it has very beautiful words. In 
their implementation through most of the selected ECs, these objectives were 
destined to be just beautiful words and not translated into action. The selected 
projects with the respective selected ECs, especially those ECs which did not achieve 
good results (see Chapter 8), put great attention on occasional staff training and 
hardware, but neglected “institutional software – i.e. informal normative and 
organizational cultural changes – which determine how the institutional hardware 
performs in practice. The efforts of early comparative public administration scholars 
to draw attention to the normative foundations of the reforms and need to transform 
the culture, norms, and mental models of academic and administrative staff along 
with the changes in the formal organizational structures and rules, and equipment 
hardware delivery” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 1848).
The selected ECs, especially those that have been less effective according to the 
results of quantitative analysis, are currently facing challenges, because of their failure 
to achieve the overall and specific objectives. It is important to confront these 







overlapping at three levels; the specific level (each project level), at the universities or 
middle management level and the level of policymaking and strategy. These challenges 
reflect the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” with its formal and informal aspects, as 
there was little consideration of how to incorporate local knowledge during the policy 
design and implementation of the Dutch-Yemen NPT programme and the related 
projects under investigation in this study.
In Chapter 4 we discussed various informal aspects of local knowledge, relating to 
the managerial functions of Yemeni organizations such as planning, organizing, 
controlling, directing, staffing and coordinating. The managerial behaviour of Yemeni 
organizations is heavily influenced by the informal system in the country and by 
society’s social structure and its values, norms and expectations of its people. For 
instance, the Yemeni civil servant’s role within his community and organization is 
shaped to a considerable extent, by the expectations of relatives, friends and 
employees. The top man or the leader of the organization, by virtue of his position in 
the organization, sees himself as the head of a family. He knows everything inside and 
out, he is the first and the last word is from him. Employees are perceived as members 
of that family. He makes decisions based upon an informal and unstructured manner. 
Society’s influence is similarly reflected in civil servants’ distinctively Yemeni styles in 
decision-making, management of conflict, interpersonal relations and strategic 
management (Muna, 1980:3). In addition, staffing, coordinating and training are 
heavily influenced by nepotism, loyalty, and personal connections.
There are other informal functions in Yemeni institutions such as attitudes toward 
time, attitudes towards women in management and the open-door policy function, 
which we reviewed in Chapter 4 and employ in our analysis in this chapter. The 
concern here is that donors have their own Western management principles, practices, 
managerial styles, skills, and knowledge that may differ from those advocated or 
practiced in the Yemeni civil service, based upon informal/traditional/managerial 
functions. Therefore, there is a need for donor contractors working in Yemen to build 
a deep understanding of such informal managerial functions and behaviors2. 
The analysis in this chapter tries to show that the actors involved in the process of 
implementing the Dutch Yemen NPT programme, could/should have done a better 
job identifying and addressing overall and specific content-related problems in each 
project; in other words “what targets and objectives the interventions should 
2 - To incorporate such informal functions and institutions requires interactions between the two parties: donors and 
their Yemeni counterparts. However, many factors can prevent the two parties from having effective interaction. This 
point is analyzed in Chapter 10, where we talk about the associability phenomena, the local knowledge problem and the 
effectiveness of  foreign aid using the example of  the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. 
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accomplish. They have not been as good at recognizing that how they promote 
reforms is as important as what targets they promote in shaping the outcomes of the 
reforms. The attention was geared towards reinforcing in a sustainable manner both 
the institutional and the human capacity of education and training at the operational 
level” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 172).
However changes are not only needed at operational level. Some actions also need 
be to taken at the middle management and policymaking levels. To investigate these, 
we follow two analytical steps. First, it is logical to look at the obstacles facing the ECs 
in training processes, by using different sets of constructs3 to assess the level of 
effectiveness in human capacity building and institutional development as part of the 
specific objectives of the different cases. We analyze the situation of the selected ECs 
or institutions and measure the obstacles facing these ECs regarding the training 
process of their participants. Three main constructs are developed and put forward, 
regarding obstacles facing the ECs at the operational level: (1) the quality of 
organizational and administrative settings, (2) the quantity of the staff members and 
(3) and the quality of the staff members. After conducting the analysis based on the 
above-mentioned constructs, mainly by using quantitative sources of data, we try to 
show why there is lack of capacity and institutional development in some ECs based 
upon LKS elements at the operational level. In this last part of this chapter as well as 
in Chapter 10, we extensively investigate the other LKS elements at the middle 
management and policy making levels, which work against the effectiveness of the 
training process and the transfer of training to the work setting. By looking at these 
LKS elements at the three levels, we develop an understanding of how deliberate 
institutional changes should be promoted by donors. “This knowledge deficiency 
seems to be among the key factors preventing donors from both effectively reforming 
themselves and promoting reforms in developing countries”( Baimyrzaeva, 
2010:188);while fueling other failures, some of which have been presented in Chapter 
8 of this study.
What follows is devoted to giving an accurate analysis in line with the secondary 
data and statistical information, gathered from the participants in the selected ECs, 
categorized and divided in accordance with the purpose of the obstacles to be shown. 
Therefore the sources of evidence in this chapter include quantitative techniques 
such as questionnaires, as well as qualitative techniques like observation and 
interviewing, and related reports of the programs under investigation. 







The frequency distribution and the mean score methods are used to compare the 
assessments of the respondents from the selected ECs, because they show the manner 
in which data are distributed. The respondents were asked to indicate their agreement 
about the selected constructs measuring the obstacles and weaknesses facing the 
selected ECs on five-point Likert-type scale with 1= Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= 
neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, and 5= strongly disagree. Based on the 
structure of the data, here and in subsequent instances we have combined similar 
categories of response and removed the neutral category when presenting the 
frequency distributions. Thus, we would expect 50% of the responses in each of the 
two categories, assuming that those categories make up 100% of the responses. 
Therefore, the number of the responses for each of the four points was then multiplied 
by its respective level of influence: with strongly agree and agree = high level of 
influence, and strongly disagree and disagree= low level of influence. To confirm the 
results of the frequency distribution, we use the descriptive analysis of mean scores, 
averaged to construct a composite measure of the level of influence of the related 
items. In other words, calculating mean score, a response of “strongly disagree” is 
given a mean score of 5, and “strongly agree” is given got a mean score of 1. The 
neutral point is 3, a response of “agree” is given a mean score of 2 and disagree is 
given a mean score of 4. This composite measure reflects an aggregate view of each 
EC based on the values of the total mean scores. This study also employs a variance 
one-way (ANOVA) test, as inferential statistic method suitable for interpreting the 
results of descriptive analysis. 
9.3 The Main Constructs and Measured Items 
There is a very long list of constructs which can measure the obstacles and 
weaknesses for the capacity and capability building of the ECs. It is impossible to 
include them all in a single study, and in this chapter we focus on the more related 
practical problems, which came out in interviews with different stakeholders and 
questionnaires from the participants. In addition, the constructs we look at here 
reflect the main objectives of the NPT projects as stated in their reports which we 
looked at in Chapter 4. We have derived three main constructs and twenty-one 
measured items to be examined for reliability and validity analysis using coefficient 
alpha: 
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Table 9.1 the Consistency and Reliability among the Variables and Measured-Items: 
Weaknesses and Obstacles in Achieving the Specific Objectives (Total Alpha =.884)
The three constructs suggested above can be used to group the obstacles and 
weaknesses, facing the ECs as identified in the Yemen NPT documents, as important 
requirements for effective institutional development and human recourses capacity 
and capability building within the higher education sector. The three constructs meet 
the convergent and discriminant criteria of validity. The three extracted constructs 
have a considerable relationship. The correlation among all items in the three 
constructs does not exceed the cut-off point of 0.30 (�  = 0.40 to 0.80). The internal 
consistency of intuition measured by the overall coefficient alpha was above 0.70 (�
= 0.884). 
Constructs and Measured  Items Alpha for consistency
α= per item α= per group
C I: The organizational and administrative settings of the ECs α=.836
1. Effective organization and  management α=.796
2. Everything is easy to carry out your study α=.798
3. Effective operation procedures α=.800
4. Admin functions and duties are clear α=.813
5. The rules and regulations do not cause delay α=.834
6. The admin staff within the education center deal with all students in the 
same manner α=.829
7. The academic staff within the education center deal with all students in 
the same manner α=.806
8. The tuition fee is reasonable considering what the students learn from 
the master degree α=.814
9.  The particular wishes of the students in terms of the time to follow the 
master programme are taken into account α=.831
C II: The quantity of the teaching staff within the ECs α=.866
1. There are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of 
Yemen’s  sectors α=.772
2. Sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s 
sectors α=.743
3. There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practical work or thesis of 
the graduate students α=.864
C III: The quality of the teaching staff within the ECs                                    α=.700
1. The attitude and working style of  teachers are unique in Yemen α=.624
2. Teachers have the same level of understanding, skills and practical 
experience of education and research; work as a team in the EC α=.634
3. Teachers have the same awareness and agreement about common vision 
of the EC’s functions α=.651
4. Teachers are very committed and eager to work for the education center α=.654
5. Teachers have enough time to be available for the  students α=.623
6. Teachers have access to the latest theoretical and practical developments 
of related subjects α=.609
7. Teachers are working to the highest standards α=.652
8. Teachers show that they have experience of working with Yemen’s 
respective sectors α=.634








Thus the three different proposed constructs to test the obstacles and weaknesses 
facing the selected ECs are: 
•	 (I) represented by the six items, examining the effectiveness of organization 
and management settings of the selected ECs; 
•	 (II) which consists of the three items of quantity-based reform and sees if 
there are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of 
Yemen’s respective sectors;
•	 (III) Which is clearly linked to the quality-based reform, as it considers 
whether there are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics 
of Yemen’s respective sector.
Reading carefully the above table 9.1, we can observe that every construct’s 
measured items differentiate between each other and from other measured items in 
the other constructs. This means that it has “divergent validity”, which is “concerned 
with the extent to which a measure is novel in the sense of measuring something 
different from that provided by other measures” (Holton et al., 2007: 388). In this 
section of our study, the three constructs are nestled among each other and with 
other constructs. That is, each construct is embedded in the next construct and 
contributes to generating other constructs. For example, bureaucratic organizations 
and administrative settings are in turn embedded in the quality and quantity of the 
teaching and administrative staff, as well the quality of leadership. Likewise, the 
quality and quantity of the teaching and administrative staff, as well the quality of 
leadership, is embedded in the bureaucratic organizations and administrative settings 
(Kotter, 1996). The other weaknesses and obstacles are characterized by a great 
complexity of processes, linkages, and dynamics among the respective environment 
and organizations. We need a leadership with vision, so these ECs can build strategic 
links with respective organizations and sectors, thus transferring the training back to 
the work setting effectively, and observing the outcomes; in order to generate broad 
capacity and capability building as part of donor-promoted administrative reform 
process in the related organizations. This should go hand in hand with a systematic 
process of selecting the participants from these organizations (Kotter, 1982). 
Unfortunately, given the above, it was impossible to avoid multicollinearity 
(measured items which are highly correlated). However, according to Hair et al, 
(1995) “some degree of multicollinearity is desirable, because the objective is to 
identify interrelated sets of variables or constructs” (1995: 374). Therefore, we can 
assume that multicollinearity is not a problem, and so we can use this data set for 
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further analysis. 
There is a need for well-qualified and local experienced teaching staff to incorporate 
the training needs of the respective organizations in the training courses. Therefore, 
it is highly informative to examine these three constructs and their consequences, as 
they show the obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their function 
effectively in the local Yemeni environment, and the extent to which the selected 
projects established the selected ECs, have been effective in changing the formal and 
informal institutions and organizations in the targeted organizations (the selected 
ECs), at a specific place and a specific time. 
9.4 The Organizational and Administrative Settings within the ECs 
The first constructs (I) is clearly dominated by organizational and administrative 
obstacles and weakness constructs within the selected ECs. It has a total alpha value= 
.836, and in all items regarding this construct the alpha value is above .700. This 
construct comprises the following measured items: (X1) there is effective organization 
and management of the master programme; (X2) the administration of education 
center has done all its duties to make everything is easy for you to carry out your 
study in a good way; (X3) the education center has effective operation procedures; 
(X4) the functions and duties of the administrative staff are clear; (X5) the rules and 
regulations (approvals and decision-making) of education center do not take time 
and cause delay; (X6) the education center takes into consideration the particular 
wishes of the students in terms of the time to follow the master programme; (X7) the 
administration staff within the education center deal with all students in the same 
manner; (X8) the academic staff within the education center deal with all students in 
the same manner; and (X9) the tuition fee is reasonable considering what the students 
learn in the master degree. It appears that there is no need to consider eliminating 
any item related to the construct (I) as all constructs are highly correlated. The values 
of all constructs are all closely grouped, with the highest being X5=.834, and the 
lowest X1=.697, which means we can be confident to use this construct for analysis. 
The results of the overall analysis reveal that there is a very large internal similarity 
in the assessment of respondents about the organizational and administrative settings. 
It is one of the main obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their jobs 








Table 9.2 the Mean Scores and Frequency Distribution of the Organizational 
and Administrative Settings within the ECs (N=227)
The frequency distribution of responses and the distribution of the mean scores as 
related to organizational administrative obstacles and weaknesses, appear to be 
different based on the cross-case analysis. 74.5% of respondents at MBA and 60% at 
WEC “strongly agree and agree” that the organizational and administrative settings 
in the EC are strong. 12% at MBA and 26% at WEC “strongly disagree and disagree” 
that the organizational and administrative settings are weak and one of the obstacles 
facing the ECs. On the other hand, at MPA (22%), NIAS (41%) and WRTC (27%) a 
low proportion “strongly agree and agree” while a much larger proportion (54%, 26% 
and 50% respectively), “strongly disagree and disagree”. It appears that there is a wide 
consensus that MBA and WEC have organization and management, that is more 
effective and leadership more qualified than at MPA, NIAS, and WRTC.
In order to analyze the respondents’ opinions in more detail, a mean score scale 
was created by combining the nine constructs clustered in this construct. This data, 
as shown in Table 9.2 above, reveals that the mean scores of MBA and WEC for this 
component are below 3.0 (2.0981 and 2.5427 respectively), suggesting that the 
respondents perceive that MBA and WEC have effective organization and 
management and qualified leadership. The mean score of MPA and WRTC in this 
component are higher than MBA and WEC for nearly every item examined with 
total mean score of 3.3148 and 3.3086, respectively, suggesting that the respondents 
perceive MPA and WRTC as having less effective organization and management and 
less qualified leadership. Respondents in the NIAS apparently have similar 
assessments, suggesting that NIAS has a partly effective organization and management 
and qualified leadership. The mean scores were below the value “3” in nearly 4 items 
out of 9 items clustered in this component with a total mean score of 2,8997 
(s.d.=.51807):
ECs N Mean S.D Impact
Frequency Distribution
Strongly agree and agree Strongly disagree and disagree
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
MBA 31 2.0981 .52085 No 208 74.5 % 33 12%
MPA 102 3.3148 .62641 Yes 200 22% 497 54%
NIAS 41 2.8997 .51807 Yes 151 41% 126 34%
WEC 26 2.5427 .74524 No 140 60% 61 26%
WRTC 27 3.3086 .54024 Yes 66 27% 120 50%
Total 227 3.1845 .73974 Yes 756 37% 837 41%
322
Figure 9.1 Means of the Organizational and Administrative Settings (n=227)
To interpret the above–presented results, we used the one-way ANOVA, as it is 
commonly used as an inferential statistic for testing of statistical significance, 
resulting in an F-value. The (ANOVA) test shows that the difference or the variation 
among the selected ECs in facing problems related to the organizational and 
administrative settings is significant as [F=30,318; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]: 
9.5 The Quantity and Quality of the Teaching Staff 
The second and third constructs (II and III) are clearly dominated by the quantity 
and quality of the teaching staff obstacles and weakness constructs within the selected 
ECs. The total alpha values are .866 and .700, respectively, and in all items regarding 
first construct the alpha value is above the .80. The nature of these obstacles comprises 
three items in variable II and nine items in constructs III. These are: (X1) There are 
qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s sectors; (x2) 
There are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s 
sectors; (x3) There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practical work or thesis of 
the graduate students; (x4) The attitude and working style of teachers are unique in 
Yemen; (X5) Teachers have the same level of understanding, skills and practical 
experience of education and research; work as a team in the EC; (X6) Teachers have 
the same awareness and agreement about the common vision of the EC’s functions; 
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shows that the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in facing problems related to the 
organizational and administrative settings is significant as [F=30,318; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]:  
                          
9.5 The Quantity and Quality of the Teaching Staff  
        The second and third constructs (II and III) are clearly dominated by the quantity and quality of the 
teaching staff obstacles and weakness constructs within the selected ECs.  The total alpha values are .866 
and .700, respectively, and in all items regarding first construct the alpha value is above the .80. The 
nature of these obstacles comprises three items in variable II and nine items in constructs III. These are: 
(X1) There are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s sectors; (x2) There 
are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s sectors; (x3) There are 
suffic ent teachers to supervise the practical work or thesis of he graduate students; (x4) The attitude and 
working style of teachers are unique in Yemen; (X5) Teachers have the same level of understanding, skills 
and practical experience of education and research; work as a team in the EC; (X6) Teachers have the 
same awareness and agreement about the common vision of the EC’s functions; (X7) Teachers are very 
committed and eager to work for the education center; (X8) Teachers have enough time to be available 
for the students; (X9) teachers have access to the latest theoretical and practical developments of related 
subjects; (X10) Teachers are working with to the highest standards; (X11) Teachers show that they have 
experienc  of working with Yem n’s sectors; (x12) Giving skills and attitude-based traini g rather than 
information-based training. 
        All items in the constructs II and III are highly correlated and closely grouped. In construct II, the 







Teachers have enough time to be available for the students; (X9) teachers have access 
to the latest theoretical and practical developments of related subjects; (X10) Teachers 
are working with to the highest standards; (X11) Teachers show that they have 
experience of working with Yemen’s sectors; (x12) Giving skills and attitude-based 
training rather than information-based training.
All items in the constructs II and III are highly correlated and closely grouped. In 
construct II, the highest value is X3=.864, and the lowest X2=.743. Similarly in 
construct III, the highest value is V4=.654 and the lowest V6=.609. Thus, we can be 
confident in using these constructs to check the variation among the selected aid 
projects in terms of having good quality and quantity teaching staff. 
The overall analysis reveals that there is a very large internal similarity in the 
assessment of respondents about the quantity and quality of their teaching staff, as 
there were the main obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their jobs 
effectively. This result is confirmed by the result of mean score as it is above the scale 
point of 3 at 3.1567 (s.d. =. 57568). 
Table 9.3 the Mean Scores and Frequency Distribution of the 
Quantity and Quality of the Teaching Staff 4
However, the frequency distribution of responses (see Table 9.3 above) and the 
distribution of the mean scores, as related to the quantity and quality of their teaching 
staff obstacles and weaknesses (constructs II and III), appears to be different based on 
the cross case analysis. About 60 % and 50% of respondents at the MBA and WEC 
respectively “strongly agree and agree” that there is sufficient and qualified staff to 
teach the characteristics of Yemen’s respective sectors. In MBA 13% of respondents 
“strongly disagree and disagree”, that the quantity and quality of their teaching staff is 
one of the obstacles facing the ECs, and at WEC it is 35%. On the other hand, at MPA 
4 It is important to note here that because the measured items in constructs II have the same “dimension and direction” 
as well as having the multicollinearity problem, as the items are related to the quantity and the quality of  the staff  mem-
bers, we have combined the related items during this analysis. In other words, we have reduced the two constructs to one 
construct, and all the values in this section have been presented on a one scale construction. 
ECs N Mean S.D Impact 
Frequency Distribution
Strongly agree and agree Strongly disagree and disagree
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
MBA 31 2.3710 .41121 No 223 60% 50 13%
MPA 102 3.3168 .47791 Yes 226 8% 639 52%
NIAS 41 3.3089 .38561 Yes 102 21% 198 40%
WEC 26 2.8782 .56825 No 156 50% 110 35%
WRTC 27 3.4907 .43873 Yes 70 21% 214 66%
Total 227 3.1567 .57568 Yes 777 28% 1211 44%
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(8%), NIAS (21%) and NIAS (21%), the number who “strongly agree and agree” 
about the same issue is in the minority, while a majority (52%, 40% and 66% 
respectively) “strongly disagree and disagree”. It appears there is a wide consensus 
among respondents that MBA and WEC have more quantity and quality teaching 
staff than MPA, NIAS, and WRTC.
In order to analyze the respondents’ opinions in more detail, a mean score scale 
was created by combining the twelve items clustered in both constructs II and III. The 
data, shown in Table 9.5 reveals that the mean scores of MBA and WEC for this 
component are below ‘3.0’ (2.3710 and 2.8782, respectively, with s.d. = .4112 and 
.56825) suggesting that the respondents perceive that MBA and WEC have sufficient 
and qualified teaching staff. On the other hand, the mean scores of MPA, NIAS and 
WRTC are 3.3168, 3.3089 and 3.4907 respectively (s.d. =.47791, 3.8561 and .43873), 
suggesting that the respondents perceive the MPA, NIAS and WRTC as having less 
sufficient and qualified teaching staff:
Figure 9.2 Means of Quantity and Quality of the Training and Teaching Staff
To interpret the above–presented results, we used a one-way ANOVA test. The 
results shows that the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in facing 
problems related to the quantity and quality of the training and teaching staff is 
significant as [F=32.632; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]:
To conclude this section, the results of the statistical analysis suggest that the 
respondents perceive the MPA and WRTC, as having less effective organization and 
management and qualified leadership than MBA and WEC. Respondents in NIAS 
suggest that NIAS was partly effective organization and management and qualified 







Figure 9.2 Means of Quantity and Q ality of the Training and Teaching Staff 
  
           To interpret the above–presented results, we used a one-way ANOVA test. The results shows that 
the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in facing problems related to the quantity and 
quality of the training and teaching staff is significant as [F=32.632; DF= (4/222); P=, 000]:         
        To conclude this section, the results of the statistical analysis suggest that the respondents perceive 
the MPA and WRTC, as having less effective organization and management and qualified leadership than 
MBA d WEC. Respondents in NIAS suggest that NIAS was partly effectiv  orga ization and 
managem nt and qualified leadership. Similarly respondents perceive MPA, NIAS and WRTC, as having 
less sufficient and qualified teaching staff than MBA and WEC.  
         It should also be noted the same EC’s that showed low effectiveness in achieving the specific 
objectives of the NPT program in Yemen based upon the results of the quantitative analysis here, namely 
MPA, NIAS and WRTC, showed low effectiveness based upon the results of the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 8.  
 
9.6 Policy Analysis Based Upon the Local Knowledge Syndrome*5 
      In this section we address some objectives set for the research in light of the findings drawn from the 
case studies, the LKS literature and conceptualizing. Different aspects about the local knowledge in the 
Yemeni public sector have been discussed in a great detail in Chapter 4 and briefly reviewed in section 9.2 
of this chapter. Here we do not repeat all of the concepts and characteristics elaborated in Chapter 4. 
Rather, we discuss some aspects within the higher education sector and its institutions, and address some 
key impacts on the NPT programme at three levels: operational, middle management and policy-making.  
 
 9.6.1 NPT Program and LKS in the Direct Beneficiary Context  
Decorative changes by the top man 
        As we argued in Chapter 6, the MPA-NIAS and MBA mission and strategy, approved by the 
universities administration, faculty and department, was to develop the capacity and capability of the host 
                                                 
 
* 5 - The source of data of the analysis in this section is mainly interviews and participated observations and secondary data, like project reports 
and related articles and books.  As many of the interviewers refused to mention to their names within the text, I just put the names of them as a 







sufficient and qualified teaching staff than MBA and WEC. 
It should also be noted the same EC’s that showed low effectiveness in achieving 
the specific objectives of the NPT program in Yemen based upon the results of the 
quantitative analysis here, namely MPA, NIAS and WRTC, showed low effectiveness 
based upon the results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 8. 
9.6 Policy Analysis Based Upon the Local Knowledge Syndrome*5
In this section we address some objectives set for the research in light of the 
findings drawn from the case studies, the LKS literature and conceptualizing. 
Different aspects about the local knowledge in the Yemeni public sector have been 
discussed in a great detail in Chapter 4 and briefly reviewed in section 9.2 of this 
chapter. Here we do not repeat all of the concepts and characteristics elaborated in 
Chapter 4. Rather, we discuss some aspects within the higher education sector and its 
institutions, and address some key impacts on the NPT programme at three levels: 
operational, middle management and policy-making. 
9.6.1 NPT Program and LKS in the Direct Beneficiary Context 
Decorative changes by the top man
As we argued in Chapter 6, the MPA-NIAS and MBA mission and strategy, 
approved by the universities administration, faculty and department, was to develop 
the capacity and capability of the host departments. However, in reality the MBA and 
MPA centers were established at university level instead of faculty level by the Sana’a 
University (SU) rectorate. Their establishment did not stem from a serious formal 
desire to have effective training or education centers for civil servants in the country, 
but rather the result of particular circumstances. The administrative and academic 
staff within the host department were not trained or informed about the coming 
projects during the designing phase; there were conflicts among the staff members of 
the host departments during implementation about the vision and mission of the 
projects6.
5* - The source of  data of  the analysis in this section is mainly interviews and participated observations and secondary 
data, like project reports and related articles and books. As many of  the interviewers refused to mention to their names 
within the text, I just put the names of  them as a list at the end of  the thesis. 
6 - There are two things to note here. Firstly, many of  the people I interviewed in Yemen told me that they did not get 
any info either from MOHESR or from NUFFIC. All they heard was that there was a Dutch program coming to their 
departments, under the name of  NPT. There was confusion about the meaning of  the NPT abbreviation, e.g., was it a 
national program for tarring? Secondly, the lack of  knowledge of  scientific departments as the direct beneficiaries of  the 
projects until the implementation stage is strong evidence of  non-incorporation of  local knowledge during the project 
policy design. These two points are related to the associability approach or explanation of  the local knowledge problem, 
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One conflict was between staff members who had no English, who argued that the 
study program should be in Arabic, and those who could speak English, who argued 
that the study programme should be in English. This latter group claimed that English 
should be used, as it is a language that assists in the understanding of means of 
communication and IT, and can help to absorb scientific and technical terminologies 
in a world racing to acquire the latest techniques and technical information. However, 
the majority of the staff members did not speak English, or their English skills were 
not good enough for them to train staff in English. In addition, it is difficult to find 
participants from the respective sectors in Yemen, which have sufficient English to 
follow a training course in English. 
Another conflict was about the study program and whether it should be executive 
based or academic based. Most of the staff members did not know or tried to play 
around to keep the study program based on an academic perspective. Most of them 
simply did not understand the practical aspects of the respective sectors and they just 
focused their teaching on the theoretical aspect. This complicates the ability of 
knowledge acquisition in the light of the weaknesses in acquiring applied or practical 
skills. It seems that everybody wanted to ensure their future position in the project, 
and moreover, personally benefit from the project. No one cared about the problems 
Yemen faces and how to develop effective training for civil servants.
Conflict management examples 
The top men in the SU and the other universities, the deans of the faculties, the 
directors of the ECs and the people who managed the projects from the Yemeni side 
limited the NPT projects to themselves in order to avoid such conflicts., The idea was 
either to keep the NPT’s external temporary fund for the university or for the purpose 
of showing that the university has training centers (centers are not similar to many 
offices in ministries and government institutions as they have computers with internet 
and super deluxe furniture but without practical use or real work). The top man 
always receives respect due to his position and power or by the norms within society 
and the top man should not be opposed by his subordinates. Thus there was relatively 
little opposition and resistance from staff members to their leaders or the top man’s 
quick decisions in solving the above-mentioned conflicts.
The quick decision-making approach & the top-man 
The defining feature of administrative systems within Yemen’s higher education 







institutions is the channeling of much of the bureaucratic activity towards the 
realization of other goals, rather than the achievement of program objectives. This is 
essentially a sign of systemic or institutionalized weakness. Additionally, changing 
the vision of donor contractors is an indicator of the lack of local knowledge, as 
changing the capacity building process from department-based to education center-
based, coincides with the traditional vision of the top men of the respective universities 
and their limited followers. Donors should realize that there is no strategic planning 
behind such a change in the implementation approach. Rather it is based upon the 
quick decision approach, which has always dominated managerial behavior of 
Yemeni institutions. At the same time, donor contractors were careful about how to 
spend the money allocated for the NPT projects (money-money moving) and how to 
show to the stakeholder the results achieved on the ground, despite the ineffectiveness 
of some of these established centers. The Dutch donor contractor failed to act as an 
agent of change in the recipient departments, and did not involve all the actors, 
incorporate and understand their objections, and show everyone how to resolve the 
issues that emerged during the implementation process. Had they done so, everybody 
would have watched for those who object. The result would have been an 
institutionalization of the process instead of following the personal and interpersonal 
management process by the Yemeni counterparts during the implementation stage. 
Everyone would have compromised; he or she would make it known that they are 
responsible for their actions.
What one can identify is that the donor side and their limited respective actors 
chose the simple approach instead of passing on the difficult road. Greater efforts 
were needed to achieve a real local change, rather than a decorative change. We could 
have at the end had these outputs materialized, though it is possible that the capacity 
building objectives and the effectiveness of aid would not have materialized because 
there was a big fight, there is no sustainability, the center ownership was not 
established, and many other obstacles which we look at later in the chapter.
As we discussed in previous chapters, we can exclude MBA and WEC, because of 
their good quantitative results. WRTC can also be excluded as it was already 
established before the NPT started. Thus, looking at MPA-NIAS, we could described 
them as the centers of the seven NOs: (1) No institutional and regulatory frameworks 
to govern the establishment and control the their activities; (2) No ongoing fund to 
activate their activities and maintain continuity apart from the tuition fees; (3) No 
partnerships or possible partnerships based on short or medium term established 
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between the centers and government institutions or private companies; (4) No formal 
desire to activate the task of training process at ECs to push the development process 
of the civil service system; (5) No methodological and intellectual training frame to 
direct the process of building the curriculum and the training process, that is to say, 
no theory to direct the process of planning and implementation of the training 
process and skills development; (6) No sufficient and qualified teachers who are able 
to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s respective sectors; and (7) generally speaking, 
no effective administration and organizational structure (GOY, SCEP, 2010; see also 
Chapters 7 and 8)7. 
ECs without administration system 
The administration of any higher education institutions at all levels, and especially 
at the operational level, has to include two main dimensions, each of which completes 
with the other. The first is the academic dimension, which leads to academic 
organization and development, and the second is related to the administrative system 
of the academic and administrative activities. The success of an aid project aimed at 
building the capacity and capability of the higher education institutions, depends on 
changing the style of the administrative directions that both academic and 
administrative leaderships believe in and want to develop administrative system in 
all its dimensions; and according to awareness of the institution new objectives 
developed by the aid intervention and the requirements of its future prosperity. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the public sector in Yemen has a traditional public 
administration system as a result of the influences of the traditional social structure 
or the informal system. Similarly, higher education institutions suffer from poor 
standards because of social and political ties; procedures in appointments and 
promotions of both academic and administrative posts which fail to abide by current 
regulations; the absence of by-laws that stipulates powers and responsibilities; the 
absence of follow-up and evaluation principle; the absence of the reward and 
punishment principle; the absence of new administrative means; and weak training 
(AL Salahi, 2009; BA Abad, 2007).
The activities of the selected ECs varied in this regard. The MBA project paid 
attention to develop the administrative system and to build the capacity and the 
capability of the academic and administrative staff, while the MPA project paid little 
attention to it. The efforts of the MPA were limited to developing an administrative 







system to manage its external funds. After the completion of the project, the 
traditional/poor administrative system came back. There was no practical change on 
the ground. In the absence of such changes and developments, and the absence of 
effective capacity and capability building for the academic and administrative staff, it 
would be difficult to say that the implemented aid projects enabled the ECs to 
administer the academic and administrative activities of the training process 
effectively, or that it would be possible for them to have the vision and leadership 
skills to promote the public and private sector reform processes.
There were a number of bottlenecks as a result of the absence of an effective 
administrative system. The first was the de facto selection of the EC directors. This 
process was done without a transparent procedure, and without any involvement on 
the part of the contractor. It was the task of the top man within the direct recipient 
organization to select directors based upon primordial ties such as family, friendships, 
“al wasta”, or by competing ties such as political and economic ties8. This is especially 
the case for MPA so far, MBA at the first phase of the project, and WRTC. This 
decision created resentments in the host university departments, exacerbated existing 
factionalism and caused frequent open conflict between departmental staff. 
Furthermore the non-transparent selection procedure is not limited to directors of 
the ECs, but also the selection of academic staff from the direct host, the scientific 
department within the respective university.9 
Training process of Yemeni trainers and “feel-good” trips to the Netherlands: 
The teaching staff and the assistant teaching staff form the backbone in the ECs. 
The value of any higher education depends entirely on its teaching staff and the 
teaching staff ’s educational competencies in fulfilling their duties. These duties vary 
and get renewed in order to achieve the goals set out for the ECs. As we have 
mentioned in former chapters, one component of the NPT projects in Yemen was to 
prepare, train and qualify teaching staff to equip them with the required skills to use 
modern technical and practical teaching aids. Unfortunately, this is the most 
8 - The social groups and the NPT projects: the MPA project was under the supervision of  the Al Saddah and Qadhis 
social groups. For example, the former director and the current (second) director are from the same social groups. In 
addition, most of  the teaching staff  or trainers were chosen because they belonged to these two social groups, as the top 
man of  the center preferred. For MBA, economic ties were the main method of  selecting the director. The director has 
experience about the issues the private sector suffers from as he is a big businessman in the country. The social-family 
ties in these two projects cannot be limited to the operational level but they also placed on the middle management and 
policymaking levels. As it is the case that the top-man of  the higher education sector or the person who was in charge 
with the NPT program in Yemen is related to one of  the above mentioned social groups and it was the case to use such 
informal ties to place close civil servants to his social group. 
9 - This evidence is discussed more in Chapter 10. 
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challenging type of institutional change, because local knowledge gaps are a result of 
the unplanned requirements and contributions of development, and not in terms of 
quantity or quality of the training. There are a number of local obstacles to this 
component in the selected projects, and we look at the most significant below. 
Despite the long list of staff in the proposals submitted from the donors’ contractors 
and their Yemeni counterparts, there is shortage of specialized staff that have 
experience of working with Yemen’s respective sectors. Most of them are not qualified 
even for the most junior tasks outlined in the job descriptions in the NPT projects. If 
an EC has enough staff, they are not willing to collaborate with other ECs. There is no 
commitment and openness to change, nor an eagerness to learn to improve quality of 
training process and transfer10. This is also, because there is no administrative system 
to impose responsibilities on the staff members to enroll in training courses. It is 
important to realize that staff members rarely have official meetings to discuss the 
problems facing their departments. Such things are only discussed by informal 
mechanisms, such as individual meetings or during the “Qat sections in the afternoon” 
(see Chapter 4). How come the policy makers did not realize this situation and find a 
mechanism to gather them for training? 
Although Dutch contractors have taken actions toward solving these problems, by 
organizing training workshops outside Yemen, such as Cairo or the Netherlands 
(“feel good” trips), most of these workshops were for a short time such as two weeks. 
These workshops cost huge amounts of money, but the impact on capacity and 
capability building may not have been effective, especially due to the weak capacity of 
most of the participants. 
Additionally, staff have not updated their knowledge and the teaching methods 
that they possess and follow. One reason is the lack of necessary facilities, also most 
of them do not have sufficient knowledge of professional sufficiency principle, and 
some are not able to use the computer and information technology and communication 
(MSM, 2010).
Alwasta as a method for attending training: 
On paper no “less” than 30 staff members (Administrative and Academic) in 
every EC got training by the NPT projects as part of the capacity and the capability 
building process, but because of the existence of “feel-good” trips the selection 
process of the participants was not based upon sound procedures, but on kinship and 
10 - This point was clearly made by participants in the questionnaires, as the results showed. There are severe problems 







friendship ties and other political considerations. There was also the problem of 
seniority at the expense of competence. People were selected on the basis of seniority, 
even though they were not qualified to perform this mission. It is the problem of the 
top man in the operational level again. It is a deep-rooted custom in Yemeni 
universities to present the seniority before the qualification. One of the Dutch project 
managers I interviewed said that some of Yemenis who came to the Netherlands for 
training, did not do so merely for training proposes. For example, they may have 
tried to get medical treatment here, or wanted to come here as a tourist, or to visiting 
relatives in neighboring countries. The last purpose for people to take part in the 
training was to receive the allowances for the training. It was a surprise to the 
aforementioned Dutch project manager, that many conflicts took place over who 
should have the chance to go outside Yemen for training. As we explain in the next 
chapter, such conflicts were one of the problems facing the process of incorporating 
local knowledge during the policy implementation11. 
Seniority and Dutch trainers 
Even though some of the people who were selected had an incentive to learn and 
were qualified for the task, there was another problem which most interviewers 
focused around, related to the Dutch contractors’ side, that some of the trainers did 
not have PhDs and “only” a master’s. In terms of seniority, most Yemeni professors, 
with their PhDs, felt affronted at being trained by someone without one. As we 
mentioned earlier, qualification is not the standard for judgment that works in 
Yemeni universities, but seniority. This aspect is not limited only to the Dutch trainers, 
but also the Dutch managers who were sent to manage projects with their Yemeni 
counterparts at the local level. Many of the Yemeni professors did not pay any 
attention to them. The seniority phenomena led to a lack of interaction and a failure 
to establish a common understanding between the two parties in most cases. This in 
turn contributed to the lack of success of some of the selected NPT projects, which 
we talk about in detail in the next chapter.
The deviation of some of the projects away from the direct recipient departments 
and towards the establishment of new ECs, prevented many staff members in the 
direct recipient departments from participating in the NPT projects, including the 
training workshops12. Excluding the MBA, the staff members who were selected for 
11 - The gender problem is also evident in the selection process of  the participants. There is discrimination against 
women as there is low level of  participation of  women as trainers and trainees in the institutions and selected ECs.
12 Instead, they acted and are still acting against those ECs.
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training, capacity, and capability building in the Netherlands and other countries did 
not belong to the ECs. The manager of the center only chose teaching staff personally. 
The staff members of the ECs belonged to the different faculties and departments in 
the respective Yemeni universities. For example, at WRTC at the University of Aden, 
of the more than 30 faculty members trained there, only two of them are still have a 
relationship with the EC. Through interviews in NIAS, we also found that about 70% 
of the trained staff members are no longer linked to the EC or never have been.
Normally, the staff members use 2-3 hours per week to teach and train the EC’s 
participants. These part-time staff members of the ECs practice several posts without 
having time to do any of them properly. This negatively affects the quality of training 
processes and internal efficiency. Apart from MBA, all the selected ‘ECs are still 
suffering from the issue of inadequate intervention system for the selection and 
preparation and evaluation of the staff members...’13.
Most of the interviewed staff members were asked if they felt a part of the EC. 70 
% of them said that they were working part time in these ECs, only to improve their 
income. This affects the level of training process and the supervision process of the 
graduates, as when staff members perform a number of jobs they are not able to 
perform in one job well Furthermore the number of stable staff members was not 
sufficient in all selected ECs. In MBA there were 12, followed by WEC (9), then NIAS 
(7), MPA (5) and finally WRTC with 4. In MPA for example, the 5 staff members 
were insufficient for the almost 300 MPA participants. This may explain why only 6 
students at MBA graduated in the past six years14. 
The problem of the new staff and no strategic management 
The process of qualifying new staff in applied research skills involved the ECs’ 
own human resources capacity. A large part of the projects’ budgets were allocated 
for training new staff with masters and/or doctoral programs in Dutch or other 
foreign universities. Despite the money spent on training these new staff members, 
they never found their way into positions within these selected ECs, with the 
exception of MBA. For example, in WRTC, five members of the faculty of the 
University of Aden were selected for doctoral degrees. Although they finished their 
studies on time and specialized in gender issues in Yemen, they could not return to 
13 - Some the other interviewees mentioned to me that some teachers became like a train, as you see him or her, at dif-
ferent times, in different ‘stations’ (universities). 







the WRTC and work as was planned by the NPT project proposal15. Another example 
is the MPA project. The project enabled two Yemeni students to do their MSc in 
Public Administration at Leiden University, despite their lack of capabilities in 
English/Dutch at that time. After graduating and returning back to Yemen they were 
not allowed to join the teaching staff to teach at the MPA program however, as Yemeni 
law for universities does not allow them to teach MPA students or participants. 
Instead, they were offered non-academic jobs and positions that did not meet their 
qualifications. On the other hand, for the MBA project, the new staff members who 
were selected for conducting Ph.D. degrees in MSM and other related subjects in 
Dutch universities are now working in the center and sharing the responsibility of the 
training process of the participants. 
Although these new staff members could have been one of the main tangible 
results of the NPT projects, there are three concerns related to place and time 
knowledge. The first concern is related to the selection of those candidates and the 
level of the qualifications they needed. There was no open competition for candidates 
from the country and no strict conditions to help achieve the specific and overall 
objectives of the ECs or NPT projects. These candidates should have practical 
knowledge in the issues of the respective sectors in Yemen and have a high level of 
English and research skills, to be able to attend Dutch universities. Then they can 
truly operate as a Yemeni-Dutch connection, knowing and understanding both 
worlds, helping to increase the capacity and capability of the ECs and promoting the 
respective sectors’ reform process. However, when the term of reference of the 
projects was done, the informal system without strategic vision was very active, as 
staff members of the respective departments refused to send graduate students from 
outside of their departments16, as they saw new well-qualified staff members as 
competitors that could threaten their existence within the ECs, and their own 
academic interests. 
 The Dutch contractors experienced considerable changes during the lifetime of 
the projects. The WRTC was the only project were the staff was trained according the 
planning. For MPA-NIAS, the set up planned for the training of 6 faculty members 
through a doctoral program and 4 staff at MA level. For MBA, the set up planned for 
the training of 4 faculty members through a doctoral program and 6 staff at MBA 
level. For WRTC, the set up planned for the training of 5 faculty members through a 
doctoral program and 1 staff member at MA level. For WEC, new staff were not 
15 - The staff  members who currently work at WRTC are not specialized in gender issues. 
16 - At that time the department had no staff  members with an MA or MSc. 
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required as they had enough staff members. During implementation these plans was 
not considered feasible by the Yemeni side and at their request the training program 
was reduced to 2 staff at MSc level in PA for the MPA, and 2 doctoral programs and 
1 MBA level for the MBA project. The departments were not able to mobilize further 
staff for training and also recruitment of new staff members from outside of the 
departments was not acceptable. For the WRTC the requirement remained the same 
but they changed the training location from Dutch universities to Arabic universities, 
especially in Egypt, because they could not find qualified staff members form their 
university who had the level of English required by the Dutch universities. 
The second concern is linked to the (formal) rules and regulations in the Yemeni 
universities. People who hold a master’s degree cannot teach or train. (ROY, GOV, 
1995 Law for Higher Education). However, most of the grants for training faculty 
members through a doctoral program were converted to master’s level due to the 
informal considerations of the people in the Yemeni side, as we mentioned above. 
Even the Dutch contractors did not realize this, as their thinking was that the new 
staff members would have a role in the training process in the future, as is the case in 
the Netherlands. This is one of the non-cognitive aspects which they faced with 
regard to local realities. 
The third concern is related to the reality of the academic qualifications of the 
selected faculty members, as the quality of some faculty members was, for many 
reasons, mediocre. One reason is the appointment of faculty members who completed 
their BA or MA at low-quality universities, but are appointed, because of political or 
social pressures and ties. Dutch contractors bear some of the responsibility in the 
academic qualification of many of these appointments, because they funded these 
scholarships, despite knowing the level of the universities where they studied. Dutch 
contactors should put strict criteria on the table in the process of selecting them. 
There is a knowledge deficiency and this case has not received adequate attention 
from Dutch contractors. On the other hand, if the Dutch contractors had attracted 
non-faculty members, there was no there a component in their projects that took into 
consideration the process of recruiting the selected new staff in the education centers 
after graduation. This there would have been a sharp shortage in teachers and trainers, 
which would have affected the functional capacity of many of the training institutions.
Moreover, planning of scholarships and policy coordination are not taken into 
consideration, especially in aligning scholarships with the human resource shortages, 







staff to study abroad was endorsed and approved without, an overall vision of the 
comprehensive development, or the capacity required of the outputs of these NPT 
projects. Instead, the donor contractors delegated this task to the Yemeni side. In 
Yemeni organizations, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the open-door policy is very 
active, which gave new staff the freedom to choose whatever topics they favored. This 
is analogous to a doctor giving their patient the freedom to choose the medicine that 
suits them, although the patient has no knowledge of how to treat themselves. It 
would be wise for the donor side to analyze the local realities in the specific place and 
find out deficiencies in the current staff members. After that, there should be a clear 
plan to send the new faculty members aboard for training, by identify specific topics 
for them that fill the existing weaknesses in teaching and training capacity in the 
ECs17.
Leadership replacing the trained staff members: 
The selected ECs are suffering from cuts in administrative organs due to non-
commitment, a clear plan for appointments, and the termination of the justifications 
in equality of opportunity in many administrative practices. We mentioned in 
Chapter 6 and at the beginning of this chapter that the NPT projects in Yemen, 
established ECs and these education centers became “directly and personally” under 
control of the rectors of the respective universities (the top men). In all the selected 
ECs, the rectors of the universities changed the directors or the heads of these ECs. 
This is because the rectors of the universities were changed by the policy making 
level. The link between the ECs and the middle management (university structure), 
is based upon personal and informal links and not institutional links, these new 
rectors in turn changed the directors. In MPA, NIAS and WRTC, EC directors who 
had been working with donor contractors during implementation process were 
replaced.
The process of changing directors of the ECs by the “top men” of universities, led 
to a number of problems and challenges that impeded the growth and performance 
of the ECs. The first problem is related to the top man technique of managing an 
17 - It would also be advisable if  they direct Ph.D. topics, e.g., in WRTC, to gender issues such as the relationship between 
men and women in the office in a Yemeni environment. Poor women are not on the agenda of  the government and 
donors. Donors just deal with groups of  women in every city in Yemen and it is the same faces benefit from foreign aid. 
It would also be good if  there is a Ph.D. student looking into how to integrate poor women in the development process 
that also can suggest channels for donors to reach these women. I have seen an MA thesis of  a student from WRTC 
which is about gender and IT. In traditional societies like Yemen, there is no need to study IT and gender, there are a lot 
more important topics. There has been no strategic thinking and plan for directing the study topics of  new staff  mem-
bers to be relate to the development problems that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program is trying to deal with. 
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institution (see Chapter 4). The second problem is that the new directors of the ECs, 
changed the old staff members for new staff members, because of the “rule of the 
game” and there is no administrative system established to organize such things. The 
new directors of the ECs did not accept new staff members returning to the ECs. For 
example, at WRTC, 5 faculty members obtained a doctorate and then faced a big 
problem with the new leadership of the EC, on their return to work. The ECs did not 
have their own stable staff, but staff members from different departments in the 
university. This is why, as I mentioned before, the staff members trained by the NPT 
projects have already left the ECs. Most of the ECs have no own developed training 
capacity, especially in a human resources (administrative and academic) should run 
the training process itself18. An EC without a minimum human resource capacity is 
like a farmer who plants, but does not harvest.
Having analyzed most of the LKS aspects that prevented the Dutch contractors to 
build the capacity and the capability in the selected ECs at the operational level, the 
main thrust of the coming section is to provide an analysis on the LKS aspects at the 
middle management level. The main focus is on two factors: the organizational and 
administrative structures, and the quality and quantity of teaching and training staff.
Before starting the analysis in the middle management level however, it is valuable 
to analyze two aspects related to the operational level and the middle management 
level: (1) The curricula design and (2) the participants’ selection process. These two 
aspects have been tested statistically in Chapter 8 of this study. In this section, I try to 
combine the quantitative results to the LKS explanation as well.
Let us first consider the design of curricula. The curriculum is a big problem area 
in the NPT projects in Yemen. During the designing phase of the NPT, there was an 
agreement between NUFFIC and the respective universities, for the universities to 
make professors available to develop the curriculum as part of their normal activities. 
There was a lack of knowledge from Nuffic, as it was requesting its targets to develop 
their capacities to take the responsibility in developing the study curricula and 
writing the study courses. The other concern is related to the promises of the 
university rectors, that they would allocate Yemeni professors in the respective 
departments, without knowing their abilities and willingness to accomplish the 
mission.
During the implementation process, the Yemeni professors were unwilling to 
contribute to curriculum development unless they were paid. Unfortunately, because 







of the financial rules of Nuffic for the NPT projects, the Dutch contractors could not 
pay them, as Nuffic considered the curriculum development as the local contribution 
and obligation. Thus the professors in the respective departments refused to develop 
the curriculum and the Dutch contractors could not ask other professors from 
outside the departments for curriculum development; because there was no budget. 
The departments for curriculum became in some ECs, an individual initiative for 
local managers and some other professors that the local manager had personal or 
family ties with him or her. The curricula were then taken from academic departments 
at colleges. This made these institutes deviate from their target of offering training 
skills to grant theoretical qualifications, since skills-based learning was the actual 
target of establishing these centers.
The existing curricula, especially in MPA and WRTC, are old and far removed 
from the history of living science, as is the case in most Yemeni “academic” 
departments at colleges. It provides information and knowledge, typically fragmented 
and does not function in reality. They depend mainly on handouts and summaries of 
books, and have a lack of methodology and thus fail to stimulate creative thinking 
methods for resolving problems. The curricula rely on memorization and lecturing in 
the delivery of training material to their participants. Due to the lack of accompanying 
activities inside or outside lecture rooms and the lack of practical training, ECs are 
often incapable of giving participants skills and professions needed by the jobs and 
professions in the both public and private sectors. There is an absence of a clear 
practical framework, in building the curriculum, in planning and implementing the 
training process using integrated and lively practical and scientific knowledge. Most 
of the interviewees indicated that the ECs found it difficult to designing curricula 
well balanced between theory and practice. Especially in WRTC, the opportunities 
for practical application and field training in the respective organizations are rarely 
made available.
Curricula and gender issues
The WRTC was one of the most relevant choices or projects in the design of the 
program to deal with gender issues. However all of the projects were designed to deal 
with the gender issue. The aim was to promote the status of women within public and 
private organizations. This is by establishing cultural patterns of how women and 
men perceive each other’s roles in the work place. In public and private offices, most 
women are subject to harassment by male employees, especially those who work in 
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the northern side of Yemen, where there are more male-dominated environments 
(strong tribal areas). The chance to contribute to solving such a social dilemma, is to 
integrate some gender issues in curricula and develop some skills regarding equality 
in the workplace. It requires specializations that would ensure greater integration, 
contribution and participation of females in this type of learning, in order to make 
full use of both genders in the development process. However, looking at the current 
curricula and other activities of the selected ECs, it is really clear there was insufficient 
or (no) attention to gender factor. “Attending to this factor is culturally sensitive. It 
requires in the first place the competent involvement of the Yemeni colleagues. From 
the Dutch side it may require support for the development of awareness, sensitivity 
and exposure to successful models of intervention known from culturally similar 
contexts” (Visser, 2008:38). 
Open-door policy function
The policy of admission or selection of the participants from the respective 
organizations for the training process for the capacity and capability building in the 
ECs was dependent on an open-door policy, which left participants the freedom to 
attend the ECs. This meant admission is without reference to the priorities of capacity 
and capability building plans. Many of the people, who I interviewed, stressed that 
these ECs acted like a body without a head. There is a lack of ability to coordinate and 
integrate admission plans with the respective organizations. The participants have to 
be compulsorily nominated for admission, in a coordinated effort between their 
organizations and the ECs. Interviewees noted that the ECs should be under the 
authority of the Yemeni Council of Ministers, to use them as factories to produce 
qualified leaders, with clear policy of re-assigning the graduates to different 
administrative levels. On the other side, the absorptive capacity of the ECs must be 
raised so they can absorb the largest possible number of participants from various 
agencies and institutions19. 
The selected ECs became either civil society organizations like WRTC, or private 
19 If  you read deeply into the backgrounds of  participants, especially at the MPA center, you can clearly see that most 
of  the students belong to the traditional social classes: Sadah, Qaddhi, and strong elders of  Gabilih. These three social 
groups have misused the Yemeni state for its whole modern history and now they get this chance to be trained in new 
skills to be placed in stronger and higher positions within the government. They did not give a room for isolated social 
groups which do not have that big role in public life (see Table 4.1 in section 4.2 of  Chapter 4) such as Khadam, Muza-
yyina, and women to be trained and placed in the higher government offices. These latter groups only belong to the third 
level of  administrative hierarchy as personnel, specialists and technicians and , sometimes, as military soldiers. In all the 
selected projects, I could not find a single participant from the Khadam social group. And women were the minority in 







training institutes, especially those with the focus on developing their profit rather 
than developing the institutional capacity and capability of the respective organizations 
in Yemen. Tuition fees can exceed U.S. $7000, which makes the process of training 
and qualification limited to the rich classes or influential people in both public sector 
and society, who are the basis of the administrative corruption and confusion in the 
public and private sectors20. 
While the above local knowledge concerns should be addressed at the specific 
level or in each project level, there are also local knowledge areas of concern that 
should receive particular attention at the universities or middle management level, 
which we look at now. 
9.6.2 NPT Program and LKS at the University Context 
The hope was that “the implementation of NPT interventions in different 
departments, schools and colleges of the university [would provide] an opportunity 
for reform and experimentation with new models in a university wide context” 
(Visser, 2007:21). However, the interviewees noted that the ECs, especially MPA and 
MBA, suffer from a lack of integration and coordination with the organizational and 
administrative structures in the universities. For example, the ECs are not part of the 
graduate schools structures in the universities at present. The certificates from these 
ECs are not documented and recognized by the graduate schools. This has hindered 
most graduates in completing their graduation processes21. The graduate schools of 
the universities claim that, the training programme is not qualified to be a Master’s 
Degree provided by the University itself. For example, the two participants in WRTC 
who have finished their studies so far could not document their certificates (see 
Chapter 8). The graduate school argued that as there are no supervisors in the 
university with specialties in their topic (gender issues), they should change their 
topics to be relevant to the specialties of their supervisors22. As is the case in most of 
the selected ECs, there is a problem as training programs have no idea of what the 
study of gender issues should look like23.
20 The tuition fees are between US$4000 and US$ 7000, which is very high in a society like Yemen where the average 
income is less than US$1 a day (see Chapter 4). 
21 This is although one of  the NPT program intentions at the inter-institutional level is to embed “the supported organi-
zations in the post-secondary educational system of  their country. It thereby strengthens the capacity of  the supported 
organizations to relate to other organizations and institutions in the sector” (MinBuza, 2012:17).
22 - This is linked to the aforementioned point that WRTC refused to appoint 5 Ph.D. holders who were sent to pre-
pare their studies in gender issues as part of  the WRTC project. 
23 - One of  the Dutch local managers who worked in Yemen with WRTC informed me that they had faced a big chal-
lenge when presenting the gender theme to the respective organization in Yemen. The concept of  gender in a male-
dominated and tribal-Muslim society is linked with a lot of  negative associations. The theme of  gender is associated 
with a feminism theme in a negative sense, such as aggressive women, free women, promiscuity, westernized women and 
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In this regard, the ECs have no relevance with the universities context as such, 
considering the overall necessity for the NPT programme in Yemen to align the 
university policy and structure. Most of the staff members in the universities consider 
these ECs as extraneous. There is no sense of being part of the organizations. The ECs 
have independent financial procedures, without a link to the financial regulations of 
the universities. Many staff members, whether academics or administrators consider 
these ECs as a trophy. For example, the cost for a two hour lecture can exceed US$100. 
This is more than half of the monthly salary of an administrative employee. Added to 
this, there is a contradiction between the regulations and the laws of the universities 
and the regulations and the laws of these ECs, if the ECs have clear regulations and 
laws to organize their operations. This situation creates major conflicts between 
faculty members and the ECs on one hand, and the administrators and the ECs on 
the other. Actually, this administrative and regulatory situation hindered the work of 
the ECs and limited their effectiveness in the university level.
One interviewee stated that, Sana’a University was not able to be proactive in such 
projects or to have an agenda to put in or to tailgate these projects to the concerned 
parties within the university. The top man of Sana’a University and his involvement in 
the process of implementation had both pros and cons. It is good to have support 
from the higher level or the middle level, but bad when every issue or any problem 
has to go to the rector in order to be solved. There is no policy or administrative 
information or rules and regulations, to inform the middle management about their 
role. There is a problem of communication, as everything goes person to person. 
Therefore, when one goes to the SU channels, he/she does not know what the proper 
channel is, and so immediately goes to the top man, the rector. If he is supportive, he 
will meet your demands. In some instances, the levels below the rector became 
unsupportive. They choose to reject the project, as they feel they do not benefit from 
it, or as is the case the majority of the time, they are neglected or ignored and not 
informed correctly about the project , its structure, aims and objective, as well as its 
function within the structure of the university.
One very informative example which we mentioned above is the accreditation of 
diplomas of the participants in the different centers. SU did not approve their 
diplomas for senseless reasons. If the Vice rector for higher education at SU refused 
to approve these diplomas and there is problem in the quality of the service the ECs 
pro-homosexuality. Indeed it has been said that the reality of  presenting gender is like presenting an evil to the Yemeni 







provide, or these centers are doing something against the SU graduate polices; why 
did they not stop them from operating? They should have not accepted them from 
the beginning. Instead it becomes a personal conflict between the rector and the 
graduate school. The structure of the SU is very weak and has to change24. 
As mentioned before these EC’s came to the individuals like the rector himself or 
the top man of management, as he is only the person dealing with these centers. The 
donors should put a condition that these centers have to be emerged with the local 
counterpart organizations from day one. Within these conditions, the administrative 
structures of these host organizations have to be reformed and they must accept these 
centers within their rules and regulations. All the people in the host organization 
should be trained, informed, and gain activities of the projects, in order to be 
knowledgeable about the coming program. In SU and the other universities, only a 
few people knew about the Dutch projects: the top man in SU, the dean of the faculty 
and the person who managed the project, or the local coordinator. These projects 
were limited to these people, in order to avoid all objections and conflicts of interest 
from the different levels. This case also has to deal with the time allocated for the 
projects. This is to convince everybody about the believes and structure and vision of 
how to address the administrative structure of SU at that time. This is to show the 
importance of the program and that everybody should be responsible for the success 
of the program. If there are any objections, one should rectify them, before the program 
begins.
Most of the interviewees pointed out that the process of implementation should 
involve all the actors starting from the dean of the faculty, the top man in the 
university, the Ministry of Higher Education; the Ministry of Planning, the 
government cabinet and in some cases the presidential office. In doing so, we would 
know if any person in any level had an objection to the success of the programme. We 
could then address it and the person would then carry the responsibility. Then, 
everybody would be eager for work, with some conditions to be associated. At the 
beginning everybody has to be addressed, and all parties have to sign an agreement, 
not the rector of the university, but all his assistance administration units. For 
example, in SU, it should start from the department, the dean, the vice rector for 
higher education, the custodian of SU, and so on. Therefore, the dean will put the 
project on the agenda of the faculty council, and the same for SU council as the rector 
will put the project in its agenda. Everybody will follow the same process to be 
24 - The same problem happened in Aden University where the WRTC was implemented. 
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approved by the ministers’ council. Every administrative level will discover who is 
involved in the project or program. In addition, the actions at the SU board will 
address the project and no one can reject them later on saying they did not agree did 
not understand. No one can play games: either they should quit their job or sign the 
agreement. As we mentioned in the former section, in doing such a process, everybody 
will watch who will object and who will be implementing the process. The collective 
responsibility will be realized, as no one will work against his position he will be 
known that he is responsible. If there is objection, from the beginning, everyone will 
put his objection on paper. This will also help to incorporate local ideas from the 
different levels and all the problems will be solved earlier in the project process.
9.6.3 NPT Program and LKS in the Wider Sector Context 
The information on local knowledge presented in the above sections, supported 
the idea that the issue of capacity and capability building within the public and private 
sectors, is not just a technical or professional issue; because building people is 
completely different from building stone. It basically needs developmental options, in 
front of the state and government that should present the donors to implement 
systematic methods. At the policy-strategic level, it was noted by most interviewees 
that there is no strategy and clear policies organizing the relationship between the 
ECs and the central government and its affiliates. Such a strategy must classify skills 
required for institutions to create a base of experts in different disciplines. There 
should be sub-policies or operational policies for capacity and capability process, 
highlighting the most important managerial skills, qualifications and requirements 
for training in these government institutions. These operational policies must include 
adequate financial budgets for capacity and capability process, and be according to 
the needs of various organizations and institutions. These things become more 
problematic when one starts looking for government policies that reflect these 
concerns. “Such policies are still often absent, deficient or not well developed. This 
reflects deficient capacity rather than lack of concern. It must thus be seen as part of 
the problem. It forces one to look outside the boundaries of individual projects and 
their immediate objectives and to focus on the context” (Visser, 2008:20). Work on 
changing the policy environment and other contextual conditions surrounding the 
various capacity building efforts, is essential before starting to design and implement 
NPT projects in Yemen. These policies will ensure the effective process of training 







The Dutch government and Nuffic were dealing with, and relying on the polices 
of, The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) as policy 
maker in this regard, but the current role of MOHESR in coordinating and supervising 
performance at middle management and operational levels is very limited. This is 
despite the fact that NPT projects targeted the middle management and operational 
levels. Formally, the role of MOHESR in the Yemeni higher education sector is 
confined to supervision and strategic guidance, and it does not perform an active 
monitoring role on this sector and its institutions (Al-salahy, 2009). In other words, 
MOHESR with its central departments and bodies is considered as responsible for 
placing the educational policies in universities, but it has no chance to monitor and 
supervise the performance of its institutions (the universities) in required manner. 
The plans and the policies of MOHESR are not strong or binding. They are not reliant 
on regulations and legislations, directed at fulfilling the aims of the overall 
development plans of the public sector and especially the civil service system in 
Yemen25. 
MOHERS suffers from very weak traditional organizational administrative 
structures. There are plenty of organizational factors that weaken its position and 
functions, as presented in Chapter 4 of this study. Together with the lack of the 
capacity and capability, there is absence of active planning in the field, in addition to 
a lack of transparency, a failure to question university decisions, and a failure to use 
information and data. It was predictable therefore, that MOHERS was not involved 
in the implementation of the NPT programme in Yemen. During the policy design 
and implementation of the NPT program, there was no attention paid to creating 
synergy and generating coordination mechanisms among all ECs in the respective 
universities. It was particularly important for the NPT program in Yemen to 
harmonize and synergize the different projects. However, this was absent from the 
thoughts of policy makers and implementers, on both the Dutch and Yemeni sides. 
Instead they simply followed the traditional procedure to divide the NPT program 
into isolated projects. This approach was criticized by many experts who I interviewed. 
They noted that this approach supported the policy of quotas between Yemeni 
universities, without a vision and a plan. The quota approach of allocation of the NPT 
projects was influenced by the vision of the top men within the central level of the 
higher education sector in Yemen, that that every university should receive its share 
25 - It is clear that on the policy level “quality assurance systems, national policy frameworks, accreditation systems, etc. 
have to be developed to establish framework conditions in which post-secondary education organizations can improve 
their performance in their sector.”(MinBuza, 2012:17). 
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from the NPT financial funds. 
Once more, the above observation relates to the argument of other interviewees, 
who noted that it was wise if the NPT programme mainly focused on developing the 
capacity and the capability, of the central level of the higher education sector in 
Yemen. There is evidence that the Center of Higher education has weak legal and 
administrative control over its related institutions. As mentioned above, mechanisms 
of authority and control management systems over institutions will help the center of 
the higher education sector, to achieve what is desired through the development 
plans and strategies.
Despite the importance of the NPT projects, they did not lead to concrete results, 
as the Ministry of Higher Education failed to make the direct recipient organizations 
accountable. In the plan of implementation process of the NPT projects, the Ministry 
of Higher Education was the main responsible body. Yet the role of the Ministry 
during the policy implementation in the universities was, limited to troubleshooting. 
There is no strategic link between the organizations who developed the plan of 
implementation, in co-operation with Nuffic, and the direct beneficiaries who 
implemented the NPT projects together with the Dutch contractors. 
As many interviewees confirmed, it would be advisable for the NPT programme 
to target two universities at first. Some of the NPT projects will link between the 
universities and the Ministry of Higher Education, and other projects will build the 
capacity and capability in those two universities at all levels (rectors and their 
administrations, faculty levels, and department levels) and the Ministry of Higher 
Education itself. There are many advantages of adopting such a development 
approach. The first is it avoids the process of efforts and money dispersion, in 
implementing many projects in more than seven universities. Therefore, the 
possibility of having effective results will be higher, and the strategic link between 
these two universities with the Ministry of Higher Education will be strengthened. 
The second advantage is to use the first stage as a pilot, for other donors or the 
Netherlands to follow (or not), when capacity and capability building in other 
universities. The third advantage is that, the Ministry of Higher Education will be 
able to establish a harmonization process in conjunction with administrative, 
economic and social needs to reach the community26. The Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, for now, remains a one-sided body, without even 
a sector for research studies. 







Achievement despite a poor policy environment
Although the poor policy environment was not taken into consideration by Dutch 
and Yemeni policy makers to make the NPT effective at the program level, some NPT 
projects (especially MBA and WEC) achieved some successes, as shown in the 
evaluation of the participants in the questionnaire and interviews as well as the 
researcher’s observations. Once more, the results of MBA and WRTC are a direct 
challenge to the explanation of the PCP approach, which is that foreign aid projects 
cannot work in a poor policy environment. MBA and WEC have comprehensive 
visions, guiding methodologies, educational and training packages to achieve the 
required balance between theoretical and practical aspects, and equipment that will 
achieve this kind of balance in the training process. In addition, MBA has good 
quality and quantity of staff. It has a clear policy to keep MBA in contact with its 
graduates, after they have finished their studies to benefit from their experiences in 
their work. Thus the MBA has an ongoing process, to develop its training program 
through the feedback of its former participants. 
The explanations of this situation are that the processes of implementing MBA 
and WEC were effective in a specific place and time. The Dutch contactors and their 
Yemeni counterparts had effective interactions and associations, which led to an 
incorporation of place and time local knowledge and thus increased the effectiveness. 
This point is discussed further in the next chapter, based on the associability model 
for analysis. Furthermore, the Dutch contactors still have partnerships with MBA 
and WEC. The MBA project at Sana’a University has strong ties with the Maastricht 
School of Management, which has enhanced the validity of its degree program. The 
WEC project at Sana’a University has partnership with Wageningen University which 
has allowed it, for example, to develop a very successful research agenda alimented by 
non-NPT funding (Visser and Almoassib, 2008).
9.7 Summary of the Findings 
This chapter contributes to the limited research on international development 
administration and public administration in Yemen, and on institutional change as 
related to the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. As such, the findings hold value for policy 
makers and people who are in charge of policy implementation regarding future/
effective administrative, and other institutional reforms in the country. The 
examination of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, does not only give aid the 
management of future aid programs in Yemen, as the institutional reforms needed 
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there are not unique. The similar and major features of local knowledge aspects of the 
public sector institutions can be found in most poor and traditional countries. By the 
same logic, the causal mechanism of local knowledge and (in) effectiveness of the 
Dutch-Yemen NPT program can be applied to other countries as well. 
This analysis sheds light on one of the questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter: how does one explain the differences in effectiveness of the NPT program, in 
building the capacity and capability in the selected ECs? To investigate this question, 
we followed two analytical steps. The first tried to examine the extent to which the 
selected ECs achieved their main and specific objectives: (1) building the 
organizational and administrative structures, and (2) improving the quantity and 
developing the quality of staff members. The analysis in this step provides the 
explanation of why the analysis in Chapter 8, showed that some selected ECs were 
more effective in training than others. It was also clear in Chapter 8, that all the 
selected ECs were ineffective in transferring training back to work settings. The main 
source of data in this step of analysis was the questionnaire, which was given to the 
participants of the selected ECs27. We conducted overall analysis and cross-case 
analysis, by using different analytical methods such ANOVA tests and descriptive 
statistical methods such as frequency distribution, mean scores and others. Table 9.4 
below summarizes the main results of the overall analysis and the cross case analysis: 
Table 9.4 Summary of the Related Weaknesses and Obstacles Facing the ECs (N=227)
Source: data analysis 
(*) YES= Impact (Red color that the EC is weak and facing obstacles) 
 (**) No= No impact (Green color: the EC has strong capacity)
(ü) Evidence of the impact (ü*) = Part-evidence of impact 
Based on the overall quantitative analysis, the results highlighted that the Dutch-
27 -In Chapter 7 we provided the sampling issues and the demographic profile analysis.
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Yemen NPT program did not provide all necessary conditions for effective capacity 
and capability building process, within the contexts of selected ECs. In this regard, 
the same capacities and capabilities which the NPT ought to have reformed or 
developed still represent the obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs. However, 
based upon the cross-case analysis, respondents perceive the MPA and WRTC, as 
having less effective organization and management and qualified leadership than 
MBA and WEC. Respondents in the NIAS suggested that, NIAS was a partly effective 
organization, management and qualified leadership. The same results were also found 
with regard to the second measure. The respondents perceive MPA, NIAS and WRTC 
as having less sufficient and qualified teaching staff than the MBA and WEC.
The second step of analysis turned our attention to some local knowledge elements, 
which were not incorporated during the policy design and/or policy implementation, 
thus explaining why there is variation among ECs in the results based upon the 
quantitative analysis in the first step. The main sources of data were the interviews, 
NPT documents, participated observations, related articles and books. This step 
therefore attempts to address the knowledge deficiency through a synthesis of 
empirical investigation, drawing from multiple data sources in order to propose a 
new explanation of why the Dutch-Yemen NPT program is not that effective in 
operating in the local Yemeni environment. Different local knowledge elements, 
especially the informal aspects, which were presented in Chapter 4, were employed in 
this chapter for analysis. 
Dutch contractor’s lack of clear understanding of the existing institutions in the 
higher education sector environment in Yemen became clear after, presenting a lot of 
elements and examples influencing the effectiveness of the projects under 
investigation. It is really difficult to understand all of the intricacies of the complex 
institutional reform processes, or the institutions of a traditional country like Yemen. 
The most vivid examples of these intricacies in the higher education sector in Yemen 
are: violations of standards by social and political ties; procedures in the appointments 
and promotions of both academic and administrative posts; not abiding by the 
current regulations; the absence of by-laws that stipulate powers and responsibilities 
the absence of the follow-up and evaluation principle; and the absence of the reward 
and punishment principle. This applies at the three administrative levels: operational, 
university level, and the sector level. 
It is difficult for a donor contactor with Western styles of management to 
understand the patterns of relations in a traditional society, such as nepotism, loyalty 
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and personal connections. These informal managerial functions, start from the 
selection of the directors of the ECs, to the selections of the trainers and trainees. 
Failure to change the vision of donor contractors is an indicator of the lack of local 
knowledge, to change the capacity building process from department-based to 
education center-based. The donor contactors simply went along with the traditional 
vision of the top men of the respective universities and their limited followers. Thus 
there was no “strategic planning”; it was based upon the quick decisions approach 
that has always dominated the managerial behavior of most leaders in Yemeni 
institutions. 
The top men of the universities just established ECs, without building 
administrative systems to run them. These ECs suffer from a lack of integration and 
coordination with the organizational and administrative structures, at the universities/ 
middle management level. Instead they just have individual contact with the rectors 
or the top men at the universities. Furthermore, there are no synergy and coordination 
mechanisms among all ECs in the respective universities. ECs still suffer from an 
inadequate intervention system for the selection, preparation and evaluation of staff 
members. The existing curricula especially in MPA and WRTC are old and far 
removed from the modern science. They provide information and knowledge 
typically fragmented and does not function in reality. Furthermore, there is a low 
level participation of women as trainers and trainees in the institutions and selected 
ECs.
Interviewees noted that it would be wise if the NPT programme mainly started to 
focus on developing the capacity and the capability of the central level of the higher 
education sector in Yemen; because the center has weak legal and administrative 
control over its related institutions. Instead of implementing small projects scattered 
among the Yemeni universities by the policy of quota, it would have been better if the 
NPT programme targeted two universities at the first stage. Some of the NPT projects 
would then link between the universities and the Ministry of Higher Education, and 
other projects would build the capacity and capability in those two universities at all 
levels (rectors and their administrations, faculty level, and department level), and in 
the Ministry of Higher Education itself. 
Despite the poor policy environment in Yemen, it was evident that MBA and 
WEC have comprehensive visions, guiding methodologies, educational and training 
packages to achieve the required balance, between theoretical and practical aspects, 







balance in their training. We saw the same results in Chapter 8 and thus, with some 
confidence we can challenge the belief of the PCP approach that foreign aid projects 
cannot work in a poor policy environment.  
The next chapter attempts to address the knowledge deficiency through the 
multiple theoretical elements of policy design and implementation reviewed in 
Chapter 3. It might be the case that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program faced challenges 
during the policy design but there are also differences among the related projects 
during the policy implementation, as we have seen more effective results of the MBA 
and WEC comparing to the other NPT projects. 

CHAPTER 10
THE PROBLEMS FACING THE 
PROCESS OF INCORPORATING
 LOCOAL KNOWLDGE DURING THE 
POLICY DESIGN 




The previous chapters subjected the Dutch-Yemen NPT program’s objectives and 
practices to critical empirical analysis. It was demonstrated that the local knowledge 
problem, was a key factor in negatively influencing the effectiveness of the Dutch-
Yemen NPT program. Information on local knowledge in the development process 
remained an unopened “black box”. Ultimately, this study observes that the reform 
content of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program has been largely based on ambiguous or 
inadequate knowledge of the informal institutions, within the Yemeni direct and 
indirect recipient organizations; and several unjustified projects on capacity and 
capability building and institutional reforms. There was a poor understanding of 
what institutions are and how to build/redesign effective institutions. 
It seems that the policy-making process of the Dutch NPT program, was faced 
with ‘the paradox of compliance’, which shows a societal relevance of the topic of 
“policy fit” (Thomson, Torenvlied & Arregui, 2007). The policy makers in MinBuza 
mainly use a ‘top-down’ designed aid policy reform, that they claim “fits” for all 
participant recipient countries. However, these countries have different local 
characteristics and aspects, which results in non-compliance in the implementation 
process. Since recipient countries have different characteristics, and therefore 
different approaches to compliance, it is not uncommon that the Dutch contractors 
implement MinBuza’s aid policy incorrectly, unevenly, or even not at all; even in 
cooperation with their counterparts in those countries (Versluis, 2005). However, in 
this study, we argue that there is hope and opportunity to incorporate information on 
LK during the actual policy implementation process. The implementation of an aid 
policy is the most vital phase, as it is at this stage that the success or failure of an aid 
project is determined, based on the LK explanation and the “development associability 
approach” of the ANT theory. This is especially the case, as the quantitative results 
revealed that two projects were more effective the others, in terms of achieving their 
specific and overall objectives.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the factors affecting the process of 
incorporating local knowledge during the policy design and implementation, of 
institutional development aid programs. The aim is, to test the corresponding 
hypotheses and to contribute to improving our understanding of institutional change 
in a poor policy environment, as well as helping practitioners diagnose and address 
key problems, that institutional reforms have struggled with. Practical implications 








program are used, to illustrate the relevance between the theoretical elements of the 
different approaches in policy making and implementation and the empirical analysis. 
The combining paradigm of the theoretical and empirical analysis in this chapter can 
help leading scholars of the PCP approach, to rethink their arguments. As we 
discussed in Chapter 2, PCP scholars assert that foreign aid programs cannot be 
effective in a poor policy environment, and that aid interventions are harming poor 
nations rather than helping them. 
This chapter is organized in five sections. It begins with an analysis of the most 
important factors that influence the process of incorporating local knowledge, during 
the policy design of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. In the second section, we offer 
an analysis of the factors that influence the process of incorporating local knowledge 
during the policy implementation of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. The focus in 
the third section is on the factors created by the LKS at both the middle management 
and operational levels. 
In section four, we present our main proposed model for effective institutional 
reforms, which is the “development associability approach”. The development 
associability approach is derived from the actor network perspective, which we 
looked at in Chapters 1and 3. This approach can be divided into two: (1) the harmony 
model, where there are harmonious interactions between contractors and their 
counterparts, and (2) the conflict model, where the interactions are characteristised 
by mistrust, poor communication and conflict. As we see in this section, the successful 
NPT projects, which are those which incorporated local knowledge, are those which 
followed the harmony model. 
The final section of the chapter offers some concluding remarks and in particular 
discusses the salience of the development associability approach. 
10.2 Policy Analysis at the Strategic/ Policy Level 
The main purpose of this section is to examine the causal factors, which tend to 
systematically undervalue LKS in its formal and informal aspects, through the lens of 
strategic and policy thinking. This lens enlarges the principles and priorities, the 
content and approach of the development programs in the public sector reforms1in 
poor countries. Before examining these causal factors, it is crucial to ask what aspects 
of local knowledge and ideas were key and available to the decision maker during the 
1 - When referring to ‘capacity development for promoting public sector reform programs’ I am not talking about any 
specific program, but discussing capacity development programs in general. However, the focus is on the NPT program 
and the interaction between the Yemeni and Dutch governments or their representative in this regard.
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policy-making of the NPT program. Furthermore, what were the influential 
assumptions or theories of change that the Dutch-NPT intervention was based on?
I answer these two questions in the remainder of this section, but first I briefly 
examine the assumptions and theories of change practiced by the donor community 
from 1950 onwards, and see how Dutch development cooperation went along with 
these changes. The latest wave of the governance agenda also had its effects on the 
NPT program. During these examinations, I show that local knowledge is downplayed 
in the donors’ reform agendas, in both specific and wider contexts. The section then 
concludes with an outline of the causal factors creating the LKS at the strategic and 
policy level based on the ideas of the actor network perspective, and its associability 
development approach, as it claims to make LK visible. 
The Netherlands is represented in a large number of countries and in many 
international organisations. It is a main donor within the international donor 
community, and it is active in public sector reforms programs (MinBuZa, 2011). It 
also has a role in setting the reform agenda, in the overall framework defined by 
donors for developing countries. Over time, this agenda has changed and formed 
three waves of reforms with different targets and objectives. Firstly from the 1950s 
there was a focus on capacity development of organizations and individuals, then by 
the 1980s the focus was on reorganizing the public and private sectors; and since the 
1990s the focus has been on reshaping the whole governance system. In the first wave 
of reforms, the underlying assumption was that they were definitive solutions for 
promoting the managerial capacity of the administrative system and particular 
organizations. The private sector was the key sector regarded as a driver for promoting 
development in the second wave. The third wave is based on the idea, that good 
governance is essential for having effective government institutions to drive 
development. This is a response to the “combination of factors– including poor 
outcomes of the reforms, major ideological shifts, and influential academic theories 
worldwide published and developed in western countries” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010).
There is insufficient space in this chapter to review all the changes in aid policy 
since 1950s. In fact such an endeavor needs a complete study to be accomplished. 
Here we summarise the first three waves. The 1st wave started in the 1950s and ended 
in the 1960s. The foreign aid strategies of 1950s focused on “macroeconomic 
development, national planning, and construction of capital-intensive industries, 
highways and power-generating systems, and on rebuilding the financial capacity of 








Development was used to build up modern governance system in the European 
countries directly after WWII. The same content of the reforms agenda were applied 
in developing countries, without taking into consideration the existing systems with 
different administrative, economic, social, and political contexts in the poor nations. 
The aid programs were mainly implemented by the USID, the American aid based on 
Marshall Help to Europe. USID was successful in reconstructing the economies of 
Europe, the American system of public administration, became more or less the 
model of public sector reform to be implemented by aid organizations in poor 
countries too. This model was followed by the European aid organizations, without 
the proper attention given to differences in conditions and needs in the poor nations, 
until these conditions appeared to create obstacles to achieving high levels of 
effectiveness of the aid programs(Rondinelli, 2003).
The IMF, the World Bank and its leading economic scholars and experts, headed 
the 2nd wave (1980s-1997). They focused on economic growth and sectoral 
adjustment packages. The idea was that privatization of public institutions, would 
lead to economic development. The influential schools of thought for this wave were 
(1) Neoclassical Economics (2) Public Choice Theory (3) New Public Management. 
Most aid interventions involved deregulation, decentralization, privatization, 
macroeconomics, liberalization, downsizing bureaucracy, and focusing on results, 
importing western institutional models and private sector principles (See for example 
Rondinelli, 2003; Akramov, 2006; Kanbur, et al., 1999; Baimyrzaeva, 2010). During 
the second wave the public administration agenda was not taken into consideration, 
and development aid just focused on the economic sector. At the end, they realized 
that no development process could take place, without a good administration system. 
This was the start of the third wave in which the good governance package became 
the response to these lessons learned. 
The main reform assumption of the third wave (from 1997-onwards), which the 
policy objectives and priorities of the NPT program were based upon, is that poor 
governance, is the cause for underdevelopment. Poor governance is translated into a 
perceived weak or lack of effective government institutions. Influential schools of 
thoughts or theories of change here are the “Public Choice Approach” and “New 
Public Management”. The approach to reforms adopted first by the most influential 
multilateral donors, like the UNDP and the World Bank, mainly focused on importing 
best practices of OECD countries (Baimyrzaeva, 2010). 
In the foreign aid arena, the term ‘governance’ has been difficult to be defined 
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satisfactorily. Baimyrzaeva (2010) analyzed the World Development Reports over 
time and shows a long list of institutional preconditions presented, to achieve good 
governance. These preconditions grew from 45 in 1997 to 116 in 2002. Grindle (2007) 
presents some of these preconditions and argues that “getting good governance calls 
for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the public sector—from 
institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political interaction, to 
decision-making structures that determine priorities among public problems and 
allocate resources to respond to them, to organizations that manage administrative 
systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff 
government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in political and 
bureaucratic arenas” (2007: 553). Jenkins and Plowden (2006) argue that in the good 
governance agenda, new elements were introduced in the aid programs that were hot 
topics in the donor countries themselves, such as gender and democratization2. From 
the above arguments, one could deduce that the third wave has paid attention to both 
the political and administrative sides of the governance. It aims at strengthening 
government institutions’ capacity, accountability, and transparency; deregulation 
and privatization; voice and participation. “It covers not only civil services and 
Cabinets, local authorities and public corporations, but also legislatures, electoral 
systems and their working, and the often literally innumerable population of 
voluntary or non-governmental organizations which are lumped together under the 
heading ‘civil society’. It is, increasingly, seen as including corruption (and its 
prevention) and transparency (or its absence)” (2006:9)3. The precondition, as it is 
the main focus of this study (NPT-related reform content), is capacity development/
building, which informs donors’ efforts to strengthen the government’s capacity 
through organizational/institutional restructuring, functional reviews, training, and 
transfer of skills and equipment (Baimyrzaeva, 2010; see also Chapter 5). 
The experiences of the two earlier waves, where a change of the government or the 
stimulation of the private sector, did not work in poor and fragile states; it convinced 
donors to try to completely change the whole governance system. This change was, 
however, not based on robust empirical research, but on explicit and implicit 
assumptions. Local realities and the understanding of the informal system and the 
rule of the games, on the basis of ‘what is present’ were not taken seriously into 
consideration. The first and second waves were foreign concepts introduced to 
2 - Now under the influence of  the western economic crisis there is again a shift of  focus towards stability, ignoring the 
government and focusing directly on youth, the unemployed, and young members of  political parties.
3 - I first introduced the concept of  good enough governance in Chapter 1. For an analysis of  the development of  the 








systems in developing countries. The third wave on governance, which is the result of 
the first two waves, is for that reason also a foreign concept. The current institutional 
development agenda of donors looks more like a “patchwork” of competing ideas and 
terms based on limited research, which draws from empirically flawed a priori ideas 
about human behavior (Baimyrzaeva, 2010)4. This is especially important to 
understand that the informal systems and the rule of the games on the basis of ‘what 
is present’ were really downplayed and not taking seriously into consideration 
(Grindle, 2004)5.
Translating this ambitious reform agenda of totally replacing the governance 
system, into practice has become a big challenge. The good governance agenda might 
be beautiful words on paper, but it is not sufficient as a practical guide6 (Grindle, 
2007). The experiences of the governance agenda of reforms in recipient countries 
show that “some activities were well planned initially, but unsuccessful in practice” 
(Addison, 2003). Some, as with other aid activities, were inappropriate and 
misconceived in the first place. They took little account of local conditions or of the 
most effective sequence in which to try to introduce changes. They rested on 
“overoptimistic assumptions about the ability of institutions to influence people’s 
behavior and about the time it would take to put working organizations into operation. 
The results of much of this intervention have been haphazard and sometimes 
perverse” (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006: 12). 
In conclusion, the briefly-analyzed three waves of public sector reforms promoted 
by leading donors in poor countries over the last five decades show that donors 
adopted reform agendas relying on western assumptions and theories of change. 
Foreign aid literature and theories have been mostly developed, and tested in western/
democratic countries with a thriving civil society and sound public administration 
systems. They have nothing to say on “how” to translate the reform agenda into 
practice (see also Chapter 9 to consider the example of the NPT program practices in 
Yemen).
It can be argued that the “black box” of LKS activities remains closed. Formal 
structures have been changed by traditional top-down, supply-driven and a one size 
4 - This comprehensive reform package of  the current wave reflects “rationalistic attitudes” of  donors acting similar to 
Simon’s (1947) satisfied man and his cousin Scott’s (1998) simplified man in functions and attitudes in policymaking and 
implementation. (see Chapter 3)
5 It is not completely valid to assign the reforms’ failures mainly to recipient countries’ conditions, such as their culture, 
backwardness, history, and weak capacity as many donors and some academics have said. It is a combination of  both 
donors’ lack of  local and practical knowledge and the internal conditions of  the recipient countries.
6 - We have two main approaches based on these practices, one is the traditional which is supply-driven and the other 
is based on demand. I mention about these two approaches and their relations to the third wave of  reform later in this 
section. 
358
fits all approach to reform, without taking into consideration if a country even has 
the capacity to fulfill these changes. The top-down approach is an externally-
determined agenda of reform, as seen in all three waves of aid. Some donor agencies 
have claimed that they have changed their approach of reform to “bottom-up” in the 
third wave, but state that these changes could not yet be enacted. The top-down 
approach, to reform is falling out of favor, at least in policy rhetoric, and the reforms 
are being tailored to beneficiaries’ ‘specific needs and make lending support locally 
driven and owned’ (Baimyrzaeva, 2010). 
In Chapter 3 we identified three approaches in policy making and implementation 
theory from the literature. These are “top-down” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983, 1989; Matland, 1995), “bottom-up” (Berman, 
1978 and 1980; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Hull and 
Hjern, 1987; Lipsky, 1978; Nilsen at al, 2013), and hybrid (synthesis) or the “backward 
mapping and forward mapping approaches” (Elmore, 1985; Birkland, 2005). The top-
down approach is considered by many scholars such as Matland (1995), as focusing 
more on the statute framers as key actors. The main assumption of the top-down 
approach is that, the people in the process of service delivery have the necessary 
knowledge and expertise of the related problems, and that they are in strong position 
to suggest sound and purposeful polices. This approach sees local actors as 
impediments to successful implementation, and calls for the control of their shirking 
behavior. Underlining Matland’s argument, Nilsen at al (2013) highlights, that many 
researchers critiqued the top-down perspective for “viewing implementation as a 
purely administrative process and failing to account for the role of the frontline staff 
who put the policy into action”(2012:2)7.
Matland (1995) also added that the top-down approach takes the statutory 
language as its starting point, which fails to reflect the significance of activities done 
earlier in the policy-making process (Matland, 1995). The author also included two 
studies to support his ideas. The first study is related to Winter (1985 & 1986) and 
states, that most barriers to implementation occur in the initial stages of the policy 
making process, and as such these processes must be carefully studied to understand 
the policy implementation. The second study belongs to Nakamura and Smallwood 
(1980), who argue that implementers obtain vital cues about the intensity of demands, 
and the size, stability, and consensus among those advocating for change, through the 
policy formation process. Therefore, an analysis that takes policy as given without 









considering history might miss important connections (1995: 147). 
According to Nilsen et al (2013), the bottom-up approach focuses its interest on 
the actions of the local implementers (and the importance of implementing structures 
or networks), as opposed to the central government, and emphasizes not so much the 
goals of a policy, but rather the nature of the social problem that a policy was intended 
to address. In line with the main argument of this study based on the “development 
associability approach” ideas (explained in different parts of this study), bottom-
uppers are less concerned with the implementation of a policy per se, and more 
interested in understanding actor interaction in a specific policy setting. Therefore, 
the contextual factors within the implementation place and time, can completely 
dominate rules created at the top of the pyramid. Under these conditions, according 
to the bottom-uppers, if local level implementers are not given the freedom to adapt 
the program to local conditions it is likely to fail (Palumbo, Maynard-Moody, and 
Wright, 1984, in Matland, 1995). However, the bottom-up approach is not free from 
criticism. Nilsen et al (2013) added that the bottom-uppers “tended to overemphasize 
the autonomy of the frontline staff and lacked an explicit theory explaining what 
influenced the process and how change occurred. The inductive nature of most 
bottom-up research combined with results that found most of the relevant factors 
varied from site to site led to few general conclusions or policy recommendations”(2013: 
2-3).
Elmore (1985) suggested a useful approach for policy designers, that the views of 
micro implementers and target groups must be considered in planning an 
implementation strategy. This approach advocates the use of both forward mapping 
(top-down approach), and backward mapping (bottom-up approach). Here forward 
mapping involves stating exact plan objectives, going into detailed means-ends 
schemes, and identifying obvious outcome criteria by which to review policy at each 
stage. Backward mapping states that behavior should be changed at the lowest level, 
“describing a set of operations that can insure the change, and repeating the procedure 
upwards by steps until the central level is reached. By using backward mapping, 
policy designers may find more appropriate tools than those initially chosen. This 
process insures consideration of the micro implementers’ and target groups’ 
interpretations of the policy problem and possible solutions” (in Matland, 1995: 5) 8.
8 - Sabatier (1986) moved away from the top-down perspective, claiming the approach was only appropriate to imple-
menting policies with precise law, limited research funds, and if  the situation is well structured. Bottom-up approaches 
will be appropriate in conditions where different policies are focused towards a specific problem; and the synthesis ap-
proach, specifically the advocacy coalition framework, should be used to explain policy changes over a period of  at least 
ten years. Goggin et al. (1990) suggests a communications model of  intergovernmental policy implementation which 
perceives implementation at the core of  a series of  communication channels. Winter (1990, 1994) suggested an “Inte-
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Elmore’s (1985) “backward-mapping” approach is one of our concerns in this 
research: how to realize a systematic approach for ensuring the process of incorporating 
local knowledge in the process of policy design. One conclusion can also be drawn 
based on the information of the policy making of the donors during the three stated 
waves of reforms, and the main theoretical elements of the above presented on the 
approaches of policy implementation. Ultimately, the key argument of the Public 
Choice approach is that aid programs will not work in poor policy environments, is 
not completely accurate. The problem is when the donors make no effort to adapt an 
appropriate aid policy implementation method. Without incorporating the specific 
characteristics, values, ideologies, attitudes and behavior of people and governments 
in their programs, the expected outcomes will not occur. Therefore, there is a need to 
adapt a “bottom-up approach”, in practice and not in theory in order to discuss these 
issues between the recipient countries and donor organizations. In other words, how 
to adapt the aid programs to the country and not the other way around. As remarked 
before, the Dutch development cooperation has followed the international 
development lines (“top-down approach”), and so the Dutch reform programs have 
faced the same problems. We now look at this in more detail for the NPT program. 
NPT policy formulation and the top-down approach
Before the NPT program was established in 2002, a number of other higher 
education programs, also administered by Nuffic were executed under other names, 
such as the Program of University Cooperation and the Joint Financing Program for 
Cooperation in Higher Education (HMO)9. The ingredients are more or less the 
same, and the change in name reflects the change of ministers over time. The content 
of the Dutch-NPT program (2002-2010), was based upon the good governance 
elements of the third wave. Aside from the Dutch strong focal sectors of education, 
water and health, two new western concepts were introduced; namely gender and 
grated Implementation Model” which attempts synthesis by integrating several of  the most fruitful theoretical elements 
from different implementation research regardless of  their origin.
9 - For example, in 1993 the “Joint Financing Programme for Cooperation in Higher Education (MHO)” was developed 
and introduced by MinBuza and then managed by Nuffic. In December 2004, a new policy framework with a number 
of  programmes was introduced, consisting of  NPT and the two Netherlands Fellowship Programmes: the Academic 
Programme (NFP/AP) and the Training Programme (NFP/TP). “MHO, NPT’s overall objective was to improve the 
quality and quantity of  trained professional staff  in the respective sectors in the partner countries. By strengthening 
post-secondary education and training capacity, NPT aimed at capacitating the partner countries to generate their own 
training institutes and human power in the long run” (MinBuza, 2012). As a consequence NPT was phased out in 2009 
and replaced by NICHE-1 which followed the same objectives of  NPT but focused more on labour market orientation, 
gender, policy alignment, continuous learning as well as technical and vocational training (MinBuza, 2012). Now, there is 
ongoing program called NICHE-2, which has shifted the focus to more towards stability, ignoring the government, and 








environment. While market relations remained from the second wave, was kept (see 
Chapter 6). On paper, the main difference with the former programs was that the 
NPT program had to be proposed by the Southern Partner. In response to widespread 
criticism of the traditional approach of donor-supply-driven organizational models 
from the Global North to the Global South, MinBuZa stated NPT was a program 
with demand driven approach, tailor-made practice based more on local expertise 
and knowledge networks10.
For the assistance to Yemen, it was more or less expected that the direct recipient 
organizations would make a self-analysis, determining their own identity, their 
position in the society, and their ways of realizing their business and communicating 
LK to Nuffic11. The framework for how to make this self-analysis was never supplied 
in detail, and many partners in Yemen kept on repeating formal information already 
known by the donors. Lacking the specific data, the proposals became like any other 
proposal from any other country, and that gave the NPT program the chance to 
continue the supply-driven approach12. In Vietnam, the demand-driven approach 
seems to have worked, according to the final evaluation report of the NPT program. 
Once more for Yemen a detailed framework was never developed in detail, leading 
the MinBuza-Nuffic-supported program to face the high expectations set by the 
Ministry’s own overall policies and objectives, based on the wider world development 
institutions approach, especially the Western models of institutional changes (IOB, 
MinBuza, 2011: 56-60).
The Dutch government should realize that the method of putting some recipient 
countries in the driver‘s seat of development, is a heavy burden for the majority of 
governments in the NPT programs. Most of them suffer from very weak planning 
and administrative capacities like Yemen; and they do not have a clear development 
philosophy. Moreover, one should be aware that giving the governments this role 
implies that the donors support an authority, which is often seen as corrupt by the 
public. Often governments collect lists of Christmas wishes to support their family 
10 See MinBuZa, 2011 as cited in Beleidskader technische assistentie Eindrapport Taakgroep TA (Policy framework tech-
nical assistance final report TA Task Group), Netherlands Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, 2nd version, 4 October 2000. In 
early 1990 UNDP led an in-depth review of  Technical Cooperation, including in a book entitled “Rethinking Technical 
Cooperation” - Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa” Regional Bureau for Africa, Development Alternatives Inc., 
Elliot J. Berg, Coordinator, 1993.
11 - The new shift of  the Dutch policy claim to put countries in the driver‘s seat, putting a grid over the governments 
of  the recipient countries, especially those with a very weak capacity such as Yemen as a very weak state. However, one 
may question whether this move is actually taking place in practice. This point is expanded upon in section three of  this 
chapter when we analyze the plan of  implementation of  the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. 
12 - Only by the help of  an outsider who was the manager of  the NPT program in Yemen could the different Yemeni 
universities come up with proposals. 
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members, without analyzing priorities for NPT assistance. The NPT cases discussed 
in the Chapter 9 can be seen as an example of such a list. Another example is the list 
of proposals to the Gulf cooperation council program in Yemen.
Dutch authorities like MinBuza and Nuffic did not receive sufficient tools to 
analyze and assess the package of the proposals from the Yemeni partners; simply 
they have lack of capacity of how to manage these projects. These packages were often 
characterized by the use of the development jargon, without making the proposals 
operationalisable. For example, a consultation organized by IOB in May 2008 made 
clear that the Ministry and many of the Dutch contractors involved in capacity 
development, could not clearly define what capacity means and how capacity 
development works (MinBuZa, 2011:105). Up to 2007, MinBuZa had not published 
a single policy document to guide decision making and operations on capacity 
development, thus making the southern approach a difficult exercise to implement, 
for both the northern and southern partners. In principle, the supply-organizations 
model was maintained. Within this model, it seems according of a number of 
interviewees at the policy level that the Dutch capacity development support, is still 
provided on the basis of “immediate needs”. The interviewees added that, the Dutch 
contractors are under pressure to spend money and demonstrate results, which are 
visible and quickly obtained, as they are accountable to Dutch taxpayers for the use 
of the money. The incorporation of local knowledge which is not visible, often leads 
to increase of costs and unforeseen circumstances and events. Local knowledge needs 
time and efforts to be incorporated. Thus a lack of time, leads to a downplaying of the 
role of local knowledge, resulting again in a one-size fits all approach for the policy-
making for the NPT in fourteen countries.
This approach shows faith in what Scoot (1998) calls “aggressive schemes of social 
engineering”, rather than adopting “control-oriented styles that takes into 
consideration the formal and informal institutions of the organizations in the 
recipient countries. Many of the current forms of assistance are not only ineffective 
but tend to perpetuate if not exacerbate the problems of development” (Ellerman, 
2009: 4). The NPT agenda retained its primary northern emphasis on changing 
institutional hardware – i.e. formal structures and procedures – while neglecting the 
institutional software of society – power relations, culture, norms and mental models– 
underlying and animating the hardware shaping its performance13. This argument is 
13 - Some of  the results I found in chapter 9 about the five cases chosen from the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, 
confirmed by Awortwi (2011) in his study about the he four year programme (2004-2007) “capacity building in good 
governance and public administration in Mozambique”, which was sponsored by The Netherlands organization for 








confirmed by Bettina Bock (2012), the Dutch former NPT-WRTC project manager. 
She points out donors are still not recognizing that the lack of local knowledge and 
the “black box” has not been open yet. In her summary, she said:
Capacity development departs from the idea that people learn how to take care of 
development themselves. It is seen as “an endogenous process that involves the main actors 
taking responsibility for the process of change”. At the same time, programs for capacity 
development such as the NPT program predefine the direction of the development and the 
capacities needed to arrive there. We could even say that the program not only aims at 
transferring our institutions– our way of doing things but also even presupposes this transfer 
in order to fulfill the NPT “rules of the game”. This seems to be a paradox if we think in terms 
of ‘us enabling an endogenous process to develop’. At the same time, the experience of a NPT 
project in Yemen seems to demonstrate that this dominance is needed for disrupting the local 
relations of power and the locally dominant way of doing things. In doing so new ways of 
acting open up and new players may be allowed to enter the stage. Maybe capacity building is 
not so much about learning new competencies but about disrupting existing constellation of 
power and identity, and allowing for the development of a new sense of control among those 
supposed to be powerless (in WI:2007:39).
Jenkins and Plowden (2006) underline the statement of Bettina Bock (2007), 
arguing that “part of what needs analysis and understanding is the relationships 
between organizations and their context. Any case, it is not a new discovery that how 
organizations work, and how people behave in organizational settings, are powerfully 
affected by the cultures both of the organizations themselves and of the wider social 
context in which the organizations are set” (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006:136). 
Rondinelli (1993) points out that the difficulties that international agencies and 
central governments faced in formulating policies and projects comprehensively, 
arose from the fact that many hidden obstacles and problems could not be identified 
in advance and therefore could not be dealt with in the initial design. 
Consequently attention on incorporating local knowledge is still lacking and the 
new shift did not provide the magic solution. The one-size fits all approach was the 
best practice adopted during the policymaking approach. In accordance with Dutch 
bilateral policy, NPT focused on the group of 36 countries with which the Netherlands 
had already entered into a multi-year partnership, but was run in initially 15 countries 
and later in 1414. It was envisaged that NICHE would be implemented in the 14 NPT 
partner countries and 9 others15. 
14 The 15 countries were: Benin, Colombia, Eritrea (NPT was stopped in view of  the worsening political situation), 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen and 
Zambia. In addition, the program initially covered Peru. However, it never went beyond the identification phase once 
Peru was taken from the list of  Netherlands partner countries.
15 The nine additional countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Egypt, Kenya, Kosovo, Nicaragua, South Sudan, 
and Suriname. 
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As discussed in Chapter 9, where we focusing on the NPT program for promoting 
the higher education sector in Yemen, it falls short of being a tool to explore what, 
specifically, needs to be done in the real world context. It was really difficult for Dutch 
contractors to understand all of the intricacies of the complex institutional reform 
processes, in a traditional country like Yemen. The most vivid examples of these 
intricacies in the higher education sector in Yemen, are the violations of the standards 
by the interactions between organizations and their context such as, social and 
political ties; the controlling procedures in the appointments and promotions of both 
academic and administrative posts; not abiding by current rules; the absence of rules 
that stipulate powers and responsibilities; the absence of the follow-up and evaluation 
principle; the absence of reward and punishment principle, and so on. These points 
are easily noticeable, but the Dutch contractors have ignored them. The result has 
been that some of the selected ECs have largely or partly failed. 
This brief overview of the Dutch NPT program indicates that at the central level 
there is very little chance of changing public sector institutions in recipient countries, 
through the social engineering approach. 
**********
While the social engineering approach is not getting local knowledge to the 
surface, the ‘development associability’ approach claims to make LK visible16. The main 
idea of the development associability approach is that the LKS can be solved by 
physical and non-physical interactions, between government institutions and their 
actors. These approach could correct data only supplied within the formal structure 
of power used in donor policies (see Chapter 3). This approach sees strategic policy 
interaction as important, in increasing our understanding, the learning and 
exchanging of ideas, and through communication opening the black box of a 
development process. 
Strategic planning is theoretically essential to fully consider the local setting, and 
to address the local knowledge deficiency, giving us the chance to open the black box 
of information. However there are several factors and actors, which create obstacles 
to this process and make it difficult to develop a fruitful interaction at the policy 
making level. For our understanding, in this study, we will try to explain the factors 
that could possibly influence the human and non-human interactions, as proposed 
by the ANT ideas and by focusing on characteristics of the processes of policymaking. 
These are: (1) the unclear vision on the final goal, (2) diplomatic language and 








development jargon used in the interactions between actors, (3) the dominance of 
the English language in the development aid realm, (4) lack of knowledge of theory 
of change in recipient countries, (5) lack of information on the local knowledge 
practices supplied by online networks, and (6) lack of institutional memory. 
In the process of interaction between the donors and the recipients at the policy 
making level, meetings are unclear and without a common understanding of the rule 
of the game. Annika Lysén (2003) remarks that certain meetings like round tables, 
seminars and conferences are tools to get the knowledge on the table, but if they are 
not followed up by other activities, the formal ideas of knowledge will take over again. 
Moreover, local knowledge is actually not used as an input for the policymaking 
process. Instead “financial problems and budget considerations take up considerable 
discussion time. It is more rare to meet in an open meetings to discuss implications 
and impacts of ongoing programmes and lessons learnt from evaluations, even 
though this does happen”(Lysén, 2003: 97).
The diplomatic language stresses the commonalities of the aid cooperation, but 
disguises LK with its informal aspects (DSO- MinBuza, NPT policy officer noted). 
The diplomatic language is the only instrument that allows, through cautious 
gradation, to deal with the counterparts without using words that can discover the 
rule of the game. Yet in Yemen, as in many traditional countries, the language has 
power; it rests on the fact that it contains the local ideas and the informal aspects of 
knowledge (Abu Jaber, 2001). This is due to oral culture being more important, than 
literary culture in Yemeni society. One of the interviewers confirmed that in Yemen 
the unwritten (informal) prescriptions, have greater influence on behavior than 
formal government laws and rules. Informal and unwritten prescriptions are hard to 
observe by policymakers on the donor side, and they need a long time of oral and 
behavioral interactions to be incorporated. The interviewees added that the 
policymakers on the Dutch side used development terminology or jargon such as 
empowerment, people-centered development and bottom-up development, but 
without clearly defining their meanings. These jargon terms negatively affect 
interactions at the policy level, because the policymakers in Yemen could not 
overcome the ambiguous use of jargon by the Dutch side17.
The development terminology or jargon is not only a problem in the interactions 
17 - “Development jardgon as order words”, a study by Jimmy Roth and Jeremy ranks (1997), confirmed the idea of  the 
development terminology or jargon used by policy makers when they are dealing with the recipient policy makers. The 
authors found that “development jargon could be misused when its meaning is clear. Where it is used clearly, but without 
allowing its meanings and implications to be contested, it is being used as an order…they added that to overcome the 
ambiguous use of  jargon, one needs simply to ask appropriate and pertinent questions”(1997:282). 
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between the policy makers from both sides of foreign aid formula- donors and their 
counterparts. Development terminology such as governance is a fuzzy concept, 
which has different explanations in Arabic literature. The concept means different 
things and it includes different sub-concepts. In some documents, we found the term 
took the name “Alhukm Al Rasheed” and “Tsharikeah”, and in the other documents, 
the concept was presented by the title of “Al-Hakmeayh”, which involves a high degree 
of abstraction that may not fit a translation of the western concept of governance. The 
concept of “Al-Hakmeayh” is explained by a very ideological paradox in term of “Al-
Hakmeayh for Allah”: the rule is for God (see for example Salwa Shaarawi, 2001). The 
Arab researchers, moreover, are trying to translate word-for-word the definitions of 
the World Bank, United Nations and the other related donors organizations for the 
concept of governance into their own language. Most of the researchers referred their 
work to the western literature, where we can find only concepts and terms that are 
western related. There is no space for local knowledge terminology or to bring along 
new ideas of change based on the local context. 
Interviewees regarded the concept of empowerment of women or gender as an 
invitation to distort women’s character in a traditional country, by calling for a 
removal of the differences between men and women. As we explained in the former 
chapters of this study, the term gender was associated with a feminism theme in a 
negative sense. It was linked with local concepts such as aggressive women, free 
women, promiscuity, and to advocate homosexuality. One of the Dutch experts 
noted: “presenting gender in Yemen is like presenting an evil if you can see in local 
perception”. 
All interviewees on both sides (Dutch and Yemen), identified the role of 
translation/interpretation within the process of interaction as a significant issue. For 
some interviewers, this issue was identified as one of the ‘most challenging to 
understand the local knowledge aspects.’ It seems there is a need to address the 
translation and interpretation barrier, to help provide locally appropriate context to 
the specific terminology used. Donor policy makers should understand that the 
challenge of the development terminology or jargon barrier could be solved through 
connections and relations, with local counterparts during non-formal activities such 
as dinners, Qat sessions and parties. In this way, the opportunities for informal 
verification mitigated this challenge18. Researchers from the South may realize that 
more important than word-to-word translation of the development jargon, is the 








understanding of the meaning of what was used by donors, and ‘providing examples’ 
that would make sense in the local context to contribute to developing theories of 
change that are locally based. 
There is no doubt that at the strategic/policy level, the recipient countries have 
nothing to say. Since most recipient countries lack information in practice and 
theories of change, in terms of capacity development, this situation is even more 
worrying (IOB, MinBuza, 2011:61). For example, in Yemen, there are few local 
researchers who have made publications on capacity development in the public 
sector. Even when local researchers are used, their publications rarely appear as 
independent contributions, but are integrated in the overall development approach. 
As such they lose much of their value. There is blame on the donor side here, as they 
did not create proper mechanisms to encourage research, select appropriate 
researchers from the recipient countries, or help to overcome the language difficulties 
in order to fill the knowledge gap in both its formal and informal aspects (MinBuza, 
2001). There is a very rich literature on North-South partnerships in development, 
but it is very poor in including aspects of local knowledge (see e.g. Barnard, 2003; 
Drew, 2003; R. James, 2001 in Scarf, 2010). Most of the publications and information 
of donors still works with their certain sets of shared norms and assumptions. All 
new ideas are spread among the donors without taking into consideration findings 
from local experts and researchers.19 
As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, mainstream research and 
practice for several decades, has operated with unjustified assumption that, Western 
formal institutions are universally applicable for recipient countries and that solutions 
should come from the north to the south, instead of normally being developed in 
south with the help of the north20. The leading bilateral donor organizations such as 
the World Bank and the UNDP, always articulate aid policies content and practices in 
the global context, depending on the ideas of consultants who are economists. Those 
economic consultants simply lack the relevant background knowledge and have 
nothing to say about behavioral issues, to understand the full complexity of the local 
19 - In addition, reports from donor organizations are hardly publicized. As a researcher, I spent more than four months 
to get the documents related to the NPT program. This process was so difficult with Nuffic. I got most of  the docu-
ments via personal relations (informal process) from Yemen. 
20 - It is also the case as anything coming from the north is acceptable within the recipient countries. In Yemen, for 
example, anything coming from outside is the magic solution for them, even if  these solutions are not suitable for the 
symptoms of  the disease they suffer from. Therefore, if  they have realistic solutions, they are unaware of  them and 
there is no recognition by donors for screening ideas and absorbed in their development policy. It is often a result of  a 
‘parent-child relationship’ whereby donor actors ‘teach’ recipient actors, rather than facilitating the access and impact of  
Southern voices in policy making process (one of  the interviewees noted). 
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contexts in the recipient countries. “In 1999 an official of another development bank 
said, somewhat despairingly, it is essential that donors stop appointing untrained 
people (usually economists) into public management reform, social impact 
assessment and community involvement jobs. The reverse would never be tolerated 
(say, asking social impact experts to do economic analysis …)” (Westcott, 1999 as 
cited in Jenkins and Plowden, 2006).
Even where there was an ability of some local knowledge actors to contribute to 
the process of incorporating local knowledge, the dominance of the English language 
was a limiting factor. The policy makers are often non-English speakers and readers, 
and they depend on translations. This is also an obstacle to actively participate in the 
policy development process. Moreover, this factor is linked to the diplomatic factor 
as the translation is often made by formal language, which excludes the informal 
aspects of local knowledge. As we discussed above, during the policy development 
the time is often too short to make inventory of researchers in languages other than 
English.
Regardless of the English problem, there is a major reason for engaging local 
experts and researchers, as they can act wisely and try to fill the gap of human direct 
interactions, and incorporate the local expatriates. The benefits of doing so go far 
deeper, than merely satisfying a local desire to be involved or providing a fig leaf of 
‘meetings’ in the strategic/policy level. Local experts can bring both understanding of 
the system and knowledge of current difficult realities. They can also have a role to 
promote the local knowledge, in non-human interactions, in the foreign aid arena, 
such as online networks; provide information to the macro-level decision-making 
processes about “subjective perceptions and opinions of the community members, 
their attitudes, mental models, cultural patterns and the informal institutions 
(semiotic context).” (Voten, 2013: 123). According to many of my interviews however, 
most online networks that have been established by donor agencies, or rely on their 
patronage, exclude local knowledge, experience, and ideas from the south. For 
example, the websites of MinBuza and Nuffic do not refer much to studies or reports 
developed by researchers from the south. Even if there are some studies, you will 
realize that the local knowledge with its “informal aspects” or the tacit component of 
knowledge is downplayed. Local knowledge is sometimes discussed or pointed out 
on the web, but it lacks the details to distinguish where it is different from one place, 
to another and from one time to another. Everyone who looks at these objects is 








information. There is ever-increasing complexity in finding consistent local 
knowledge, in areas where one really needs to know a little such of as informal aspects 
of the local knowledge (MinBuza, 2011). This partly explain why donor aid programs 
for promoting public sector reforms in poor countries, randomly jump from one 
reform wave to another, without analyzing and mapping the consequences of the 
previous wave, as was the case of the Dutch aid for higher education (see section 2 of 
this chapter). “This is in part related to the dramatic pace of change that makes earlier 
knowledge obsolete. One well-known expert argues that most of what we think we 
now know is just plain wrong” (Fukuda-Parr et al, 2002:239). 
Another important causal factor is the institutional memory within donor 
policymaking levels. It is always very weak, as there is no a systematic method to 
attract consultants to systematically analyze lessons from the experiences and apply 
them to the proposed programs of reforms. Therefore, the official literature and 
reports are full of ideas on what should be done, but they have nothing to say about 
the actual implementation of aid polices based on lesson learned in the past21. 
Unfortunately, there are no discussions amongst regulatory bodies such as parliament, 
chefs de cabinet, civil society organizations , related governmental and societal 
control organizations, within donor countries on why aid programs fail and how to 
propose programs that are more applicable. They have been even more silent about 
what should not have been done. Even when reform has been more or less successful, 
the reasons for these successes and the ways to further implement the aid programs, 
are not discussed with the responsible organizations and governments. Instead, the 
parliament and the chefs de cabinet receive another new proposal from a new minster 
and director with new directions, “leaving the field littered with the unanalyzed, 
unexplained wreckage of the earlier attempts” (Martens, et al. 2002:137). Even where 
those at the top genuinely want to take actions and change the aid system and process, 
advisers can be unrealistic about institutional realities, and too easily take assurances 
with little substance behind them at face value. The intermediaries of aid dominate 
the decision-making through the ambiguous information loop (Martens, et al. 
2002)22.
21 - When I was conducting my interviews with the donor actors who participated in the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, 
I asked whether Nuffic or MinBuza asked them to write a report about their experience and the lessons learned dur-
ing their mission in Yemen. The answer was for all of  them was a resounding no. Even the long-term expert or the 
local manager of  the Dutch-Yemen NPT program who stayed in Yemen for more than four years was not asked. This 
is regardless of  the formal evolution reports they normally conduct as a formal process in every project, which often 
show that everything is fine. The lack of  the institutional memory can partially explain why MinBuza has implemented 
since 1960s program after program changing in the reform content, and still today they are following the same changes 
without a real learning of  the local context.
22 - If  you have a new mission there is much research done on the lesson learned from the past. For example, it was 
370
*********
In conclusion, the analysis in the above section was testing our underlying 
hypothesis number 2, stating that incorporation of local knowledge in policy design, 
integrating formal and informal institutions and organizations in host governments 
or organizations, increases the effectiveness of aid programs. Reduced incorporation 
of local knowledge increases ineffectiveness of aid programs. The above analysis may 
suggest that the policy making process of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, might 
have not had the chance to incorporate LK with its informal aspects, leading to 
unsuccessful programs (see Chapter 9). The comprehensive, wide and social 
engineering development approach or top-down approach used by Dutch policy 
makers, could not detect the hidden obstacles or solutions of local knowledge. At the 
same time, the development associability approach that claims to make LK visible at 
policymaking level, failed to act towards the incorporation of the local knowledge, 
because of the six analyzed factors and the other related causal factors. Strikingly, 
anyhow, it seems that is difficult task to incorporate local knowledge at the strategic/
policy level, due to hidden or normative nature of the local knowledge itself and the 
process adopted by most the donors countries, including The Netherlands in 
designing aid programs23. As we explained in Chapters 4 and 9, this is also because of 
the rule of the game, as the information of the local contexts, is hidden information 
and not clearly identified. This information cannot be incorporated by holding some 
formal activities and by asking direct questions, because of its hidden nature. Instead 
this information has to be dealt with through interactions and the relationship during 
the implementation phase of a program. 
Accordingly, the analysis of the casual factors at the strategic/policy level of aid 
interventions may help to address part of the question, of why LKS occurred. Dvir 
and Lechler (2004) suggest that “while policymaking has no value to incorporate the 
local knowledge, changing polices during the policy implementation is everything” 
(cited in Ika et al, 2009: 65). Therefore, there is a possibility for the inappropriate and 
original policy design, to be promptly corrected by incorporating local knowledge 
during the implementation stage. Information on the processes of design and 
implementation of the programs is critical for policy makers and analysts in 
conducting the analysis of the aid policies, and for successful outcomes. In our study, 
interesting to find that there was one proposal that has been handed by the Yemeni authorities to more than ten donor 
countries during the last 20 years and more than five donor countries had funded this same proposal. The only change 
made by the Yemeni authorities was to alter the title of  the proposal. 
23 - There are several recommendations for the policy makers of  how they can overcome LKS at the policymaking 








the implementers (contactors) of aid programs and projects are “players at the heart 
of the aid intervention process”, because they are able to solve the knowledge problems 
through their direct and indirect interactions with all actors involved in the process, 
from both donor and recipient sides. In this sense, we should move to analyze the 
factors creating the LKS during the policy implementation, focusing on the factors 
related to the middle management level, which is responsible for conducting the plan 
of implementation. 
Based on the associability development approach, we now test hypothesis number 
3 which states that incorporation of local knowledge during the implementation 
stage leads, to greater openness to local realities, not foreseen in the design stage, and 
reduces the probability that aid programs or projects need redesigning, increasing 
their effectiveness. The main intention is to explain why we have more and less 
successful projects related to the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, as presented and 
analyzed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Sometimes LK incorporated well in one region, may 
fall short in another setting. Finally, the findings from these two tested hypotheses 
allows us to propose a new practical model, that can ensure the process of incorporating 
LK at the policy implementation level and thus promoting public sector reforms in 
poor nations.
10.3 Policy Analysis at the Implementation Level (Middle Management Level)
Here we discuss the processes that affect the incorporation of local knowledge 
through the NPT policy implementation. However, prior to the discussion of these 
processes, I briefly link the aid policy implementation to the main theoretical debate 
of the policy implementation, reviewed in Chapter 3 of this study and the above 
section of this chapter. This is in order to give a practical definition of aid policy 
implementation. In practice in aid policy, there is still a separation in policy-making 
and policy implementation, following the synoptic approach or the top-down 
approach of policy implementation. Policy-making is mainly done by the donor 
organizations and contractors do policy implementation. For example, MinBuza 
makes policy under influence of the main multilateral donors, and then hands the 
policy implementation over to the middle management, in the form of programs and 
projects within a framework decided by MinBuza. Often this framework is too 
narrow for the middle management (and also for implementers who come at a lower 
level), to integrate lessons learned from projects where reference is made to LK, and 
so feedback which could have contributed to a more effective policy decision making 
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and implementation is neglected. The feedback from the implementers of their 
experiences in the field, is not much used in reviewing the policy-making of the 
donors. LK can only be collected through experiences in the field and if donors are 
hardly using the field information, LK will not appear in the policy-making.
This study theoretically argues against the synoptic approach, which is adapted by 
the donor organizations, as it did not and will not adequately address the problematic 
nature of LKS. There are many reasons for this. First, it is a challenge according to the 
current practice in the aid system to, incorporate informal information on LK of 
specific setting and time of aid project intervention, during the policymaking process. 
Second, the broken feedback loop from the field or the lower level to the higher level 
within the aid system, as we mentioned above. Third, the geographical separation of 
where the aid policy is formulated (in the capital of a donor country) and where the 
actual aid policy implementation takes place (in a recipient country). 
In this study, we argue that there is possibility to incorporate information on LK 
during the actual policy implementation process. The implementation of an aid 
policy is the most vital phase, as it is at this stage that the success or failure of an aid 
project is determined. During the plan implementation process, which is the 
responsibility of the middle management level, there might be a chance of including 
LK if time and money are made available for doing research. Since there is often no 
time and insufficient money, this seldom happens.
Accordingly, I agree with Rondinelli that if we establish an effective model that 
ensures the incorporation of local knowledge, the aid policymaking and 
implementation must be more closely integrated or linked in order to reduce 
uncertainties and unknowns of local settings in the recipient countries (Rondinelli, 
2003). However, I want to argue more that LK is only manifesting itself during the 
interactions at implementation level and that there are a number of processes, which 
prevent the plan for implementation conducted by the middle management to 
integrate LK effectively. Therefore, this study focuses on projects, because they are 
particularly designed to translate policy goals into actions. As we mentioned in the 
previous section, the implementers (contactors) of aid projects are “the players at the 
heart of the aid intervention process”, because their advantage is to solve the LKS 
through their direct and indirect interactions, with all actors involved in the actual 
process of implementation in the specific places and time. It may allow us to develop 
variations in the level of incorporating local knowledge across the selected NPT 








showed varied results among the selected projects as we have more and less effective 
projects in terms of achieving their overall and specific objectives. 
Nuffic as Planner for Implementing the NPT program24
MinBuza designed the policy framework of the Dutch NPT program in 2001, 
with the overall objective to help developing countries strengthen their institutional 
capacity for post-secondary education and training, in a sustainable way that equips 
them to meet their own needs for training and manpower. The programme was 
targeted at post-secondary education and training capacity, relevant to the sectors 
targeted for Dutch bilateral aid and to cross-sectoral or supra-sectoral themes. More 
general support to the higher education sector was also a possibility (Aa, et al., 
2007:11). The overall objective of the NPT program in Yemen was to strengthen the 
teaching learning conditions, the overall capacity of institutions, the higher education 
system, and the institutions which are part of the system. It aimed to raise the capacity 
and quality of higher education to provide services for promoting capacity 
development within the Yemeni public, private and non-governmental sectors (Visser 
and Almoassib, 2008:1).25
MinBuza selected Nuffic to manage the NPT program over 15 participating 
countries26, by following a tender process, where Nuffic had to bid against other 
organizations. MinBuza as the policy-maker handed over the policy framework to 
Nuffic, as the middle manager who handed on its turn this policy framework over to 
the contractors as the policy-implementers. However, as we will later see in the 
discussions on the project implementation, the framework set by MinBuZa and by 
Nuffic did not leave much room open to absorb LK, let alone integrate it in the 
decision-making process. Up to this point, an immediate question I asked the 
interviewees is ‘what is your opinion about the tender procedures on which Nuffic 
was selected to manage the NPT program?’. One reply was the role of the middle 
management level27 specified by the policymaking level (MinBuZa). One interviewee’s 
24 - All the information presented in this section is mainly based on the official documents of  the NPT program and the 
interviews that I conducted during the field study (1/6/2013 to 19/9/2013). 
25 - For more details about the overall objective of  the NPT program and the Dutch aid in the cross-sectoral or supra-
sectoral themes in recipient countries including Yemen see Chapter 6. 
26 - The countries that participate in the NPT have been selected by MinBuZa from among the countries with which 
the Netherlands has multi-year cooperation arrangements. The NPT programme is being implemented in the following 
15 countries: (1) Benin (2) Colombia (3) Eritrea (4) Ethiopia (5) Ghana (6) Guatemala (7) Indonesia (8) Mozambique 
(9) Rwanda (10) South Africa (11) Tanzania (12) Uganda (13) Vietnam (14) Yemen (15) Zambia (see Nuffic website). 
27 - As we mentioned before, Nuffic represents the middle management level of  NPT program implementation process. 
The middle management level is defined as an actor practicing both a subordinate role and a supervisory role, located 
between the level of  policymaking and the operational level (Floyd and Lane 2000).The middle management is also 
the integrative agent between the donor government or its direct provider and the recipient organization and its direct 
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profound statement was that:
The bidding criteria for obtaining the management of the NPT were designed by 
MinBuZa in such a way that only an administrative office could qualify. The bidders 
were not asked to bring innovative or development thoughts or actions, but stick to 
the NPT policy and implementation framework. When Nuffic won the tender it 
received this framework and aside from slight adaptations, Nuffic did not get the 
opportunity to bring in the knowledge and experiences the project managers had 
collected from implementing programmes in former Higher Education Development 
programmes, such as MHO and before PUO. With this framework, MinBuZa also 
lost its opportunity to collect LK within the Higher Education sectors of the different 
countries. This could have had a more positive effect on the policy-making and 
policy-implementation of the NPT program28.
MinBuZa could opt for an administrative organization or a development to 
implement the NPT It is not clear why MinBuZa selected an administrative 
organization (Nuffic) rather than opting for a development organization. Possibly it 
was the fear that working outside the already-existing templates would lead to more 
work. The main difference between these two kinds of organizations are that the 
administrative organization will carefully apply the framework with all its rules and 
regulations, trying to avoid exceptions, and the development organization will put 
much attention to practical solutions for problems arising from the implementation 
of the program, and analyze what patterns could be discovered to tilt the 
implementation process to higher levels. Thomas (2007) explains that there are 
specific questions concerning the development aid agencies to develop the ideas of 
‘the right thing to do’ over local or national autonomy. It was clear for him that 
management of a development process involves challenges not only over what is the 
recipient organization(s). Middle management links the donor government with the recipient government, and the do-
nor contractors with their counterparts. Actually, any marginal role at this level will lead to a contradiction in ideas and 
expectations of  the program among the respective actors. Moreover, in this level, there is ability to affect and change aid 
intervention directions, considerations, insertions, and objectives into direct recipient organizations practical perspec-
tives and contexts (Rosalia Aldraci, et al, 2009).
28 - I asked the interviewees the following question: Do you see that Nuffic as an organization for development or 
is it focusing more on money moving? One interviewee said that Nuffic should be confined to learn more in what 
they do. Nuffic should be aware if  it is an administrative unit and it is main mission is to distribute money based on 
their own administrative procedures. In this case, Nuffic should check if  their administrative procedures are respected 
or not in doing their administrative duties. ON THE OTHER HAND, Nuffic can say that it is a development organiza-
tion, which has its development vision and the institutional memory for learning from their experiences. Nuffic should 
develop along, if  this project or that does not work, it should be there a more room to divide. Nuffic wants to be learned 
organization to have a lot of  knowledge of  the implementation process; but in the reality, it has many constraints. Nuf-
fic is an administrative organization that often get money from the government, and this money should be distributed 
quickly under the conditions that there should be a high impact of  the projects. Nuffic should bring to the surface some 
outcomes for the taxpayers and the parliament in The Netherlands. There is no a room to compromise quality. In this 
kind of  approach, at the end after 4 years, the evaluation will take place, the same subjects such as gender is important, 
and institution development is important. So, the highest objectives are more moved to the background. “In reality, I see 
this in Nuffic very often that in one hand they have very beautiful words in their programs but in the reality they are an 








right thing to do but also over what must be the guiding principles or values of 
development itself by explaining its own “normative stance” (2007, in Jaradat, 2008).
Let us now look at the role of Nuffic as an administrative organization, in managing 
the NPT program in the context of Yemen. It was pointed out by the interviewees that 
Nuffic has no specialized staff with knowledge in managing the aid projects in Yemen. 
The policy framework [MinBuZa] posted several lines of development, which needed 
different type of expertise that could not be found in one organization, and they 
needed an aid sector specialism within the organization or even a field management 
specialist.
After Nuffic won the MinBuZa tender evaluation, it started with a Plan of 
Implementation (POI), which according to the final evaluation document of 2012 of 
the NPT program conducted by Ramboll Foundation on behalf of the MinBuza, 
followed a linear process of four phases: (1) the demand identification, (2) the demand 
articulation, (3) the tender procedure and (4) the project implementation. Nuffic 
mainly conducted the first three phases and Dutch contractors who were responsible 
of the actual implementation process of the aid projects (the operational level) 
conducted the last phase.
Figure 10.1 The Linear Phases of the NPT’s POI in Yemen
The demand identification phase is the core of the planning process for 
implementation, which is aimed at identifying the possibilities of building capacity in 
reality. It consists of four processes: information and research, fact-finding missions, 
implementation plan and selection of partners (Raetzell, 2012). Nuffic started this 
phase by conducting a “desk research” for collecting and analyzing international and 
national information and data on the recipient countries. One interviewee expressed 
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and national information and data on the recipient countries. One interviewee expressed doubts about the 
value of the desk rese rch, a  Nuffic was confronted with 15 NPT countries and with a short time 
schedule set by MinBuza. Hence, there was not much room for Nuffic to deal with the details of all those 
countries and to get information about the peculiarities of each country, thus developing a well thought 
of NPT program implementation plan. The main input in this desk research remained limited to available 
global and related donors’ knowledge, as we argued in former section, and little or no attention paid to 
informal local knowledge, such as “salaries are low, so there is little motivation among staff to do 
additional work” or “recruitment is based on relationships than on merits”.  
                                                 
 
29 -  The note here is related to the fact that these processes were not linear in reality, but parallel mainly due to time and money constraints.  
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doubts about the value of the desk research, as Nuffic was confronted with 15 NPT 
countries and with a short time schedule set by MinBuza. Hence, there was not much 
room for Nuffic to deal with the details of all those countries and to get information 
about the peculiarities of each country, thus developing a well thought of NPT 
program implementation plan. The main input in this desk research remained limited 
to available global and related donors’ knowledge, as we argued in former section, 
and little or no attention paid to informal local knowledge, such as “salaries are low, 
so there is little motivation among staff to do additional work” or “recruitment is 
based on relationships than on merits”. 
It was mentioned by interviewees that for Yemen, the desk study was mainly 
limited to getting knowledge from existing information and data on Yemen in general 
and the Higher Education sector in particular. The basic document for Higher 
Education was the report that was developed for the Learning and Innovation Credit 
project of the World Bank. Time and money were not reserved for undertaking part 
of the desk research in Yemen itself. Experiences of other countries already engaged 
in the NPT or former Nuffic programmes were used as well. In this way, the fact-
finding mission was organized on the available data and it was expected that during 
the mission itself and during implementation of the NPT projects, more information 
would be collected for further use. The question here is if more local knowledge was 
available, would the fact-finding mission and further implementation have differed 
from what actually happened? For example, informal local knowledge on the general 
lack of a scholarly approach among Yemeni university teachers, and an overall 
resistance to additional knowledge and skills might have stopped Nuffic or NPT 
investment in the Yemeni universities. If the formal local knowledge on the HE 
system, in which the university rectors are at the same level as the Minister of Higher 
Education and not in a subordinated position, was used, it might have been that the 
coordinator of the NPT programme would have been sought at the level of the Prime 
Minister’s Office; where the universities and Ministry of Higher Education meet each 
other through the Council for Higher Education and not at the level of the Vice-
Minister of Higher Education. It was only during the implementation phase that this 
construction between Vice-Minister and Rectors was discovered. The choice for the 
Vice-Minister was a logical step, following the World Bank report in which the Vice-
Minister had participated, and following the advice of the Dutch Embassy, that had 
good relations with the Vice Minister. Luckily the Vice-Minister was a charismatic 








period, as we see later29.
On the other hand, it was clearly experienced by some interviewers that Nuffic 
just did quick desk research, which left it open to the “local knowledge syndrome”. 
The worst-case scenario is that the plan of Dutch-Yemen NPT program was based 
upon just collection of loose ideas, precepts and positions published in the online 
networks. One interviewed aid official commented: “Most of the donors’ agencies 
including Nuffic put the local knowledge incorporation process in its abstract level. 
This is because if they put the local knowledge in its real sense, it will work against 
their tender proposal for getting the fund from the policy making level. ‘Interviewers 
noted’ that conducting development strategy resulted from a process of rigorous 
research and an institutional analysis of the targeted organizations will show that 
their “tender proposal” will not work and it does not fit with the main intentions of 
the NPT program”. 
Eshuchi (2009) evoked the same factor in his study about the donor programs to 
promote the higher education sectors in Africa. The author pointed out: 
Most donor programs in higher education do not earmark funding for research 
on higher education in Africa. Policy and practice can be better informed by empirical 
data regarding various issues and success indicators in higher education such as 
graduate absorption rates in the labor market and labor market needs. Yet a lot of 
donors involved in the support for higher education either ignore research on higher 
education completely or mostly use data from the World Bank, which though being 
acknowledged as an authoritative source, is hardly up to data and most of its data is 
specifically tailored to its own needs. Thus, most programs are based on sketchy, or 
even wrong, data and this affects their viability and eventual success (2009: 42).
**********
In the fact-finding phase, Nuffic held a meeting in Aden on 22 January 2003, with 
representatives of the MHESR, the Yemeni universities and Community Colleges and 
the World Bank, the Dutch Embassy, The British Council and the NUFFIC. The 
meeting marked the launch of the Higher Education Project (HEP), financed by a 
Learning and Innovation Credit of the World Bank. NUFFIC’s participation in the 
meeting was to achieve “optimal coordination and complementarity between the 
29 The respondents of  the Dutch interviews reflected their ideas on their rule in the process of  the demand identification 
in their responses to the following questions: ‘what was Nuffic’s specific role during the identification process of  NPT 
program in Yemen?’ The rule of  Nuffic is limited in formulating the conditions, which would allow us [Nuffic] to set 
up the capacity-building program in Yemen. This rule started by setting with the Higher Education sector in Yemen to 
see which inputs the NPT can contribute to improve the higher education system and the higher education institutions, 
which are part of  the system. However, Nuffic program has certain futures that they should stick to, as the program is 
worldwide that operates in different countries and it was not only operating in the Yemeni context. However, the Yemeni 
context was unique in this regard [they noted]. Yemen was much unfamiliar case and no one basically knows how things 
are going in Yemen. The expiration of  the special interests and the priorities of  reform were determined only by the 
Yemenis. We set up the NPT program based on the information we got from two sources: the vice minister of  the higher 
education ministry by personalized approach and the World Bank project as mentioned above about it.
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various support efforts to Yemeni higher education.” Because it had already been 
decided, for undoubtedly good reasons, that the NPT effort would be an integrated 
contribution to, and in fact piggybacked onto, the HEP, the question of what needs 
ought to be served was no longer investigated in a manner recommended by the 
acknowledged literature on needs assessment (Visser and Almoassib,2008:7-8). To 
assist in the HEP implementation the following NPT sectors were selected: 
Information and Communication Technology, Public and Business Administration 
at postgraduate level, Basic Sciences and Gender. Furthermore, it was equally 
determined during the same meeting that “initially all seven public universities and 
the three community colleges” would participate in, and therefore be the institutional 
beneficiaries of, the NPT effort. With this last decision made by the MoHESR 
representatives, the Selection of Partners phase could be shifted to a later moment 
during the Project Articulation. The Identification phase was closed with the handing 
over of the Project formats to the representatives of the universities and the 
Community Colleges. They were asked by the Vice Minister and Nuffic to submit 
proposals as soon as possible with the requested information. 
There are many factors mentioned by the interviewees, which made the fact-
finding missions ineffective in playing a role toward incorporating information on 
local knowledge. In general, it was stated that the fact-finding mission phase to 
Yemen was too short. The data collected during the desk research did not give 
members of the team sufficient knowledge to discuss NPT’s wishes, and wants with 
the Yemeni representatives. The time during the first meeting was merely sufficient to 
exchange the main characteristics of the NPT program with the main features of the 
HE sector. Time to do a more detailed study was not given and would probably also 
not have been welcomed by the Yemeni representatives. What remained, however, 
was that the Nuffic mission returned with a little further information and the Yemeni 
counterparts were left behind with a lot of questions on what should come, and only 
with the certainty that money would be invested in their HE system.
The interviews evoked several questions, such as, would more Local Knowledge 
have resulted in a better selection than the four areas and the Yemeni partners? For 
example, would information that in Yemen most academics and leaders in the Higher 
Education sector hardly read reports or literature have prevented Nuffic from taken 
actions towards this attitude in this stage? Maybe with this information more pressure 
could have been exercised on the Rectors to stimulate their staff, but that could have 








influences on the documents to be drafted and signed by the leaders with regards to 
the Plan of Implementation and the respective Plans of Operations.
The second mission of Nuffic to Sana’a in May 2003, can be considered as the first 
step in the Demand Articulation phase, where the information packages were 
collected from the Yemeni partners, discussed and prioritized. Nevertheless, 
according to the Yemenis interviewed, Nuffic, in close cooperation with the Embassy, 
also decided to include two more sectors, namely Water and Health – two focal areas 
of the Embassy that got less funding through the Netherlands’ bilateral aid. One can 
agree with the statement that ‘in line with the Dutch assistance approach towards 
capacity building, the selected sectors dovetail well with the aims and basic principles 
of Dutch development policy, as formulated in the track of the international trends of 
education policy framework’ (Ruud van der Aa, 2007, 166). The NPT program was 
linked to the traditional bilateral sectors of the Netherlands’ development cooperation: 
(1) water and sanitation, (2) health and (3) education, and also focusing on 
crosscutting themes: (1) gender, (2) good governance, (3) institutional development 
and (4) ICT 30(see Chapter 6). 
The interviewees were also asked the following questions: Do you see a clear 
Yemeni expression of interest in the selected priority areas or did the Yemeni 
representatives just go along with the Netherlands’ priorities? Did the NPT program 
request that the projects should be integrated in the overall reform of the Ministry of 
Higher Education? Were the fact-finding missions effective to formulate development 
priorities that were sufficiently realistic to allocate NPT funding? On what basis did 
you make your judgment? It is worthwhile to reiterate here that many of the 
interviewees indicated that Yemeni partners had no a clear idea about what they 
30 - Good governance, for example, was developed through the MPA, MBA, and NIAS projects. One would have ex-
pected detailed analysis and reports on the selected priority areas. Instead, only outlines were proposed, like Christmas 
wish lists. In any case, fourteen projects related to the Dutch-Yemen NPT program were identified and implemented 
in different organizations within the higher education sector in Yemen to reform these sectors. These were: (1) Reform 
and Development of  Problem-Based Learning Approach at Hadhramout Medical College (HUCOM) in Mukahla; (2) 
Strengthening the Higher Education Project Management Unit to Manage the NPT in Yemen/MoHESR; (3) Develop-
ing an ICT Policy for the Yemen Higher Education System and Master Plans for ten institutions of  Higher Learning; 
(4) establishment of  an MBA Degree Programme at Sana’a University; (5)Strengthening the Water and Environment 
Centre of  Sana’a University: Graduate Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management; (6) Women’s Research 
and Training Centre (WRTC), Aden University; (7) Strengthening Basic Science Education in Yemen/ Mathematics 
And Science Teacher Education Reform in Yemen “MASTERY”; (8) Establishment of  an executive MPA Degree Pro-
gramme at Sana’a University; (9) Strengthening the Ministry of  Higher Education and Scientific Research MoHESR in 
managing foreign assistance projects including the NPT and NFP in Yemen; (10) Strengthening the Ministry of  Techni-
cal Education & Vocational Training (MTEVT) and Sana’a Community College and the Industrial Technical Institute, 
Muala, Aden; (11) Strengthening the Ministry of  Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR); (12) Phase 1 
implementation of  the Yemen Foundation of  Information Technology in Higher Education (YFIT-HE); (13) Phase 2 
implementation of  the Yemen Foundation of  Information Technology in Higher Education (YFIT-HE); and (14) Train-
ing implementation of  the Yemen Foundation of  Information Technology in Higher Education (YFIT-HE Training).
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wanted to achieve, and how. They were incapable of make a clear analysis of their 
situation at their respective universities since no strategies were available and reliable 
data could not be produced. It is therefore unlikely that they would be able to present 
strategic proposals for developing their universities. The Yemeni partners agreed 
with the Netherlands’ priorities, as long as the NPT would start. The proposals 
brought forward by the different universities and colleges were far from what Nuffic 
expected to receive. The proposals lacked most situational information, had no clear 
objectives and aims, or a sound work strategy. Most projects consisted of lists of 
equipment needed in the selected fields and training of staff.
Let us now analyze the second mission in terms of local knowledge. Many 
interviewees stated that, due to the fact that on request of the MoHESR all seven 
public universities and all community colleges could participate in the programme, 
there was no moment for Nuffic, and the whole selection process was a Southern 
affair. The complication for Nuffic and later the implementers was that they were not 
sure that they were working with the most capable institutions. The reasoning of 
putting one university in a better position than the other was never put on paper and 
discussed (see also Chapter 9). It was demonstrated that some projects were 
unsuccessful because of the selection of the wrong university, faculty and managers. 
Often during the implementation phase, contractors were confronted with university 
leaders who claimed that the selected sectors were not their priorities, but from the 
donors.
Another point is that Nuffic, not knowing the Yemeni HE sector, relied too much 
on secondary information and on contacts through third persons. In the latter case, 
the Dutch Embassy had good contacts with the Vice-Minister, through cooperation 
in Basic Education programmes. However, the Ministry of Higher Education is quite 
different from the Ministry of Basic Education. The fact that universities had their 
own financial links directly to the Ministry of Finance, and that they had their own 
responsibilities in defining their role, in the society, placed the Ministry in a more 
advising than leading role during the NPT development and implementation in 
Yemen.
The majority of rectors did not speak English and were dependent on the 
translation and interpretation, during the workshops where the NPT was explained 
and negotiations took place. The atmosphere set by the officials, was that everyone 
should be positive on the propositions from the Nuffic and the Embassy, because 








totally unrecognizable by the recipients, for whom the NPT was probably the first 
time that they had to deal with foreign donors. The ‘open discussions’ did not invite 
university representatives to give much comment during the negotiations between 
the official representative of MoHESR, Nuffic and the Embassy. This was more or less 
in line with what I explained in Chapter 4 that in principle, the top men speak and 
decide and it is only during implementation that alternatives appear. The top-men at 
all levels of administrative hierarchy are looking towards their organizations, as they 
are their groups of families or tribes. Most of the top men always claim they know 
which is right and wrong to an organization business. 
The aforementioned lack of reading capability (in English) among academics and 
leaders, meant that the project proposals with all the questions and explanations were 
quickly put aside or given to lower ranks, who tried to make the best out of them. 
Rectors and directors with the right informal channels to the top man profited, in 
presenting their proposals despite not having the information. 
In responding to the time and finance pressures of MinBuZa, Nuffic behaved as a 
good administrative organization. Critics might question why Nuffic, confronted 
with a terra incognita, did not develop a more explanatory guideline without too 
much jargon, to make the counterparts more familiar with donor aid and expectations 
from the donor side once involved in the NPT program. A development organization 
would have made more effort to undertake a situational analysis, to know the in and 
outs of the Higher Education in Yemen. It would have taken into consideration that 
it would take time and also money, to get the trust of the interviewees to bring forward 
not only the formal, but also the informal information of the HE system and its 
structure.
Nuffic followed different steps to come to a Plan of Implementation. It answered 
to the wishes of MinBuZa to get the programme in Yemen started within a short 
period. For that reason, the time between the first identification mission and the 
second articulation mission was only three months. Due to the lack of local knowledge, 
it was confronted with selections of persons and institutes by the Yemeni partners, 
but not on clear criteria. This required NPT Country Managers in The Hague to solve 
problems at a later stage that could have been foreseen if LK, and in particular formal 
LK, had been available from the beginning. 
Instead of organizing a thorough situation analysis of the higher education in 
Yemen, the three parties found the solution to give the developmental role to a Yemen 
NPT Project Coordinator through a NPT project, helping Nuffic to regain the 
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administrative role again. Most problems arising from informal and formal LK could 
be solved through the Vice-Minister of HESR and this Project Coordinator. 
The question then becomes: what is a practical method to incorporate LK during 
the process of demand identification? To answer this question, the respondents 
indicated that to deal with countries which have a “weak capacity” like Yemen, Nuffic 
should have first of all conducted rigorous research and consultation and a thorough 
institutional analysis of the targeted organizations. The institutional analysis is 
essential, because of many reasons. The first is the inexperience of Nuffic, regarding 
different aspects of Yemeni higher education system and the ignorance of the Yemeni 
higher education system with the NPT program. It was the first program for Nuffic to 
deal with in the context of Yemeni higher education sector. Moreover, it was the first 
reform program to be implemented in the Yemeni higher education’s system by a 
donor country. Therefore the NPT program in Yemen was a new experience for both 
sides. The second reason is that institutional analysis will be used as basis or backup 
for the future implementation processes of the NPT program in Yemen. The third is 
the local knowledge in the secondary resources from the experience of projects in 
other countries, which are just assumed to be similar for Yemen under the argument 
that all developed countries have more or less the same characterics. Many 
interviewees expressed that taking information from different settings and trying to 
adopt it, for example taking information from Uganda to Yemen, is an abstract action 
toward incorporating local knowledge because every country has its own set of 
circumstances.
********
Demand articulation is composed of three processes: information packages for 
the requesting organizations, project outline, and capacity self-assessment (Raetzell, 
2012). A relevant question here would be, whether there is any relationship between 
the LKS and the other variables related to the aforementioned processes. Surprisingly, 
the interviewees’ responses were clear that the lack of information on local knowledge 
collected during demand identification, repeats itself during the demand articulation. 
Nuffic requested the national NPT program manager in The Hague, to propose local 
experts to assist in the development of the project’s terms of reference. Together with 
a Northern partner the projects outlines were developed. The Yemeni interviewees 
noted that the information packages sent to the participating institutions were for 
many Yemeni managers, their first experience with foreign aid programs. They faced 








project jargon and it was difficult to collecting certain data, as it was normally 
produced by their institutes. For many institutions a development policy was not 
available, and staff development plans, teaching skills assessments, and descriptions 
of functions, faculties, departments and units were non-existent. Some used the 
national coordinator as the middleman, to be on the list with a minimum of deaf 
requested and make of the analysis leaking. This also gave the national coordinator 
the power to assist those requests were familiar to them. It not surprising then that 
the University of Sana’a participated in five projects out of 15 projects allocated in 
Yemen as part of the NPT program. 
The most interesting comments were related to the project outline, it was difficult 
for the selected institutions to develop and they got assistance from the NPT program 
coordinator. Since neither the Ministry of Higher Education, nor the national NPT 
program coordinator would come up with the needed assistance, the Dutch Embassy 
and Nuffic decided to develop a project in which the Dutch consulate, would help in 
collecting the formal data, mainly for the projects’ terms of reference. Even with this 
assistance, it was difficult to get the requested SWOT analysis. The Yemeni partners 
were supposed to give the local knowledge to make the project implementation 
visible; however, they could deviate from the formal information. Since each piece of 
information about the staff, curriculum, courses and equipment had to pass all 
through all levels-the head of sections, the faculty council, and the university council-
each weakness and deviation from the legal processes were heavily sanitized, and not 
stated in the final version. The possibilities to integrate local knowledge diminished 
greatly through these exercises. 
We can make several observations here. The first is that actors from both the 
Yemeni side and the Dutch side were incapable of including information on local 
knowledge. It was there a clear lack of formal and informal data on the structure, 
organization, management and staffing and the censorship at the various levels did 
not provide a good picture of the targeted institutes31. The second is if we consider all 
31 - It is so important to incorporate informal information about the social dynamics of  the organizations with which you 
are dealing with. We argued in Chapter 4 of  this study and confirmed it by the practical examples discussed in Chapter 9 
that the functioning of  the higher education institutions in Yemen is affected by many administrative and social dynamics 
and deeply-rooted values and patterns of  behavior. These include attitudes to hierarchy and seniority (top men), to tribe 
and family, to ‘political’ and to ‘appointed’ staff, to political party and to personal gain an advantage as compared with 
any sense of  the public interest. Other relevant issues include the significance of  money as a motivator, or of  formal 
rules, compared with the informal expectations and self-policing patterns of  behavior of  those who work in the system 
and who have accepted its norms. For example, it was found in Chapter 9 regarding curriculum design and teaching 
that in a situation where northern staff  are seen as external experts whose inputs needed to be paid for, but southern 
staff ’s inputs are seen as counterpart support that cannot be paid from donor funds, there is always the possibility of  
tension developing in the partnership. It worsens in countries like Yemen where a local salary is about one-tenth of  the 
external experts.
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the processes initiated by Nuffic to plan for implementing the NPT program in 
Yemen, one can find that there is academic planning with little mention of the reality 
of having little time and limited funding. The linear academic planning is often 
traversed by perilous planning skipping different stages (see figure 10.2 below). The 
other interesting result is that, the demand of identification and articulation processes 
about the higher education system in Yemen was not understood. The information 
provided was short, even on the formal aspects of the Yemeni higher education 
system. 
The third observation we can make is that the information in the project outlines, 
did not give the Dutch contractors the information to prepare for problems, they 
could face, confronted with the local situation in the actual implementation. It may 
be the case that the actual implementation of the projects became just a lottery if they 
were succeeded or not. This systematic observation leads us on to discuss the last 
process, which is the actual implementation of the selected four NPT projects in 
Yemen. This is to see if there is variation among the selected aid projects in level of 
incorporation of LK in the specific place and time, in a way that can explain why we 
have more and less effective aid projects. 
**********
Before turning to analyze the actual implementation of the NPT projects and their 
relation to the LKS, I wish to discuss the last phase of the Plan of Implementation, the 
tender procedures with a focus on the evaluation grid and tender evaluation and 
their relations with LK. The debate in this section is based on the answers to the 
following questions to Nuffic, tenderers and Yemeni partners: Could you explain 
your evaluation grid for tender proposals? Was this grid used for all NPT projects or 
was it adapted to the individual projects? Why was only a minor percentage given for 
local expertise? With increasing local knowledge, is it to be expected that this 
percentage will increase as well? What were the main comments and concerns of 
these teams (tenders) in the project proposals, with regard to local knowledge? What 
were the main issues discussed during the contract negotiation? Did you introduce 
the winning contractor to their Yemeni partners or was it left to the contractor him/









Figure 10.2 Typical Assessment Criteria of the Bidding Process (Nuffic Adapted 
Model of the EC)
Source: (Nuffic’s Sheets, 2003; Jenkins, and Plowden, 2006)
I use the answers to these questions to highlight my argument why LK is hardly or 
not measured in the evaluation of the tender proposals. Our aim is to highlight some 
notions, which cast serious questions on the relation between the tender procedure 
and the LKS. 
Let us now turn to the first point which provoked the interviewers. The tender 
prescribes several criteria, but within these attached criteria to select the bidders (the 
contractors) in competitive process, there is no criterion related to the experience 
within the country concerned. That shows how LK was downplayed in the first place. 
According to some interviewees, Nuffic was simply following the European 
Commission approach, which as Jenkins and Plowden (2008) explain includes 
categories such as organization and methodology (rationale 20%, strategy 20% and 
timetable 10%). The other 50% is divided according to qualifications and skills, and 
general and specific professional experience.
In this project, Nuffic adapted the EC criteria as follows (Nuffic, TEC reports, 
2003):
(1) Capacity of the applicant organization/consortium. This includes 
several categories. The applicant organization/consortium has to show that it 
has knowledge and experience of education and training in the subject area 
of the project in question. The applicant organization/consortium has specific 
project implementation experience in the region with the subject matter in 
question. 
(2) Substantive quality of the proposed project that includes items such 
understanding of the needs and problems (quality of the analysis of the 
problem and its context). 
(3) Technical quality of the proposed project that includes items such as 
logical coherence between objectives, planned results, activities, required 
resource, indicators and sources of verification. 
(4) Quality of the team members that includes experience and expertise 
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of the project director and team members. 
(5) Use of regional capacity that includes the degree to which possibilities 
for education and training which already exist in the region (not belonging 
to the counterpart sector and its organizations) will be used, and the degree 
to which local or regional expertise (not belonging to the counterpart sector 
and its organizations) will be enlisted for the project. 
(6) Price: one point for each 1.5% the budget falls below the maximum 
possible amount of the project.
The first two criteria are not requesting specific knowledge about the recipient 
country or region. The tenderer can use experiences from other countries to show 
they have sufficient organization and substantive quality. Furthermore the technical 
quality criterion does not necessitate a visit to the recipient country. 
With regards to criterion 4, most bidders know it is good to have a Team Leader 
with experience in the region. For example if someone is working for a consultancy 
agency in education reform in Saudi Arabia and that firm is going to bid for the 
proposal, the bidder is lucky, because it will get points for the experience of the 
company and additional points for their expert. Regarding the use of Regional 
Capacity, again a trip to the recipient country is not required, as information can be 
garnered on the internet or through connections from former projects, and intentions 
exchanged with future institutions in the region once the bidder has won the contract. 
According to interviewees the only opportunity to put in LK was when the strategy 
and workplan were developed. 
It is however not wise to put too much LK in the proposal, in order not to confuse 
the partner organization in Yemen with information, that might give another 
interpretation of the situation than they perceive themselves. The same was 
experienced with innovative proposals, where the Yemeni partners no longer 
recognized what was being discussed during the writing of the Terms of Reference. 
The consequence was that the scores decreased from the Yemeni side. One contractor 
mentioned that he always paid a visit to the country, for which he was going to bid in 
order to see the future setting. He acknowledged that three or four days were not 
sufficient to analyze the total situation, but he said that showing his face was 
appreciated by the counterparts. He mentioned that actual meetings with the 
counterparts, were officially forbidden during the development of the tender proposal, 
but he did not want to make the decision to bidding only from his desk in the 








mentioned that it was not LK that gave you high scores, but the use of words that were 
in fashion, such as gender, marketing strategies, ownership, and sustainability. The 
safest way was to stick close to the Terms of Reference without too many details.
Therefore, concerning the evaluation grid, the interviewees observed that there is 
actually no criterion directly related to local knowledge. Is local knowledge stimulated 
by inviting a Southern evaluator in the tender evaluation committee? The tender 
evaluation committee, consist of three evaluators: the first, in most cases, the Nuffic 
programme coordinator for that particular country; the second, a Southern evaluator, 
in most cases someone who was closely involved in the development of the proposal; 
and a third evaluator, an external person, in most cases an expert in the area of the 
project content. One of the evaluators acts as the chairperson. It is assumed that 
Nuffic and the Southern expert will cover the ‘specific country or regional experiences’. 
The process of evaluating is transparent: each evaluator will receive a grid in which 
they have to fill in their own assessments of the proposals. The scores are discussed 
within the team whenever there are differences in opinions. Together they come to a 
final score. 
Although the processes are transparent, one of the major problems found is that 
the assessment of proposals is totally new for the Southern partner. They are suddenly 
bombarded with four or five negotiations and no guidelines are given on how to read 
these proposals, how to translate the project jargons, and how to quickly read the 
skills and knowledge from the presented CVs. As long as the background information 
and workplan is recognizable, they feel safe. Deviations from the original plan, such 
as details on the environment the bidder intends to work on with, or innovative 
approaches are not very much appreciated and as already mentioned will lead often 
to lower scores. One of the main difficulties mentioned is the assessment of CVs of 
the expert team. A checklist on how to read them was not given and for that reason 
the Yemeni evaluators focused more on the importance of the institute they were 
going to work with. Was it on the list of the 200 best universities? Did the degree give 
access to European universities? All other information became more or less 
subordinated to these questions. Although it was supposed that the evaluator would 
work individually, the scoring decisions often became a shared exercise with a small 
group, since the evaluators wanted to avoid potential individual blame later on. Often 
the Yemeni evaluator went along with the scores of the Northern partners. The focus 
of the Yemeni partners on the status of the Netherlands’ institute gives more problems 
in the extension of the project. The Northern concept that, every three or four years 
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a company has to go through a bidding process is a strange process for the Yemeni 
partners, where long-term commitments are more important than quick solutions by 
each group. The whole exercise is seen as something which is not in the interest of 
Yemen, but that belongs to the Northern games. The main issue for the Yemeni 
partner is that it can keep the Netherlands’ institute that they are increasingly 
acquainted with. Until present, most of the projects, which got a second phase show 
that trust in the partner that offers quality, is highly appreciated. One of the Yemeni 
interviewers asked if in the Netherlands, a new university would be selected to 
conduct a Management program every four years32. 
In brief, the data presented, indicates that the tender procedure is not very much 
inviting for presenting LK in the bidding proposals. The trend is to keep the 
information as short as possible (limitation of pages is even requested) and not to 
propose innovative approaches, because that might not be understood by the Yemeni 
evaluator. The bidding proposals are for that reason more or less a copy of the Tender 
proposal, which is again based on the data and information collected during the 
identification and articulation phase. As already concluded, much LK is not collected 
and assessed during these phases. It means that the contractors have shifted the 
confrontation with the Yemeni society from MinBuZa and Nuffic towards the 
implementation phase. This is especially, as Nuffic has not yet established clear 
methods to prepare the selected Dutch organizations for the actual implementation 
about the local knowledge aspects before sending them to the field. 
On this point, I asked the Dutch contractors and their experts who went to Yemen 
the following questions: What was your preparation for implementing your project 
in Yemen? Did your Project Director brief you about the whole situational framework 
of the project and what they could expect in Yemen or where you gotten the job 
descriptions only? What was the role of your International Department and Nuffic in 
this regard? 33 One Dutch interviewee replied that: 
32 - One interviewee suggested that the tender procedure as such is a Northern demand. Where would you see in Europe 
that in higher education technical assistance a totally new team with new approaches appears every four years? Especially 
in the Arabic world where trust is one of  the main features for cooperation, this Northern concept is destroys any mid- 
or long-term policy, strategy and implementation. Aside from the three or four year tenders, the Southern policies are 
also disturbed by each change of  a Northern Minister who likes make their mark on their government period by chang-
ing (among other things) the education experts within the Embassy. Where in Europe do you see an education system 
where every three years a completely new team of  teachers comes to the schools to present their new methodologies and 
approaches? Another point made by another interviewee is that if  a project has to get an extension or a new phase and 
the Southern partners are happy with the Dutch implementers, they will abstain from information that will be counter-
productive towards this extension and towards the implementers. So even in a second phase, only the present team will 
know the LK and a new winning bidder will start all over again, losing time, trust and money.
33 - There is other opinion we got form the interviewees which is that the briefing is not problem by itself. They argued 
that the problem is much more in the project identification phase as we mentioned before, which it did not address all 








It would be good if Nuffic or at least the Contractor would have briefed us 
before going to Yemen on what to expect. During my time, I was regularly in 
troubles. Many of these troubles arose from the interpretation of the aims and 
objectives where most of my Yemeni colleagues were not aware of even with the 
person appointed as a counterpart, we had on-going conflict situations, which 
made work very difficult. Discussions on the way the project goals, objectives, 
logical framework had to implemented, were hardly held. 
*********
Throughout this section, we have seen the pervasive evidence that the process of 
POI includes little local knowledge and also little understanding of the detail of the 
technicalities, of reforming Yemeni public administration. Our approach has been to 
look at the ideas of the Dutch and Yemeni interviewees, who were part of the plan of 
implementation of the Dutch NPT program in Yemen of how the LKs was downplayed. 
Following the linear process of three phases - (1) the demand identification, (2) the 
demand articulation, (3) the tender procedure adapted by Nuffic for POI – we have 
seen many factors preventing the incorporation of LK. Time and money pressure 
prevented the demand articulation phase from being thorough. Moreover, the 
demand and articulation phase were more or less done in parallel, not giving sufficient 
time to the Yemenis to chew on the newly acquired information on NPT and coming 
back with their feedback. Both Northern and Yemeni parties trusted information, 
given by a small group of top men claiming to represent the whole HE sector. From 
their side the Yemeni top men trusted that the Northern partners would be sufficiently 
flexible to permit all kinds of changes in aims, objectives and activities during the 
implementation. It made the whole exercise of the Plan of Implementation an 
adventure where from both sides actually no one knew what to expect. Before the 
implementation, Yemen remained a terra incognita for the Nuffic and the winning 
contractor, and for the Yemeni partners there was no preparation to get knowledge 
about the winning team either. 
If so many activities are requested to start the real implementation of the projects 
and, at the same time, so little is known before the project starts, one could question 
if with more pressure on time and money, it is wise to spend so much effort at the 
start of the projects. If LK is not considered to be important in the first phases, why 
not take the gamble just to start with formulating projects in those areas where the 
implementation process of  the aid projects, as there is already agreement with the local counterparts. Then, the contrac-
tors came to the country itself; the agreement pared which Nuffic made. It was completely different understood. The 
contractors have to re-discuss many of  the themes, which was a bothering approach. That Nuffic did the project articula-
tion not well and too often like “a dead body is coming out of  the closet”.
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Netherlands’ suppliers are best in. Why spend so much money on organizing seminars 
or workshops to get LK on the sectors most in need, only then to select the Netherlands’ 
favored sectors? Why not collect all ‘lessons learned’ by Nuffic from each project and 
use that as the framework, against which the project Terms of Reference will be 
developed? Why not ask the contractors to bring forward the LK specific approaches 
in their bidding proposals? This approach would however, require that MinBuZa 
allows Nuffic, to become a development organization with the capacity to assess each 
project proposal on its own merits. In the case of Yemen, with an Arabic culture 
where long-term relations are a basis for trust and cooperation, Nuffic would have to 
take up the struggle against MinBuza’s EU policy of tendering every four years. By 
long-term cooperation, LK will increasingly establish its role and the ‘lessons learned’ 
will become more a learning experience for Nuffic, the contractors and the Yemeni 
partners. The steadily increasing LK by Nuffic on the Yemeni HE would not only help 
the contractors in HE, but since the sectors are based on bilateral assistance, it would 
also help the Dutch bilateral contractors. Increasingly, time-consuming and costly 
seminars and workshops on the identification and articulation phases would become 
less important and needed.
Nuffic just did quick desk research which left it open to the “local knowledge 
syndrome”. The worst-case scenario is that, the demand articulation of Dutch-Yemen 
NPT program was based upon a collection of loose ideas, precepts and positions 
published on online networks. One of the main difficulties in collecting informal data 
during a short span of time is that the members of the mission are not fully trusted, 
the local leaders are not even aware of their social and cultural environment they 
work in, and the interpretation of local informal words into standard English could 
already give a wrong impression of the situation. Like most desk studies of other 
donors, the NPT desk studies were created in the donor country. Generally, national 
researchers or consultants provided little up-to-date input. In addition, here the time 
frame and financing played a major role in the decision to use local expertise. Thus 
the study often consisted of Nuffic representatives with information about the NPT 
programme and not much about the particular history, culture and politics of the 
country. The products were desk studies written in name of the recipient countries, 
but in reality not ‘demand driven’. 
To summarise, demand articulation was composed of three processes: information 
packages for the requesting organizations, project outlines, and capacity self-








participating institutions were for many Yemeni managers, the first experience with 
foreign aid programs. They faced problems in the assessment and analyses requested, 
in understanding the project jargon and in collecting the data. The information in the 
project outlines did not give the Dutch contractors, the information to prepare for 
problems they could face confronted with the local situation in the actual 
implementation. In the tender process there are no criterion related to the experience 
within the country and sector concerned, thus downplaying LK from the off.
In this situation, during the actual implementation of aid projects, contractors can 
find themselves dealing with a difficult road of reform, trying to understand how to 
overcome the difficulties to achieve realistic results. They may also find themselves 
pressed to pass the difficult road of reform and to deliver results in timescales or in 
forms which they find completely unrealistic. Partly, the effective incorporation of 
LK occurs as a result of planning appropriate implementation plans.
One of the main arguments of this study is that to work towards the ideal of 
incorporating local knowledge, we must be aware of the importance of the informal 
interaction with individuals, as it is more significant than formally structured 
meetings with high policy makers or the top men. Individual interactions are 
identified, as a significant factor in the creation and sharing of knowledge within 
organizations in traditional countries (Cross, et al. 2001). Effective individual 
interactions need time for building trust and mutual understanding between the 
respective actors. Trust is an important factor in the creation of desired interactions 
and cooperation. Furthermore, it reduces uncertainties about the behavior of the 
other actor. In reality however, the middle stage of the voyage of aid program 
implementation is very short, mostly about three weeks. There is no room for building 
trust as a (stable) perception about the intentions of other southern actors. However 
this might be done during the actual translation of an aid program into projects, 
which can take more than five years (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006)34.To elaborate this 
argument, we now review the implementation of the four development policy areas 
(cases).
10.4 Policy Analysis at the Implementation Level (the Operational Level)
As we discussed before, at policy level the implementation of more or less 
international standardized programmes makes LK a footnote in the different country 
programmes. For the middle management, focusing on one or two sectors, and in the 
34 - In the coming section, the processes of  implementation vary across the projects in a way that can explain why 
some projects were more successful than others were, as shown in the former chapters. 
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case of NPT on the Higher education sub-sector, LK should have become more 
important, but they relied on international reports and censured workshops so failed 
to take LK was not taken into account. In effect, all experiences with LK were pushed 
to the operational level of implementers. The ‘change’ that has been so far on paper 
and that did not affect the recipients becomes reality when implementation starts. 
Pros and cons that could have developed during the paper period appear during the 
implementation, through the work of the contractors and their consultants.
It could be the case that the information on LK can be incorporated at the 
grassroots level. The information on local knowledge remained unopened and an 
invisible black box until the operational level. The main argument of this study is the 
problematic that “Local Knowledge Syndrome” can “only’’ be solved during the actual 
implementation of the aid project. Decentralized agents such as contractors of aid 
projects, are players at the heart of the aid system and they can potentially close the 
local knowledge gap through their interactions with the beneficiaries. This is because 
LK is much linked to context and is time specific. Dealing with the LKS at the 
operational level leads to greater openness to local realities not foreseen in the design 
stage and reduces the probability that aid programs or projects need redesigning. 
However, contactors confronted with the black boxes, could either open them or 
keep them closed (or be unable to open them). This is reflected in the quantitative 
microanalysis (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 and the below summary of the results) based 
on the “development validity approach”35, where we revealed different results, i.e., 
projects had varying levels of effectiveness in achieving their overall and specific 
objectives.
10.4. 1 Summary of the Overall Results of the Quantitative Analysis
The overall objective of the Dutch NPT in Yemen was to promote the public sector 
reform process in Yemen. It did this by outlining specific objectives: building and 
strengthening the institutional capacity and capability for post-secondary education 
institutions in order to meet their own needs for training staff in the public sector. By 
using the “development validity approach”, the level of effectiveness of the selected 
NPT projects in achieving the above overall objective was measured ‘explicitly’ by 
using indicators as proxies that have been quantitatively analyzed in Chapters 7 and 
8. The main source of evidence in this part of the quantitative analysis was the 
35 - As we argued in previous chapters, the development validity approach is different in the case of  measuring the suc-









questionnaire and the unit of analysis was the students or the participants of the 
different selected projects from different organizations within the private and public 
sectors in Yemen. This population has three levels: the ministerial level (ministers 
and deputy ministers), the managerial level (general managers) and the unit level 
(department heads and employees). The sample size was 325, 65% of the total 
participants of the selected four projects36. The overall response rate was statistically 
acceptable, and a total of 227 (70%) questionnaires were returned acceptably answered 
and usable for the analysis. This is because we used the drop-off delivery where the 
typical response rate is around 70%. 
Based on practical knowledge aspects of the Yemeni respective sectors provided 
in Chapters 4 and 7, five variables (indicators or measures) were developed to conduct 
quantitative analysis, to measure the level of effectiveness of the selected projects in 
achieving the overall objective and specific objectives of the NPT program in Yemen. 
We followed this methodology to first vary the results among the selected projects 
and second to work backward to analyse LKS, as the causal variable of having different 
results, as we reveal in this section. To conduct the first step of our enquiry, the first 
variable was the demographic profile and work background of participants. This 
variable reflects local knowledge facts and includes four measures or criteria that 
assumes that the project will be more successful when (m=1) there is orientation 
towards the promotion of female enrolment; (m=2) when there is a geographical and 
an organizational prevalence in the participation process throughout the different 
organizations and cities in Yemen; (m=3) when the enrolment of the participants 
focused on the age group 30-35 (and lower) more than other age groups, especially 
the age group 45+, and (m=) when the enrolment of the participants is focused on 
the low-level and (mid) level civil servants. The results based on a cross-case/measures 
analysis suggests that the WRTC (mean = 2.00, in the first position) and WEC (mean 
= 2.25 holding position 2) are more successful than MBA (mean=3.50 holding 
position 3), NIAS (mean=3.75 holding position 4), and MPA (mean=4.75 holding 
the last position 5), in selecting appropriate participants for attending the training 
process for capacity building process (see Chapter 7): 
36 - MPA and NIAS were established by one project, implemented by the ROI/Leiden University as a Dutch contractor. 
For more information, see Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Table 10.1 Summary of the Overall Results of the Quantitative Analysis (N=227)37
Based on the ´ideal model for capacity building within public sector in Yemen´ 
presented in Chapter 4, the second variable reflects the essential needs of training 
and capacity building of the Yemeni public sector. We assumed that any aid program 
like the Dutch NPT program, must develop the following managerial skills, dividing 
into four main skills categories: (1) the strategic management skills (2) the human 
resources management skills(3) the managerial communications skills; and (4) the 
leadership skills. Under the heading of these four main categories, we derived 32 
indicators [measured items] from the literature reviewed in the former chapters, used 
as proxies to implicitly reflect the current needs for reforming the public sector in 
Yemen. The cross case/measures analysis results suggest that there is consensus 
among respondents in MBA (mean= 2,019 holding the first position 1)38, as effective 
in developing selected managerial skills. On the other hand, there is clear consistency 
among respondents at NIAS (mean= 2.857, holding the position 3) and MPA (mean= 
3.12, in last place) that MPA-NIAS were less effective in developing their selected 
managerial skills. 
As the ideal model for capacity-building within public sector in Yemen argues, 
that capacity building processes will not be complete until the transferring process is 
achieved, the third variable was the process of transferring knowledge and skills 
37 - For the purpose of  this study, two steps were used to rank the selected projects on the basis of  the selected variables 
and the results of  the overall mean scores. First, we calculated sample mean for each project based on the used criteria 
following the mean formula: = x = (Σ xi) / n. Second, we used the mean score values of  the selected projects or case 
studies and ranked them based on the “rank order method”: as mean score 1-2(++) = the highest level of  success and 
mean score 4-5(--) = the lowest level of  success.
38 The calculation of  the means scores of  the four indictors for MBA = (2.064+1.835+1.909+2.271) =8.079*4=2.019 as 
an overall mean score among the four indicators. The calculation of  the means scores for NIAS at the same indicators= 
(2.853+3.016+2.843+2.719) =12.48*4=2.857 as an overall mean score among the four indicators. The calculation of  
the means scores for MPA at the same indicators= (3.297+3.099+2.932+3.152) =12.48*4=3.12 as an overall mean score 
among the four indicators. The results of  the mean scores were interpreted per indicator and by using ANOVA tests, 
which confirmed the variation among the selected projects (see hapter 8 for more information). 
Measuring the level of effectiveness in achieving the 
NPT overall objective
Measuring the level of effectiveness in 
achieving the NPT specific objectives 
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MBA 3 1 1 1 1 1.40 (++)
MPA 5 5 5 5 5 5.00 (--)
NIAS 4 3 3 3 3 3.20 (-)
WEC 2 n/k 2 2 2 2.00 (+)








learned back the work settings. To analyze the third factor, we developed different 
indicators used as proxies that implicitly reveal the variation in the level of effectiveness 
among the selected projects in conducting this role. These indicators are: (1) the 
selection process of participants, (2) the teaching methods used, (3) the quality of the 
curriculum and courses, (3) the quantity of training efforts, and (4) the coordination 
between the selected projects and the respective organizations. This is especially 
relevant as one aspect of the civil service in Yemen is that there is no strategy for 
management and development of the Yemeni Civil Service corps. Currently there is 
no vision on how the civil service should be organized and according to what model. 
Respondents’ opinions revealed that the MBA (position 1) and WEC (position 2) 
were more effective than MPA-NIAS (positions 5 and 3 respectively) and WRTC 
(position 4) in transferring the developed skills and gained knowledge to the work 
settings. For MPA-NIAS and WRTC, the respondents reveal widespread displeasure 
of the methods adopted by their organizations and the process of selecting the 
students to attend the training process. It appears that targeted or direct beneficiaries 
of such projects have no recognition of these training services and objectives. The 
selection process was based upon a voluntary method, so the decision on participants 
was very haphazard.39
The variation in the results based on the efforts made by the selected projects in 
the way of achieving their overall objectives, led us to examine the level of effectiveness 
of the Dutch projects in achieving their specific objectives-building the capacity and 
capability, of the higher education organizations (see Chapter 9). Based on the 
documents and reports of the Dutch NPT program in Yemen, all the selected projects 
were aimed at: (1) building the organizational and administrative structures; (2) 
increasing the quantity of staff at the selected HE institutions, and (3) developing the 
quality of the staff members at the said institutions. These three variables provide 
explanations why some of the selected projects were more effective in training their 
participants than others. It seems that some of the projects of the Dutch-Yemen NPT 
program did not provide all necessary conditions for effective capacity and capability 
building process within some of the Yemeni higher education contexts. The same 
capacities and capabilities which the NPT ought to have reformed or developed still 
represent the obstacles and weaknesses facing some of these organizations. In Chapter 
39 - These four indicators included more than 20 measured items. Because in this section, we used questions without 
multiple answer just (Yes or NO), it is imposable to conduct calculation of  the means scores. We specified our conclu-
sion on the positions of  the selected project in the level of  effectiveness by systematic method, see chapter 8 for more 
information. 
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9, we conducted quantitative analysis of these three variables. The first variable 
includes 9 measured items and the results of revealed that respondents perceive MBA 
(mean=2.0981, position 1) and WEC (mean=2.5427, position 2) as having more 
effective organization and management and qualified leadership more than the NIAS 
(mean= 2.8997, position 3), WRTC (mean=3.3086, position 4) and MPA (mean= 
3.3148, position 5)40. The second and third variables have been analysed together as 
relate to the quantity and quality of the teaching staff within the targeted organizations. 
12 measured items included in these two variables and the results suggest that the 
respondents perceive that MBA (mean=2.3710, position 1) and WEC (mean=2.8782, 
position 2) as having more sufficient and qualified teaching staff than NIAS (mean=3. 
3089, position 3), WRTC (mean=3.4907, position 4) and MPA (mean=3.3168,position 
5). 
After exploring the results and the positions of the selected projects based on the 
single variable, we have explored the pattern of responses based across case and 
variables analysis method in order to provide overall results of the quantitative 
analysis. In Table 10.1 above, we calculated the frequencies of positions which the 
single project had in all five variables. We used the following the mean formula= x = 
(Σ xi) / n and “the rank order method”. For example, the MBA with positions in 3 
(v1), 1 (v2), 1 (v3), 1(v4), and 1 (v5) =7, divided by 5 (the number of the variables), 
gives a mean score of 1.40, thus occupying highest level or rank of effectiveness in 
achieving the overall and specific objectives of the NPT program in Yemen. Based on 
the seam formula and order ranking method, the mean score of the other projects is 
as follows. WEC scored 2.00 making this project to occupy the second rank of 
effectiveness, NIAS and WRTC scored 3.20 and 3.25 respectively (above the neutral 
point 3.0), coming in the third and fourth ranks of effectiveness. The lowest level of 
effectiveness is for the MPA project, with a mean score of 5.00, which is very high 
compared to the neutral point 3.0.
The overall results of the quantitative analysis are a response to the public choice 
approach (PCP) and its main argument that aid project does not work in a poor 
policy environment. We have presented sufficient empirical evidence that some aid 
projects can work even in poor policy environments. However as we hypothesized in 
this study, we need to be careful to incorporate the local knowledge with its informal 
aspects during the actual implementation of the aid projects. 
40 - The mean scores below 3.0 suggest that the respondents perceive that the selected project effective and above the 
3.0 the respondents perceive that the selected project less effective. The results of  the mean scores in the above stated 
variables were interpreted per indicator and by using an ANOVA test, which confirmed the variation among the selected 








We now turn to the factors that reduced the incorporation of local knowledge in 
some of the selected projects, and the factors that led other projects to be more 
successful, as they succeed in incorporating local knowledge. To do so, we employ the 
‘associability development approach’, divided into two models. The first is the 
associability harmony model, which reflects the actual implementation process of the 
more effective projects based on the quantitative analysis (MBA and WEC). The 
second is the associability conflict model, which reflects the implementation process 
of the less effective projects (MPA-NIAS and WRTC). 
10.4.2 The ‘Associability Development Approach’ and the Aid Projects’ Success 
and Failure 
Here we employ the ‘associability development approach’ based on the main ideas 
of the actor-network perspective that we reviewed in Chapters 1 and 3. The core of 
this theoretical tool for analysis is that interactions and association between actors 
involved in specific foreign aid intervention can incorporate the local knowledge 
aspects. Actor-network perceptive offers an alternative methodology to address the 
LKS as explanation for the success or failure of aid projects during the implementation 
process. This method is “particularly useful for describing how networks emerge and 
how interactions among the actors involved in innovation take shape; it is not a static 
description of nodes and hubs. Actually, actor-network perceptive is not a theory; 
rather it is descriptive and explanatory as the development has to be studied in action, 
focusing on the dynamics rather than on the stability of the relationships” (Voeten, 
2013:112). What makes it particularly relevant for our analysis in this section, is the 
actors around a single aid project from the two worlds, donors and recipients have 
different managerial styles and systems and cultural differences, which can lead to 
harmonized or conflicted associations and interactions. 
The associability development model derived from the ANT ideas suggests two 
models to explain the success and failure of aid projects: (1) The associability harmony 
model and (2) The associability conflict model. The first model reflects the process of 
actual implementation of the aid project through harmonized interactions, which led 
to the incorporation of the informal information on local knowledge. The second 
model reflects conflicting interactions between the contractors and their counterparts. 
If there are conflicts that means we have different visions, expectations, objectives, 
and understanding of the projects.
Actor-network perceptive uses the term black boxing to define the creation of a 
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network and how the alliances and interactions between actors are established. A 
black box is created when “all the underlying human interactions are clarified and 
there is a shared common understanding of the identity and role of each actant. This 
black boxing process being achieved through the translation moments… The Actor-
network perceptive methodology focuses on describing how actors enroll to the 
network, agreeing that it is worth building and defending the sociology of translation” 
(Voeten, 2013: 115). Different studies (Faulkner and Rond, 2000; Vartiainen, 2002; 
Sako 1998 &1992; Kanter, 1989; Isabella, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Klitgaard, 1998; Board, 
2002, Joop Koppenjan, and Erik-Hans Klijn, 2000; Dasgupta, 1988; Burns and Flam, 
1987; March and Olsen, 1989; Jenkins and Plowden, 2006; Olsson and Wohlgemuth, 
2000) consider many factors that can influence human interactions, leading either to 
the conflict model of networking or the harmony model of networking. The most 
important of these factors are: building trust and openness; commitment; mutual 
understanding; cultural differences; unequal representation; the rapid rotation of 
staff, and the number of actors involved around the aid project during the actual 
implementation process. 
To measure the factors of harmony or conflict, based on the Actor-network 
perceptive ideas, we asked interviewees about the main problems in the organization 
and management of the ECs between the Dutch and Yemeni counterparts and 
amongst Yemeni staff themselves. This refers to the structure, organization, financing, 
responsibilities, management, and also in terms of: (1) mutual understanding and 
putting things into action; (2) respect, openness and trust; (3) absence of conflicts 
and cultural clashes; (4) communication (formal and informal) and reaction; (5) 
common vision and integrating the way of working on both sides; (6) flexibility; (7) 
adaptability of the work environment (e.g., work and personal style and time 
management); and (8) interpersonal relationship between you and the staff in the 
host organization. It is worth noting here that the above-mentioned factors cannot be 
investigated separately in every case but I try to make use of them as much as I can 
during the analysis of the cases. 
Based on the structure of the NPT program and its objectives, the groups supposed 








Figure 10.3 Shows the Actors Network Supposedly Involved in the Process of 
Implementing the Selected Projects
The above figure shows that Nuffic was the bridge in the web of the management 
and monitoring of the NPT projects, linking the Yemeni and Dutch actors. As we 
have seen in the above section 10.3 Nuffic has its own administrative process of top-
down approach, in implementing all projects in all recipient countries. In this section, 
I focus on two other aspects of Nuffic’s role in the monitoring process. The interviewees 
provided us with clear information about the monitoring role of Nuffic and argued 
that the monitoring process maintains the implementation process itself, and that 
there is hope that this role can have the advantages to manage the interaction; between 
the actors during implementation in order to incorporate local knowledge. However, 
because of the short distance from contractor to Nuffic, Nuffic gets information on a 
conflict situation easier about how the Yemeni are performing than the other way 
around. Only during the yearly monitoring missions, can Nuffic learn from the 
Yemeni side. There are possibilities for requesting Nuffic interference, in case there 
are main differences between the Dutch contractor and the Yemeni partner. However, 
there are no penal sanctions for the Dutch contractor in case the conflicts cannot be 
solved. The only possibility seen, so far, is that the project stops, thus also punishing 
the Yemeni partners. Cases where there was a new tendering of a Dutch contractor, 
because of bad performance are not known. In most cases, the Yemeni partners were 
asked to adapt.41.
41 The interviewees pointed out that Nuffic should be more effective when they deal with the contractors, as they are not 
part of  their administrative body. This is because Nuffic has no a clear and strong control mechanisms if  the contrac-
tor is making many mistakes. Normally they just send a short letter or email to bring attention to it, and take no more 
action. Conversely when the local counterparts make small mistakes, Nuffic tries to take strong action. Especially in the 
conflicted associability model, there is no trust in the relationship. Nuffic trusts the Dutch contractors but does not trust 
the local managers or the local counterparts, even though these latter groups have local knowledge on how the rule of  
the game is running within their organizations. If  the local partner objects to a case, the threat coming from the Nuffic 
is that they are looking to stop the project. Since the local counterparts fear they may lose the project, they continue with 
the Dutch contractor organization even if  it is not the right organization to implement the project. Thus the contractor 
is the strong party influencing the weaker recipient party. 
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The second model reflects conflicting interactions between the contractors and their counterparts. If 
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Further data from the interviews, strongly pointed out that progress reports are 
another mean of letting Nuffic know about conflict, but this tool is not very much 
used by the Yemeni partners. The Dutch contractor writes the reports and requests 
the Yemeni partner give comments on the texts. As reading is not very much a cultural 
trait, the reports are only signed without mentioning differences in opinion. These 
differences are left for the Nuffic monitoring missions where the Yemeni partners can 
orally put their issues directly. Based on the local facts, the Yemeni people do not 
have a cultural of writing, reading, listening, but only talking. The question then is 
what is the value of following the western style of management and asking the 
counterparts to write reports? If this was known in the beginning, Nuffic could find 
a method of oral mentioning. The problem is that Nuffic continues in ignoring the 
local information and relying on the Dutch contactors’ written reports. 
In the harmonized associability model, it is generally believed by the interviewees 
that there is a trust from Nuffic towards the contractor, who has trust from the Yemeni 
partner that the activities performed through social exchanges and events will be for 
their benefit. Trust is a very important element within Yemeni culture. Without 
having this trust, it would be difficult for the contractor to implement the project 
smoothly. The trust of the Yemeni partner towards the Contractor and the trust from 
Nuffic towards the Contractor make Nuffic influential in terms of flexibility, with 
solid commitment from both sides needed to allow the contractor to adapt with the 
local context during the process of implementation. 
10.4.3 The Patterns of Associability in the Project Level 
The main observation when we analyzed the interviews is that the patterns of 
associability and interactions, between the actors at the beginning of the 
implementation process of all selected project were full of cultural shocks, clashes 
and conflicts. As we mentioned before, this is because the incorporation process of 
local knowledge was left to the implementation stage of the contractors and their 
teams. Depending on the expertise of the contractors and the long-term expert, these 
cultural shocks and clashes could turn out to positive or negative. The foreign team 
was confronted with its own culture, as they have to change the local environments. 
The local team was also in shock, because they were requested to change their work 
environments and the rule of the games. This is particularly true where the contractors 
came with reform ideas and assumptions, to change the local institutions not really 








common goal taking into account the needs of the clients who wished to get better 
services, if both teams could establish a plan of steps, where both felt they could profit 
from cooperation, and if the project was led by respected leaders, trust and 
commitment were given. This harmony model of associability among the actors 
occurred in the MBA and WEC projects.
On the other hand, where the teams were not able to overcome the difficulties, this 
led to the conflict model of associability among the actors around the projects. This 
was the case for the MPA-NIAS and WRTC projects. If both foreign and local teams 
were not able to define the reasons why the final clients would like to improve the 
services, it also became difficult to use these arguments to set common goals and to 
convince the local teams to accept the assistance of the foreign teams. Although the 
top men contracted the project aims and goals, the local teams felt that they had to 
implement a programme of change that did not lead to both parties winning. The 
winner would be the contractor and for that reason the local teams disapprovingly 
followed all steps of the contractor and no trust and commitment was reached.
Table 10.2 The Patterns of Associability in the Project Level
+ Harmony patterns of associability
 - Conflict patterns of associability
N.A. it was not clear at the beginning
Based upon the above table, the analysis in the coming sections, deals with certain 
patterns of behavioral interactions among the actors at the level of the single project. 
After that, we put the selected projects in a comparative setting. As we mentioned 
above, this is will be done in line with the two models of associability and focusing 
the analysis, on how such as different patterns of interactions influence the process of 
incorporating local knowledge. 
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10.4.3.1 The Associability Harmony Model ( MBA and WEC)
Based on the main results from the analysis above, the harmony model represents 
two projects: MBA and WEC. We will look at each in turn.
MBA project
Several actors from the Yemeni side were responsible for the implementation of 
the MBA project: the private sector (clients), the Rector of Sana’a University, the Dean 
of the Faculty of Commerce and its staff members, the Department of Business 
Administration and its staff members, and the Yemeni local manager. For the Dutch 
side, the main actors are MSM and its international project manager and consultants. 
In the view of the interviewees, the implementation process of the MBA project 
followed two different paths and human interactions, eventually led to the creation of 
contradictory actor interactions. The first phase, of three years, was characterized by 
a conflict model of interactions, which actually neglected the LK. When Nuffic and 
its MSM contractor announced the MBA to the department staff, it was expected to 
be based on the Western style of management, as there was communication 
capabilities between the different levels within the higher education sector, and the 
staff of the department had already and collectively consulted and been informed by 
the policy making level about the coming project. Assistance was not expected for the 
academic Master programme of Administration Sciences for regular students, but for 
the Yemeni private sector and for professional BA students with 3 years’ experience 
in the private sector.
The interviewees raised critical points about the first stage of implementation of 
MBA, as well as in MPA project. They argued that in the Yemeni public sector, the 
interpersonal relationship is the main mechanism of communication between and 
among the different levels and leaders and their subordinates. Moreover, the decision 
making process is always made by the top men without consultation of their 
subordinates. Accordingly, the department staff was not well informed about the 
nature of the project. Just two people from the department, who had strong personal 
ties with the higher level were well informed, one of whom became the Yemeni local 
manager of the MBA project.42 The staff of the Department of Business Administration 
surprisingly discovered that the Nuffic MBA project focused on a professional 
business administration master, which meant for the department staff (1) another 
42- According to an interviewee who was a member of  the selection committee for the local project manager, eight de-
partment staff  members applied for the job, but from them only two took the trouble to read the job description and 
background information of  the project. For this interviewee the excuse of  ‘not being informed’ is one of  the most 








teaching methodology (adult education), (2) case study development, and (3) 
interactive teaching instead of just classrooms and reading. They were not very keen 
on changing a regular Master Programme they had developed into a professional 
Master programme. However, this was never put on paper. Those staff members who 
did not have much experience with the world of work outside the university started 
to create an anti-change climate to which the Dutch project manager, who had little 
experience of working in the Yemeni environment, fell victim. The Yemeni project 
manager could not fully support the Dutch manager, because he was under the 
scrutiny of his colleagues and also he had open cultural and managerial conflicts with 
the Dutch manager himself. The local project manager counted on the full support of 
the Dutch project manager in getting a team formed, but confronted with a lot of 
animosity from the department staff, the Dutch project manager hardly dared to 
move anymore. One of the interviewees noted, “The Dutch project manager had no 
detailed local knowledge in his mind, and then he treated the local details by lack of 
respect or contempt, creating some sort of conflict and thus this led to a lack of 
harmony in all aid project activities”.
This conflict situation as many interviewees confirmed, lead to a lack of respect 
towards the Dutch project manager and in turn a lack of respect towards the local 
project manager, who was seen as an accomplice of the Dutch team. Not much of the 
conflict dealt with the content of the project, but had to do with personalities and 
perception about people. During the first three years of the project, the Dutch 
contractors and its counterparts failed to develop mutual trust to get to know each 
other’s approaches, capacities, and interests. Nearly all actors around the project had 
no or minor commitments toward the activities of the project, particularly in how to 
involve the private sector in the process of implementation and how to incorporate 
its needs in the training courses. It is very strange that the clients were not consulted 
even by the policy making level or by the operational level at this stage. In the context 
of the needs of the Yemeni private sector, this decision should have been seriously 
considered. Yet this proved difficult in the climate of interpersonal conflict (MSM, 
2009). 
When analysing the role of the contractor to solve the conflicts, the final evaluation 
report of the MBA project (MSM, 2009) shows the Dutch consultants attempting to 
impose their Western managerial cultures, following Western rules of solving 
problems in a direct confrontation between managers and subordinates or between 
employees of the same level. Furthermore, in the conflict, the Dutch consultants did 
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as they always do, and turn to what was originally agreed on paper by both parties. 
However, this might have been too western for Yemen, where conflicts are only 
discussed orally as well as by mediation (Al Wasta), and solved by interpersonal 
interactions. In such cases, these interactions do not always lead to direct changes 
because the top man in the organization has the first and the last word to make or 
break things. What happened was that the Dutch contractor and the Dutch project 
manager went to the Dean of the faculty and the faculty board in order to solve 
conflicts between the Dutch project manager and the Yemeni project manager, 
between both managers and the Yemeni staff members or conflict among the staff 
members themselves. The Dean of the Faculty was in favor of finding ways of ending 
the conflicts. However, he had to deal with a strong opposition power from some staff 
members (politically well-connected) and so he did not take a clear decision.43. 
Besides, the Faculty Board consisted of members who were the same faculty staff 
members opposing the project. The result was that no authority of the faculty level 
wanted to deal with these problems. The Rector of Sana’a University or the top man 
of the organization was the right person to deal with. 
Thus there was a very difficult first three years in the implementation of the 
project. This resulted in the replacement of three Dutch project managers. The 
interviewees commented that it would have been wise if the Dutch contractor had 
sent a project manager with experience in the Arabic region from the beginning. This 
could have helped in reducing the lack of shared vision and values of the project, and 
to facilitating work based on shared agreement and cooperation.44 
The second phase of the process of implementing the MBA project, which 
represented the harmony stage of implementation, started when MSM conducted in 
June 2007 a “vision & mission” workshop in Maastricht, to redefine the values of the 
Centre and look again into the vision and mission and specifically how to translate it 
into strategy and action to be taken by management (SU & MSM 2009). According to 
the interviewees, this workshop was very confronting, but was also at the same time 
opened a window for transparent communication and interactions between all the 
actors around the project. The contactor team mobilized the top-man of Sana’a 
43 - Some of  the interviewees noted that behind these conflicts or above them was the board of  informal association. 
Staff  and board members of  the faculty had their own goals because they were related to different informal ties and 
thus wanted to get something out of  the project for their own, or had their own ambitions for their other departments 
within the faculty. One of  the consequences was that some of  those involved lost interest in the project because they 
saw no benefit for themselves. They were not informed well about the aims and the objectives of  the project. The Dutch 
consultant could not mobilize them because of  the continue conflicts of  interests within the faculty and no power above 
them to end these conflicts. 
44 - As we noted in section 10.3, there is no preparation of  the Dutch contractors and their experts about the local 








University (rector), to be part of the workshop in order to have support from the 
higher level of decision-making within the recipient organization. It was decided 
after the workshop to give all the management activities to the Yemeni project 
manager with full authority, which resulted in more respect and trust and avoided all 
kinds of conflicts between him and the Dutch project manager. The Yemeni project 
manager was in favor of establishing the professional MBA, had well-established 
contacts with the private sector and the higher level with SU structure, and had 
academic qualifications as he hold a Ph.D. in business. Furthermore he had a good 
family capital. According to the interviewees, from this point the Yemeni project 
manager had the support of Nuffic-MSM and the SU rector personally who was fully 
committed to run the project successfully. The rector saw in the establishment of the 
professional MBA a good opportunity to make Sana’a University known in the region. 
The other positive shift in the MBA project implementation process occurred, 
when the Dutch contractor sent a Dutch project manager assistant, who had the local 
knowledge of how to deal with Yemenis, as she had worked in the Arabic context 
before. She played a major role in mobilizing all factions within the department staff. 
It was confirmed by the majority of the interviewees that the new Dutch assistant 
project manager inspired respect and trust, and there were commitments from her as 
long term assistant manager to work together with the local Yemeni project manager 
to bring the commitments to all levels. 
The interviewees added that all of them have been working and putting effort into 
the project that goes beyond standard work. Many more working hours and many 
more new local ideas have been implemented than stipulated by the original terms of 
references for this project. Moreover, the interviewees believe that is also a reason for 
the success of the project. Everybody was enthusiastic about working on the 
project, respected each other and learned from each other, exchanging knowledge 
and ideas. They were all excited about the bigger goal, which was to establish the 
MBA center in order to build the capacity of the business sector in Yemen. 
During the project the implementers became increasingly confronted with 
unexpected situations that asked for networking and management actions. The 
interactions among the actors were changed, as before there was no affective 
networking among the related actors of the project, and the implementers were 
confronted with the situation that everybody acted according to what they thought 
was best, rather than on corporate (mutually agreed-upon and understood) frame of 
references. This is the point where clashes and conflicts are inevitable. 
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According to the Dutch project assistant manager, at a certain point in time the 
workload became bigger and immediate actions were always needed to solve 
problems. She got involved as a consultant to identify the clashes and to develop 
corporate values that were clear for everybody around the project. 
Let’s look at two examples of how the Dutch project assistant manager mobilized 
support around the project by understanding the local knowledge environment. 
Firstly, because in Yemeni administrative culture problems cannot be solved in group 
meetings, and such meetings in fact lead to conflicts among the staff members, the 
Yemeni and Dutch project managers stopped having faculty meetings but just had 
small discussions with faculty members face-to-face or they had very small group 
meetings with a maximum of 3 people. It was further decided to split up the 
Inservice-1 training into small groups of faculty for a maximum of 3 people. Care was 
taken to form these groups based on common professional grounds rather than 
personality. For example, they formed a group of three by having an accounting 
professor, a financial professor and a statistics professor. Those subjects have some 
overlap and there needs to be a discussion on who is teaching what. 
The second example is that the Dutch assistant project manager was really aware 
that in Yemeni culture “flexibility” and the so-called “just in time management”, is 
one of the most difficult issues to deal with when coming from a western society. 
Planning far in advance like the people do in the western world does not work in 
Yemen because the whole society does not work like this. The Dutch assistant manager 
was more flexible in having many scenarios and going with the flow. At the end, she 
found that the nice aspect of the flexibility of Yemen society is that whenever 
something is not working you find all sorts of unexpected support on the spot. 
Yemenis are very good in firefighting. Moreover, because of their advanced capabilities 
in firefighting they are able to finish things at the last moment. 
According to the Dutch assistant project manager, the MBA project was mainly 
guided by short-term amelioration tasks rather than long-term transformation 
options. Exchange of experiences and network building, were more important than 
any consideration about changing attitudes and transforming the department. In this 
sense, the contractors did not behave as missionaries, but rather as potential partners 
for future co-operation. Getting to know the different approaches, capacities, and 
interests was considered as the first step towards mutual trust and long-term co-
operation. All of the above efforts led to the establishment of effective organizational 








quality of the staff within the project. Thus the specific objectives of the MBA project 
were achieved within its specific place and time.45 
The policy of the NPT program was formulated in cooperation with the higher 
education ministry, one can assume, as there was coordination between the Ministry 
of Higher Education and the private sector in order, to ensure the coherence between 
topics as well as the same approach towards developing training materials and 
discussion about what is needed by the business community in Yemen. This 
represented the overall objective of the NPT program. As we mentioned in Chapter 
4, in Yemen the ministries and government agencies usually issue decisions and 
policies without prior consultation or in coordination with the concerned sectors, 
both within their organizations and with other relevant institutions. This lack of 
coordination leads in many cases to a freeze on the implementation of such decisions 
and policies, because of the potential differences that could be created. The Ministry 
of Higher Education and the universities are not output related. The main emphasis 
is the on training students, but not specifically for the market. So consultation of what 
the society expects of a graduate is not considered to be a necessary step. As long as 
there are sufficient students to give work to the lecturers, the university will offer the 
curriculums as it did before. The focus on professional students with a working 
experience of 3 years forced the universities to go beyond the input-related focus. The 
Yemeni staff members in the projects witnessed a totally different style of teaching by 
foreign teachers, and a group of students who expected to be treated as a party with 
whom the teachers could communicate and exchange experiences in an interactive 
way. The classroom style of teaching normally applied for the regular students could 
not be repeated here for the professional students.
The interviewees saw the network building within the MBA emerging over time, 
as it became part of the culture of the network to find ways of growing its substantive 
activities and its resource base by associating itself with other actors. In this current 
policy environment, the project could establish active involvement of the Yemeni 
private sector or the business community with the project. This took place not based 
on strategic formal approach but based on informal approach and strong personal 
ties with the business community46. As we mentioned before, the efforts made by the 
45- It was noted by other interviewees that actually staff  members could slowly be included in the MBA program. The 
main lectures were conducted by Dutch or MSM recruited lecturers from other countries. The Yemeni staff  saw that the 
students, who were able to speak and write in English, were raising issues that went beyond their skills and knowledge. 
This confrontation also meant that a number of  initially critical staff  told the project manager that they were willing to 
participate in the professional MBA program.
46 - The first intakes on a personal and informal basis, however, increasingly adapting to the western-style of  advertise-
ments in Yemen and Arabic papers.
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Yemeni project managers - the first one a big business man and the second from the 
private sector - confirmed the effective involvement of the business community with 
the project. These two Yemeni project’s managers mobilized all the related business 
organizations and incorporated information on their needs, by getting their opinions, 
surveying their attitudes, and informing them about the project. Consequently the 
main managerial skills for promoting the capacity and capability of the business 
community, were specified and many local case studies were incorporated in the 
training course. The other main issue is that the main stakeholders were part of the 
process from the outset, which ensured strong commitment to transferring the skills 
developed to the work setting47. The businessmen and companies trusted the local 
managers personally more than the SU as an organization. They sent their employees 
to be trained in the project, but also to hold many workshops in cooperation with the 
EC, to map the opportunities and the distinctive characteristics of private sector, the 
extent of the differences in workplace behaviour or professional behaviour, and the 
chances to build the capacity and the capability of the private sector in this regard. 
The WEC project 
For WEC, the main responsibility for the implementation on the Yemeni side fell 
to the director of Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University (WEC) and the 
staff members, the Rector of Sana’a University, the Water Sector and its different 
organizations in Yemen. From the Dutch side, Wageningen University (WAU), the 
department of Irrigation and Water Engineering of Wageningen University and the 
Dutch project manager were responsible for implementation.
In view of the interviewees from both sides (Yemeni and Dutch) and at different 
levels, it is clear that conflicted interactions between actors were never an issue in the 
WEC project. The intervention was designed in a way that the kind of conflict seen in 
the first stage of the MBA implementation process, could not arise as the networking 
of all actors around the project was created with harmonized and co-operative 
interactions. The conflicts arising at the beginning of the implementation came about, 
because the WAU project director was not able to overcome the cultural shocks in 
working in Yemen, but such as conflicts were logistical and not about the content of 
the project. The other positive issue is that WEC and WAU decided, due to differences 
47 - While conducting the interviews with the participants from the MBA project, I discovered that more than 15 of  them 
have established their own business as a result of  attending the training course of  this project. Furthermore, some of  the 
participants were big business men in Yemen who saw the project as an important chance to increase their capacities in 
running their business effectively, and systematically changing their attitudes from the traditional approach of  running 








in management styles, to have only a part-time Dutch project manager. The Dutch 
Project Director did not have much experiences working in developing countries, 
while the Yemeni Project Director had years of experience working with Dutch 
partners. The latter knew informally how to find the right people to get his complaints 
heard at highest levels. The Dutch project manager had the right qualifications (PhD) 
to get the respect of the Yemeni co-workers (see discussion of the seniority problem 
within the public sector in Yemen in Chapter 4) and together with the Yemeni Project 
Director he was able to create an atmosphere to establish a new programme. The 
expertise of the Dutch project manager was recognized by the WEC staff. At the same 
time, the WEC director was able to convince his staff to change the environment. His 
staff accepted the new structure and organization without comments once approved 
by the Director as he was well connected politically and socially.
In this sense, there were all kinds of strong interactions and the WEC project thus 
had strong support from product of the alliances, that mobilized around the project: 
the WEC and its staff as one team, the WAU and its team, and Nuffic which trusted 
the Dutch contractor WAU which in turn was trusted by the Yemeni partner (see 
section 10.3.2.1). From the beginning, the two parties summed up the major 
challenges by providing a locus to explore the problems involved, transferred 
information, communicated effectively and acquainted themselves with one another 
and with each other’s needs and interests. 
The interviewees acknowledged that the IWRM was new for both WEC and WAU, 
new, but World Bank and IMF programs heavily stressed it, so the integration of new 
disciplines like economics, sociology, gender etc was new. The common experiments 
also led to better cooperation. The initial steps within the project development were 
taken with enormous enthusiasm from both sides. In particular the Dutch team was 
willing to help and eager to experience the historic challenge of Water management 
in Yemen. For the Yemeni partners, the project came at the right moment, because 
the WEC was founded in 1999 as a small unit within the Faculty of Engineering48, 
SU, and had recently (in 2003) moved into a newly constructed building provided by 
Sana’a University. There was also full support from the organizational structure of SU 
and the top man of SU as he had strong personal, political and social ties with the 
director of WEC. The top man of SU also had his own agenda to build the capacity of 
WEC, to save the university the time and money to do it itself. Moreover, when the 
NPT project started in 2003, there were no formal institutions, no support programs, 
48 The Faculty of  Engineering was not part of  the project implementation process, so it is not part of  the actors as-
sociated around the WEC project. 
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no formal policies, and the administrative system of WEC was very weak. During the 
implementation of the WEC project, local counterparts started to collaborate to build 
the capacity of WEC. In the end, a successful network emerged with a good plan for 
implementing the project and with solid commitment from both sides. 
In the MBA project, there was no strategic planning in the governmental and 
sectoral levels and no development of a plan of actions for implementing the policies. 
They just formed policies without even consultation with the respective sectors. This 
was also the case for the WEC project as the water sectors and its institutions were 
not consulted during the policy making process either by the donors (Nuffic) or by 
the higher education sector. To overcome this, the actors at the operational level were 
forced to conduct this role. The interviewees confirmed that the Yemeni director of 
WEC used his strong personal and social ties with the water minister and institutions 
to informally mobilize them. This is especially as most of the top men in the water 
sector were former followers at the Dutch international institutions or universities, 
which have previously implemented projects in the unit of water management and 
engineering within the faculty of engineering, SU. In other words, WEC has support 
from the water sector and its leadership. The Director of WEC was a leader with a 
good support network within and outside the university in the Water Sector. He 
could mobilize staff to be integrated in the WEC project without causing conflicts. 
And the views and the problems and skills need to be developed needs of the water 
sector have been incorporated easily in the course of training, which made this 
project more successful. 
The director of the WEC project pointed out that project tried to organize its 
activity though a full supportive network with the water sector and its leaders, 
creating a network among the different government organizations located in both the 
main cities and in the countryside. This helped to incorporate ideas about the 
problems facing the water sector, to motivate, and to exchange experiences and 
knowledge on water sector organizational structures and the specific transition 
problems of their legal role, as well as their role in the countryside areas.49 The director 
added that there was also a common attitude among the WAU and WEC staff towards 
the training modalities of the Water Sector. Due to high engagement of WEC staff in 
projects outside the university, and the relatively small number of lecturers and 
limited availability of WAU staff, both partners arranged the training courses at the 
times they were available. Originally, this created some problems with the professional 
49 - There were available and rich studies and publications, and institutional analysis in English about the water manage-








students who wanted to concentrate their studies in the evenings and weekends, but 
due to the high quality of training, the students adopted.
10.4.3.2 The Associability Conflict Model ( MPA-NIAS and WRTC)
The conflict model represents two projects: MPA-NIAS and WRTC. Again we will 
look at each project in turn.
MPA-NIAS
Several actors from the Yemeni side were responsible for the implementation of 
the MPA-NIAS project: the Rector of Sana’a University, the Dean of the Faculty of 
Commerce and it staff members, the Department of Politics and Administration the 
Yemeni project manager, the Yemeni National Institute of Administrative Sciences 
(NIAS), and the Yemeni public sector. For the Dutch side, the main actors were Dutch 
Institute of Public Administration (ROI) and its staff and experts who linked to the 
project directly and indirectly, and the Dutch project manager. 
To interpret the information we received from the different interviewees, we can 
observe that the implementation process of the MPA-NIAS project failed to create 
durability in the alliances created around the project. There was open conflict and the 
project experienced serious turbulence between actors as they tried to get off the 
ground. The conflicts in this project were manifold. The first conflict was between the 
Dutch project managers and the Yemeni project managers on an individual basis. The 
second was between the Dutch contractor and its experts and the Yemeni counterparts 
as a collective. The third was between the Yemeni staff members of the faculty and the 
Department of Politics and the few members of the Unit of Public Administration 
within the Department of Politics. The fourth was between the Unit of Public 
Administration within SU and the Yemeni National Institute of Administrative 
Sciences (NIAS). Finally there was a conflict between the project as a whole and the 
direct stakeholders within the Yemeni government, especially the Ministry of Civil 
Service. 
When the Dutch contractor came to implement a readymade professional master 
in public administration, the department staff were very opposed, creating an anti-
change environment as they already had a master of political and public administration 
for the regular students. The MPA-NIAS project came from the highest authority 
from the higher education ministry so that meant the top man had decided upon it 
already, irrespective of whether it represented a priority of the department or not. 
The same problems mentioned in the MBA project associated with the requirements 
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of a professional master in public administration reared their head again within the 
MPA context. 
There is a widespread view among the interviewees that the formulated policy of 
the MPA project came without a clear explanation about the rules of Nuffic in such 
capacity building projects. There were conditions put in terms of financial and human 
resourses commitments by the recipient department50. This decision created 
resentments in the southern partner, exacerbated existing factionalism and caused 
frequent open conflict in departmental staff and project meetings. This is because; 
there was no financial reward for taking up project activities. The Dutch contactor 
argued that there was a lack of understanding among Yemeni project personnel of the 
Nuffic guidelines for financial management, leading to diminished Yemeni 
involvement in decision-making. This is a particularly sensitive matter in a situation 
where, as a norm, project implementation is subject to bipartite contracts with a 
Dutch contractor. One of the Dutch interviewees argued, “It may be very blunt but 
the counterparts of MPA look at the project as opportunity to get resources like 
computers, to get stuff`. 
The above situation created resentments in the southern partner. The department 
staff did not respect and trust the coming project, which resulted in very weak 
commitments from them to achieve its objectives. What the Dutch interviewee noted 
is part of the rule of the game in most Yemeni organizations, and the fact that this 
occurred was also due to a lack of understanding among the Yemeni counterparts 
about the content of the project itself and the organizational culture of the donor side. 
The Yemeni Project Director was selected without a transparent procedure and 
without any involvement on the part of the contractor. To deal with this internal 
conflict, the Yemeni Project Director used his strong social ties and support from the 
highest levels to neutralize the department staff, especially the political science 
specialists, which he claimed were not related to the content of the project, and were 
thus excluded from the human resources development plans. The project then faced 
more severe attacks from the department staff and none of them were supportive of 
the project. In the end, the MPA, as one of the interviewees said, is “familized”, as just 
the director and the individuals who belong to him by family or social ties were active 
in the project in training and teaching. Some of these people were not part of the 
50 - One of  the Dutch interviewees argued that the curriculum was actually immediately a problem area in the project. 
The agreement made by Nuffic with the SU when they designed projects was that the university would make professors 
available as part of  the projects, who would then develop the curriculum as part to their normal activities. When they 
started preparing the curriculum, Yemeni professors said they would not do anything until they got paid. Unfortunately, 
because of  the financial rules of  projects that Nuffic has for such projects, under no circumstance could professors be 








capacity building process. 
The interviewees added that from the very beginning it was discussed that the 
project should make a degree program and get NIAS together with the SU. 
Nevertheless, the Yemeni counterparts were not very interested in working together 
with NIAS. There was vision that NIAS was not qualified to collaborate with SU, as it 
was created just for students who scored very low in secondary school exams and 
who do not meet the qualifications to enter university. 
Another problem identified by the interviewees was that the Dutch contractor 
could not understand the above patterns of conflicts, and failed to overcome such 
strong opposition from the different actors around the project. The (usually relatively 
inexperienced) Dutch project directors and manager as well as the experts were 
inadequately prepared, resulting in poor communication and avoidable conflict. 
There was a lack of flexibility and willingness to negotiate roles and responsibilities 
among partners. Because of these conflicts, three Dutch project managers were 
replaced within a short time, and none of them had experience of how to manage 
projects in the Yemeni environment. They did not know how to act at the level of the 
center or the university level. They just followed the orders from ROI (top-down 
policy implementation). Further to the fact that Dutch experts did not trust the local 
counterparts and they did not have experience in professional management, they 
acted in a superior manner. The Dutch project managers were very busy managing 
the financial resources and funding instead of trying to understand the local 
environment and overcome the difficulties. 
One of the interviewees argued that, because of the conflict and the absence of the 
trust between both sides during the course of implementation, both of them lost the 
chance to learning from each other. It was assumed that the Dutch project manager 
would try to train the Yemeni counterparts and especially the Yemeni project manager 
about the organizational cultural of the donor side, and similarly the counterparts 
would inform the Dutch project manager about the organizational cultural of the 
recipient organization, thus incorporating local knowledge about what needs to be 
done to make the project a success. Once more, the presence of conflicts between the 
management with regard to the common vision and strategy of the recipient and the 
contractor meant that there was coherence in the implementation process of the 
project. Additionally, the recipient organization did not possess a shared vision and a 
set of principles which govern the organization, as we saw in Chapter 4. The majority 
of interviewees argued that if both foreign and local teams were not able to define the 
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reasons why the final clients would like to improve the services, it became difficult to 
use these arguments to set common goals and to convince the local teams to accept 
the assistance of the foreign teams. Although the top men signed the project aims and 
goals, the local teams felt that they had to implement a programme of change that did 
not lead to a win-win situation. The winner would be the contractor and for that 
reason the local teams criticized all the steps of the contractor and no trust and 
commitment was reached. 
To the extent that strife resulted from the above situation, the Rector of Sana’a 
University has shown great understanding for the fact that this is a natural occurrence 
in an environment where pioneering work is being undertaken. The interviewees 
asserted that the Rector of SU or the top man within the recipient organization tried 
to play an important role in resolving conflicts. Furthermore, the mediating role in 
many such situations of Nuffic and the NPT long-term manager Han Blom is well 
recognized and appreciated across the board. However, conflicts continued to take 
place until the project closed. Nuffic’s role was limited to trusting its Dutch contractor 
(ROI) and distrusting the information coming from the local counterpart. Then there 
was de facto selection of the Yemeni Project Directors during the formulation stage of 
the project. The first Project Director was selected by strong family and social ties, 
and the second selected by strong political and social ties with the highest level of 
authority in Yemeni state, far higher than the power of the rector or the top-man of 
SU himself. In this sense, the MPA Yemeni Project Directors had stronger informal 
power within the SU’s administrative body than the top man of SU or the direct 
recipient organization. No one could influence them or change their beliefs. 
Regarding the clients here - the public sector and especially the civil service system 
- the interviewees confirmed that incorporating their capacity and capability building 
needs, is a decision that required serious consideration and strategic approach in the 
policy making level. Yet this proved difficult in the climate of conflicted development 
processes within MPA/NIAS, lack of vision, and mission and unusual understanding. 
ROI and its partners, as Leiden University or the Yemeni counterparts could not deal 
with their beneficiaries. The beneficiary government sectors were not well informed 
about the objective of the project because the Yemeni counterparts were focusing on 
the personal interests and not on the collective interests of society. ROI attempted to 
bring beneficiary government sectors to the table but failed to do so. This demonstrated 
their lack of local knowledge, as Yemeni organizations are instead mobilized by the 








project and the beneficiary government sectors was not strongly built by either by 
formal or informal methods, and thus the relationship was strained. 
As we saw from results in the previous chapters, what is missing in this situation 
is a rational and strategic approach that could be established by the efforts of the 
project to direct and guide the government of Yemen and the behavior and choices of 
its organizations in capacity building process. One issue that could be a particularly 
important result of the project efforts is effective and efficient development of Yemen’s 
civil service. The country suffers from the absence of a strategy on the management 
and development of the Yemeni civil service corps. Currently there is no vision of 
how the civil service should be organized and according to what model. Nor is there 
a strategy outlining the model to be in place for decentralized government. We found 
also that the MPA/NIAS could not help the Yemeni government in deciding the 
approach to the participation process in the training efforts of the civil servants, to 
work out whether it wants to allow public organizations to freely contract or if there 
should be a centralized approach. Most of the interviewees pointed out that the 
enrolment in the training process in MPA/NIAS project was based on decisions that 
were not organizational decisions. It is hardly ever a ministry of civil service that 
decides on the organizational goals, which particular staff requires additional 
knowledge or skills. Also there is no strategy of how to transfer the skills and 
knowledge developed during the training process to the work setting. Instead, the 
decision to take training is made by each individual civil servant on the basis of their 
own interests, such as getting a diploma in order to get promotion, or whether they 
can get the Ministry or employing organization to finance the training is dependent 
on personal standing and clout.51
The WRTC project 
For WRTC several actors from the Yemeni side were responsible for the 
implementation of the WRTC project, but the central actors are the Women’s Research 
and Training Centre (WRTC), and its director and staff members and Aden University 
(AU) rector. From the Dutch side, the actors were the Wageningen University 
Department of Social Sciences, Rural Sociology and its staff and the Dutch project 
manager. The clients were women from Yemen. 
The WRTC project was not a development priority either for the policy makers 
within the higher education ministry or within AU. Based on information collected 
51 - There are many elements of  local knowledge reviewed in previous chapters. The policy recommendations in the 
coming chapter will include some of  them. 
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during the interviews the request for setting up this project was through the embassy 
of The Netherlands in Yemen, and thus an outside request. There a personal tie 
between the embassy, especially the gender specialist within the embassy, and a 
person in Aden University who became the Yemeni project director at the same time, 
who was the director of the WRTC. 
The majority of the interviewees declared that most of the conflicts that took place 
between the actors around the WRTC project and during the policy implementation 
were because of a lack of mutual understanding about the theme of “gender” in the 
Yemeni team and the Dutch team. In tribal and traditional countries, the topic of 
gender is seen as horrible, irrelevant and unnatural topic. Thus there was no respect, 
trust or commitments to the project from AU, the top man of the organizations and 
from the targeted community or organizations. It was a struggle to change mentality 
inside the AU. One of the interviewees pointed out the opposition against the center. 
When they presented on women’s rights they received emails with the threats. “We 
will go to kill you if you continue with the center (WRTC)”…it was a threat from the 
society”. For the AU, presenting the gender theme was like presenting an evil to them. 
As we mentioned in earlier chapters, it was associated with a feminism theme in a 
negative sense, such as aggressive women, free women, promiscuity and 
homosexuality. One can recognize the complexity involved in changing forcefully 
established cultural patterns of how women and men perceive each other’s roles in 
public sector or in wider context in society. 
It was noted by the interviewees that the Dutch contractor and the Dutch project 
manager could not understand the local environment and the informal institutions 
around the theme of gender. They could not create a positive environment of change 
at all levels, as they were not able to bridge the cultural clashes on the gender issues. 
This is especially true at operational level, as none of the staff at WRTC specialized in 
gender, so the set up of the training course depended on the input of the contractors 
and the Dutch project manager. As long as they lack local knowledge, they were 
trying to imposing Western values of gender. They were not supported by the director 
of the WRTC as she was told by the top man of the AU that if she supported them she 
would lose her position. One of the Dutch interviewees notes that there was a conflict 
in the gender approach among the Yemeni staff members of the WRTC. Some of the 
staff were traditional in terms of women rights and were against the western values, 
and other staff members were more advance and progressive. 








conflicts that also affected the process of implementation of the WRTC project. One 
of the interviewees argued that the conflicts took place among the WRTC staff 
members, as the Yemeni director of the project distrusted the advanced and 
progressive women within the center. The director is said to have claimed all the 
power, monopolized entire decision-making within the center tried to force and 
control every single activity. The contractors were not able to resolve the conflicts 
between the center staff and the project director. 
The above situation was enough to show that the WRTC project had no respect 
and thus no trust and commitment from different levels such as wider society, the 
university level, the center level and the operational level. At the same time, the Dutch 
contractor and project manager made the process of implementation very difficult, as 
they did not fully acknowledge the local policy environment to overcome the 
difficulties and failed to the introduce the theme of gender in a way that would have 
been acceptable to all stakeholders. Moreover, one of the interviewees noted that in 
such conflicted situation the attention of the actors and the interaction between them, 
was not about the LK of how to do this project and the challenges in gender in Yemeni 
public sector. This interviewee confirmed, as occurred in the MPA project, that the 
main attention of the actors around the WRTC project was about side-problems such 
as money distribution. There were no effective efforts to bring about change in 
approaches towards teaching, curriculum design, and attitudes towards learning. The 
shortage of staff members was not effective solved. As we saw in Chapter 9, there were 
many problems related the quality and the quantity of the staff members within the 
WRTC.
We have argued in the above projects that the top men in Yemen usually formulate 
public policies or accept policies coming from outside as donor efforts without 
consultation of their followers, administrative bodies or other bodies within or 
outside of the government. The consultation and coordination is just left to the 
implementation process stage.
The WRTC project represented the conflict model of interaction between the 
Yemeni counterparts and the Dutch contactor organizations and its experts. This led 
to weak coordination between the WRTC and the other stakeholders such as the 
government organizations, NGOs, women’s communities and women’s unions, as 
well as other donors working in the same field. The argument here is that there are 
many reasons why information about the informal system and its role against gender 
development is lacked. In Yemen, there are different factions of women in formal and 
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informal organizations that are in continual competition. There is the group of Aden 
and the group of Sana’a. If one of the women from Sana’a can do their PhD at the 
WRTC project, the women in Aden which the WRTC is part of it would not accept 
that at all. It would have been wise to have information available on how the WRTC 
can contribute to bringing these factions together. 
10.4.4 Four Cases in the Comparative Setting
The advantage of this way of investigating project success and failure is that it 
allows us to move outside the narrow view of examining the effectiveness of the aid 
projects, in level of achieving their ready-made or stated aims (top-down approach of 
policy making and implementation), and look at the wider context of interactions 
between ideas, institutions, and individuals and objects that all contribute to the 
process of aid project translation on the ground. It also gives us a much-needed 
realism about how to incorporate information on local knowledge during the policy 
implementation of an aid project. Relevant examples here are the process of translation 
of MBA and WEC projects, and the durability of the alliances and harmonized 
networks created, involved and supported by different levels - the personal level, the 
department level (MBA was partly supported by the department staff), the 
organizational level, the sectoral level as well as by the other direct stakeholders. 
There is a great deal more evidence of the two projects attempting to enroll beneficiary 
groups, not through formal consultation, but by informal and personal ties (the local 
manager role in MBA and the role of the Minster of Water Ministry in the case of 
WEC). These efforts were all part of the process of enrolling the respective sectors in 
the projects as allies. The black box of information about the formal and informal 
institutions at all levels was opened. All the involved actors were eager to achieve the 
specific objectives of the NPT project, by building the capacity and capability of the 
host organizations within SU, and to contribute to some extent in promoting the 
capacity building process within the respective government sectors. The lesson 
learned from the MBA case is that conflict and strife, even if they could have been 
avoided, are not essentially detrimental. When faced positively the network actors 
involved come out of it stronger, knowing each other better and with a better 
perception of how their collaborative relationship can best revolve issues. The process 
takes time and requires effort. It is time and effort well spent as long as the parties 









On the other hand, we can use the associability approach of actor network 
perspective to explain why the translation processes of MPA and WRTC were marred 
by conflicts. These projects faced different problems such as distrust, lack of mutual 
understanding; cultural clashes and so on that led various alliances to disintegrate. 
The main result was the breakdown of relationships between the Dutch contractors 
and the Yemeni counterparts and between the Yemeni counterparts themselves. 
Therefore, the projects failed to keep the interests of actors aligned, and the black box 
of information on local knowledge remained closed. In the case of WRTC, this also 
took place because of the poor translation of the gender theme in the first place: the 
beneficiaries of the project, as I have explained, saw the WRTC as evil and thus they 
made it very difficult for the project. The other formal and informal organizations 
such as the civil service ministry for MPA and women’s NGOs and unions were not 
fully brought on board. The donor, I have argued, acted as a processing centre that 
focused on side problems such as money distribution. Ultimately, the donor’s interests 
were not being met, and in the absence of an effective relationship between the donor 
and the counterparts, the networking between them had withered away by the end of 
the project.
10.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the limited research on aid policy analyses in Yemen 
and on institutional change that have taken place there. As such, the findings of this 
chapter also hold value for policy makers and implementers concerned with effective 
administrative and other institutional and governance reforms in recipient countries. 
The policy analysis in this chapter allows us to test the two main hypotheses posed in 
Chapters 1 and 3, that:
 (1) Incorporation of local knowledge in the policy design stage, 
integrating formal and informal institutions and organizations in host 
governments or organizations, increases the effectiveness of aid programs. 
(2) Incorporation of local knowledge during the implementation stage 
leads to greater openness to local realities not foreseen in the design stage 
and reduces the probability that aid programs or projects need redesigning, 
thus increasing their effectiveness.
To test the above main hypotheses of the study, we empirically analyzed the factors 
that downplayed the LKS at both the policymaking and implementation levels. The 
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main conclusion of the analysis is that donors have little chance of changing public 
sector institutions through their conventional approach. Why? This approach is 
inappropriate for incorporating the local knowledge aspects of specific recipient 
country, and it is based on a poor understanding of what institutions are and how 
they change. As revealed in section 10.2, Dutch policymakers adapted international 
assumptions and western theories of good governance to identify the problems and 
to formulate the NPT program in the infamous one-size fits all policy. The 
implementation process of the NPT program implicitly adopted the top-down 
approach. The middle management, who took over the responsibility to conduct the 
POI for the NPT in Yemen, could not perform this mission in an effective way. There 
was a clear lack of formal and informal data on the structure, organization, 
management and staffing and censorship at various levels, so there was no clear 
picture of the targeted organizations to realize “the policy fit”. The information in the 
POI did not give the Dutch contractors the necessary information to prepare for 
problems they could face confronted with the local situation during the actual 
implementation. The local knowledge was in an unopened black box. Information on 
local knowledge, therefore, required effort on the part of the project implementation 
team to incorporate it.
In other words, at policy level the implementation of more or less international 
standardized programmes made LK a footnote in the different country programmes. 
For the middle management, focusing on one or two sectors (and in the case of NPT 
on the HE sub-sector) the LK should have become more important, but the middle 
management relied on the international reports and censured workshops, so LK was 
not taken into account. Thus all experiences with LK were pushed to the operational 
level of implementers. The explanation here is that the policy maker just wanted to 
overcome difficulties and just to formulate a policy that picked low-hanging fruits. It 
was therefore a process which passed on the difficulties of incorporating local 
knowledge from one level to another, from the policy making level to the middle 
management level from the middle management level to the operational level. 
It was assumed that the opposite would take place, as local knowledge should be 
higher in the policymaking than the operational level. Contractors who implement 
the aid programs often have no institutional stability, meaning that their involvement 
in the implementation process is based on a competitive selection among plenty of 
contractors. At policymaking level, the organizations are institutionally stable as the 








There should be lessons learned about the accumulation of knowledge through 
previous aid practices in recipient countries. However, there is a lack of information 
on local knowledge practices on online networks. There is a lack of institutional 
memory within donor countries, and also the diplomatic language and development 
jargon used in the interactions between actors during policy making prevents the 
black box of LK from being opened at the policy making level: 
Table 10.3 The Process of Incorporating LK during the Development of the NPT 
Program
The patterns and theme that seemed to emerge among the four selected NPT 
cases are that implementers (contactors) are the players at the heart of the aid 
intervention process. This idea is interrelated with the actor-network perspective, 
which provided the associability development approach and its main idea that the 
LKS (opening the black box) might be solved through the direct and indirect 
interactions with all actors involved in the actual process of implementing of an aid 
project in a specific places and time. The associability development approach is an 
alternative analytical tool of aid policies that offers a unique lens for analysis, and 
allows a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the aid programs’ implementations 
process. It reminds us of how solve the sheer complexity of incorporating local 
knowledge, as in this study the four selected case studies as part of the NPT program 
in Yemen are divided equally into two models of associability. The first is the harmony 
model of associability and networking; and the second one is the conflict model of 
associability and networking. 
The harmony model explains the MBA and WEC projects. They witnessed 
effective mobilization of allies, such as government organizations, using formal and 
informal ties and tools. There were significant and strong actor-network interactions 
between the actors such as the donor contractor and its experts with the Yemeni 
counterparts, or among the Yemeni counterparts themselves at the departmental and 
organizational levels. They could open the black box of information about the 
functions of formal and informal institutions that set the rules of the game within the 
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confronted with the local situation during the actual implementation. The local knowledge was in an 
unopened black box. Information on local knowledge, therefore, required effort on the part of the project 
implementation team to incorporate it. 
          In other words, at policy level the implementation of more or less international standardized 
programmes made LK a footnote in the different country programmes. For the middle management, 
focusing on one or two sectors (and in the case of NPT on the HE sub-sector) the LK should have 
become more important, but the middle management relied on the international reports and censured 
workshops, so LK was not taken into account. Thus all experiences with LK were pushed to the 
operational level of implementers. The explanation here is that the policy maker just wanted to overcome 
difficulties and just to formulate a policy that picked low-hanging fruits. It was therefore a process which 
passed on the difficulties of incorporating local knowledge from one level to another, from the policy 
making level to the middle management level from the middle management level to the operational level.  
      It was assumed that the opposite would take place, as local knowledge should be higher in the 
policymaking than the operational level. Contractors who implement the aid programs often have no 
institutional stability, meaning that their involvement in the implementation process is based on a 
competitive selection among plenty of contractors. At policymaking level, the organizations are 
institutionally stable as the same organizations in a donor country are responsible in forming its aid 
polices. There should be lessons learned about the accumulation of knowledge through previous aid 
practices in recipient countries. However, there is a lack of information on local knowledge practices on 
online networks. There is a lack of institutional memory wi hin donor countries, and also the diplomatic 
language and development jargon used in the interactions between actors during policy making prevents 
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        The patterns and theme that seemed to emerge among the four selected NPT cases are that 
implementers (contactors) re the players t the heart of the aid intervention process. This i ea is 
interrelated with the actor-network perspective, which provided the associability development approach 
and its main idea that the LKS (opening the black box) might be solved through the direct and indirect 
interactions with all actors involved in the actual process of implementing of an aid project in a specific 
places and time. The associability development approach is an alternative analytical tool of aid policies 
that offers a unique lens for analysis, and allows a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the aid 
programs’ implementations process. It reminds us of how solve the sheer complexity of incorporating 
local knowledge, as in this study the four selected case studies as part of the NPT program in Yemen are 
divided equally into two mode s f associability. Th  first is th  harmo y mod l of associability and 
networking; and the second one is the conflict model of associability and networking.   
        The harmony model explains the MBA and WEC projects. They witnessed effective mobilization of 
allies, such as government organizations, using formal and informal ties and tools. There were significant 






capacity building within the SU university organizations and the targeted 
organizations, within the government and the private sectors. The more harmonized 
interactions increase the level of incorporating information about local knowledge 
(opening the black box), and increase the level of effectiveness of aid projects.
The conflict model of associability explains the MPA/NIAS and WRTC projects. 
These projects experienced ongoing conflicts and poor consultation between allies. 
There were significant and strong conflicted interactions between the actants such as 
the donor contractor and its experts with the Yemeni counterparts, or among the 
Yemeni counterparts themselves at the departmental and organizational levels. The 
conflicted interactions showed that there were remarkable differences in the motives, 
power position and dominance of the actors, which decreased the incorporation of 
information on local knowledge (i.e. kept the black box closed), and thus decreased 
the level of effectiveness of the aid interventions. There are several factors that lead 
towards the creation of conflicting actor networks which we reviewed during the 
analysis, such as: trust and openness; commitment; mutual understanding; avoiding 
cultural differences; unequal representation; the initial visit to define the project; the 
rapid rotation of staff; and a large number of actors. 
The above conclusions, which were drawn based on qualitative analysis, are in line 
with the results of quantitative analysis (see Chapters 7, 8, 9), showing that MBA and 
WEC were more effective than MPA-NIAS and WRTC in achieving the overall 
objective and the specific objectives of the Dutch NPT program in Yemen. Depending 
on the strong compatibility between the results of quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, we can say that the results of this study are strong enough to generalized 
that there is a deficiency of broad understanding and the application of local 
knowledge by donors. In turn, the deficiency of practical knowledge or the lack of 
incorporating local knowledge is a very important factor in the failure of donors, 
trying to promote public sector reform programs in poor policy environments. These 
results give us strong empirical support to refute the argument of the PCP approach 
and its main argument that, foreign aid programs did not and will not work in poor 
policy environment. The problem is not a poor environment but rather poor aid 
polices formulated with a lack of synthesis, research and institutional analyses to 
understand the environment. Unfortunately, donors, frustrated with their failed 
involvement and unwilling to challenge their underlying assumptions, have been 
reluctant to eschew a top-down approach in policy implementation. In particular, 








reform context. The aid policy makers must formulate sound polices that fit with, and 
are tailored to, recipients’ unique context and needs. There are many policy and 
theoretical reflections of this study which we present in the next, concluding chapter. 

CHAPTER 11




This study was undertaken to identify how donor-promoted public sector reforms 
in poor countries could be improved, in order to generate outcomes that are more 
beneficial. Donor programs offer great potential for Yemen, in terms of improving its 
administrative institutions, but the country has experienced many cases of failed and 
uncompleted development programs. The country suffers from high rate of poverty, 
corruption, economic, social and political unrest, and more recently security 
concerns. Empirically, this dissertation is primarily concerned with the identification 
of why donor-promoting public sector reforms programs in Yemen are not effective, 
especially those which are expected to build the capacity and capability the higher 
education sector. This question is not limited to the Yemeni case, but it extends to 
many poor nations, for which the outcomes of foreign aid activities are the same as in 
Yemen.
To deal with this complicated question, this research has taken an in-depth look 
at the factors affecting success of development projects, through a review of existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. The study found that the public choice perspective 
(PCP) with its economist scholars and experts is the prevailing explanation, for the 
ineffectiveness of donor-promoting public sector reform. The PCP approach has 
publicized two main causal explanations: (1) the multiple goals of donors for 
providing aid, and (2) the poor policy environments in poor nations themselves. 
Theoretically, this dissertation has argued against the public choice perspective (PCP) 
and its presupposed causal mechanisms of aid intervention ineffectiveness, by 
hypothesizing an alternative explanation of aid (in) effectiveness. This explanation is 
that aid projects and programs can certainly work and achieve satisfactory results, 
despite the poor quality of governance in host countries, and with the existence of 
multiple goals among donors for providing aid. To do so, however, aid practitioners 
in the field and those in charge of development policies at the highest institutional 
levels, should be in touch with reality and start incorporating local knowledge (LK) 
with a careful project design and/or implementation and adopting delivery 
mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness. 
Consequently, in this dissertation, I have explored the extent of the role played by 
the “Local Knowledge Syndrome”, as a potential cause of the low performance of 
donor-promoting public sector reforms programs in poor nations. This dissertation 
has taken a look at the factors influencing the incorporation of information on local 
knowledge during aid policymaking and implementation, through the purview of 
implementation and policymaking theories and other theories such as institutional 
theory, cultural theory, the actor network perspective and explicitly its development 
associability approach. Based on these theories, two propositions on institutional 
change were developed and tested in this study, and I have sufficient evidence to 








(I) Incorporation of local knowledge in the policy design, integrating 
formal and informal institutions and organizations in host governments or 
organizations, increases the effectiveness of aid programs. 
(II) Incorporation of local knowledge during the implementation stage 
leads to greater openness to local realities not foreseen in the design stage, 
and reduces the probability that aid programs or projects need redesigning, 
thus increasing their effectiveness. 
A few studies have touched upon the LKS problem (see for example Voeten, 2013, 
Baimyrzaeva, 2010; Scarf, 2010; Jenkins and Plowden, 2006), but to my knowledge no 
more studies have extensively investigated this topic and its relation to the 
ineffectiveness of donor-promoted public sector reform in poor countries, including 
Yemen1. In the previous chapters, I showed that the incorporation of information on 
local knowledge can occur on the ground. I applied a grounded mixed research 
methodology, in order to develop conceptual clarity of LKS at the micro level. The 
method allowed us to describe the processes of capacity building (as part of the public 
sector reform process), based on the interaction between the formal and informal 
institutions (LKS) in the specific place and time of aid intervention, as well as yielding 
theoretical and policy implications, and pinpointing possible topics for further 
research.
11.2 Summary of the Key Findings of the Theoretical and Literature Review 
This study started by mapping and analyzing the record of the causal factors of the 
ineffectiveness of donor-promoted public sector reform in poor nations. In Chapter 
2, I reviewed the literary and some concepts which are applicable to the main 
argument of this study. I saw that the foreign aid discourse has been marked by two 
important contradictory research approaches: (1) the public interest perceptive (PIP) 
which argues that foreign aid does work and that it should be continued, to overcome 
the poverty trap in poor nations; and (2) the public choice perspective (PCP) which 
argues that foreign aid does not work and moreover that it has harmed poor countries 
instead of helping them, and thus should be stopped. I ignored the public interest 
perceptive (PIP) here and instead focused on the public choice perspective PCP. The 
public interest perspective states that aid is justified, because aid flows by donors to 
recipient countries are needed to fill the financial gap that poor nations suffer from. 
It regards the financial gap as the main cause of the depressed situation in poor 
nations. Undoubtedly, the financial gap needs to be covered, especially in the 
particularly poor countries. However, I do not fully agree with this argument, because 
a condition for the effectiveness of this aid is that there should be a local knowledge 
on how to use this money in an effective way. As we have seen in the case of Yemen, 
1 - This study is the first study is dealing with the foreign aid programs at a whole in the context of  Yemen, as there is 
no a single academic study with the topic of  foreign aid was conducted. 
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more than US$18 billion has been allocated to the country, but there is a big question 
mark about its effectiveness. 
In this dissertation I isolated the explanation of the public interest perspective and 
instead focused on the public choice perspective. The PCP states that foreign aid is 
ineffective in achieving its ultimate objectives: prompting developments, growth and 
reducing poverty in poor nations. Moreover, it argues that foreign aid actually harms 
rather than helps the poor nations, and suggests that foreign aid flows should stop to 
avoid such harm. The PCP approach scholars have divided the factors of why foreign 
aid is ineffective into two main strands. The first strand, based on macro studies, 
argues that poor policy environment, such as weak and corrupt policies and 
institutions, is the main cause of the shortcomings of foreign aid programs. The 
second strand, based upon country level analysis, argues that the problem is that 
most donors tie their aid to political, strategic, commercial, cultural, and religious 
self-interest. The donors, it is argued, are highly motivated to achieve these self-
interests, but less interested in holding recipient countries accountable for achieving 
anything productive with the aid. The egoistic interests of donors often work against 
the altruistic objectives of providing aid and might lead to corruption of the aid 
projects’ outcomes, thus reducing the effectiveness of aid interventions.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the researcher does not agree with much of what has 
been mentioned and proposed by previous writers on this subject, especially the 
economic scholars and experts related to the PCP approach, including Burnside & 
Dollar (1997, 2000, and 2004) and Easterly (1998, 2005, and 2008). This study argues 
that aid projects and programs can certainly work and achieve satisfactory results 
despite a “poor quality of governance in host countries” and with the “presence of 
manifold objectives” among donors for providing aid. Economists lack the relevant 
background knowledge to understand the full complexity of the social dynamics and 
deep-rooted values and patterns of behavior of the poor. They do not focus on 
behavioral issues and the motivation of the key organizations and individuals that 
they are dealing with in the public sectors of poor nations. 
This dissertation has sought to confirm an alternative explanation that the “Local 
Knowledge Syndrome” is a cause of the ineffectiveness of donor-promoting public 
sector reform programs. The main idea behind this explanation is that the knowledge 
and ideas that inform donor reforms programs and projects can serious affect their 
outcomes and their level of effectiveness. If I look at the body of aid policies, there is 
clearly a growing appreciation that policy depends on local knowledge for 
implementation-but no one has figured out how to incorporate LK successfully in 
inhospitable or poor political and social climates. 
Chapter 3 addressed the theoretical agenda of the study. Based on many 
institutional theories, I started with a basic definition for Local Knowledge Syndrome 








defined as the relative lack of formal institutions and organizations in poor nations’ 
public sectors compared to informal institutions and organizations. Neither the rule 
of the game within public sectors nor wealth are generated, transmitted and practiced 
through the state’s formal institutions and organizations. The power of formal state 
institutions and organizations is far less than it appears on paper, and they are broadly 
subservient to the interests of the informal institutions and organizations. The 
research found that LKS reflects donors’ ignorance of the role of informal structures 
and instead rely on (weak) formal institutions for capacity building. It is essential for 
the development community to realize that informal institutions and their “implicit-
knowledge” are as important, if not more, than formal institutions and organizations’ 
“explicit-knowledge” for the effective promotion of public sector reforms processes in 
poor countries. The informal system or structure sets the main rules of the game by 
which most of the recipient government bodies are administrated and controlled. If 
aid participants are aware of this system, they can successfully design and promote 
reforms and “institutional change” in non-transparent environments (see for example: 
Polanyi, 1958 & 1966; Bernard, 1968; North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005).
In Chapter 4 I saw that to comprehend the dynamics of the Yemeni public sector, 
one must look beyond written laws and regulations and institutional rules and 
procedures to examine the informal rules of the game that govern the organizational 
and individual behavior. These informal institutions and organizations’ influence is 
reflected in Yemeni government officials’ distinctive and informal style of decision-
making, management functions and interpersonal relations. The researcher found 
that the function of civil servants in Yemen, especially managerial behavior, is heavily 
influenced by society’s social-political structure and by the values, norms and 
expectations of its people. For instance, the function of the civil servant within his or 
her community and organization is shaped to a considerable extent by the expectations 
of tribesmen, relatives, friends and employees. The top tribal leader, by virtue of his 
position in the organization, sees himself as the “top man” of a tribe and not a formal 
organization that has formal rules and regulations. Thus employees are perceived as 
members of that tribe. 
Despite the complexity and sensitivity of LKS, public policy theory argues that 
clear understanding and positive interaction between formal and informal institutions 
is a pre-condition for identifying the problems and formulating sound policies, for 
building and improving managerial capacity of administrative systems in poor 
nations, Such information on local knowledge was missing in all three waves of aid 
policies since the 1950s: (1) Capacity development of organizations and individuals 
(1950s-70s); (2) Reorganizing the public and private sectors (1980s – mid-1990s); 
and (3) reshaping the whole governance system (late 1990s onwards). During these 
three waves, donors’ aid policies, towards all recipient countries including Yemen, 
incorporated scientific knowledge and theories of development that have been mostly 
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developed and tested in western countries with a thriving modern society. These 
idealized models of governance have rarely had much to say about the practicalities 
of bringing about change in a recipient country.
In addition to the deficiency in practical knowledge, I found that aid policies are 
still dominated by two main unsubstantiated assumptions. The most important of 
them, is a strong belief among aid policymakers in the potential of Western knowledge 
and expertise to take poor nations out of their backward situation into modernism. 
The other is that institutions in developing countries should be based on the Western 
lines, as Western models are universally relevant and superior to local institutions in 
recipient countries. Due to the prevalence of both assumptions and the deficiency in 
practical knowledge, donor agency plans for an enormous number of recipient 
countries, have been based on the infamous one-size-fits-all formula. These projects 
have not worked in recipient countries, because there are varying local conditions. 
The social-engineering model of James Scott (1998) provided a clear theoretical 
explanation of why aid policies formulated by using assumptions and not focused on 
the social contexts of their policies, resonates in the simplification policies from the 
twentieth century on centrally-planned social-engineering projects in high modernist 
states. Scott (1998) explained the simplification policy by looking at the interactions 
between scientific knowledge holders and practical knowledge holders. Local 
societies are complex and it is not that easy to understand them. In addition, states 
exercise a “high-modernist ideology”, which is about having a strong faith in scientific, 
technological and human progress. Carriers of such faith often see progress in visually 
aesthetic terms. To simplify or to create “legibility” of complex phenomena, states 
have used the authority of scientific knowledge and its tendency to disallow other 
competing sources of judgment in its developmental agenda. The result has been 
either a massive failure of these developmental agendas or the imposition of orders 
that isolate and simplify the societies that they seek to administer and develop. 
I also found in this study that aid policy implementation has mostly followed the 
top-down approach. This approach is an externally-determined approach to aid 
policies, which tries to transfer skills and formal aspects of institutions or organizations 
planned and implemented by foreign professionals into recipient countries. 
Fortunately this approach is falling out of favor, at least in policy rhetoric. 
Another significant finding from this study is that development should begin 
from the grassroots level, in the specific place and at the specific time of the aid 
interventions. This is because, local knowledge is much linked to context, and time 
specific. This was demonstrated in the case of Dutch-Yemen NPT (Netherlands 
Programme for the Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary Education and 
Training Capacity) program, which I looked at in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. I provided 
empirical evidence that at NPT policy level the implementation of (almost) 








different country programs. 
For middle management, focusing on one or two sectors - and in the case of NPT 
on the higher education sub-sector - local knowledge should have been important, 
but they relied on international reports and censured workshops, so LK was not taken 
into account. Consequently information on local knowledge remained an unopened 
and invisible black box until the operational level. Contactors either successfully 
opened this black box or were unable to open it. This explains some aid projects in 
our study failed, while others succeeded. 
In this dissertation, I have also looked at the ‘associability development approach’ 
(see Scoot-smith 2013), which derived from the main ideas of the actor network 
perceptive, as an alternative approach to address the LKS. The network perceptive 
provides an original lens for the analysis, and allows closer insights into the dynamics 
of the development process in the related projects. The advantage of the network 
perceptive for examining project success and failure allows me to move beyond the 
narrow concern with stated aims, and to look at the local knowledge of the specific 
context such as ideas, formal and informal institutions, individuals, and objects that 
all contribute to the development activities during “the translation process”. It also 
gives me much‐needed skepticism, about any claim that development projects have 
an inherent, objective validity, but it has an adaptable and associable validity to the 
local context. Once again, the network perceptive lens provides a conceptualization 
tool that was epistemologically challenging; combining the ‘real’ outcomes of aid 
project (positivism) with how humans formally and informally interact, perceive, 
respond and react to events and to one another (constructivism) in order to mobilize 
the different allies of the project and to exchange aides and information on local 
knowledge during the implementation process. 
The associability development approach describes how networks emerge and how 
interactions among the actors involved take shape around the aid project in order to 
exchange ideas, local facts and capture the local reality. It is not a static description of 
nodes and hubs, rather it is descriptive and explanatory as the development has to be 
studied in action, focusing on the dynamics rather than on the stability of the 
relationships (Voeten, 2013). The development associability model suggests two sub-
models to explain the success and failure of aid projects: (1) The associability harmony 
model and (2) The associability conflict model. The first sub-model reflects the 
process of implementation of the aid project through harmonized interactions, which 
lead to the incorporation of local knowledge. The second sub-model reflects 
conflicting interactions between the contractors and their counterparts, meaning the 
failure to incorporate local knowledge and therefore jeopardizing effective project 
implementation. 
This research considers many factors that can influence human interactions and 
which can lead to the harmony model or conflict model of networking. The most 
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important of these factors are: building trust, openness, commitment, mutual 
understanding, cultural differences, unequal representation, rate of rotation of staff, 
and the number of actors involved in the aid project during the actual implementation 
process. In Chapter 4, I also argued that the above mentioned factors can come into 
play because, of the lack of attention among donor implementers that their 
counterparts might work in disagreement with their skills, styles, perform functions 
and techniques. Consequently there is not only the expected culture shock, but it is 
also difficult for implementers to understand the “rule of the game” which the 
recipient organization functions are mainly based on. 
11.3 Methodological Approach and the Main Empirical Findings 
The researcher focused on research design and mixed methodology to empirically 
argue against the saliency of past analyses of aid project ineffectiveness based on the 
PCP approach. As I mentioned above, PCP studies and scholars argue that foreign 
aid ineffectiveness occurs because of self-egoistic interests of donors by providing aid 
to poor nations and poor policy environments in poor nations. 
The methodology approach was designed to test if the LKS is a causal mechanism, 
among others of course, determining the effectiveness (or otherwise) of aid projects. 
I used Dutch-Yemen development co-operation, to provide macro-policy analysis in 
order to test whether the existence of multiple egoistic goals of aid giving are the 
main cause of ineffective aid interventions. I selected Dutch development activities in 
Yemen, as the Netherlands is historically one of Yemen’s biggest foreign aid donors. 
In Chapter 6, I used secondary and available sources of data to provide a brief 
historical background of the Netherlands’ development aid history, determinants, 
and its role in Yemen. I found that the egoistic/strategic interest of the Netherlands 
for assisting Yemen, is to achieve security and stability in the country. However, I also 
found that the Dutch implementers do not have the “local knowledge” to accomplish 
their strategic aim. Yemen has yet to witness dramatic improvements in terms of 
development outcomes, that have meaningful impacts on security and stability, and 
in fact has turned into an almost failed state.
I then used to the methodology approach to analyze one policy area in depth. I 
selected education sector reform, because more than 40% of Dutch foreign aid goes 
directly to the education sector at all levels. The Dutch NPT program included 14 
projects implemented in different higher education institutions in Yemen. In this 
study, I selected just four projects (N=4) by using a Most Similar Case Selection 
strategy. These projects are MPA-NIAS ( Yemeni National Institute for Administration 
Sciences), MBA, WEC, and WRTC2, which are all similar, because all the projects are 
2 - In detail, the projects are: (1) Establishment of  an Executive Masters in Public Administration (MPA-NIAS) degree 
at the Faculty of  Commerce, Sana’a University and Institute of  Administrative Sciences (NIAS); (2) Establishment 
of  an executive Masters in Business Administration and an MBA Degree Project at Degree at Faculty of  Commerce, 








funded and implemented by the Dutch government for the same recipient (HE sector 
in Yemen) and especially Sana’a University, within approximately the same timeframe. 
All the selected projects had specific objectives to build the institutional capacity and 
capability of the host organizations, by building their organizational and administrative 
structures and increasing the quantity and quality of the staff members. The aim was 
to provide training services for promoting capacity development within the Yemeni 
public, private and non-governmental sectors as the overall objective of the Dutch 
program in Yemen. These projects are comparable in such a way that it allows some 
level of control of the other variables.
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I applied the “development validity approach”, conducting 
micro/quantitative analysis to reveal the level of effectiveness of the selected NPT 
projects in achieving their overall and specific objectives. At this stage, a survey 
questionnaire was used as the main data source of evidence to identify the opinions 
of the participants. The questionnaire was designed on the basis of the local knowledge 
aspects in Yemen, the ideal model for capacity building within public sector in Yemen 
that was developed in Chapter 4, and the objectives of the Dutch NPT program 
reviewed in Chapter 6. The importance of the findings of this stage of enquiry, should 
be judged in the light of the strengths and limitations of the methods by which the 
data were collected and analysed (see Chapter 5). 
To assess the level of effectiveness of the selected projects in achieving the overall 
objective of the NPT program between 2004 and 2012, different sets of variables were 
used. The first variable was the demographic profile and background of the 
participants, used as a proxy to measure the contribution of the aid projects in 
building the capacity within the public sector. This variable includes different 
measured items to look at the following questions in regards to capacity and capability 
building: (1) What are the target group(s) and which administrative level should they 
belong to?; and (2) What are the appropriate criteria for participants’ enrollment, 
which may be appropriate to some degree to the place/time circumstances of the 
respective organizations? The results based on across case analysis suggest that the 
WRTC and WEC are more successful than MBA, NIAS, and MPA in selecting 
appropriate participants for attending the training process. 
The main objective of the second set variable was as proxy to explore the 
contribution of the selected projects to building their participants’ managerial skills. 
Thirty-two measured items were tested, and the aim was to find relationships between 
the level of effectiveness of the selected aid projects and the different measured items 
which were improved by attending the training process. For this, manager skill 
development was divided into four categories, based on the ideal model for capacity 
building within the public sector in Yemen that I developed in Chapter 4. These four 
Centre (WRTC) of  Aden University; and (4) Strengthening the Water and Environment Centre of  Sana’a University 
and its Program in Integrated Water Resource Management (WEC).
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categories are: (1) improving corporate policies and strategies, (2) effective human 
resources management, (3) building leadership skills, and (4) establishing and 
building their communication skills. One interesting issue which emerged is that in 
reality the identified managerial skills are so overlapping that it is difficult to make a 
clear-cut distinction between the first three categories.
The third proxy variable was used to explore the efforts made by the selected 
projects and the respective target organizations, to transfer training to work settings. 
It would be impossible for a donor intervention to set up a self-sustainable civil 
service training system, by merely tackling the supply side or focusing on building 
skills for civil servants. There should be there a rational strategy which will provide 
structure and guidance, for subsequent implantation and budget allocation 
discussions. This should go alongside a strategic human resource management 
framework guiding the development of the civil service in Yemen and providing clear 
mechanisms, for transferring training to work settings. Capacity building processes 
will not be complete until the transferring process is achieved. 
The quantitative results of these three variables varied among the selected projects. 
The quantitative analysis revealed that the MBA and WEC were more effective than 
MPA and WRTC, and that NIAS was in the middle. The cross case analysis results 
suggested that MPA and NIAS must focus on developing the managerial skills of 
their participants, while at the same time eliminating the obstacles which are 
hindering the processes of training and skills transference. 
I found that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program did not provide all necessary 
conditions for effective capacity and capability building process, within the contexts 
of MPA, NIAS, and WRTC. The same capacities and capabilities which the NPT 
ought to have reformed or developed still represent the obstacles and weaknesses 
facing the less effective projects. MPA, NIAS, and WRTC all resorted to earlier 
practices during the NPT process and so change was not picked up. 
To discover the obstacles of the selected projects to realize the overall objective of 
the NPT program, I analyzed the process of building capacity within the targeted 
organizations. Twenty-one measured items were tested. Here I divided the obstacles 
into three categories: the organizational and administrative settings; the quantity of 
the teaching staff; and the quality of the teaching staff. The quantitative results showed 
that the MPA and WRTC have less effective organization, management and qualified 
leadership than MBA and WEC. Respondents in the NIAS place their institution in 
the middle, with partly effective organization and management and qualified 
leadership. Similarly, MPA, NIAS and WRTC were found to have less sufficient and 
qualified teaching staff than the MBA and WEC. 
11.4 Local Knowledge Syndrome through Qualitative Analysis








knowledge elements, which were not incorporated during policymaking and/or 
policy implementation, and explained why there was variation among the selected 
projects based upon the quantitative analysis in the first step. The main source of data 
was the oral interviews, NPT documents, participated-observations, and related 
articles and books. This stage therefore, attempted to address the knowledge deficiency 
through a synthesis of empirical investigation, drawing from multiple data sources to 
propose an explanation as to why the Dutch-Yemen NPT program is not that effective 
in operating in the Yemini local environment. Different local knowledge elements 
presented in Chapter 4 were employed in Chapters 9 and 10 for the analysis. 
Regarding the LKS explanation, I found that the reform content of the Dutch-
Yemen NPT program has been largely based on ambiguous or inadequate information 
of the informal institutions within the Yemeni direct and indirect recipient 
organizations, and several unjustified and systematic projects on capacity and 
capability building and institutional reforms. The Dutch-Yemen NPT program based 
itself on the Western assumption, that the Ministry of Higher Education in Yemen 
should be the highest decision-making level for the higher education sector. The 
reality was, however, that the University Presidents were at the same bureaucratic 
decision level, as the Minister of Higher Education. Selecting the Vice-Minister to be 
the overall NPT Project Coordinator for Yemen caused problems during the 
implementation of all projects, since he could only advise the Rectors of the 
universities to take the necessary steps to improve the project performances. The 
NPT could have taken another direction, if they would have known that the 
management and staff of the Ministry of Higher Education, and the Yemeni 
universities and faculties were not convinced of being reformed. The isolated position 
of the universities within the world of work, did not push the university staff to adapt 
to a changing environment that was taken place in the society. The Ministry did not 
establish a clear mandate in the higher education sector. Moreover, perhaps most 
Dutch contractors related to the NPT program had a poor understanding of what 
institutions are and how to build/redesign effective institutions. 
It is really difficult to understand all the intricacies of the complex institutional 
reform processes or the institutions of a traditional country like Yemen, such as 
nepotism and personal connections. These informal managerial methods start from 
the selection of the directors of the aid projects, to the selections of the trainers and 
trainees. Donor contactors went along with the traditional vision of the top men of 
the respective universities. In doing so, ECs were created without building 
administrative systems to run them. The assumption was that the Rectors would like 
to establish a western-style model of university, where lecturers would have freedom 
to do research, study and to undertake services for the community. However, most 
Rectors were appointed to control the university, so the will to develop a new style of 
‘open’ management was not in their direct interest. The Rectors went along with the 
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NPT demands, but most of them refused to take a leading role in the reform activities. 
They often remained the ‘judge’ in case of conflicts between the Dutch and Yemeni 
partners. At lower levels, Deans are in control of staff and students, and a free 
exchange of ideas, knowledge and skills, could threaten their positions. Inviting 
professional, students to participate in new programs with new methodologies and 
management was for many deans a step too far. Furthermore, the assumption that 
faculty staff were motivated to learn about new ways of learning and teaching, and 
new subjects and services was too Western-based. 
In the public administration sector the civil service managers had no clear idea 
why they had to change their systems, and why they had to follow upgrading programs 
at university. Most University staff members, having no experience with civil servants, 
but only with regular BA students from different sciences, did not have an idea what 
to teach them. There was a two year period put in to bridge between the two, before 
the Master’s program started. The assumption was that teachers would be very 
motivated to step into the NPT projects, based on the principle that each academic 
would be very happy to learn additional knowledge and skill. However this did not 
work out in the Yemen context. Most teachers were happy to give their lectures to 
regular students, reading their often-outdated materials and not integrating the 
modern developments in their subjects too much. Stepping into the project meant 
additional work and that should be paid. Since payment through the project was not 
allowed, most teachers abstained from the NPT project activities.
The ECs suffer from a lack of integration and coordination with the organizational 
and administrative structures at the university level, or middle management level. 
Instead they have individual connections with the rectors or the top men in the 
universities. Furthermore, there are no synergy or coordination mechanisms among 
ECs. ECs still suffer from inadequate selection and evaluation of staff members. The 
existing curricula, especially in MPA and WRTC, are old and far removed from 
modern science. Furthermore, there is low-level of female participation as trainers 
and trainees in the institutions or the selected ECs.
As I have seen, MBA and WEC achieved a reasonable level of effectiveness. The 
projects had comprehensive visions, guiding methodologies, educational and training 
packages to achieve the required balance between theoretical and practical aspects, 
effective administrative systems, and effective capacity building among their 
participants, ensuring participants transferred skills and knowledge back to the work 
setting. MPA-NIAS and WRTC, on the other hand, failed to reach a reasonable level 
of effectiveness. I considered various theoretical perspectives to understand the above 
variation in the level of effectiveness, among the four selected aid projects, by focusing 
on factors that affect the incorporation of information on local knowledge during 
policy making and/or implementation. 








internationally standardized programmes, using western theories of good governance 
to identify the problems and to formulate the NPT program in the infamous one-size 
fits all policy. Thus LK was entirely sidelined in the process. Middle management 
relied on international reports and censured workshops, so LK was not taken into 
account, and all experiences with LK were shifted to the operational level of 
implementers. In global development policies there seems to be little room for 
deviation. The identification process is mainly focused on finding recognizable 
problems within the recipient country to which new policies can be directed. Middle 
management is charged with identifying the right institutions and people to carry out 
these interventions. Counter-information might be available, but is not systematically 
collected because it will not serve the interests of the policymakers. 
None of the existing analytical frameworks of these theories were able to address 
why there were more and less effective projects and how this related with the LKS. 
This is especially as I mentioned above the selected aid projects were all developed 
under one heading, namely the Dutch NPT program and they were all implemented 
in one sector that is the higher education sector in Yemen. Therefore as an alternative 
analytical tool, I employed the associability development approach, drawn from the 
ideas of the network perspective. As mentioned above, the implementers of the Dutch 
aid projects are confronted with black boxes of information on local knowledge 
during the actual policy implementation. The main idea of this approach is that the 
LKS (opening the black box), can be solved through direct and indirect interactions 
with all actors involved in the actual process of implementation. It suggests that the 
success of the interactions, depends upon the extent of mobilization of the alliances 
both inside the project, and outside, with the beneficiaries of the project. The more 
actors work to maintain the network, the more successful it will be. This idea was 
significant in this dissertation, because it detaches thinking of how to solve the LKS 
within the aid arena from objectively measurable validity. 
The associability development approach is divided into the harmony model of 
networking and the conflict model of networking. The harmony model describes the 
MBA and WEC projects, which witnessed effective mobilization of allies, such as 
government, the private sector and other stakeholders. They were able to build 
alliances by not challenging formal and informal powerful structures and powerful 
actors, but rather by bringing them on board. This occurred by using both formal and 
informal economic ties and tools for the MBA, and formal and informal social and 
political ties for the WEC. The private sector was greatly involved in the MBA project 
and the water sector was strongly involved in the WEC project. Thus, the direct 
beneficiaries of both projects were able to exchange local knowledge information on 
their capacity development needs. There were significant and strong actor-network 
interactions between the donor contractor and its experts and the Yemeni 
counterparts, and among the Yemeni counterparts themselves at the departmental 
438
and organizational levels. Thus they were able to open the black box of local 
information. The more harmonized the interactions, the greater the incorporation of 
local knowledge, and the greater the effectiveness of the aid projects. The ultimate 
goals of better functioning in the private sector , and thus competing better at a global 
level (for MBA), and better provision of a scarce commodity like water (for WEC), 
convinced the participants in the projects to overcome cultural and personal 
differences. 
The conflict model of associability describes the MPA-NIAS and WRTC projects, 
which witnessed ongoing conflicts and poor consultation between allies. The 
conflicted interactions showed that there were remarkable differences in the motives, 
power position and dominance of the implementers, which decreased the 
incorporation of local knowledge (i.e. the black box remained closed), and thus made 
these projects less effective. The Dutch contractors and their counterparts, failed to 
develop mutual trust to get to know each other’s approaches, capacities and interests. 
Nearly all actors around the projects had no or little commitment towards, the 
activities of the project, particularly how to involve the public sector (for MPA-NIAS), 
and how to involve the related sectors for women’s affairs (for the WRTC project) and 
thus incorporate the respective sectors’ needs in the training courses. It is very strange 
that the clients were not consulted even during the policy making stage or the 
operational stage. In both projects, there was a climate of interpersonal conflict, and 
absence of trust, commitments, and mutual understanding among the networks 
actors. The conflict situations prevented the teams from getting the beneficiaries’ 
opinions and informing them about the projects. Consequently, the main managerial 
skills for promoting the capacity and capability of the respective sectors within the 
Yemeni government were not specified and local case studies were not incorporated 
into the training courses. 
The associability model provides a conceptualization and analysis tool to overcome 
LKS, taking account of how humans interact and respond to the views, ideas and 
norms of each other. The model shows how to mobilize different allies concerned 
with aid intervention. As effectiveness of aid projects is linked to the process of 
incorporating information on local knowledge, the associability model of development 
considers empirical remedies to the LKS endemic. It accords high importance to the 
role of interactions, between all actors around the aid project during the 
implementation process. This means there is a good match between the theoretical 
basis on LKS and the empirical evidence, namely effective capacity building to 
promote public reform process in poor nations. 
The qualitative analysis results in this study were in line with the results of 
quantitative analysis, showing that MBA and WEC were more effective than MPA-
NIAS and WRTC in achieving their specific and overall objectives. Given the 








that the results of this study are strong enough for us to generalize that there is a 
deficiency of broad understanding of local knowledge and a failure to apply local 
knowledge during project implementation. 
It was assumed that the opposite would take place, as the incorporation of local 
knowledge should be greater at the policy making level than the operational level, as 
that local knowledge itself is more important at the policy making level than the 
operational level. However, contractors who implement the aid programs often have 
no institutional stability, meaning that their involvement in the implementation 
process is based on a competitive selection among numerous contractors. At 
policymaking level, on the other hand, the organizations are institutionally stable, as 
the same organizations in a donor country are responsible in forming its aid polices. 
There should be lessons learned about the accumulation of knowledge through 
previous aid practices in recipient countries. However, there is a lack of information 
on local knowledge practices on online networks. There is a lack of institutional 
memory within donor countries, and also the diplomatic language and development 
jargon used in the interactions between actors during policy making prevents the 
black box of LK from being opened at the policy making level. Furthermore, in 
recipient countries there is often no tradition of archiving reports or other documents.
In chapter 10, I found that Dutch policymakers just went along with the global 
donor approach, ignoring local knowledge during the policy-making process, and 
adapting complex and unpredictable NPT policy as presented in section 11.3. The 
comprehensive, wide and social engineering development approach or top-down 
approach used by Dutch policy makers could not detect the hidden obstacles or 
solutions of local knowledge. It is interesting to note that evaluation reports on the 
reforms of five Ministries supported by the EU Commission were not made public, 
because the results were not very positive. For Dutch policy makers such reports 
would have probably given an opening to Yemen LK. The same is true for the World 
Bank reports on the first Basic Education Development, which were also not 
published. Consequently, the donors had to use secondary materials that stated the 
need for reform according to the global donor approach. 
At the middle management level, which is responsible for the planning of 
implementation (POI) of the NPT program, I have seen the pervasive evidence that 
the process of POI includes little local knowledge of the local situation and also little 
understanding of the technicalities of reforming Yemeni public administration. My 
approach has been to look at the ideas of the Dutch and Yemeni interviewees, who 
were part of the POI to see how LK was downplayed. I looked at the process in three 
phases: (1) demand identification, (2) demand articulation, and (3) the tender 
procedure adapted by Nuffic. In each of the phases I have seen many factors preventing 
the incorporation of LK. Time and money pressures, prevented LK from being 
incorporated in the demand identification phase. Moreover, the identification and 
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articulation phases were more or less at the same time, thus not giving the Yemenis 
sufficient time to consider this newly-acquired information on NPT and come back 
with feedback. Both Northern and Yemeni parties trusted information given by a 
small group of top men claiming to represent the whole HE sector. From their side, 
the Yemeni top men trusted that their Northern partners would be sufficiently flexible 
to permit all kinds of changes in aims, objectives and activities during the 
implementation. It made the whole POI exercise an adventure where neither side 
knew what to expect from the other. Before the implementation, Yemen remained 
uncharted waters for Nuffic, and similarly for the Yemeni partners there was no 
preparation to get knowledge about the contractor. 
11.5 The Study’s Contributions to the Theoretical Understanding 
This has been a multidisciplinary study, employing disciplines including public 
administration, political science, sociology, public policy, policy implementation and 
economics. It has mapped the arguments about foreign aid ineffectiveness provided 
by researchers with different scientific backgrounds in order to link public 
administration, public policy and institutional analysis with development studies. 
Most studies on the ineffectiveness of foreign aid have been done by economic 
scholars, and social and behavioral sciences have been neglected. 
This study makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature 
on donor prompting public sector reforms in poor nations. Firstly, it is an essential 
contribution to studies of international development administration in fragile states 
where the global interest because, of concerns over security, poverty, and political 
and social unrest. Although Yemen is very important for international stability and 
security, and the country has received almost US$18 billion of aid commitments, 
there has to my knowledge been no systematic academic case study of aid effectiveness. 
This is an area where this country has so far has received inadequate attention by 
researchers.
Second, in terms of theoretical contribution, this study has shown the blind spots 
in theories and the limitations of a macro economic analysis of foreign aid 
ineffectiveness. A major part of this study was to dispute with the PCP approach and 
its leading scholars. They debate based on Western theories and assume that aid is 
homogenous. Consequently they argue that aid is harmful to recipient countries. 
One of PCP’s explanations is that the self interest of donors often works against the 
altruistic objectives of aid assistance and can lead to corruption of the aid projects’ 
outcomes, thereby reducing the effectiveness of aid interventions (e.g., Lancaster, 
1999, 2006; Easterly 2006, Lindsay Whitfield, 2009). In this study however, I have 
seen evidence that self interest is not the homogenous causal explanation for foreign 
aid ineffectiveness. I have to move away from using such a generalized explanation of 








systems, but they lack the local knowledge of how to do so in practice. The second 
explanation of the PCP approach is that the poor policy environment, such as weak 
and corrupt policies and institutions, is the main cause of shortcomings in foreign aid 
programs (see for example: Burnside and Dollar, 1998 & 2000; Ear, 2005 & 2006; 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000). The problem however is not a poor policy environment 
itself, but poor aid policies formulated with a lack of synthesis, research and 
institutional analysis to understand the poor policy environment. 
Ultimately, this study draws attention to the impact and importance of Local 
Knowledge Syndrome as a key factor limiting the effectiveness of donor-promoted 
public sector reforms in poor nations. This syndrome has not received sufficient 
attention in the literature. This study has looked at Yemen, but the information on 
local knowledge applies to many tribal and traditional states. Having said that, I 
should of course bear in mind, that each society has its unique aspects and should be 
dealt as a unique case. 
This study showed how the formal and informal institutions interact within the 
Yemeni public sector, and how the rules of the game formed in the Yemeni public 
sector, encouraging the donor’s experts to compare local knowledge aspects with 
whichever society they were most familiar. There were two reasons for this type of 
approach. First, I were trying to deal with the dearth of systematic research on local 
knowledge in order to open a black box of rich local information for policy makers to 
formulate sound policies of reform, that fit and are tailored to local contexts. Donor 
policy makers have been struggling or neglecting to open these black boxes of local 
knowledge, since the inception of aid activities in the 1950s. Second, the information 
provided on local knowledge may help outsiders such as aid contractors and aid 
policy implementers, to overcome difficulties in dealing with their southern 
counterparts during the implementation of their aid programs in the field. The donor 
implementers normally apply Western management principles, practices, managerial 
styles, skills, and knowledge, which differ from the informal, traditional and specific 
managerial functions in a traditional civil service system. Aid policy implementers 
need to be aware that this local knowledge, might not accept these imported principles 
and practices. Donor implementers are often not aware of the local rule of the game, 
and only experiencing these in conflict situations during implementation (for 
example, see the cases of the MPA-NIAS and WRTC). 
This contribution to the current literature of international development 
administration and the local knowledge explanation lead us now to the study’s 
potential contributions to policy and practice.
11.6 The Study’s Potential Policy Implications 
It is commonly recognised that a best practice model of how to incorporate local 
knowledge, does not exist, and donor-promoted public sector reforms in recipient 
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countries need to focus on informal systems and institutions, and need to be tailored 
to the context and actual needs of recipient countries and organizations. Until now 
the best practice model is still thriving partly because no better alternative has been 
proposed.
This study offers a reflection for aid policy makers and implementers, on how to 
incorporate information on local knowledge, and how they can open the black box of 
both formal and informal institutions. The framework elaborates on key components 
of the actor network perspective as well as some elements of public policy theory. The 
model is named the “development associability approach” and defines the development 
process, as reliant on the durability of alliances it creates around the aid project or 
intervention in a specific context and time during the policy implementation. As I 
have said, information on local knowledge at the aid policymaking level consists of 
footnotes and unsupported assumptions. The aid policy implementers must therefore 
incorporate local knowledge at the operational level. Consequently, the success and 
failure of the aid project is highly unpredictable because it is difficult for aid policy 
implementers to control and materialize the outcomes of an aid intervention. The 
responses of the actors at the operational level is unknown and it can lead either to 
success through the harmony model of development, or failure through the conflict 
model of development (see Chapter 10). 
Given the normative nature of local knowledge, the “associability approach of 
development” claims that information on local knowledge can be incorporated, 
through the direct and indirect interactions with all actors involved in the actual 
process of implementation. In other words, the implementers (contractors) of aid 
programs and projects are “players at the heart of the aid intervention process” 
because; they can overcome the LKS through their direct and indirect interactions 
with donor and recipient actors. In order to have effective interactions, alliances must 
be built around the project. Rather than challenging powerful structures and powerful 
actors, the focus should be on bringing them to the table. This requires actors, 
especially the donor contractors or aid project implementers, to be more practical 
during the interactions with their counterparts, to achieve respect and develop trust 
and commitment. Observing and questioning what is not clear, and asking for 
clarifications on why counterparts act in a particular way facilitates discussion on 
which actions should be taken by the program and which should not. The actors in 
this sense can see what is right and what will succeed. The actors should keep in mind 
that projects will not succeed by accepting dominant assumptions and ready-made 
objectives that have nothing to say about the local context, but rather by being 
adaptable to the local context. They need to form a cooperative and harmonized team 
which forges alliances with powerful actors. 
The associability approach of development is important to ensure effective aid 








responsibility. In the poor policy environment, the structure of power and the rule of 
the games within the government organizations are not accomplished through the 
state’s formal institutions and organizations, but mainly through the informal 
institutions and organizations. In such a situation, government organizations are not 
well institutionalized. Decisions made by high government officials, whom donor 
policymakers often rely on during the aid policy formulation process, are not based 
on institutional strategies or general policies. Such government organizations are 
governed mainly by top men who make decisions based on their personal judgments 
and their social and political ties. Those decisions will not necessary be in favour of a 
development project. Top men normally just go along with ready-made aid policies 
that are unable to deal with the source of the problems in their organizations.
A donor has accountability expectations, which force them to compare the relative 
effectiveness of multiple aid projects they are involved in. The more projects vary to 
adjust for LKS, the more difficult it becomes from this perspective to compare projects 
and hold each project accountable for the purposes of validity evaluation. Until now, 
this ‘development validity’ approach, which judges the success or otherwise of a 
project, using certain quantitative indicators has held sway. This approach is not valid 
in our opinion, because it is difficult to provide good quantitative evidence in some 
cases. I argue that a good development project is a valid one, rather than a project that 
is designed a certain way by policymakers out of touch with reality. Seeing success in 
terms of the associability approach presents development as a controllable 
intervention, contributing towards a set of aims that are widely approved and accepted 
in the local context. This can be done by contractors who should adjust to the local 
context or environment to ensure effective interactions.
Establishing a `Local Knowledge Information Bank´ (LKIB)
In my view the most effective way to help donor policy makers, aid agencies and 
contractors incorporate local knowledge is to establish a ̀ local knowledge information 
bank´ (LKIB). An LKIB will provide a practical means for advancing the contribution 
of the South to support the development dialogue and agenda between not only 
North and South, but also within the South itself. 
In Yemen, an LKIB could review the final reports of completed aid projects over 
the past 20 years, analyze them, and record and archive the lessons learned. It could 
focus on conflicts and solutions according to the sector, region and national level. 
Although more than 10,000 Yemeni civil servants at all levels and in different 
government sectors have been attended short term and long-term courses, workshops 
and seminars, there has been no overall evaluation done on how far these capacity 
building exercises have helped to improve the civil service. The LKIB would bring in 
some Yemeni researchers to work alongside the donor experts to clarify the specific 
LK that played a decisive role in the outcomes of the projects or programs. This can 
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be done though training the Yeminis, that already deal with and work in the different 
projects. For example, Sana’a University has many development centers: the Dutch 
alone have helped to established five. It is good to have these centers take a role within 
the LKIB, to share in doing rigorous research and institutional analysis of past aid 
interventions. 
The main aim of this LKIB should be to create an open online network to feed 
policy makers (donors) and recipients about local knowledge, thus allowing sound 
policies to be formulated and allowing the LKS to be overcome. Furthermore, the 
LKIB will provide essential information to independent researchers who are interested 
in the development process in Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders, currently passive 
recipients of scientific knowledge or development assumptions, would be empowered 
by the LKIB to be active knowledge providers. Further reasons why an LKIB is 
important are as follows:
(1) In the foreign aid arena there is no systematic method to analyze 
lessons from past experiences and apply them to future proposals. Official 
literature and reports are full of ideas on what should be done, but fail to 
consider actual implementation of aid polices based on lessons learned.Oral 
interviews from donor or recipient sides commenting on these interviews are 
not or hardly documented.
(2) Donor documents use development terminology or jargon such as 
governance, empowerment, people-centered development, and bottom-up 
development, without clearly defining meanings. This jargon negatively 
impacts on effective interactions at the policy level because policymakers in 
Yemen cannot overcome the ambiguous use of jargon by the donor side. And 
knowing that a Frenchman would explain, for example, ‘governance’ 
differently from an Englishman or a Dutchman, it is sake that for each larger 
program the terminology should be spelt out well.
(3) There are few researchers from Yemen who have published on capacity 
development in the public sector. Even when local researchers have been 
used, their publications have not appeared as independent contributions, but 
have been integrated in the overall development approach. There is a very 
rich literature on North-South partnerships in development, but it is very 
poor of including aspects of the local knowledge (see e.g. Barnard 2003; Drew 
2003; R. James 2001 in Scarf 2010). Most of the publications and information 
of donors still work with their certain sets of shared norms and assumptions. 
New ideas are spread among donors without taking into consideration 
findings from the local experts and researchers. 
(4) An online network would represent the non-human objects of 
interactions between the south and the north, and could provide local 








subjective perceptions and opinions of the community members, their 
attitudes, mental models, cultural patterns and the informal institutions. 
Most online networks thus far have been established by donor agencies or 
rely on their patronage, and thus exclude local knowledge, experience, and 
ideas from the south. 
(5) Until now, there have been no discussions among regulatory bodies 
such as parliaments, chefs de cabinet, civil society organizations and other 
related governmental organizations in donor countries on why aid programs 
failed and how to propose programs that are more applicable. Even where 
those at the top genuinely want to take actions and change the aid system and 
process, advisers can be unrealistic about institutional realities, and too easily 
take at face value assurances with little substance behind them.
The call for an LKIB to incorporate information on local knowledge in the 
resolution of international development challenges anticipates that the main elements 
of the LKIB are the collection of local knowledge data, research and analysis. LKIB 
should have basic groups who are critical researchers. Furthermore it should have 
access to past reports for further analysis, complemented by extensive oral interviews 
with past and present participants in the programs. At the level of a recipient country, 
the LKIB should be attached to the council of ministers, because all the sectors are 
combined in this structure. As I mentioned above, the LKIB should be an independent 
organization under the heading of the prime minister that combines local and foreign 
staff to know which the local knowledge and national ingredients and to know where 
the local knowledge start. 
Recommendations for the Selected NPT Projects in this study
This study makes a number of specific recommendations for the NPT projects I 
have studied. Firstly, the ECs need qualified leadership and need to develop 
institutional and organizational structures and regulatory frameworks. The ECs 
should be specifically designed to meet the participant-related aspects of their job 
effectively. I would suggest that to ensure the success and continuation of these ECs, 
the host organizations should commit themselves to the development, and see where 
they can find a win-win situation in the capacity and capability building process. To 
ensure the success and the continuation of these ECs in term of development, they 
should be integrated within the structure of the host organizations (SU and AU) as 
part of capacity and capability processes. 
Overcoming the weaknesses in quantity and quality of training staff, should be 
one of the main targets of the ECs. They can do that through organizing some special 
and practical courses, in particular in adult education methodologies, case study 
development, e-teaching and learning modes and presentation skills. I would also 
suggest the following changes are implemented: (1) recruitment based on job 
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descriptions and qualifications, and a transparent selection process; (2) Appointment 
on a contract basis; (3) Tackling the fallacy amongst current staff that new staff 
coming from outside are competition, and then they can open the market for the new 
staff; and (4) Offer positions to people funded by the projects to complete master’s 
and/or doctoral programs in Dutch and other foreign universities (e.g. the WRCT 
has five new Ph.D. holders who cannot get a position in the EC.) 
It is essential for ECs to have a more structured policy of admission for participants 
from the respective organizations. As we have seen, the policy of admission has been 
dependent on an open-door policy, which has left participants the freedom to attend 
the ECs. Admission has been without reference to the priorities of capacity and 
capability building plans. Participation has to be on a mandatory basis in a coordinated 
effort between their organizations and the ECs. They must produce a new generation 
of qualified leaders, with a clear policy of reassigning the graduates to different 
administrative levels. The absorptive capacity of the ECs must be raised so they can 
train the largest possible number from various agencies and institutions. If the ECs 
were under the Council of Ministers they would be protected from all kinds of 
individual attacks from University staff. On the other hand, this could create a 
problem with the degrees, because here the ECs are depending on the universities. So 
I think it is better to place the ECs administratively under the Rector, but the Board 
of the ECs can recruit the best staff from all over the country or from abroad. It is 
important to note that the Chairman of the Board of Directors is often the Rector 
him/herself.
Only a few women have attended the training process within the selected ECs. A 
special commitment is needed to enroll more women, to develop their managerial 
skills and to generate a generation of female managers. For the effectiveness of this 
training, I suggest that the ECs could, in consultation with the private sector and 
public institutions, stimulate the take up amongst women by reducing tuition fees 
and organizing special women-only intakes, in keeping with local practice and 
custom. Moreover, ECs should focus on training young officials at the unit level as 
part as the strategic capacity building process of the targeted organizations. 
There is a particularly urgent need for ECs to concentrate on problems outside of 
the major cities (Sana’a and Aden). Yemen still suffers from qualitative and quantitative 
deficiency concerning capacity and capability building efforts, in different 
organizations around the country, especially small cities and semi-rural and rural 
areas. The ECs should have a strategic link with target groups throughout Yemen 
from both central and local administrations. In my view, that does not mean the ECs 
should have branches everywhere, but they need to establish co-operation with other 
universities in Yemen and with NPT education centers sited in different cities. The 
main ECs, in cooperation with their Western counterparts, should establish local 








combination with individual and group e-learning modules. 
Additionally, there is a need to develop specialist training curricula based on 
methodological and intellectual training frameworks. The ECs have struggled to 
design curricula which have a good balance between theory and practice. Especially 
in WRTC, opportunities for practical application and field training in the respective 
organizations are rarely made available. There is not a translation of the needs 
expressed by women organizations into practical training offered by WRTC. For that 
reason, the WRTC program is still too academic and not yet offering a practical 
Master’s program in Gender.
As I mentioned in section 11.3 and in Chapter 4, the ideal model for capacity 
building within public sector in Yemen, involves the development of curricula which 
work on four basic managerial skills. Such skills would allow course participants, 
when they return to their work, to improve corporate policies, strategies, effective 
human resources management and communications, in line with the local 
environment, if the structure permits. Alongside curricula-based skills development, 
the training process should incorporate case studies from daily practice in Yemen’s 
public sector. Northern universities are increasingly putting their Master lectures on 
the internet, in many cases free of charge. The translation of the lectures to the Yemeni 
context will increasingly demand lecturers, who can coach Master’s students to 
understand the lectures, develop practical projects and find literature and other 
materials.
Aside from these changes within the ECs, a new strategy for directing and guiding 
the Government of Yemen, and the behaviour and choices of its organizations in 
capacity building process, needs to be adopted. This strategy will provide structure 
and guidance for subsequent implementation and budget allocation discussions. 
Let’s now look at how to link the above recommendations with the LKIB. From 
the long-standing assistance from the WB, the EC and bilateral donors to the various 
ministries in Yemen, a research of all public and non-public reports could be 
requested, to learn why none of the ministries were able to reform their structure 
according to the aims and goals agreed upon. What are the reports telling us about 
the strong and weak points met during the implementation, what were the lessons 
learned, what were the recommendations made and which recommendations were 
taken into account in new programs? The results from the research should form the 
basis for a dialogue between the donor and the Yemen Government about the 
conditions which need to be satisfied for assistance to be given. Since the LK is 
different per sector, region and government level, the dialogue should be held per 
subject. For the Higher Education sector, Nuffic could play a role in stimulating this 
research and use the results to have a more thorough dialogue on which sub-sector to 
stimulate with what kind of assistance. It would give Nuffic a more important role 
during the policy and planning phase and from the Yemeni side it would necessitate 
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the mobilization of manpower and financing in a more serious way. It would request 
that the Yemeni counterparts would share the information and decisions with not 
only the top men, but also with the subordinates, who will become more responsible 
and thus more committed to the implementation of the program or projects. The 
policy and planning can lead to particular strategies for human resource development. 
An overall vision and mission could be established to set a minimum standard, but 
for each intervention the basis of the strategy will be the outcome of the dialogue on 
what LK to take into account. 
This approach is asking for more flexibility, which is against the trend of increasing 
standardization of inputs and results. In the case of NPT (or now NICHE, the de facto 
successor to NPT), the overall vision and mission could be established by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, but Nuffic should be able to participate in the dialogue for the 
subsectors. The Ministry will request that Nuffic changes from an administrative 
office into an organization that will attract researchers for assessing and analyzing 
reports and finding the LK in the areas of interest. By doing this work, Nuffic will get 
the trust of the Yemeni partners and the contracts signed for further development 
will be taken more seriously. A number of lessons learned from the NPT assistance 
are that a period of three to four years is in the Yemeni context not sufficient to build 
up a trusting relationship. A commitment with a ‘strange company’ should be for a 
longer time to overcome the NPT rule that the winning company offers quality 
against the cheapest price. 
Another issue is that in their ambition to link up with the world developments, 
Yemeni universities are very eager to establish links with Dutch universities, since the 
latter are among the 200 best world universities. Through the assistance of Dutch 
universities, the Yemeni universities are able to establish commercial Education 
Centre’s where Master programs are offered. The combination of a Master Degree 
from a Yemeni university with the cooperation of a Dutch university is a much 
sought-after. Again it is important that the Dutch university gets the time to set up 
the programs and train the Yemeni staff, rather than changing to a cheaper Dutch 
institute after three or four years. 
The political situation in Yemen requires another form of donor assistance to 
higher education. Staying in the country as a foreigner will become increasingly 
difficult in the short term and in the supply of education programmes, more attention 
could be given to blended programmes offering e-learning combined with classroom 
teaching. This will of course be a flexible approach where for each program a strategy 
is developed based on LK. This strategy should exist alongside a strategic human 
resource management framework, guiding the development of the civil service in 
Yemen. The strategy should supply a vision of how the civil service should be 
organized and according to what model, and outline the model required for 








contract ECs for training or if there should be a centralized approach. It will also 
outline which particular staff requires additional knowledge or skills. This strategy 
and implementation plan should be rolled out simultaneously to all other central 
ministries and their sub-organizations in Yemen (especially the higher education 
ministry and the ministry of planning), and possibly agencies and decentralized 
government institutions as well. Each ministry could then build its plans and activities 
according to the overall strategy. The strategy must develop coordination mechanisms 
between the high levels in Yemen’s public administration system and its direct 
organizations to ensure effective use of inputs and good outcomes. Finally, the 
strategy should meet the requirements of transferring training to work settings. 
Capacity building processes will not be complete until the transfer process is achieved. 
Positive action could be initiated by commissioning a research team to look into 
the real factors, which influence the attitudes of civil servants towards capacity 
building. This could be done in cooperation with the LKIB as proposed above. 
Solutions could consequently be formulated to tackle complacency or address the 
difficulties appropriately through support or authorizations. Those who are charged 
with promoting public sector in Yemen must continue to reiterate the importance 
and urgency of the task of equipping the nation with the necessary skills, to enable it 
to face the future with confidence. They must make sure that the role of ECs will be 
promoted as a high profile issue for the future of Yemen. 
11.7 Areas of Future Research
There has been little research and writing on the subject of local knowledge 
syndrome and the effectiveness of donors promoting public sector in recipient 
countries. This subject is new in the context of building the capacity and capability of 
higher education in Yemen. Consequently there is a need for more studies to be 
carried out in the future. 
One piece of research that could be conducted is to explore the influence of the 
local knowledge syndrome, on the level of effectiveness of donor promoting public 
sectors in other recipient countries. This is important to show donor policy makers 
that they must stop relying on unsupported assumptions and Western theories in 
formulating aid policies. There is also a potential research to be done in the context 
of Yemen, to look at other policy areas that are supported by other donors. Such 
studies and research will help to solve the endemic of the LKS that aid policy makers 
and implementers have been trying to solve since 1960s. They will also help to argue 
against economist and their prevailing explanation of poor policy environments as 
the reason for foreign aid ineffectiveness. 
There is also a need to further research the associability development approach, 
which I looked at here. Additionally, the argument I have made here that Western 
knowledge and experience on capacity building is not applicable for public sector in 
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Yemen necessitates more empirical studies, focusing on the issue of how to adjust the 
Western theories to be applicable, and how such adjustments can be incorporated in 
the policy formulation process. 
Building the capacity of civil servants, especially in management training, is a new 
field of study in Yemen. Research is needed to develop a paradigm, basic principles 
and a guiding strategy for capacity development within the Yemeni context. This 
research should explore informal behavioral and management aspects within Yemen’s 
civil service, by considering interaction between formal and informal institutions. 
Despite the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, a clear understanding and positive 
interaction between formal and informal institutions is a pre-condition for identifying 
the problems and formulating sound policies to build and improve managerial 
capacity. Such information on local knowledge, has been missing from all three waves 
of donor-promoted public sector reforms in developing countries over the last six 
decades, and has led to poor outcomes. 
For example, in this study I have explored some aspects of the functions of the 
civil servants in Yemen based on the LKS explanation: (1) the top man syndrome; (2) 
the decision-making process (3) conflict management; (4) interpersonal style; (5) 
attitudes towards time and managerial behavior; and (6) attitudes towards women in 
management. My approach has been to view the civil servants as part of the social 
system, which, in turn, is embedded in the wider environment. This environment is 
made up of socio-cultural values and norms and social structural elements 
(institutions, groups and sets of social relations and roles). In each of the preceding 
chapter, I have witnessed how the environment (despite its diversity and variety) 
influences the behavior of the civil servants. I would like to make it clear that this 
work brings just a little light to a very dark cavern, as there are many other aspects 
that need to be explored and the aspects that are explored here need to be discussed 
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Table 7.3 Distribution of Participants based on the Organizational Background 
Organizations The Selected ECs Total 
MBA MPA NIAS WEC WRTC 
 Services Count 10     10 
Percent 32.3%     4,4% 
Trade Count 11     11 
Percent 35.5%     4,9% 
Manufacturing Count 6     6 
Percent 19.4%     2,7% 
Media Count     3 3 
Percent     11,1% 1,3% 
Civil Service Ministry Count  28 16  11 55 
Percent  28,0% 39,0%  40,7% 24,4% 
Finance Ministry Count  14 6   20 
Percent  14,0% 14,6%   8,9% 
Parliament Count  6 8   14 
Percent  6,0% 19,5%   6,2% 
Local Administration 
Ministry 
Count  8    8 
Percent  8,0%    3,6% 
Higher Education 
Ministry 
Count  8   3 11 
Percent  8,0%   11,1% 4,9% 
Water Sector Count    21  21 
Percent    80,8% ,0% 9,3% 
Education Ministry Count     10 10 
Percent     37,0% 4,4% 
Other Count 4 36 11 5  56 
Percent 12,9% 36,0% 26,8% 19,2%  24,9% 
Total Count 31 100 41 26 27 225 
Percent 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
               
Table7.4 Age Categories among all ECs (Cross-case analysis) 
Age Categories MBA MPA NIAS WEC WRTC 
20-25yr 10% n.a n.a 11% 44% 
26-30yr 29% 13% 12% 38% 37% 
31-35yr 26% 24% 32% 34% 11% 
36-40yr 16% 22% 36% 4% n.a 
41-45yr 3% 20% 10% 4% 4% 
46yr and above 16% 21% 10% 8% 4% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table7.5 Distribution of Participants based on the Functional level and Age  
Functional level Frequency Percent Valid Percent Age- Above 35yr 
Minster 1 ,4 ,4 1 (100%) 
Deputy Minster 14 6,2 6,2 14 (100%) 
Deputy Assistant 13 6,0 6,0 8 (62%) 
         General Manager 100 44,1 44,4 62 (62%) 
Head of Unit 24 10,7 10,7 9 (38%) 
Head of Sub-Unit 27 12,0 12,0 7 (26%) 
Employee 33 14,6 14,6 5 (15%) 
Other 5 2,2 2,2 n.a 
Total 225 99,1 100,0 106 (47%) 
 
Table 7.6 Functional Level of the Participants (cross case-analysis) 
Functional level  MBA MPA NIAS WEC WRTC 
Minister n.a 1% n.a n.a n.a 
Deputy Minister n.a 11% 2% n.a n.a 















Deputy Assistant n.a 12% 2% n.a n.a 
General Manager 64% 70% 7% 19% 8% 
Head of Unit n.a 6% 29% 23% n.a 
Head of Sub-Unit n.a n.a 44% 38% 33% 
Employee 30% n.a 15% 12% 55% 
Other 6% n.a n.a 8% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 










1_10yr 107 47,1 48,2 48,2 54 (50%) 
11 20yr 58 25,6 26,1 74,3 28 (48%) 
21_30yr 48 21,1 21,6 95,9 48 (100%) 
31_40yr 9 4,0 4,1 100,0 9 (100%) 
Total 222 97,8 100,0  139 (63%) 
   
Table 7.8 Length of Experience (Cross tabulation) 
ECs Length of Experience in current job Total 
1_10yr 11_20yr 21_30yr 31_40yr 
 MBA Count 11 7 7 6 31 
Percent 35,5% 22,6% 22,6% 19,4% 100,0% 
MPA Count 56 24 15 2 97 
Percent 57,7% 24,7% 15,5% 2,1% 100,0% 
NIAS Count 24 12 4 1 41 
Percent 58,5% 29,3% 9,8% 2,4% 100,0% 
WEC Count 15 7 4 0 26 
Percent 57,7% 26,9% 15,4% ,0% 100,0% 
WRTC Count 18 8 1 0 27 
Percent 66,7% 29,6% 3,7% ,0% 100,0% 
Total Count 107 58 48 9 222 
Percent 48,2% 26,1% 21,6% 4,1% 100,0% 
          
1.1.2 Tables of Chapter 8 
Table 8.3 Frequency Distribution of Leadership Skills Developed 
ECs 


















F F F F F 
P P P P P 
X20 MBA 9 11 4 6 0 2,2333 Effective 1,10433 1,8210 2,6457 1,00 5,00 
MPA 5 15 34 35 13 3,3529 Ineffective 1,04025 3,1486 3,5573 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 1 13 13 12 2 3,0244 Ineffective ,96145 2,7209 3,3279 1,00 5,00 
Total 15 39 51 53 15 3,0809 Ineffective 1,10724 2,9148 3,2471 1,00 5,00 
9% 22% 29% 31% 9% 
X21 MBA 1 12 11 6 0 2,7333 Effective ,82768 2,4243 3,0424 1,00 5,00 
MPA 5 15 34 35 13 3,3529 Ineffective 1,04025 3,1486 3,5573 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 1 13 13 12 2 3,0244 Ineffective ,96145 2,7209 3,3279 1,00 5,00 
Total 7 40 58 53 15 3,1676 Ineffective 1,01196 3,0158 3,3195 1,00 5,00 
4% 23% 33% 31% 9% 
X22 MBA 9 12 7 1 1 2,1000 Effective ,99481 1,7285 2,4715 1,00 5,00 
MPA 2 20 43 27 10 3,2255 Ineffective ,94300 3,0403 3,4107 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 5 11 14 8 3 2,8293 Effective 1,11585 2,4771 3,1815 1,00 5,00 
Total 16 43 64 36 14 2,9364 Effective 1,07374 2,7753 3,0976 1,00 5,00 
9% 25% 37% 21% 8% 
X23 MBA 8 12 9 1 0 2,1000 Effective ,84486 1,7845 2,4155 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 14 40 33 11 3,3235 Ineffective ,97657 3,1317 3,5153 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 5 9 16 9 2 2,8537 Effective 1,06210 2,5184 3,1889 1,00 5,00 
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Total 17 35 65 43 13 3,0000 Ineffective 
 
1,07292 2,8390 3,1610 1,00 5,00 
10% 20% 37% 25% 7% 
X24 MBA 5 15 10 0 0 2,1667 Effective ,69893 1,9057 2,4277 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 18 35 35 10 3,2843 Ineffective ,99879 3,0881 3,4805 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 10 15 11 2 2,9756 Effective 1,01212 2,6561 3,2951 1,00 5,00 
Total 12 43 60 46 12 3,0173 Ineffective 
 
1,03696 2,8617 3,1730 1,00 5,00 
7% 25% 35% 26% 7% 
x25 MBA 7 18 5 0 0 1,9333 Effective ,63968 1,6945 2,1722 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 14 35 37 11 3,3663 Ineffective ,98715 3,1715 3,5612 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 11 15 10 2 2,9268 Effective 1,00971 2,6081 3,2455 1,00 5,00 
Total 14 43 55 47 13 3,0116 Ineffective 
 
1,07599 2,8497 3,1736 1,00 5,00 
8% 25% 32% 27% 7% 
X26 MBA 3 15 9 4 0 2,4516 Effective ,85005 2,1398 2,7634 1,00 4500 
MPA 2 14 38 37 11 3,4020 Ineffective ,92554 3,2202 3,5838 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 9 17 9 4 3,0976 Ineffective 1,01992 2,7756 3,4195 1,00 5,00 
Total 7 38 64 50 15 3,1609 Ineffective ,99564 3,0119 3,3099 1,00 5,00 
     
X27 MBA 1 22 5 2 0 2,2667 Effective ,63968 2,0278 2,5055 1,00 5,00 
MPA 2 16 37 37 9 3,3465 Ineffective ,92126 3,1647 3,5284 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 4 13 12 9 2 2,8000 Effective 1,06699 2,4588 3,1412 1,00 5,00 
Total 7 51 54 48 11 3,0292 Ineffective 
 
1,00251 2,8779 3,1806 1,00 5,00 
4% 30% 31% 28% 6% 
 
X28  
MBA 7 17 5 2 0 2,0645 Effective ,81386 1,7660 2,3630 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 17 33 39 8 3,2970 Ineffective ,97514 3,1045 3,4895 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 5 9 16 9 2 2,8537 Effective 1,06210 2,5184 3,1889 1,00 5,00 
Total 16 43 54 50 10 2,9711 Effective 1,06982 2,8106 3,1316 1,00 5,00 












Ineffective T.P 7% 24% 34% 27% 8% 3.0416 
   Source: data analysis 
 
Table 8.5 Frequency Distribution of Human Resources Management Skills Developed 
ECs 

















F F F F F 
P P P P P 
X6 MBA 9 14 5 3 0 2,0645 Effective ,92864 1,7239 2,4051 1,00 5,00 
MPA 5 24 29 36 8 3,1765 Ineffective 1,03801 2,9726 3,3804 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 4 14 11 7 4 2,8250 Effective 1,15220 2,4565 3,1935 1,00 5,00 
Total 18 52 45 46 12 2,8960 Effective 1,12096 2,7277 3,0642 1,00 5,00 
10% 30% 26% 27% 7% 
X7 MBA 4 15 8 4 0 2,3871 Effective ,88232 2,0635 2,7107 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 25 32 34 7 3,1471 Ineffective ,99898 2,9508 3,3433 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 11 15 11 2 3,0000 Ineffective ,97468 2,6924 3,3076 1,00 5,00 
Total 10 51 55 49 9 2,9770 Effective 1,00837 2,8261 3,1279 1,00 5,00 
6% 29% 31% 28% 5% 
X8 MBA 11 11 7 1 0 1,9333 Effective ,86834 1,6091 2,2576 1,00 5,00 
MPA 7 27 31 31 6 3,0196 Ineffective 1,04342 2,8147 3,2246 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 9 16 12 2 3,0732 Ineffective ,95891 2,7705 3,3758 1,00 5,00 
Total 20 47 54 44 8 2,8439 Effective 1,07505 2,6826 3,0053 1,00 5,00 
11% 27% 31% 25% 5% 
X9 MBA 6 9 15 1 0 2,3548 Effective ,83859 2,0472 2,6624 1,00 5,00 
MPA 5 22 37 31 7 3,1275 Ineffective ,99176 2,9327 3,3223 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 1 8 12 18 1 3,1707 Ineffective 1,02231 2,8481 3,4934 1,00 5,00 
Total 12 39 64 50 8 3,0000 Ineffective 1,01435 2,8482 3,1518 1,00 5,00 
7% 22% 36% 29% 4% 
X10 MBA 4 12 11 4 0 2,4839 Effective ,88961 2,1576 2,8102 1,00 5,00 
MPA 3 21 32 35 11 3,2941 Ineffective 1,01072 3,0956 3,4926 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 1 10 14 15 1 3,1220 Ineffective ,89986 2,8379 3,4060 1,00 5,00 
Total 8 43 57 54 12 3,1092 Ineffective 1,00555 2,9587 3,2597 1,00 5,00 
4% 25% 32% 31% 7% 
X11 MBA 7 13 8 3 0 2,2258 Effective ,92050 1,8882 2,5634 1,00 5,00 
MPA 4 19 30 34 15 3,3627 Ineffective 1,06974 3,1526 3,5729 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 1 11 11 13 5 3,2439 Ineffective 1,06725 2,9070 3,5808 1,00 5,00 
Total 12 43 49 50 20 3,1322 Ineffective 1,12245 2,9642 3,3001 1,00 5,00 
7% 25% 28% 29% 11% 















MPA 3 15 32 37 15 3,4510 Ineffective 1,01110 3,2524 3,6496 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 10 10 12 7 3,2927 Ineffective 1,16713 2,9243 3,6611 1,00 5,00 
Total 10 39 53 50 22 3,2011 Ineffective 1,10165 3,0363 3,3660 1,00 5,00 
6% 22% 30% 29% 13% 
X13 MBA 6 13 10 2 0 2,2581 Effective ,85509 1,9444 2,5717 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 17 29 37 13 3,3333 Ineffective 1,08394 3,1204 3,5462 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 7 13 12 7 3,3659 Ineffective 1,11257 3,0147 3,7170 1,00 5,00 
Total 14 37 52 51 20 3,1494 Ineffective 1,12798 2,9806 3,3182 1,00 5,00 
8% 21% 30% 29% 11% 
 
X14 
MBA 6 18 6 1 0 2,0645 Effective ,72735 1,7977 2,3313 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 22 27 32 15 3,2745 Ineffective 1,13589 3,0514 3,4976 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 11 12 14 2 3,0732 Ineffective 1,00971 2,7545 3,3919 1,00 5,00 
Total 14 51 45 47 17 3,0115 Ineffective 1,13274 2,8420 3,1810 1,00 5,00 
8% 29% 26% 27% 10% 
X15 MBA 10 13 7 1 0 1,9677 Effective ,83602 1,6611 2,2744 1,00 5,00 
MPA 7 29 27 27 12 3,0784 Ineffective 1,14049 2,8544 3,3024 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 13 15 9 1 2,8049 Effective ,95445 2,5036 3,1061 1,00 5,00 
Total 20 55 49 37 13 2,8161 Effective 1,12284 2,6481 2,9841 1,00 5,00 















T.P 7% 27% 29% 30% 8% 3.01364 Ineffective 
Source: data analysis 
 
Table 8.7 Frequency Distribution of Strategic Management Skills Developed 
ECs 


















F F F F F 
P P P P P 
X1 MBA 9 16 6 0 0 1,9032 Effective ,70023 1,6464 2,1601 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 21 49 21 5 2,9804 Effective ,92255 2,7992 3,1616 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 2 17 10 8 4 2,8780 Effective 1,09989 2,5309 3,2252 1,00 5,00 
Total 17 54 65 29 9 2,7644 Effective 1,01246 2,6129 2,9159 1,00 5,00 
8% 24% 29% 13% 4% 
X2 MBA 14 13 4 0 0 1,6774 Effective ,70176 1,4200 1,9348 1,00 5,00 
MPA 11 33 33 18 5 2,7300 Effective 1,04306 2,5230 2,9370 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 17 11 5 5 2,8049 Effective 1,14498 2,4435 3,1663 1,00 5,00 
Total 28 63 48 23 10 2,5581 Effective 1,09336 2,3936 2,7227 1,00 5,00 
12% 28% 21% 10% 5% 
X3 MBA 9 17 4 1 0 1,9032 Effective ,74632 1,6295 2,1770 1,00 5,00 
MPA 8 30 32 25 6 2,9109 Effective 1,04975 2,7037 3,1181 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 13 11 6 8 3,0732 Ineffective 1,25280 2,6777 3,4686 1,00 5,00 
Total 20 60 47 32 14 2,7688 Effective 1,12775 2,5995 2,9380 1,00 5,00 
9% 26% 21% 14% 6% 
X4 MBA 7 16 5 3 0 2,1290 Effective ,88476 1,8045 2,4536 1,00 5,00 
MPA 7 31 27 28 9 3,0098 Ineffective 1,10351 2,7931 3,2266 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 5 15 10 7 4 2,7561 Effective 1,17857 2,3841 3,1281 1,00 5,00 
Total 19 62 42 38 13 2,7931 Effective 1,12910 2,6242 2,9621 1,00 5,00 
9% 28% 19% 17% 6% 
X5 MBA 9 15 5 1 0 1,9333 Effective ,78492 1,6402 2,2264 1,00 5,00 
MPA 7 27 33 26 9 3,0294 Ineffective 1,07589 2,8181 3,2407 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 6 13 12 7 3 2,7073 Effective 1,14551 2,3457 3,0689 1,00 5,00 
Total 22 55 50 34 12 2,7630 P. Effective 
 
1,11877 2,5951 2,9309 1,00 5,00 



















T.P 12% 34% 29% 18% 7% 2.729 P. Effective 
         
 
     
Table 8.9: Frequency Distribution of the Managerial Communication Skills Developed 













S.A A N Dis S.Dis 
Lower Upper F F F F F 
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P P P P P Bound Bound 
x16 MBA 9 13 5 3 0 2,0667 Effective ,94443 1,7140 2,4193 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 23 36 25 12 3,1373 Ineffective 1,08125 2,9249 3,3496 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 13 15 9 1 2,8049 Effective ,95445 2,5036 3,1061 1,00 5,00 
Total 18 49 56 37 13 2,8728 Effective 1,09757 2,7081 3,0375 1,00 5,00 
x17 MBA 9 14 6 2 0 2,0323 Effective ,87498 1,7113 2,3532 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 19 42 23 12 3,1569 Ineffective 1,05065 2,9505 3,3632 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 3 15 13 9 1 2,7561 Effective ,96903 2,4502 3,0620 1,00 5,00 
Total 18 48 61 34 13 2,8621 Effective 1,08241 2,7001 3,0240 1,00 5,00 
x18 MBA 6 9 13 3 0 2,4194 Effective ,92283 2,0809 2,7579 1,00 5,00 
MPA 5 18 42 27 9 3,1683 Ineffective ,99065 2,9728 3,3639 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 4 17 11 8 1 2,6341 Effective ,99388 2,3204 2,9479 1,00 5,00 
Total 15 44 66 38 10 2,9075 Effective 1,02447 2,7538 3,0613 1,00 5,00 
x19 MBA 3 9 16 2 0 2,5667 Effective ,77385 2,2777 2,8556 1,00 5,00 
MPA 6 18 42 27 9 3,1471 Ineffective 1,00884 2,9489 3,3452 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 6 14 11 7 3 2,6829 Effective 1,14976 2,3200 3,0458 1,00 5,00 





66 182 252 145 145 11.5788 
 
Total 
T.P 10% 26% 36% 21% 21% 2.8947 Ineffective 
   Source: data analysis 
 
Table 8.12:  Measures 1 and 2 of Participants’ Selection Process 
ECs Involving in the EC(s) Paying the fees 
Via the Org Self Sponsor Via the Org Self Sponsor 
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequenc
 
Frequency 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
MBA Count 17 2 12 13 16 2 
% 55% 6% 39% 42% 51% 6% 
MPA Count 44 53 5 45 51 6 
% 43% 52% 5% 44% 50% 6% 
NIAS Count 28 13 0 28 13 0 
% 68% 32% ,0% 68% 32% ,0% 
WEC Count 16 5 4 12 4 10 
% 64% 20% 16% 46% 15% 39% 
WRTC Count 1 25 1 1 26 0 
% 4% 93% 3% 4% 96% ,0% 
Total Count 106 98 22 99 110 18 
% 46% 44% 10% 43% 49% 8% 
           Source: data analysis  
 
Table 8.13: Measures 3 and 4 of Participants’ Selection Process 
 
ECs 
Are you part of the employees upgrading plan 
of your organization 
Were more candidates within your organization for the 
master programme 
Yes NO Yes NO 
Frequency Frequency Frequency  Frequency  
Percent Percent Percent  Percent  
  MBA Count 14 17 13 18 
% 45% 55% 41,9% 58,1% 
MPA Count 12 90 18 84 
% 12% 88% 17,6% 82,4% 
NIAS Count 11 30 9 32 
% 27% 73% 22,0% 78,0% 
WEC Count 2 23 5 19 
% 8% 92% 21% 79% 
WRTC Count 3 21 1 25 
% 13% 87% 4% 96% 
Total Count 42 181 46 178 



















Table 8.14 Measures 5 and 6 of Participants’ Selection Process 
The ECs (1) The criteria were you selected by an 
organization 






































Percent Percent  Perce
  
Percent  Percent Percent Percent  Perce
  
Percent  
  MBA Count 1 7 6 0 17 0 3 12 0 16 
 % 3% 23% 19% ,0% 55% ,0% 10% 39% ,0% 51% 
MPA Count 41 30 24 6 1 38 33 24 6 1 
 % 40% 29% 24% 6% 1% 37% 32% 24% 6% 1% 
NIA
S 
Count 21 10 8 2 0 21 11 7 2 0 
 % 51% 24% 20% 5% ,0% 51% 27% 17% 5% ,0% 
WE
C 
Count 16 0 9 1 0 17 0 8 1 0 
 % 61% ,0% 35% 4% ,0% 65% ,0% 31% 4% ,0% 
WRT
C 
Count 3 14 10 0 0 0 11 6 8 2 
 % 11% 52% 37% ,0% ,0% ,0% 41% 22% 30% 7% 
Total Count 66 61 57 9 34 59 58 57 17 36 
 % 29% 27% 25% 4% 15% 26% 26% 25% 7% 16% 
 
Table 8.15 Frequency Distribution of Training Methods Used (N=227) 
ECs               Case Study      Lecture technique 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  
 MBA 21 8 2 0 1 6 7 17 
68% 26% 6% 0% 3% 19% 22% 55% 
MPA 14 6 7 75 58 1 22 21 
14% 6% 7% 73% 58% 1% 21% 20% 
NIAS 11 9 3 18 8 11 9 11 
27% 22% 7% 44% 19% 27% 29% 27% 
WEC 22 2 0 2 2 7 3 14 
78% 11% 0% 11% 7% 27% 11% 54% 
WRTC 1 5 3 19 21 1 3 2 
4% 18% 11% 70% 77% 4% 11% 8% 
Total 69 30 15 114 90 26 44 65 
30% 13% 7% 50% 40% 12% 19% 29% 
 
 
Table 8.16 The Mean Scores of Training Methods Used 
     Method Used 
                            
                        The ECs 





95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Case Study MBA 31 2,0645 MF 1,34004 1,5730 2,5560 1,00 4,00 
MPA 102 3,5105 LF ,95141 3,3236 3,6974 1,00 4,00 
NIAS 41 2,0976 MF 1,26105 1,6995 2,4956 1,00 4,00 
WEC 26 1,2692 HF ,72430 ,9767 1,5618 1,00 4,00 
WRTC 27 3,2593 LF ,76423 2,9569 3,5616 1,00 4,00 
Total 227 2,7712 MF 1,31722 2,5990 2,9435 1,00 4,00 
Lecture 
technique 
MBA 31 2,6452 MF 1,25295 2,1856 3,1047 1,00 4,00 
MPA 102 1,6987 HF ,95064 1,5120 1,8854 1,00 4,00 
NIAS 41 2,5854 MF ,89375 2,3033 2,8675 1,00 4,00 
WEC 26 2,7692 MF 1,10662 2,3223 3,2162 1,00 4,00 
WRTC 27 1,5556 HF ,97402 1,1702 1,9409 1,00 4,00 
Total 227 2,0937 MF 1,11415 1,9480 2,2394 1,00 4,00 
 
Table 8.17 Frequency Distribution of the Quality of the Curriculum and Courses 
Variables Frequency distribution 
S. agree  Agree Neutral  Disagree S. Disagree  
Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  
X1: Overlapping in course materials 17 66 58 60 26 
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7,5% 29% 25,6% 26% 12% 
X2: The courses are relevant to the special 
needs of the Yemeni related sector 
27 82 68 39 11 
12% 36% 30% 17% 5% 
X3: Focusing on how the manager should 
manage rather than what is management  
27 82 68 39 11 
12% 36% 30% 17% 5% 
X4. The balance between theory and 
practice is good’ 
17 54 71 65 20 
7% 24% 31% 29% 9% 
X5: Case studies presented in the courses are 
based on the daily practice of Yemen’s 
 
10 59 63 74 20 
4% 26% 28% 33% 9% 
Total 93 328 330 292 90 
8% 29% 29% 26% 8% 
                
Table 8.18: Descriptive Analysis of the Quality of the Curriculum and Courses 
SUMB 














MBA 31 2,4516 Effective ,64146 2,2163 2,6869 1,00 5,00 
MPA 102 3,3585 Ineffective ,78469 3,2044 3,5126 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 41 3,0772 Ineffective ,59640 2,8890 3,2655 1,00 5,00 
WEC 26 2,2372 Effective ,52741 2,0242 2,4502 1,00 5,00 
WRTC 27 3,0123 Ineffective ,66172 2,7506 3,2741 1,00 5,00 
Total 227 3,0142 Ineffective ,80062 2,9095 3,1190 1,00 5,00 
       
Table 8.20 the Mean Scores of Training Course Finished in Time 











MBA 31 1,4194 Effective ,50161 1,2354 1,6033 1,00 2,00 
MPA 102 1,9804 Ineffective ,13933 1,9530 2,0078 1,00 2,00 
NIAS 41 1,8293 Ineffective ,38095 1,7090 1,9495 1,00 2,00 
WEC 26 1,6154 P. effective ,49614 1,4150 1,8158 1,00 2,00 
WRTC 27 1,9259 Ineffective ,26688 1,8204 2,0315 1,00 2,00 
Total 227 1,8282 Ineffective ,37805 1,7788 1,8776 1,00 2,00 
          
Table 8.21 the Distribution of the Participants Form the Different ECs 
ECs The size of the participants in the ECs 
Frequency Percent 
MBA 146 23% 
MPA 239 38% 
NIAS 85 13% 
WEC 75 12% 
WRTC 85 13% 
Total 630 100% 
 
Table 8.22: Descriptive Analysis for the Process of Application the Training (Q1) 









Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
MBA 31 3,2064 Ineffective ,53832 3,0090 3,4039 1,00 5,00 
MPA 102 2,3885 Ineffective ,67530 2,2558 2,5211 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 41 2,5945 Ineffective ,53966 2,4242 2,7649 1,00 5,00 
WEC 26 2,7788 Ineffective ,67575 3,5059 4,0518 1,00 5,00 
WRTC 27 2,6481 Ineffective ,83568 2,3176 2,9787 1,00 5,00 
Total 227 2,7275 Ineffective ,79946 2,6230 2,8321 1,00 5,00 
 


















direction Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
MBA 31 3,3495 Ineffective ,72310 3,0842 3,6147 1,00 5,00 
MPA 102 2,4510 Ineffective ,78755 2,2963 2,6057 1,00 5,00 
NIAS 41 2,3862 Ineffective ,93128 2,0922 2,6801 1,00 5,00 
WEC 26 2,5185 Ineffective ,70918 2,3171 2,7199 1,00 5,00 
WRTC 27 2,9259 Ineffective ,73368 2,7737 2,0782 1,00 5,00 
Total 227 2,2395 Ineffective ,90924 2,1034 3,3755 1,00 5,00 



















Appendix 1.2: List of the Interviewees 







Aannimari Hermis Yemeni Desk office at Nuffic 8/4/2012 
Alexander 
Delckman 
ROI International, Dutch Institute for Public 
Administration, Former International Project 
Manager of MPA. 
27/3/2012 
Angela Kwok ROI International, Dutch Institute for Public 
Administration - Advisor International Affairs For 
MPA Project. 
22/2/2012 





ROI International, Dutch Institute for Public 
Administration, Former International Project 
Manager of MPA 
22/2/2012 
Bert Huguenin DSO- MinBuza, NPT Program Officer, The 
Netherlands 
5/4/2012 
Bettina Bock Wageningen University , Dept. of Social Sciences, 
Rural Sociology - Associate Professor Rural 
Sociology, WRTC Project Director  
10/4/2012 
Carin Vijfhuizen NUFFIC - Senior Programme Administrator and 
Former Yemeni Desk Officer of the NPT Program  
12/4/2012 
Frans Huibers Wageningen UR, Wageningen University, Centre for 
Water and Climate, Irrigation and Water Engineering 
- Associate Professor Health and Environment, 
Dutch WEC Project Director 
5/5/2012 
Han Blom Team Leader and Resident Expert on Behalf of 
SPAN Consultants for Project on Strengthening the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
in Managing Foreign Assistance Projects Including 
the NPT and NFP in Yemen 
Several Times 
Jaap Voeten Maastricht School of Management, MBA and WRTC 
Expert, the Implementation Teams of both Projects  
17/4/2012 
Jan Visser The External Evaluator of the NPT Program in 
Yemen 
14/1/2012 
John Berelee ROI International, Dutch Institute for Public 
Administration, International Project Manager, MPA 
and NIAS  
4/4/2012 
Jos Walenkamp Director NUFFIC, Directorate Knowledge and 
Innovation 
15/3/2012 
Marc van den 
Muyzenberg 
ROI International, Dutch Institute for Public 
Administration - Director ROI International, Project 
Director of MPA and NIAS  
28/3/2012 
Meinhard Gans Maastricht School of Management-Director 




















Patrick D. Martens Maastricht School of Management – Former MBA 
Project manager 
6/4/2012 
Tjay-Koen Yap NUFFIC - Team Leader Capacity Building 
Programmes, Former officer of the Yemeni Desk in 
Nuffic (NPT program ) 
12/6/2012 
Vogels, Mieke DSO- MinBuza,  Policy officer of the Higher 
Education Programs within MinBuza,  including the 











Abdual Aziz Al 
Shabi  
Republic of Yemen, Rector of IBB University, Former Dean 





Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics,– 
Former Dean, Former Dean ( MPA and MBA  Projects) 
13/7/2012 
Abduall Athouman  Head of the Special Unit of the Foreign Aid, Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) 
7/8/2012 
Abduallh Abriaheem  Student at WEC, from the Water Sector in Yemen 5/9/2012. 
Abduallh Al Fakeeh  Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics,– 
Political Sciences Department, Staff Member ( MPA Project) 
21/7/2012 
Abudall Ashater  Republic of Yemen, Deputy of the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, ( MPOIC) 
9/8, 2012 
Adel Alwashily  Sana’a University, Water and Environment Center (WEC), Vic 
Director of the WEC Center  
7/8/ 2012 
Adnana Al Maqtari  Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics,– 
Political Sciences Department, Staff Member ( MPA Project) 
12/8/2012 
Ahamed Al Durafi  Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics, 




Sana’a University, Coordinator of MBA Project and Director 
of CBA, MBA Project  
6/8/2012 & 
2/9/2012 
Al Kakai, Hana Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 
WRTC, Staff Member  
10/7/2012 
Ali Qasem  Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance, 
Former Director of the WB Project within the Minsitry   
25/8/2012 
Azhar Abdu-Allah  Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 
WRTC – Former Head of Quality Unit of WRTC 
12/7/2012. 
Aziz Alhadi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Yemeni 
Local manager of the NPT Program 
20/8/2012 
Bilkis Zabara Sana’a University, Water and Environment Center (WEC) -




Republic of Yemen, Vice Director of the Anti-Corruption 
Committee in Yemen. 
5/9/2012 
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Dalal – Al 
Mkaterey 
MBA student at CBA, From the Private Sector  15/8/2012 
Fadil AlShouabi  Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Finance, Deputy of the 
Minsitry  
13/8/2012 
Focus Group  Five New staff members in Aden University who have been 
sent to Study by the WRTC Project  
11/7/2012 
Focus Group  With 15 of the MPA Students from 15 Ministry in Yemen  5/8/2012 
Fuad Ahmed Al 
Hada 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 
Strengthening of MoHESR Project - National Project 
Manager 
19/8/2012 
Hana Al Hardi  Student at CBA , MBA, Worker at the National Oil 
Organization in Yemen  
4/9/2012. 
Hanan Al Maqrabi  Student At WEC, Working at the Water Sector  13/8/2012 
Hani Anan  General Manager of Foreign Aid Administration, Ministry of 
Finance and Former Student at MBA 
3/9/2012 
Hasen Alawdini  Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Finance, Deputy of the 
Minsitry 
20/7/2012 
Huda Alawi  Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 




Republic of Yemen, Deputy of the Ministry of Planning and 




Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Deputy 




Director of NIAS and Former Project Manager, The Yemeni 














Republic of Yemen, Minster of the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, MOPIC 
23/7/2012 
Morheb Al Assed  Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics,– 
Political Sciences Department, Staaf Member, MBA Project  
21/8/2012 
Nadeah abduallh  Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 
WRTC, Staff Member of WRTC 
9/7/2012 
Naif Abu-Lohom Sana’a University, Water and Environment Center (WEC) - 
Head of Research Department and WB Water Expert  
6/9/2012 
Najeeb Abeed  Republic of Yemen, Former Ambassador of Yemen in The 
Netherlands  
28/8/2012 
Rokshana Ismail Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 
WRTC – Former Director 
10/7/2012 
Roza Al Khamri  Aden University, Women’s Research and Training Center- 
WRTC  
10/7/2012 
Saib Sallam Thabet Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics, 
Department of Business Administration – Former 
Coordinator of MBA Project 
22/8/2012 
















Taha Al Hmdani  Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance, 
Deputy of the Minsitry for Human Resources  
18/8/2012 
Yahya  Al Mutahar Sana’a University, Faculty of Commerce and Economics, 
Department of  Public Administration – Former Coordinator 
























Appendix 1.3: Questions Lists for the Interviews
Notes: 
1- Every interview session started by the checklist for the personal and the 
organizational information of the interviewee. 
2- I confirmed with all the interviewees that I will handle the information 
confidentially.
3- This is a semi-interviews guide; I selected questions based on the level of the 
interviewee. I have added some questions as a reaction to the answers of the 
interviewee. That means different questions appeared during the semi-
interviews
4- During all the interviews I conducted, I started by introducing the local 
knowledge syndrome topic and the effectiveness of aid programs (the main 
argument of this dissertation) and posing the following main question: 
How do you define “Local Knowledge Syndrome”? Why that definition? As an 




1. What are the priority areas in your development areas? How were they decided upon?
2. What is the influence of donors, such as WP, UNDP, USAID, DIFID, and GTZ on setting 
the development priority areas? For example, do donors consent with your vision and 
mission? Did they assist you in the analysis of the local context and situational analyses? 
Is there difference of opinion? In what way and with what particular donor?
3. Was there a specific input of the Netherlands’ development aid into your strategy? If yes, 
what?
4. What are the main issues of negotiation on the Dutch inputs? With whom are these 
issues discussed? BuZa or Embassy? For Example: the accent on gender, does this give 
raise to questions inside MOPIC and does that lead to discussions with BuZA/Embassy? 
If so, what results?
5. What was your particular role in the establishment of NPT? Were you consulted as the 
main institution for donor coordination? If yes in what way?
6. MOPIC is divided into Geographical Directorates: how do analyze the request for 
assistance to Higher Education that is not a priority area within your development 
strategy? Who in MOPIC, for example, made an analysis of the HE situation in Yemen, 
the rationale and the particular requests of NPT in the implementation of the 
programme? Did you rely on MoHESR? On Embassy?
7. When the NPT was established and the first overall plan was developed by MoHESR in 
consultation with Embassy, Nuffic, WB and some Rectors of the public universities, etc 
was the first plan submitted to you for comment and recommendations? In how far was 
the first plan, where all universities would receive a number of projects till a total 
amount of some € 10 million in line with your overall vision how the HE sector should 
be developed? Or was that left to MoHESR?








you before the NPT programme was signed? And what conditions did you require from 
MoHESR in financial terms, feasibility, sustainability? Did you request a specific role as 
MOPIC, such as overall supervisor or advisor? If not, why not?
9. Did you provide MoHESR with specific skills on how to deal with donor support? How 
to identify and formulate projects? How to set up a good programme management 
system? How to link with other donor programmes?
10. During implementation of NPT: did you receive annual reports on the projects? If not: 
why not? If so: what was your particular role? Overall monitoring? Connecting with 
other donor programmes?
11. In some cases MOPIC got the request from universities to get new buildings and these 
requests were put on the donor lists. In how far did you link these requests with the NPT 
programmes? Did you put the responsibility for the request on the Rector’s Offices, 
MoHESR or had MOPIC an own HE advisor for these requests?
12. Near the end of the NPT programme was any request made to you to ask other donors to 
continue the different projects? Was there any reason for you not to ask MoHESR to 
come with such a request?
13. Did you get feedback from MOHERS about the outcomes of the NPT program and 
about the lessons learned during the program implementation to inform future aid 
policy set up? If yes: please tell me about? If No: Why?
14. Is there a question/piece of data that hasn’t been addressed but that you think would be 
helpful to our discussion?
Policy Making Level (Within Higher Education Sector)
1. How did you prepare the identification process of the NPT program in Yemen in terms 
of: preparation of HE documents, mobilization of universities, appointing special staff 
within your ministry to deal with NPT?
2. What were the main Yemeni documents where NPT could make use of with regards to 
HE sector? Which institution did supply these documents: MPIC? World Bank? 
MoHESR? Did it contain a recent situational analysis of the sector?
3. Did the public universities submit situational analyses and rationales for participation in 
the NPT program and with priorities areas of NPT assistance before meeting with the 
Embassy and Nuffic staff?
4. Were meetings held between MoHESR and the public universities to discuss the strategy 
during the NPT meetings? If so: what were the results? Did the Universities form one 
front? Competition between them and between the universities and MoHESR?
5. How did the NPT criteria tally with the main problems defined in the HE sector? Which 
NPT criteria had to be ‘taken on board ‘to get the consent of the Netherlands 
‘Government? 
6. Was MOPIC involved in the identification of the NPT program? If so, what was its 
particular role?
7. During the NPT identification meetings who took the main role on Yemeni side? On 
Netherlands ‘side? What was the role of the Chairman?
8. What were the main issues discussed? What reached easy agreement? What were points 
of longer discussion? Were there points that you felt that these are typically Dutch issues 
and not so much Yemeni issues? If so: Which ones? How did you come to a solution?
9. What were the main comments of Nuffic, the Embassy or World Bank on the 
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programme the Yemeni side had proposed? In how far were your inputs maintained in 
the identification agreement? Do you think that it was a win-win situation? Why?
10. What would you have improved in the identification phase with your present 
knowledge?
11. How was the NPT programme presented to you? Did discussions take place on the NPT 
requirements? How did they fit into your vision on the development of the HE sector? 
What documentation did you send to the universities introducing NPT and what were 
your instructions? The NPT format? Explanation from the Ministry? Who in MoHESR 
was the daily coordinator in the program?
12. What presentations were given by Nuffic at the meeting with you, Embassy and 
representatives of universities and WB? Were examples given of NPT programmes in 
other countries? Was a SWOT analysis presented, giving the advantages and 
disadvantages, opportunities and threats of the program? Was it clear what could be 
expected from the TA and also what the incentives for the Dutch partners could be if 
they would be working in Yemen?
13. What were the reactions of the universities? What did the universities expect from 
MoHESR in its leading role? Quality control?
14. Did the universities submit their first proposals in the NPT format? Who collected the 
proposals? Who did the quality control of the first proposals? MoHESR/ Nuffic? 
Embassy? Who did the prioritizing and on what grounds?
15. What were the main shortcomings in the first proposals? What did you do to improve 
these?
16. Were you or the universities known with the NPT format language, such as vision, 
mission, strategy, long-term objectives, results, activities, etc? If not, how did you solve 
this problem? 
17. On whose recommendation did you decide to recruit an external and foreign consultant 
(first Dr Peter Llelewyn and after that Dr Scott Mcgullough) to assist you in formulating 
the projects? Why not opted for a Yemeni consultant?
18. What was the reason to make a NPT coordination project with a foreign consultant (Han 
Blom)? Could the same results have been reached with a Yemeni consultant in this NPT 
project? If yes: why and if not: why?
19. Were you often consulted by the participating universities to give them more 
information on matters like institution and capacity building? If so, what actions did you 
undertake? 
20. What was your role in the final approval of the Terms of Reference of the project 
proposals? What were the main interventions to get the full commitment of the 
participating universities? In case of conflict during the formulation could you give an 
estimation of how much percentage was solved in a formal and in an informal way?
21. What is your lesson learnt of formulation of projects in HE during the NPT programme? 
Do Yemeni consultants by now have the skills and attitudes to formulate programmes 
and projects in HE?
22. Who initiated the reform project? How did you prioritize the proposals and on what 
basis (selection criteria)? Who were the Yemeni counterparts during the formulation and 
how were the official and unofficial roles? (The role of the national coordinators, rectors, 
and departments)? Were your interactions with the Dutch partners enough to ensure 
effective design of the NPT? 








vision and expectations, common understandings and the prevailing mental models of 
the actors to guide efforts for developing the capacity within the host org? 
24. What is your explanation to select the different types of Yemeni universities to receive 
the projects? What are side-effects of this involvement? Did you select these universities 
on basis of their capacity and capability to carry out the projects in effective way? Or 
were other criteria more important? If so, which ones?
25. What was the quality control in the situational analysis of the different projects’ 
proposals? (Formal and informal capacity and capability). And by whom was the 
situational analysis written? If foreigners: were they translated and who translated 
(quality)? Where they distributed and to whom?
26. What were the main problems faced during the formulation and how did you solve 
them? Could you give an estimate in percentage how to solve the problems in the formal 
and in the informal way? 
27. Did you or Dutch partners make any concessions in order to come to an understanding? 
What were the major concessions, if any? Did you agree on the time frame of the 
program? Did you consider the timeframe realistic to attain the aims and goals of the 
projects? Were the incentives of the Dutch partners to participate in the projects clear to 
you and to them?
28. Was that individual or common exercise within the host universities to ensure common 
vision and expectations, common understandings and the prevailing mental models of 
the actors to guide efforts for developing the capacity within the host org? 
29. What is your explanation to select the different types of Yemeni universities to receive 
the projects? What are side-effects of this involvement? Did you select these universities 
on basis of their capacity and capability to carry out the projects in effective way? Or 
were other criteria more important? If so, which ones?
30. What was the quality control in the situational analysis of the different projects’ 
proposals? (Formal and informal capacity and capability). And by whom was the 
situational analysis written? If foreigners: were they translated and who translated 
(quality)? Where they distributed and to whom?
31. Did you or Dutch partners make any concessions in order to come to an understanding? 
What were the major concessions, if any? Did you agree on the time frame of the 
program? Did you consider the timeframe realistic to attain the aims and goals of the 
projects? 
32. Were the incentives of the Dutch partners to participate in the projects clear to you and 
to them? What were the main problems faced during the formulation and how did you 
solve them? Could you give an estimate in percentage how to solve the problems in the 
formal and in the informal way? 
33. Regarding the projects proposals, could you give an estimate how much was written by 
the recipient partners and how much by the external or Nuffic? 
34. What were the main weaknesses of the Yemeni partners in the formulation of the 
projects proposals? (Did they have the same understanding and expectations as Dutch 
contactors? Were their differences in goals and priorities? How did those differences 
affect the projects implementation, outcomes and long-term benefits?
35. What were the amendments made by you in the Yemeni proposals? Were these 
amendments commented upon by your national NPT Manager (MoHESR)?
36. Was there any role for Dutch embassy in Yemen during project formulation? If so, what 
were the main contributions?
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37. How do you evaluate the selection process of the contactors by Nuffic? What were the 
main comments and concerns reading to this process? 
38. Did Nuffic introduce the winning contractor to their Yemeni partners or was it left to 
you or to the contractor him/herself?  
39. Did you see that contractors had special introduction program on how to work in a 
Yemeni context?  
40. How do you rate and Nuffic MoHSR in terms of capacity and capability in giving 
information, comments and indications during the process of projects formulation? 
What could be improved?
41. How do you evaluate your relation with Nuffic, Dutch contractors, and the Yemeni 
counterparts during the different processes of the NPT lifetime in terms of:
•	 Better mutual understanding
•	 Openness and trust
•	 Absence of conflicts (or more open conflicts )
•	 Better interactions (formal and informal) 
•	 Common vision of doing work
•	 More flexibility in dealing with each other
•	 Observing the rules and regulations of NPT implementation while trying to find 
common solutions in case of difficulties
42. What quality control mechanisms were used during the implementation of the projects?  
How was the division between Nuffic, MoHESR, contractor and local counterpart?  How 
many time times did you have to intervene for keeping the control channels open? In 
percentages how much through formal and informal channels?  Was there a need for 
midterm review of a project in case no solution was found? If yes: what would have been 
your actions?
43. What quality control mechanisms were used during the implementation of the projects?  
How was the division between Nuffic, MoHESR, contractor and local counterpart?  How 
many time times did you have to intervene for keeping the control channels open? In 
percentages how much through formal and informal channels?  Was there a need for 
midterm review of a project in case no solution was found? If yes: what would have been 
your actions?
44. Which were the most important actors for the successful implementation of the 
projects?(long term staff, short term staff, materials, equipment, fellowships?
45. What were the important factors for successful implementation of the program?   ( clear 
institutional structure, willingness to participate,  political climate, social calamite, 
attitudes and behaviors of the staff, teaching styles, team work, common vision  (give me 
good examples)? 
46. What were the advantages and disadvantages of having a NPT Project Coordinator in 
Yemen and Yemeni manager  in terms of:
1) Formulation of projects (Terms of Reference, Background Information, Rationale)
2) Assistance in monitoring? Access to national programme manager and to local project 
managers during the different stages of the project cycle? 
3) Provision of information about the informal structures of the Centres, Universities and 
MoHESR. Did that lead to:
•	 Better mutual understanding
•	 Openness and trust








•	 Better interactions (formal and informal) 
•	 Common vision of doing work
•	 More flexibility in dealing with each other
•	 Observing the rules and regulations of NPT implementation while trying to find 
common solutions in case of difficulties
47. Did the placement of the Yemen Project Coordinator lead to more successful 
implementation of the NPT programmes in other countries? If Yes: why? If No: why not?
48. Would you repeat such a construction in countries where there is not much experience 
with aid projects in Higher Education?
49. Is there a question/piece of data that has not been addressed but that you think would be 
helpful to our discussion?
The Operational level: The University and Project level
1. When did you hear about the NPT program? by whom? and in which phase 
(identification, formulation, and implementation)?
2. What information (documents, instructions, explanations) did you receive from 
MoHESR about NPT program? Were, aside from the NPT format, manuals provided by 
MoHESR such as “How to develop a Project” or “Jargon lists”?
3. Were guidelines given on How to select the Faculty/Department that could participate in 
the NPT?
4. How did you select the field of attention? (Based on university development plan, based 
on the requirements of the Gov, University Council? Selected Deans? or other?
5. Were the NPT projects selected also highest on your priority list of University 
development? If not, what kept you of proposing the highest priority? Did you discuss 
this issue with MoHESR? Conclusion?   
6. Who did you approach to write the first wider draft proposal(s)? Individual staff 
members, department, faculty?  What were, if available, the criteria of selecting the 
persons to write this draft(s)? Were the same persons also used to write the Terms of 
Reference for the final NPT proposal? If not, why not? Was the writing of the draft 
proposal an individual or group exercise?
7. How did you guarantee that the draft NPT proposals contained a common vision and 
expectations from you, and the selected Faculties/Departments? When you signed the 
NPT proposal and submitted it to Nuffic did you had the idea that the you, the Faculty 
and Department all agreed on the same objectives, results and activities?  
8. After the draft proposal were submitted to MoHESR, what was the feedback on the 
proposal? Were there conditions put to in terms of financial and human recourses 
commitments? If yes: what were these? If not: what actions did you take to get these 
commitments? 
9. Introductory sentence: Within the 4 years time of the NPT programme setting up an 
academic programme would not be feasible, since this would request a time frame of at 
least 6 years. For that reason Nuffic proposed to set up Master programmes for 
professionals who had already followed a BA and had working experience) 
10. Did the university agree with the NPT proposal of starting commercial and practical 
study programs instead of academic programs? Did it still fit in your development policy 
of your university? What were the changes for you in your financial and organization 
commitments at University/ Faculty and Department levels?  
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11. What were the reactions of the various staff members within the host departments about 
these changes? Did they agree with the new objectives, results and activities and targets 
groups or did they consider that as a dominant donor intervention? What were theirs 
and your reactions?  
12. Regarding the writing of your projects proposals, could you give an estimate how much 
was written by the recipient partners and how much by the external consultant or Nuffic? 
13. What did you consider the main weaknesses of your Yemeni colleagues in the 
formulation of the projects proposals? (situation analysis? Problem stating? Priority 
setting of assistance? TA approach?) Did they feel that their input was taken seriously 
into the project proposal? If not, what aspects were not taken into account? And why 
not?
14. What feedback mechanisms were built in that the writers of the Terms of Reference 
could give feedback to you/Faculty and Department? 
15. What was the quality control in the situational analysis of the different projects’ 
proposals? (Formal and informal capacity and capability). And by whom was the 
situational analysis written? If foreigners: were they translated and who translated 
(quality)? Where they distributed and to whom?
16. If project formulation is an explicit or implicit activity of the education sector, how is it 
supported with research, discussions, and other formal and semi-formal interventions? 
17. What were the main problem face during that period:
•	 Lack of communication and interactions 
•	 Wrong information 
•	 Monopolistic approach
•	 Trust, openness, flexibly
•	 Understanding      
18. When you signed the final Terms of Reference were the projects implications clear to 
you? If not? Which not and what were your actions?
19. What were your actions to guarantee your financial and organizational commitments?  
20. Were the incentives of your Dutch partners clear to you and to them?
21. What would you have done different in the project formulation of your project with your 
present knowledge to improve the project processes and results? 
22. What is your lesson learnt of identification of projects in HE during the NPT 
programme? Do as Yemeni consultants by now have the skills and attitudes to identify 
and formulate programmes and projects in HE? 
23. Having experienced the technical in couricluim development, what knowledge, skills 
and attitudes did you learn? What was new to you and what was filmier to you?
24. What were the negative experiences? What suggestions do you have to improve the 
assistances in couricluim development?   
25. How was the Yemeni evaluator selected to the tender evaluation?  The right person: do 
you have experience in tendering? 
26. What were the main problems in reading the project docs? Did you get any assistance 
from Nuffic how to read the project proposals? 
27. What was the main difficulty in analyzing the local knowledge on Yemen, the Yemeni 
higher education structure and the university context of the different bidders for the 
proposal? 








should be more stressed?
29. Was there a big difference in rating between you and the other two evaluators? If so: In 
which item you deviate most?
30. Was your wining contractor different from the other evaluators? And what was the final 
result?   
Selection of the local manager of the project
•	 Was the selection of the project manager transparence process? Were objective 
criteria used? 
•	 Did you get feedback on your performance on the selection? 
•	 Do you practice the selection process yourself in other selections?
Questions to the Project Manager
31. Did you get a training course from the Contractor to act as a project manager? Or was it 
in-service training at the spot? 
32.  Did you get any training in finance management, report writing or other skills?
33. Were there specific activities undertaken to get acquainted with the (culture of the) 
international project manager? If not: how did the relation work out?   
34. Which skills, knowledge, and attitudes did you learn directly from the international 
project manager?
35. What were the best and worst experience in the cooperation with the IPM?  Was there 
division in tasks and what were they?  Which tasks did lead to conflicts and how were 
they resolved? 
36. By performing as a Project Manager did the relation change between you and other staff 
members of the Department? If so, in what way?  In case of conflicts how were they 
solved? 
37. How did you cope with the double loyalty of giving supporting the international team 
and being a Department staff member? 
38. Which capacities did you lack in performing as a project manager and what kind of 
recommendations would you (or did you) give to a new project manager? 
39. What skills did you use to mobilize other staff member to participate in project activities 
and how were you different from the approach of the internal project  manager in this 
mobilization? Which approach was most effective? 
40. How did you see the performance of the internal contractor in the project 
implementation? Was an open discussion about differences in approach possible? Did it 
lead to changes? 
Feedback After Projects
41. After the finishing of the project was your status among the staff members increased/
lowered or did it remain the same? Or are you blamed for whatever went wrong? 
42. Did you do your work according to your job description in the proposal of the 
contractor? Which tasks did you do well and which not? 
43. Was the project description realistic?
44. Would you opt to be a project manager in a new project again? What would be your 
requirements? 
45. What are the advantages to have a long term consultant in your project? In case there is 
no consultant would you opt for one? For what particular tasks?
46. How do you evaluate your relation with Nuffic, Dutch contractors, and the Yemeni 
counterparts during the different processes of the NPT project terms of:
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•	 Better mutual understanding
•	 Openness and trust
•	 Absence of conflicts (or more open conflicts )
•	 Better communication
•	 Common vision of doing work
•	 More flexibility in dealing with each other
•	 Observing the rules and regulations of NPT implementation while trying to find 
common solutions in case of difficulties
47. What formal and informal groups were created or supported during the project 
contributing to critical mass formation within the organization? Are these groups still in 
existence?
48. Do the groups devise structure and stabilize their functioning and operation by, for 
example, devising new “rules of the game” in accordance with project objectives? Do 
they complement or undermine one another?
Local and International Managers
49. To which extent did the differences in cultures and communication styles between the 
international manager and counterparts within the host organization prevent them from 
expressing their opinions and concerns and this, in turn, marginalize ideas and 
expertise?
50. To what extent has the difference in culture and the language capabilities influenced the 
management of the project? Were your main problems in communicating the tasks and 
responsibilities to your direct counterpart and how were his/her problems in 
communications with his own staff members within the project and with the main 
stakeholders? In how far did you support him/her in strengthening his/her position? 
With what means?
Questions for Counterparts or Staff within the Host Organizations 
51. Was there an internal need to start this project? Or was it an external intervention?
52. Who was in charge of the project design? Was it in individual or common exercise? How 
was the selection of the individual made? 
53. Was there enough formal and informal information about the project elaboration? If yes 
how? If no why?
54. What was your vision on establishing a master program for professional at the university 
at the start of the project and now? 
55. How did you see the role of the donor organization in the process of establishing the 
vision? 
56. Was your vision taken into consideration in the project design? If no, what were your 
actions to ensure your vision? 
57. What were the activities leading to establishing the final vision for the master program? 
Did you share this vision? 
58. Were you involved in the elaboration of the project activities? 
59. Having experienced the technical in formulation development, what knowledge, skills 
and attitudes did you learn? What was new to you and what was filmier to you?
60. What were the negative experiences? What suggestions do you have to improve the 
assistances in formulation?








62. How did you create a common culture that could be transmitted to the contractor, which 
the contractor on his turn, could take into account? What was the role of the contractor 
in this regard? What was the role of the International Project Manager and that of the 
National Project Manager? What was the role of the Steering Committee in this?
63. Did you participate in the NPT program? Why? What were your duties and 
responsibilities?
64. Were these duties assigned to you or could you choose?
65. Was there a common agreement on the division of the responsibilities among the 
participating staff? What were the main problems to come to this division?
66. What is your opinion about the selection process of the program director not clear here 
what you mean here: the project manager or the programme director of the Master 
Programme?
67. How did the project team divide the responsibilities?
68. Was your contribution over estimated, under estimated or just in the line with the 
division?  If over estimated or under estimated, please explain? 
69. If you participate, how did you prepare yourself to meet the demands of the professional 
students and your responsibilities? 
70. Did you have specific items that want to bring forwards? Is that reflected in the project 
design? If not why? If yes: could you please explain? 
71. Was there any feedback from the program staff in your contribution?
72. What was the specific role of the contractor in the division of the responsibilities and the 
feedback on the individual contribution in the line with the overall master program? 
How do you see this role? Did this role have a major impact on the master program?  
73. If the role of the contractor was minor, what did you do to ensure the quality of the 
master program?  
74. Did the donor and university give you the sufficient time to prepare yourself? If yes, 
please explain?  If no: how this influences your work? Are there other factor influences 
you in preparing yourself? Please explain?  
75. What you did you do aside of this time? 
Curriculum Development
76. What is the basis for your Master Programme? How was this Programme introduced? By 
your international team? Together? By own research? Other? 
77. Did you opt for an international Master degree or for a Yemeni degree? How did this 
work out during the elaboration of the curriculum?
78. Did you take into consideration specific requests from Yemeni Ministries such as 
Ministry of Water, of \Civil Service, and of the Yemeni private sector? 
79. Could you describe the process of the curriculum definition: who participated? Where 
did it take place? How long did it take to agree on the content of the different subjects, 
the teaching methodologies and methods? Which subjects took most time to come to an 
agreement? What were the main points of disagreement? Were external advisers present 
during the discussions on the curriculum content? 
80. Did the curriculum that was developed differ from the curriculum you had in mind 
when starting the Curriculum Development (CD) process? In what way(s)? 
81. What were the teacher’s profiles resulting from the new curriculum? Or were these not 
developed?
82. How many teachers did the curriculum at least require? Was this a point of discussion?
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83. How did you define the students’ entry requirements for the Master Programme? Based 
on international experiences? 
84. How was the curriculum of the Master Programme presented to the Department/
Faculty/University and outside the University?
85. What was the feedback on the curriculum and, if available,  its brochures?
86. What specific arrangements were made between the Yemeni and the international staff 
for developing the specific courses within the curriculum?
87. Having experienced the technical in curriculum development, what knowledge, skills 
and attitudes did you learn? What was new to you and what was filmier to you?
88. What were the negative experiences? What suggestions do you have to improve the 
assistances in curriculum development?
89. Was the foreign assistance needed in this point?
Course Development
90. On what basis were teachers selected to develop courses within the new curriculum? 
Who did the selection? Was it a joint Dutch/Yemeni exercise or was it left to the Yemeni 
or to the Dutch? What were the main problems faced in this selection? Did you follow a 
formal or informal procedure?
91. What were the main lacks of the teachers involved in the course development/ For 
example, no experience in course writing, no knowledge about the subject, no teaching 
methodology skills? 
92. What were the requirements of entering the program? How did you settle these 
requirements? Was a situational analysis conducted at the different ministries, private 
sector or other interests groups to measure the knowledge of the target group? And how 
did you test the interested students? 
93. Who were involved in the development of the program? Were stakeholders outside the 
university involved as well in defining the study program? In how far were their 
comments included?
94. How did you present the study program to outsiders (ministries, private sector, and 
other beneficiaries)?
95. Did you get comments and were these comments integrated in the program over the 
years?  
96. Did you pear up Dutch teachers with Yemeni teachers to guaranty the quality of the 
teaching courses? What were the main problems faced in course writing (teaching 
methodologies, practical knowledge, experience in course writing, subject knowledge)? 
How did you solve these problems? Was there an improvement over the years?
97. What was the overall reaction of your staff members about the course writing exercise of 
what was the reaction of the Yemeni partners?
98. BY who were the final courses inspected to control the quality as set in the begin of the 
program? Were other stakeholders involved? If so: what were the results of the 
assessments? Was the program submitted to the Faculty Council and University Council 
for approval? Has the MoHESR recognized the program? What is the quality of the 
program in relation to your own Netherlands/International program? 
99. Did the teaching materials and equipment lead to discussions? What were the main 
problems? How did you solve that? Who took the final decision? What were main 
complaints of the Yemeni teachers on the Dutch guidance and assistance?








the courses in Yemen? Was teaching common exercise conducted by International and 
Yemeni teachers? Was inter-vision practiced?  Were there problems in supervision of the 
International teachers to the Yemeni teaching staff (knowledge, teaching methodologies, 
language, attitudes, communications, interactive methods) and how did you solve these?  
101. Did the short term experts met with other stakeholders during their time in 
Yemen? Did that affect the training courses? If yes who organized the contacts and what 
were the amendments in the training courses? 
102. Were there evaluations of students on the teaching performances of the 
International and the Yemeni teachers? And what did you do with the results to improve 
those performances? Were International and/or Yemeni teachers not recruited again 
when low markings? Examples?
103. Having experienced the technical in curriculum development, what knowledge, 
skills and attitudes did you learn? What was new to you and what was filmier to you?
104. What were the negative experiences? What suggestions do you have to improve the 
assistances in curriculum development?   
105. What did you learn from students? 
Monitoring and Evaluations
106. What was the monitoring role of Nuffic, the deans and the rectors? Did it lead to 
changes in goals or aims? To major changes in the management of the project? To more 
efficiency? What was the role of MoHESR, did it lead to changes? If yes in both questions 
what? What were major advantages and disadvantages of Nuffic’s monitoring? The same 
for the ministry, the dean and the rectors? 
107. In percentages how often were problems solved by those actors on a formal and on 
an informal basis and what are the results for MoHESR? 
108. Did the actors’ (such as Nuffic or MoHESR) monitoring lead to more flexibility in 
the further implementation of the project or to more restriction? 
109. Were there moments that you thought you would stop the project? And when and 
why?
110. What are the final gains for your institute of having conducted this project 
(knowledge, finance? 
111. How did you use your knowledge to improve projects in your field in the future? 
112. How did you use improved knowledge to make the Yemeni project better aware of 
the implications of aid projects in the future? What were the main lessons learned? What 
would you avoid next time? 
113. What would you advice the MoHESR, NUFFIC, university rector and the 
Government of Yemen(MPIC) to improve their roles in managing aid programs in the 
higher education sector in Yemen?
114. Do you consider your project to be a role model for other projects? And why? 
115. Is there a question/piece of data that hasn’t been addressed but that you think 
would be valuable to our conversation?
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The Netherlands
Policy Making Level (MinBuZa)
First: North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM) and Middle East 
Division (DAM/MO)
1. Who are the main counterparts and co-partners in Yemen for defining the Netherlands’ 
contributions to the Yemeni development aid?  In what way does the Yemeni 
development policy fit within the overall development aid policy of the Netherlands? 
2. Who were the main stakeholders in selecting Yemen as one of the donor countries of 
Dutch foreign aid?  What were the main selection criteria? Who negotiated the priority 
areas with the ministry of planning in Yemen? Was the DAM or the Dutch embassy in 
Yemen? If the Dutch embassy:  Did it deliver the needed information and data about the 
local context to make your decisions valid? 
3. If the ministry of planning: Did it deliver the needed information and data about the 
local context? How many times did you meet with MOPIC to establish the priority areas? 
For how long are these priorities the main focus?  
4. Which of the priority areas (Gender, good governance, institutional building, water…
ect) has most impact until now and (why)? What are the main reasons for the 
Netherlands’ public and private sectors to participate in these areas? 
5. In how far were the priority areas influenced by other donors? WB and GTZ ect in 
Yemen? Dutch private sector?
6. Was DAM directly involved in the design of the NPT program for Yemen? Or Through 
the Embassy? 
7. Higher Education was not a priority area for Yemen: why could NPT still operate in 
Yemen?  
8. Did you use information from NPT projects in Yemen in your discussions with the 
MOPIC on other programs within the priority areas for Yemen? 
9. How do you evaluate the role of DSO/OO/ in defining the NPT program? Did you get 
feedback from DSO/OO about the outcomes of the NPT program and about the lessons 
learned during the program implementation to inform future aid policy? If yes: tell me 
about? If No: Why? 
10. Is there a question/piece of data that hasn’t been addressed but that you think would be 
valuable to our conversation?
Second: Social Development Department (DSO) and Education and Research 
Division (DSO/OO)
1. What was the reason to set up the NPT program? Was it a lobby from the Netherlands 
HE and International Education institutions or was it an initiative from ministries of 
Higher education in developing countries where former HE programs were conducted 
or are the other reasons like economic and strategic interests? 
2. What were the benefits of the Netherlands institutions to participate in this program? 
3. Did the recipient countries play a role in the policy making process of the NPT program? 
If yes how? If no: why?
4. How did NPT fit with the Netherlands priorities for Yemen? What was the role of the 








5. How did NPT fit with the Yemeni development priorities? And who were counterparts 
in that matter? ( The Ministry of Planning , the ministry of Higher Education, and/or 
other Ministries or institutions? 
6. What were main the docs you based your decisions upon? Did you carry out a 
situational analysis of the host sector?  If so. Did the situational analysis address the 
formal structure of power and/or the informal one as well? 
7. Was there agreement from the start on the NPT priorities between the Yemeni and 
Netherlands representatives? If not, were did the Yemeni differ from the Netherlands 
‘priorities? What were the main issues on getting the Yemeni (financial, materials, 
equipment, and buildings) commitments and was a timeframe discussed in which the 
projects were supposed to be sustainable? Did the timeframe differ between the Yemeni 
and Netherlands’ representatives? )
8. Did the Yemeni representatives discuss how they could integrate the NPT program 
within the overall reform of the HE system? Did they discuss the connections with other 
donor programs such as the World Bank loan? In how far, if these discussions took place, 
did these result in other priorities or other methods of organizing the NPT program in 
Yemen? 
9. Were the capacity and the capability of MoHESR to have the overall responsibility of the 
NPT program discussed in the first meetings and also the roles of the universities in the 
management of the NPT projects?
10. What actions were taken to make the NPT program known inside and outside of the 
higher education sector (MOPIC, GOM, President Office) of Yemen? Was there a role 
for the RNE or was it handed over to Nuffic?
11. What were the main problems encountered to come to the common decisions? 
(Understanding the implications of NPT projects to bring about changes in the 
universities?  Understanding the Dutch culture, understanding the jargon such as good 
governance sustainability, gender ect
12. What quality control mechanisms were used by MinBuza during the implementation of 
the NPT program?  How was the division made in these mechanisms between MinBuza 
and Nuffic, and the Dutch embassy?  
13. How many times did you have to intervene for keeping the control channels open? In 
percentages through formal and informal channels?  Was there a need for changing in 
the NPT definition during the implementation stage in Yemen, in cases of problems were 
not foreseen in policy making being found? If yes: what were your actions?
14. How were the Yearly Nuffic reports and evaluations used to improve the NPT program 
implementation? Did it give a comparative analysis of the NPT programs in the different 
countries? 
15.  What are the main lessons learned (capacity and capability) from the implementation of 
the NPT project in Yemen? How far did influence the vision in NPT in general?
16. In how far did the NPT program in Yemen differ from NPT in other countries?  (Good 
and bad examples). 
17. Did Nuffic answer to your demands in implementing the NPT program for Yemen? 
What could be improved? 
18. How do you evaluate the program outcomes? In your point of view, was the program 
successful? And why? On what basis did you make your judgment? How do you measure 
success or failure? What indicators do you use?
19. Do you think the program will provide long-term sustainable benefits, especially to 
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generate the manpower needed by the country and did the NPT program contribute to 
the wider aims of socio-economic development, poverty alleviation and gender equity? 
How and why?
20. Is there a question/piece of data that hasn’t been addressed but that you think would be 
valuable to our conversation?
Middle management Level ( Nuffic)
1. What was Nuffic’s specific role during the identification process of NPT program in 
Yemen?
2. Do you see a clear Yemeni expression of interest in the selected priority areas or did the 
Yemeni representatives just go along with the Netherlands’ priorities? Did the NPT 
program request that the projects should be integrated in the overall reform of the 
Ministry of Higher Education? 
3. Did they show that they are serious, responsible, and effective to formulate development 
policies that were sufficiently realistic to allocate NPT funding? On what basis did you 
make your judgment?
4. Which points in the agreement on the NPT program lead to problems during the 
implementation of the program?
5. Who initiated the reform project? How did you prioritize the proposals and on what 
basis(selection criteria)? Who were the Yemeni counterparts during the formulation and 
how were the official and unofficial roles? (the role of the national coordinators, rectors, 
and departments)? Were your interactions with the Yemeni counterparts enough to 
ensure effective design of the NPT? 
6. What was the quality control in the situational analysis of the different projects’ 
proposals? (Formal and informal capacity and capability). And by whom was the 
situational analysis written? If foreigners: were they translated and who translated 
(quality)? Where they distributed and to whom?
7. Did you or Yemeni authorities make any concessions in order to come to an 
understanding? What were the major concessions, if any? Did you agree on the time 
frame of the program? Did you consider the timeframe realistic to attain the  aims and 
goals of the projects? 
8. Were the incentives of the Yemeni partners to participate in the projects clear to you and 
to them?
9.   Was it in individual or common exercise? Were other stakeholders involved such as the 
private sector? 
10. What were the main problems faced during the formulation and how did you solve 
them? Could you give an estimate in percentage how to solve the problems in the formal 
and in the informal way? 
11. Regarding the projects proposals, could you give an estimate how much was written by 
the recipient partners and how much by the external or Nuffic? 
12. What were the main weaknesses of the recipient partners’ in the formulation of the 
projects proposals? (Did they have the same understanding and expectations as Nuffic? 
Were their differences in goals and priorities? How did those differences affect the 
projects implementation, outcomes and long-term benefits?
13. What were the amendments made by you in the Yemeni proposals? Were these 
amendments commented upon by your national NPT Manager (MoHESR)?








projects or was it adapted to the individual projects? Why was 0% given for local 
expertise? With increasing local knowledge is it to be expected that this percentage will 
increase as well? 
15. What were your criteria for selecting the evaluation teams? What were the main 
comments and concerns of these teams in the projects proposals? What were the main 
issues discussed during the contract negotiation? 
16. Did you introduce the winning contractor to their Yemeni partners or was it left to the 
contractor him/herself?  Was there special introduction program for contractors on how 
to work in a Yemeni context?  
17.  How do you rate MoHSR in terms of capacity and capability in giving information, 
comments and indications during the process of projects formulation? What could be 
improved?
18. Was there any role for Dutch embassy in Yemen during project formulation? If so, what 
were the main contributions?  
19. What quality control mechanisms were used during the implementation of the projects?  
How was the division between Nuffic, MoHESR, contractor and local counterpart?  How 
many time times did you have to intervene for keeping the control channels open? In 
percentages how much through formal and informal channels?  Was there a need for 
midterm review of a project in case no solution was found? If yes: what would have been 
your actions?
20. Which were the most important actors for the successful implementation of the 
projects?(long term staff, short term staff, materials, equipment, fellowships?
21. What were the important factors for successful implementation of the program?   ( clear 
institutional structure, willingness to participate,  political climate, social calamite, 
attitudes and behaviors of the staff, teaching styles, team work, common vision  (give me 
good examples)? 
22. What were the advantages and disadvantages of having a NPT Project Coordinator in 
Yemen in terms of:
23. Formulation of projects (Terms of Reference, Background Information, Rationale)
24. Assistance in monitoring? Access to national programme manager and to local project 
managers during the different stages of the project cycle? 
25. Provision of information about the informal structures of the Centres, Universities and 
MoHESR. Did that lead to:
•	 Better mutual understanding
•	 Openness and trust
•	 Absence of conflicts (or more open conflicts )
•	 Better communication
•	 Common vision of doing work
•	 More flexibility in dealing with each other
•	 Observing the rules and regulations of NPT implementation while trying to find 
common solutions in case of difficulties
26. Did the placement of the Yemen Project Coordinator lead to more successful 
implementation of the NPT programmes in other countries? If Yes: why? If No: why not?
27. Would you repeat such a construction in countries where there is not much experience 
with aid projects in Higher Education?
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The operational Level (the Contractors Level)
1 What attracted you to get involved in this aid project in Yemen? Other than the project’s 
stated objectives, did you have any other goals or secondary objectives you were hoping 
to reach? What were the incentives of your institute? What was your original vision to 
get own benefit from this project?
2 How did this NPT project fit into the overall policy of your institute? If not, why was the 
project selected? What is your responsibility?  How did the project affect your daily 
work? 
3 What was your knowledge about Yemen and/or about the organizational structures and 
incentives of participating in this NPT project of your direct counterpart before 
submitting the proposal to Nuffic? 
4 Were the NPT (financial or other) incentives and overall guiding capacity provided by 
Nuffic sufficient to implement the contract in efficient and effective way? For example: 
•	 In terms of the tender and contractors selection process
•	 In terms of having sufficient numbers of specialized staff with more than average  
knowledge on higher education reform processes in developing countries and/or 
experience in project management and teaching in developing countries, especially 
about in-Yemen institutional reform experience 
•	 In terms of preparing your missions on subject matter and giving the information 
and tools to effectively cooperate with the counterpart  government and/or 
organization before sending them to the field
•	 In terms of internal (between ……..) processes of information sharing
•	 In terms of flexibility during all phases of the project timeline
•	 In term of quality monitoring  and accountability in decisions  during the different 
project  phases 
•	  In terms of the  interactions between different Yemen NPT program’s chains ( 
different projects) or between different links in project chain
•	 In term of adopting effective mechanisms to ensure post-field knowledge transfers 
(setting up a feedback and information system that could be used for consultancy 
after the project finishes?
•	 Others please mention
6. Were the Terms of Reference of the project sufficiently clear to you to base your proposal 
on? Where did you deviate from the ToR? What was innovative in your proposal?? Was 
the ToR time frame realistic? 
7. How did you translate the NPT policy priorities into your project proposal? Which of 
the policy priorities were difficult to integrate? And why? 
8. In how far was your work plan original and different from your other work plans in 
other proposals?    
9. Did you go to Yemen before submitting the proposal to get more information about 
situation and how far did that improve your work plan? If you went to Yemen for how 
long you stayed there and who did you meet? If not: what were the resources you 
consulted for writing the rationale and work plan?
10. What were the main difficulties faced in obtaining the commitments of the requested 
short-term and long term experts? How many experts did you have to commit from 
outside your institute? And why? 








preparations for implementing your project in Yemen? Were the staff members briefed 
about the whole situational framework of the project and what they could expect in 
Yemen or where they given the job descriptions only? What was the role of your 
International Department and Nuffic in this regard?
12. What was your particular role in the implementation and who were your counterpart(s)?
13. How did you organize the first contacts with your counterpart in Yemen?
14. Did you experience that your counterparts were informed about the project aims and 
activities? Were they aware of the importance of having a common vision to reach the 
project aims and goals in the time frame set?  If not: what did you do to solve this 
problem?
15.  How did you cope with the mostly informal system in which the counterparts were 
working with your formal requests of getting activities on the way? Can you draw on 
paper the informal system of your counterparts according to your findings? Did you 
experience positive, active and unified attitudes and behaviors among the staff members 
to make the project a successful one?
16. Where disagreement arose on planning of project activities during the Inception Phase 
between Yemeni staff members, how did you solve this? And between you and the 
Yemeni staff at the same level? And between you and the higher decision level?  
17. What were the main issues on which problems in-between Yemeni partners arose during 
the Inception Phase? And between you and the partners? Was the issue always a ‘us 
‘against the ‘other’?  How did you solve these main issues?  How did you keep the 
channels of communication open? Did Nuffic and/or MoHESR play a role in settling 
issues?
18. Were there delays in the Inception Phase and if yes: What were the main reasons for 
delay in the Inception Phase? In what ways did the understanding of partners play a 
role?  Leadership, status, finance, formal versus informal systems?  Or were other reasons 
of delay in the inception phase?
19. Did you experience the capacity and capability of the counterpart organizations to carry 
out the activities in line with the background information in the project proposal? If not: 
how did you change your activities to tackle this issue??  How did you measure this 
capacity and capability?
20. Was your Plan of Operations adapted after the Inception Phase? And in what ways and 
why? Did your counterparts agree in the changes? Did Nuffic agreed and also MoHERS?
21. How did you make the new plan of operation known to the Yemeni counterparts and 
stakeholders and to your own staff members? Did it lead to an increased involvement 
from all stakeholders? Who in particular? And who not?
22. Did you select the local manager? Or was he/she already selected? By whom? Did he or 
she come from inside or outside of the recipient organization structure? Was your 
international project manager selected from your institute or from outside? If from 
inside, what were the advantages and disadvantages during the projects implementation? 
In both sides?
23. How did you introduce your project manager to the counterparts? Was his role accepted? 
What did you do to form one team of the Yemeni project manager and your project 
manager? What were the main problems faced in this regard?
•	 In terms of mutual understanding and consummating
•	 In terms of openness and trust 
•	 In terms of the absence of conflicts and cultural clashes
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•	 In terms of interactions ( formal and informal) and reaction  
•	 In terms of  having common vision and integrating the way of working of both sides
•	 In terms of flexibility 
•	 In terms of observing implantation’s problems and trying to solve them collectively
•	 In terms of the adaptability with the work environment (e.g., work and personal style 
and time management).
•	 In terms of the interpersonal relationship between you and the staff in the host 
organization
•	 Please give examples about the elements above-mentioned.
24. How did this reflect on the further project progress such as the preparation and making 
available staff for cooperating with your short term experts and the buying and 
distribution of materials and equipment and making available the necessary 
infrastructure?  How many times did the Project Director had to intervene to solve 
problems and which ones? Did that lead to a long term solution or did the same 
problems repeat over the project period?
25. To which extent did the differences in cultures and communication styles between the 
international manager and counterparts within the host organization prevent them from 
expressing their opinions and concerns and this, in turn, marginalize ideas and 
expertise?
26. To what extent has the difference in culture and the language capabilities influenced the 
management of the project? were your main problems in communicating the tasks and 
responsibilities to your direct counterpart and how were his/her problems in 
communications with his own staff members within the project and with the main 
stakeholders? In how far did you support him/her in strengthening his/her position? 
With what means?
27.  How did you manage to keep the Yemeni and Dutch staff involved and motivated?
28. What were the main problems in defining the study program? Was an international 
program introduced or was an international program adapted to the Yemeni context? 
How? If to Yemeni context how did you and your partners safeguard the international 
standard?  
29. What were the requirements of entering the program? How did you settle these 
requirements? Was a situational analysis conducted at the different ministries, private 
sector or other interests groups to measure the knowledge of the target group? And how 
did you test the interested students? 
30. Who were involved in the development of the program? Were stakeholders outside the 
university involved as well in defining the study program? In how far were their 
comments included?
31. How did you present the study program to outsiders (ministries, private sector, and 
other beneficiaries)?
32. Did you get comments and were these comments integrated in the program over the 
years?  
33.  How did you select the teachers to be involved in the course writing? Was this selection 
a common responsibility or was it left to the Yemeni partners?  What were the main 
problems faced in this selection? Did you follow a formal or informal solution? 
34. Did you pear up Dutch teachers with Yemeni teachers to guaranty the quality of the 
teaching courses? What were the main problems faced in course writing (teaching 








How did you solve these problems? Was there an improvement over the years?
35. What was the overall reaction of your staff members about the course writing exercise of 
what was the reaction of the Yemeni partners?
36. BY who were the final courses inspected to control the quality as set in the begin of the 
program? Were other stakeholders involved? If so: what were the results of the 
assessments? Was the program submitted to the Faculty Council and University Council 
for approval? Has the MoHESR recognized the program? What is the quality of the 
program in relation to your own Netherlands/International program? 
37. Did the teaching materials and equipment lead to discussions? What were the main 
problems? How did you solve that? Who took the final decision? What were main 
complaints of the Yemeni teachers on the Dutch guidance and assistance?
38. What were the main problems the Dutch short term experts faced in conducting the 
courses in Yemen? Was teaching common exercise conducted by International and 
Yemeni teachers? Was intervision practiced?  Were there problems in supervision of the 
International teachers to the Yemeni teaching staff (knowledge, teaching methodologies, 
language, attitudes, communications, interactive methods) and how did you solve these?  
39. Did the short term experts met with other stakeholders during their time in Yemen? Did 
that affect the training courses? If yes who organized the contacts and what were the 
amendments in the training courses? 
40. Were there evaluations of students on the teaching performances of the International 
and the Yemeni teachers? And what did you do with the results to improve those 
performances? Were International and/or Yemeni teachers not recruited again when low 
markings? Examples?
41. Did the project effort have reduced the effects of the detrimental formal and informal 
attitudes of the counterparts? If yes how? If no why? 
42. Did the counterparts’ attitudes changed productively (directly or indirectly), during the 
implementation stage of the project?
43. Did the project’ efforts created formal and informal factions within the host university? 
If yes: why in your perspective? Did this factions had conflicts and to what extent this 
factions prevented you form incorporating local knowledge during the project 
implementation and How?  
44. Did you tick to the formulation of the project vision? Or did you make any changes in 
the project inception after the last agreement during the implementation? In both 
answers, please explain why? And what were the benefits/effects of the change for the 
project?
45. What were the main problems in the organization and management of the Centers  
between the Dutch and Yemeni counterparts and Yemeni staff among themselves ( the 
structure, organization, financing, responsibilities, management, and also:
•	 In terms of mutual understanding and consummating
•	 In terms of openness and trust 
•	 In terms of the absence of conflicts and cultural clashes
•	 In terms of interactions ( formal and informal) and reaction  
•	 In terms of  having common vision and an integrating t way of working on both sides
•	 In terms of flexibility 
•	 In terms of the adaptability with the work environment (e.g., work and personal style 
and time management).
•	 In term of the interpersonal relationship between you and the staff in the host 
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46. Is the center sustainable at the moment? If Not what were the main course of failure? If 
yes what were the main factors of success? On what basis did you make your judgment? 
How do you measure success or failure? What indicators do you use?
47. Do you feel that the Yemeni partners owned the program after the project finished? If 
Yes why and if no why?
How often 
•	 Did you meet with: Yemen desk officer in Nuffic and the other Dutch contractors in 
Yemen as a Team
•	 (Your ) local manager met with other local managers of the other projects and the 
international long-team manger as a team
•	 (Your) local manager (you) met with the professional team in the department  
(formally or informally)
•	 (Your) local manager (you) met with an informal professional team (i.e. Librarian, IT 
Coordinator, Administrator, and supporting staff)
The questions: 
•	 How long did these meetings last? 
•	 How often did you discuss problems and progress of the project based on the 
different views of individuals? 
•	 Who was normally included in these meetings?
•	 How supportive were these meetings to you to incorporate formal and informal 
knowledge about the different projects?
•	 Were notes of the meetings taken? Were they distributed? To whom?
48. What was the monitoring role of Nuffic? Did it lead to changes in goals or aims? To 
major changes in the management of the project? To more efficiency? What was the role 
of MoHERS, did it lead to changes? If yes in both questions what? What were major 
advantages and disadvantages of Nuffic’s monitoring? The same for the ministry?
49. In percentages how often were problems solved by Nuffic on a formal and on an informal 
basis and what are the results for MoHESR? 
50. Did Nuffic’s or MoHESR’s monitoring lead to more flexibility in the further 
implementation of the project or to more restriction? 
51. Were there moments that you thought you would stop the project? And when and why?
52. What are the final gains for your institute of having conducted this project (knowledge, 
finance? 
53. How did you use your knowledge to improve projects in your field in the future? 
54. How did you use improved knowledge to make the Yemeni project better aware of the 
implications of aid projects in the future? What were the main lessons learned? What 
would you avoid next time? 
55. What would you advice the MoHESR, NUFFIC, MinBuza to improve their roles in 
managing aid programs in the higher education sector in recipient countries especially 
Yemen?
56. Do you consider your project to be a role model for other projects? And why? 
57. Is there a question/piece of data that hasn’t been addressed but that you think would be 






















Note: All the questionnaires in Arabic which related to the other selected projects 
(MPA, NIAS, WEC, and WRTC) have been adapted from this version. 
The questionnaires in Arabic are available upon request. 
 
(Questionnaire, English Version) 
MBA Project, University of Sana’a (CBA) 
 
 
Donors-Promoted Public Sector Reforms in Developing 





The Dutch NPT Program in Reforming 













An Academic questionnaire prepared to be directed in detail for the purpose of 
evaluating the impact of the Dutch-Nuffic aid project to establish of an 
executive Master Degree in Business Administration (MBA)











Dear Survey Participant, 
 
     I am a lecturer at the Faculty of Commerce- Sana’a University, Political Sciences Department. 
Meanwhile, I am currently undertaking full time Ph.D. research under the supervision of Prof. 
Dr. Frits van der Meer and Prof. Dr. David Lowery at the Institute of Public Administration, 
University of Leiden, The Netherlands. My research involves a depth examination of the 
effectiveness of “donors-promoted public sector reforms in developing countries”. The research 
is examining four aid projects funded by Netherlands-Nuffic-NPT program to reform the higher 
education sector in Yemen. This includes the establishment of an executive Master Degree in 
Business Administration (MBA), Sana’a University. 
 
     I would be grateful if you could please spare a few moments of your valuable time to 
complete the attached questionnaire. Most of the questions simply require you to place a tick in 
an appropriate box. If you wish to make additional comments at any point please feel free to do 
so by using the open question placed in the end of this questionnaire.  
 
 
I would also like to assure you that the information you provide will be treated as confidential. 
The data will not be used for any purpose other than the purpose of this study. Finally, I would 
like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your kind co-operation in this important 
and topical study. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Moosa Elayah  
Email: 8TUelayahmaa@fsw.leidenuniv.nl U8T 
Tell: 7-380-280-54 
 
• I am concerned to explore your evaluation about the impact of the MBA degree, in your response, please 
describe exactly what is going on in reality, not what you feel is the right answer or believe should have 
happened. 
• It is allowed to answer the open questions in Arabic language. This is if you do prefer, but we do prefer 
to have the answers in English language. 



















Section One: The Impact of the MBA degree 
1- To what extent do you agree or disagree that the MBA degree has improved your capacity and capability to 
conduct the following:  
 
Note: By placing a tick () only on the one cell which you consider that it greatly indicates the most suitable answer from 
the five answers optionally allowed to you in the case of each item as follows: 
 Statements Strongly 
Agree 





1.  How to develop and analyze policies for your 
organization  
     
2.  How to develop a strategic plan for your business       
3.  How to develop a Plan of Actions  and a basic 
business budget based on the strategic plan  
     
4.  How to develop indicators to measure the 
successful implementation of the business 
strategy 
     
5.  How to organize the business according to the 
strategy 
 
     
6.  How to define the functions and job descriptions 
of organization  
     
7.  How to introduce and implement an evaluation 
system of functions and jobs 
     
8.  How to set criteria for evaluating the 
performance of the employees  in the present 
situation   
     
9.  How to develop an employees’ upgrading 
programme   
     
10.  How to identify the shortcomings of the present 
employees to fulfill new jobs and functions 
     
11.  How to set up and implement a monitoring and 
controlling system of change processes   
     
12.  How to establish reference group to discuss and 
defend your visions within your organization 
     
13.  How to establish reference group to discuss and 
defend your visions with the beneficiaries of your 
interventions 
     
14.  How to make effective and participatory 
decisions  
     
15.  How to introduce and maintain (business) ethics 
and values such as transparency and 
accountability 
 
     
16.  How to set up and implement a communication 
system within the organization 
 
     
17.  How to develop meetings skills  
 
     
18.  How to set up a reporting system      
19.  How to develop a  reporting skills 
 
     
20.  How to get a better understanding of English 
 
     
21.  How to promote the technology literacy1 
 
     
22.  How to read and comprehend information, to 
express ideas effectively in written and spoken 
form, and to listen attentively 
     
23.  How to use and understand quantitative 
information 
 
     
24.  How to be creative in solving problems2      
                                                 
1 -The ability to use responsibly appropriate technology to communicate; solve problems; and access, manage, integrate, evaluate, and 
create information to improve learning in all subject areas and to acquire lifelong knowledge and skills.
2 - The process of dealing with change by generating new ideas and approaches that have value and contribute to business growth and 
profitability; the ability to deal with unanticipated variables.
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25.  How to be integrative in thinking and able to see 
connections in disparate information3 
     
26.  How to be critical/analytical thinker and  clear in 
your idea and arrive at the correct conclusions4 
 
     
27.  How to set up and implement a reward penalty 
system within your organization 
     
28.  How to manage conflicts and to settle disputes 
effectively 
     
29.  How to stimulate and implement  team building 
exercises  
 
     
30.  How to plan for competition and deliver 
customer value and organizational growth; 
differentiating a business from competitors 
     
31.  How to negotiate a good deal for the business, 
especially in client handling and acquisition 
     
32.  How to have an overall control of business 
operations in the Yemen development 
environment 
 
     
33.  How to collaborate in diverse teams5      
34.  How to support and enhance involvement of 
women in the private sector 
     
35.  How to translate the MBA courses into the daily 
practice of your organization  
 
     
Section Two: Obstacles and Weaknesses:- 
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the organization of the 
MBA degree? 
Note: By placing a tick () only on the one cell which you consider that it greatly indicates the most suitable answer from the 
five answers optionally allowed to you in the case of each item as follows: 
 The statements Strongly 
agree 






A Administration of the Center of Business Administration 
Development 
 
1 There is effective organization and  management of the MBA 
programme 
     
2 The administration of CBA has done all its duties to make 
everything easy to carry out your study in a good way 
     
3 CBA has effective operation procedures       
4 The functions and duties  of the administrative staff are clear        
5 The rules and regulations of CBA are clear        
6 The rules and regulations (approvals and decision-making) of 
CBA take time and cause delay 
     
7 CBA takes into consideration the particular wishes of the 
students in terms of the time to follow the MBA programme   
     
8 The administration  staff within  CBA deal with all students in 
the same manner 
 
     
9 The academic staff within CBA deal with all students in the 
same manner 
 
     
10 The tuition fee is reasonable considering what the students 
learned from the MBA degree  
     
B Curriculum and courses 
 
 
1 There is no overlapping in course materials      
                                                 
3 - The application of knowledge from different areas that leads to greater creativity and insights into approaching complex problems.
4 - Reasonable, reflective thinking that enables an individual to reach logical and well-informed conclusions; continually looking for the 
reasons behind or the rational for the information presented.
5 - The interaction of two or more individuals in an exchange of knowledge toward a common goal, influenced by such attributes as race, 



















2 The courses are relevant to the special needs of the Yemeni 
business sector 
     
3 The content of MBA is focus on how the manager should 
manage rather than what is management in general 
     
4 The balance between theory and practice is good      
5 Case studies presented in the courses are based on the daily 
practice of the Yemeni business sector  
     
6 There is uniformity among teachers in the approach of the 
course  subject 
     
C Teaching staff  
1 There are qualified teachers who are able to teach the 
characteristics  of the Yemeni business sector 
     
2 There are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the 
characteristics  of the Yemeni business sector 
     
3  There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practical work 
or thesis of the graduate students 
     
4  There are qualified teachers to supervise the practical work or 
thesis of the graduate students 
     
5  Teachers have access to the latest theoretical and practical 
developments of business administration in the world  
     
6 Teachers show that they have experience of working with the 
Yemeni business sector 
     
7 Teachers are mostly using the language and jargon used by the 
Yemeni business organizations in their daily work 
     
8 Teachers are mainly giving information rather than skills and 
attitude-based training 
     
9 Dutch teachers are more qualified than the Yemeni teachers      
10 Dutch teachers are experienced in Yemeni business 
community management 
     
11 I do prefer Dutch teachers more than the Yemeni teachers      
12 Teachers have almost the same level of understanding, skills 
and practical experience of education and research; work as a 
team in the CBA 
     
13 Teachers have the same awareness and agreement about 
common vision of CBA functions 
     
14 Teachers are very committed and eager to work for CBA      
15 The attitude and working style of  teachers are different from 
the situation in educational organizations in Yemen 
     
16 Because teachers have other time-consuming work 
obligations, they don’t have enough time to be available for 
the  students  
     
D MBA and Work  
1 The MBA program offered is in line with the employees’ 
upgrading program  of your organization  
     
2 The MBA degree will lead to promotion in your organization       
3 Your organization does understand the importance of CBA; it 
is  supportive and helpful to you  
     
4 Your organization does understand the importance of CBA; it 
is  supportive and helpful to the center itself 
     






     
6  Your organization gives you (or you give yourself) sufficient 
time to follow the MBA programme   
     
2. Please number the teaching methods that teachers have used in order of frequency 1, 2, 3 etc. (1=most) 
Lecture technique                   Case Study                              Role Playing  
 Business Games   Other/ Please specify---------------------------------------------------- 
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3- In your opinion, which teaching methods are more practical for MBA? (In order of priority) 
1  2   
3  4   
 
Section Three: Attending of the MBA programme 
 
1. How did you get involved in the CBA as student?   
 
 
Via your organization  Self  Other  
If other/ Please specify-------------------------------------------- 
 
2- What are the main motivations of you to attend the MBA programme? 
 1  ------------------------------------------ 5  ----------------------------------  
 2  ------------------------------------------ 6 -----------------------------------  
 3  ------------------------------------------ 7  ----------------------------------  
 4  ------------------------------------------ 8 -----------------------------------  
3-You paid the fees of the MBA degree through 
Fellowship by the 
Organization                   
          Self       Sponsor  
                        If Sponsor/Specify -------------------------------------  
4-Are you part of the employees upgrading plan of your organization?  
Yes NO 
  
5-Were more candidates within your organization for the MBA?  
Yes NO 
  
6- The criteria were you selected by your organization to study MBA degree:  
   Very good                                      Satisfactory                                     Weak  
 
7- The criteria were you selected by CBA to study MBA degree: 
   Very good                                      Satisfactory                                     Weak  
8- What is your opinion of the current criteria for selecting students by your organization and/or by CBA and how, if at all, 






9- Did you finish your MBA degree on time?  
If No: why /please specify factors 
 1  ------------------------------------------ 5  -----------------------------------  
 2  ------------------------------------------ 6 -----------------------------------  
 3  ------------------------------------------ 7 -----------------------------------  
 4 ------------------------------------------  8 -----------------------------------  
If yes: please specify factors  
 1  ------------------------------------------ 5  ----------------------------------  
 2  ------------------------------------------ 6 -----------------------------------  
 3  ------------------------------------------ 7 -----------------------------------  
 4 ------------------------------------------  8 -----------------------------------  
 
Section Four: Personal and Business Improving 
1-How would you describe your position in your organization before attending the CBA for MBA degree? 




















2-How would you describe your position in your organization after attending the CBA for MBA degree? 
   Very good                                      Satisfactory                                               Weak  
 
3-Did you have promotion of function in your organization?  
Yes NO 
  
4-Did you receive a salary increase after obtaining the MBA degree? 
Yes NO 
  
5-What impact has MBA had upon yourself? (Please number them 1, 2, 3, in level of impact, 1=top) 
Better communication   Time management  Better policy and decision making  
 Being better leader   Using strategic 
management  
 Managing change effectively  
Other/ Please specify-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6-What impact has MBA had on for your Organization? (Please number them 1, 2, 3, in level of importance, 1=top) 
Management skills                 Marketing                                   Financial  
            Production     Stock & Inventory                                Purchasing  
Other/ Please specify----------------------------------------------------- 
 
7- How would you describe your organization’s bargaining position in the souk after attending the MBA 
programme? 
   Very good                                      Satisfactory                                               Weak  
 
8- To which extent did the MBA degree that you got provide you with the skills, knowledge, and competencies to 
handle your work in the long term (strategically) based on the Yemeni local /business environment? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
To a very large extent To a large extent To some extent To a very low extent Not at all 
     
• If 1 and 2, please state what those skills, knowledge, and competencies are (in order of priority): 
 1  ------------------------------------------------------- 5  ----------------------------------------------  
 2  ------------------------------------------------------ 6 -----------------------------------------------  
 3  ------------------------------------------------------ 7 ----------------------------------------------  
 4 ------------------------------------------------------- 8 ----------------------------------------------  
 
• If 3,4 ,and 5, What the major handicaps to perform your skills (in order of priority): 
 1  ------------------------------------------------------- 5  ----------------------------------------------  
 2  ------------------------------------------------------- 6 ----------------------------------------------  
 3  ------------------------------------------------------ 7 ----------------------------------------------  
 4 ------------------------------------------ ------------ 8 ----------------------------------------------  
9-In general, how do you evaluate the role of MBA programme for developing a new breed of managers in the Yemeni 
business community? 
Very successful Successful Doing satisfactorily Not doing so well Doing badly 
     
10-In general, how do you evaluate the role of MBA for promoting the business community in Yemen? 
 
Very successful Successful Doing satisfactorily Not doing so well Doing badly 
     
 
11- If you consider CBA is not doing so well or doing badly, what is exactly required? 
Note: By placing a tick () only on the one cell which you consider that it greatly indicates the most suitable answer from 
the four answers optionally allowed to you in the case of each item as follows: 






1 Teachers should have more knowledge about subject-matter 
and contents of the study program  
    
2 Teachers should have more skills and practical experience in 
education and research  
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Donor-Promoted Public Sector Reforms in Developing 
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February, 2014
Promoters: Prof. Dr. David Lowery, Prof. Dr. Frist van der Meer, and Prof. Dr. Rene Torenvlied
This dissertation examines in depth the Local Knowledge Syndrome (LKS) as one 
of the possible causes for the ineffective assistance from donors in the public sector 
reforms in developing countries. The LKS arises when donor aid policies and 
programs do not tailor to recipients’ unique context and needs, and instead import 
unsupported reform assumptions and formal models from selected developed 
countries. It can also arise when aid policies just focus on reforming the formal 
organizations and institutions, which is also called “explicit-knowledge”, and neglect 
the “implicit knowledge” of informal organizations and institutions. The quality of 
knowledge and ideas provided to foreign aid donors can seriously affect the course of 
an aid program and consequently the effectiveness of that aid. In many developing 
countries or poor nations, there are strong informal institutions and organizations in 
the public sector functioning besides the formal structures. There is what I call ‘the 
rule of the game’, and has a strong grip on all matters related to development aid.
In this dissertation focus on Dutch aid in Yemen. Yemen is a ‘fragile state’ and the 
only low-income country in the Middle East. It faces plenty of challenges, including 
poverty, corruption, social and political unrest and more recently, security. These 
problems can lead to violence and crush livelihoods, jeopardizing citizens, regional 
neighbors, and the wider world. The state of Yemen is unable to govern its territories 
well. It is a spawning ground for global threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, 
environmental devastation, and disease. The country has received almost US$18 
billion of aid commitments from different donors including the Netherlands to 
develop the capacity of the state and its public sector. However, the donors’ 
development efforts have not prevented Yemen from turning into an almost-failed 
state. Yemen has yet to witness dramatic improvements in terms of development 
outcomes that have meaningful impacts on security and stability. It is clear that these 
bad development outcomes have formed the major roots of the Yemeni people’s 
revolution that is still ongoing, despite the signing of the political settlement 







My particular focus here was on the education sector reform because more than 
40% of Dutch foreign aid goes directly to the education sector at all levels. The 
Netherlands’ Programme for Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary Education 
and Training Capacity (NPT program) included 14 projects implemented in different 
higher education institutions in Yemen. In this study, I selected just four projects 
(N=4) by using a Most Similar Case Selection strategy. These projects are (1) 
Establishment of an MBA Degree Programme at Sana’a University; (2) Establishment 
of an executive MPA Degree Programme at Sana’a University, in partial partnership 
with the National Institute of Administrative Sciences (NIAS), Ministry of Civil 
Service; (3) Strengthening  the Water and Environment Centre of Sana’a University 
Graduate Programme in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM); and (4) 
the Women’s Research and Training Centre (WRTC), Aden University, which are all 
similar because all the projects are funded and implemented by the Dutch government 
for the same recipient (HE sector in Yemen) and especially Sana’a University, within 
approximately the same timeframe. All the selected projects had specific objectives to 
build the institutional capacity and capability of the host organizations by building 
their organizational and administrative structures and increasing the quantity and 
quality of the staff members. The aim was to provide training services for promoting 
capacity development within the Yemeni public, private and non-governmental 
sectors in line with the overall objective of the Dutch program in Yemen. 
This dissertation has taken a look at the factors influencing the incorporation of 
information on local knowledge during aid policymaking and implementation using 
theories such as institutional theories, cultural theory, the actor network perspective 
and explicitly its development associability approach and the social-engineering 
model. I used the methodology approach to analyze one policy area in depth based 
on the theoretical ideas. 
The Local Knowledge Syndrome explanation in this dissertation shows the blind 
spots in theories and the limitations of a macroeconomic analysis of foreign aid 
ineffectiveness. A major part of this dissertation contests with the public choice 
perspective (PCP) and its leading scholars. They assert and  assume that aid is 
homogenous and even  harmful to recipient countries.  Their first reason for this 
assertion is that the self-interest of donors often works against the altruistic objectives 
of aid assistance and can lead to corruption of the aid projects’ outcomes, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of aid interventions. In this study, however, I have seen 
evidence from Dutch-Yemen development co-operation that self-interest is not a 
homogenous causal explanation for foreign aid ineffectiveness. Donors in fragile 
states often intend to build recipients’ governance systems, but they lack the local 
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knowledge of how to do so in practice. Helping such fragile states become increasingly 
necessary, not just because morality demands it, but for reasons of global security. 
The second reason cited by PCP scholars is that the poor policy environment, such as 
weak and corrupt policies and institutions, is the main cause of shortcomings in 
foreign aid programs. According to me the problem however is not a poor policy 
environment itself but poor aid policies formulated with a lack of synthesis, research 
and institutional analysis to understand the poor policy environment. 
Regarding the Local Knowledge Syndrome explanation, I found that the reform 
content of the Dutch-Yemen NPT policy has been largely based on ambiguous or 
inadequate information on informal institutions within recipient organizations. 
Dutch NPT policymakers within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adapted international 
assumptions, assertions and western theories of good governance to identify the 
problems and to formulate the NPT program in the infamous one-size-fits-all policy. 
The implementation process of the NPT program implicitly adopted the top-down 
approach. The middle management represented by Nuffic, who took over the 
responsibility to conduct the Plan of Implementation for the NPT in Yemen could 
not perform this mission in an effective way. There was a lack of formal and informal 
data on the structure, organization, management and staffing and censorship at 
various levels, so there was no clear picture of the targeted organizations to realize 
“the policy fit”. The information in the Plan of Implementation did not give the Dutch 
contractors the necessary information to prepare for problems they could face when 
confronted with the local situation during the actual implementation. The local 
knowledge was in an unopened “black box.” Information on local knowledge, 
therefore, required effort on the part of the project implementation team to 
incorporate it.
The network perspective and the associability development approach are well 
suited for describing how to incorporate information on local knowledge during the 
actual aid policy implementation. A harmony associability model describes successful 
projects (for example MBA, WEC), whereas a conflict associability model describes 
a failed project (e.g. MPA-NIAS, WRTC). The patterns and theme that seemed to 
emerge among the four selected NPT cases are that implementers (contactors) are 
the players at the heart of the aid intervention process. This idea is interrelated with 
the actor-network perspective, which provided the associability development 
approach and its main idea that the LKS (opening the black box) might be solved 
through the direct and indirect interactions with all actors involved in the actual 
process of implementing of an aid project in a specific place and time. The associability 
development approach is an alternative analytical tool of aid policies that offers a 








The advantage of the network perceptive for examining project success and failure 
allows us to move beyond the narrow concern with stated aims and look at the local 
knowledge of the specific context, such as ideas, formal and informal institutions, 
individuals and objects that all contribute to the development activities during “the 
translation process”. In order to have effective interactions, alliances must be built 
around the project. Rather than challenging powerful structures and powerful actors, 
the focus should be on bringing them to the table. This requires actors, especially the 
donor contractors or aid project implementers both at the middle management and 
at operational levels, to be more practical during the interactions with their 
counterparts, to achieve respect and develop trust and commitment. Observing and 
questioning what is not clear, and asking for clarifications on why counterparts act in 
a particular way, facilitates discussion on which actions should be taken by the 
program and which should not.  The actors in this sense can see what is right and 
what will succeed. The actors should keep in mind that projects will not succeed by 
accepting dominant assumptions and ready-made objectives that have nothing to say 
about the local context, but rather by being adaptable to the local context. They need 
to form a cooperative and harmonized team which forges alliances with powerful 
actors.
The associability approach of development is important to ensure effective aid 
projects in poor policy environments, and to highlight the need to encourage shared 
responsibility. The findings of this study have significant implications for international 
development programs, international development institutions, policy makers, 
recipient nations and for the understanding of the factors that influence the outcomes 
of development projects.
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Donors-Promoted Public Sector Reforms in Developing 
Countries and the Local Knowledge Syndrome 
The Dutch-Yemen NPT Program for Developing 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
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University of Leiden, Campus Den Haag
Promoters: Prof. Dr. David Lowery, Prof. Dr. Frist van der Meer, and Prof. Dr. Rene Torenvlied
Deze dissertatie bestudeert het Local Knowledge Syndroom (LKS) als één van de 
mogelijke oorzaken van ineffectieve donorhulp in de publieke sector van 
ontwikkelingslanden. LKS ontstaat wanneer hulpstrategieën en programma’s niet 
overeenkomen met de unieke context van het ontvangende land, en wanneer 
ontwikkelde landen hervormingsveronderstellingen en formele modellen kiezen die 
niet door de ontwikkelingslanden ondersteund worden. LKS kan ook ontstaan 
wanneer het ontwikkelings-samenwerkingsbeleid zich alleen maar concentreert op 
het hervormen van formele organisaties en instituties. De kwaliteit van de kennis en 
ideeën van buitenlandse donoren, kan de voortgang van het ontwikkelingsprogramma 
ernstig beïnvloeden en daardoor ook de effectiviteit van die hulp. In veel 
ontwikkelingslanden of arme bevolkingsgroepen, functioneren in de publieke sector 
sterke informele instituties en organisaties naast formele structuren. Dit is wat ik 
noem ‘de regels van het spel’, en deze hebben een ferme grip op alle zaken die verband 
houden met ontwikkelingshulp.
In deze dissertatie staat de Nederlandse hulp in Yemen centraal. Yemen is een 
‘fragiele staat’ en het enige lage-inkomensland in het Midden Oosten. Het land kent 
problemen van armoede, corruptie, sociale en politieke onrust, en recentelijk ook 
veiligheid. Deze problemen leiden tot geweld en brengen het levensonderhoud van 
burgers, landen in de regio en de wereld, in gevaar. De overheid van Yemen is niet in 
staat om haar land degelijk te besturen. Het is daarom een vruchtbare grond voor 
gevaren op globale schaal, zoals terrorisme, drugssmokkel, milieurampen en ziekte. 
Het land heeft bijna US$18 miljard ontvangen aan hulpovereenkomsten van 
verschillende donoren, inclusief Nederland, om de capaciteit van het bestuur en de 
publieke sector te ontwikkelen. Echter, de inspanningen van de donoren hebben niet 
kunnen voorkomen dat Yemen veranderd is in een bijna mislukte staat. Yemen moet 
de zogenaamde dramatische verbeteringen van ontwikkelingssamenwerking nog 









veiligheid en stabiliteit. Het is duidelijk dat de slechte uitkomst van hulp een 
belangrijke oorzaak is van de voortgaande revolutie onder de bevolking van Yemen, 
ondanks het sluiten van een politieke overeenkomst door verschillende politieke en 
sociale partijen.
Ik heb me vooral beperkt tot de onderwijssector, omdat daarin meer dan 40% van 
de Nederlandse hulp in Yemen wordt besteed. Het ‘Netherlands Programme of 
Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary Education and Training Capacity 
(NPT) omvatte 14 projecten, geïmplementeerd in verschillende hoger 
onderwijsinstellingen in Yemen. Voor deze studie heb ik 4 projecten geselecteerd 
(N=4), die qua doelstelling en opzet het meest op elkaar leken. Deze projecten zijn: 
(1) het opzetten en uitvoeren van een MBA programma voor professionals aan de 
Universiteit van Sana’a; (2) het opzetten en uitvoeren van een MPA Programma voor 
professionals aan de Universiteit van Sana’a samen met het National Institute of 
Administrative Sciences (NIAS) onder het Ministerie van Civiele Zaken; (3) het 
opzetten en uitvoeren van een Master programma in ‘Integrated Water Resource 
Management’ binnen het Water en Milieu Centrum van de Universiteit van Sana’a; en 
4) het opzetten en uitvoeren van een programma in Gender Studies aan de Women’s 
Research and Training Centre (WRTC) van de Universiteit van Aden. Deze vier 
projecten zijn ook min of meer terzelfder tijd uitgevoerd tussen 2004 en 2009. Alle 
vier projecten hadden het specifieke doel om de institutionele capaciteit en de 
capaciteit van de gastorganisaties te ondersteunen door de organisatorische en de 
administratieve structuren op te bouwen en de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van de 
personeelsleden te verhogen. Het doel was om training te faciliteren om de 
capaciteitsontwikkeling in de publieke, private en non-gouvernementele sector van 
Yemen te verhogen, overeenkomstig het algemene doel van het Nederlandse 
Programma in Yemen.
Deze dissertatie heeft gekeken naar de factoren die van invloed zijn op de 
verwerking van informatie over lokale kennis tijdens het beleidsontwerpproces. 
Hiervoor heb ik de volgende theorieën onderzocht: institutionele theorieën, de 
cultuurtheorie, het actoren-netwerk perspectief en expliciet de 
'ontwikkelingsbenadering op basis van verenigbaarheid (associability development 
approach) en het sociale maakbaarheid (social-engineering) model. Ik heb de 
methodologie benadering gebruikt om één beleidsgebied dieper te analyseren dat is 
gebaseerd op theoretische ideeën. 
De verklaring voor het syndroom van het Lokale Kennis Syndroom in deze 
dissertatie laat de blinde vlek zien in de theorieën alsook de beperkingen van een 
macro-economische analyse van de effectiviteit van buitenlandse hulp. Een belangrijk 
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deel van deze dissertatie bestrijdt de Publieke Keuze Theorie (PCP) en haar 
voornaamste voorstanders. Zij veronderstellen dat hulp homogeen is en zelfs 
schadelijk voor ontvangende landen. De eerste reden voor hun stellingname is dat 
het eigenbelang van donors vaak tegen de altruïstische doelen van hulp werkt en zelfs 
kan leiden tot corruptie van de resultaten van de projecten waardoor de effecten van 
programma’s afgebroken kunnen worden. Donoren in fragiele staten hebben vaak de 
intentie om lokale overheidssystemen op te bouwen, maar ze missen de lokale kennis 
om dat in de praktijk voor elkaar te krijgen. Het helpen van dergelijke fragiele staten 
wordt in toenemende mate noodzakelijk, niet alleen omdat de moraliteit dit vereist, 
maar om redenen van globale veiligheid. De tweede reden die wordt aangehaald door 
PCP voorstanders is dat de gebrekkige beleidsomgeving, met zwak en corrupt beleid 
als gevolg, de belangrijkste oorzaak is voor de tekortkomingen in buitenlandse 
hulpprogramma’s. Naar mijn mening is het probleem echter niet een gebrekkige 
beleidsomgeving, maar het feit dat beleid wordt geformuleerd vrijwel zonder 
synthese, onderzoek en institutionele analyse om de zwakke beleidsomgeving te 
begrijpen. 
In het verklaren van het LKS, heb ik ontdekt dat de inhoud van het NPT 
ontwikkelingsbeleid tussen Yemen en Nederland grotendeels gebaseerd is op 
dubbelzinnige of onvolledige informatie over informele instituties binnen de 
ontvangende organisaties. Nederlandse beleidsmakers in het Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken passen internationale veronderstellingen, beweringen en 
westerse theorieën van goed bestuur toe om de problemen te identificeren en een 
NPT programma te formuleren als een ‘one-size-fits-all’ beleid. De uitvoering van het 
NPT programma nam zodoende impliciet een top-down benadering over. De 
middenlaag van het management, vertegenwoordigd door Nuffic, die de 
verantwoordelijkheid kreeg om het Plan van Implementatie uit te voeren in Yemen, 
kon haar missie niet effectief uitoefenen. Er was een gebrek aan formele en informele 
gegevens over de structuur, organisatie, management, en personeel en er was sprake 
van censuur op verscheidene niveaus. Derhalve was er geen duidelijk beeld van de 
uiteindelijke organisaties om werkbaar beleid te realiseren. De informatie in het Plan 
van Implementatie gaf de Nederlandse project uitvoerders niet genoeg informatie om 
zich voor te bereiden op de problemen die hen te wachten stonden wanneer zij 
geconfronteerd zouden worden met de lokale situatie tijdens de daadwerkelijke 
uitvoering. De lokale kennis was een ongeopende ‘black box’. Informatie over lokale 
kennis, vereiste daarom inspanning van het projectteam om deze te integreren.
Het netwerk perspectief en de ontwikkelingsbenadering op basis van 
verenigbaarheid (‘associability development approach ‘) zijn geschikt voor het 









werkelijke uitvoering van ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid. Een harmonieus 
verenigbaarheidsmodel beschrijft succesvolle projecten (zoals MBA, WEC), terwijl 
een conflictueus verenigbaarheidsmodel falende projecten omschrijft (MPA-NIAS, 
WRTC). De patronen en thema’s, die onder de vier geselecteerde NPT casussen naar 
boven schijnen te komen, zijn dat projectuitvoerders de kern vormen van het 
interventieproces. Dit idee is gerelateerd aan het actor-netwerk perspectief, dat de 
‘associability development approach’ en haar centrale idee voorzag van het feit dat 
LKS (door het openen van de ‘zwarte doos’) het probleem zou kunnen oplossen door 
directe en indirecte interacties van alle bij de werkelijke uitvoering betrokken actoren 
in een bepaalde context van plaats en tijd. De ‘associability development approach’ is 
een alternatief instrument van ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid, dat een unieke 
lens biedt voor analyse en een dieper begrip toestaat van de dynamiek van de 
implementatie van hulpprogramma’s. 
Het voordeel van het netwerkperspectief is het beoordelen van een project op succes 
en falen, dat ons toestaat ruimer te kijken dan alleen maar op geschreven doelen en te 
kijken naar de lokale kennis van een specifieke context, zoals ideeën, formele en 
informele instituties, individuen en objecten die allemaal bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling 
van activiteiten tijdens ‘het vertaalproces’. Om effectieve interacties te hebben moeten er 
allianties gebouwd worden rondom het project. In plaats van machtsstructuren en 
machtige actoren uit te dagen, moeten deze boven water komen en besproken worden. 
Dit vereist van actoren, en vooral van project uitvoerders van de donor kant op 
middenmanagement als op uitvoeringsniveau, dat ze meer praktisch zijn tijdens 
interacties met de ontvangende partij, om respect te bereiken en vertrouwen en 
betrokkenheid te ontwikkelen. Het observeren en onderzoeken van wat onduidelijk is, 
en het vragen om opheldering over waarom de ontvangende partij zich op een bepaalde 
manier gedragen, kan een discussie op gang brengen over welke acties wel of niet 
genomen moeten worden door het programma. De actoren kunnen op deze manier 
zien wat goed is en wat niet kan slagen. De actoren moeten in gedachten houden dat 
projecten niet zullen slagen door het accepteren van dominante vooronderstellingen en 
al klaar liggende middelen die niets zeggen over de lokale context. Een project kan 
slagen wanneer actoren zich aanpassen aan de lokale context. Ze moeten een coöperatieve 
en harmonieuze team vormen dat allianties kan smeden met machtige actoren.
De ‘associability development approach’ is belangrijk om effectieve hulpprogramma’s 
te garanderen in een gebrekkige beleidsomgeving en om de noodzaak tot gedeelde 
verantwoordelijkheid te benadrukken. De resultaten van deze studie hebben significante 
implicaties voor internationale ontwikkelingshulp, internationale instituties, 
beleidsmakers, ontvangende landen, alsook voor het begrip van factoren die de 















الهادفة إلى مانحينالمعرفة المحلية وفاعلية مساعدات المتالزمة 
ة في الدول الناميةالعاماتإصالح القطاع
إصالحإلىالهادفالهولندينوفكلبرنامجةتحليليدراسة
قطاع التعليم العالي في الجمهورية اليمنية
 
 ملخص الدراسة
ةإعداد: موسى أ. أ. عالية، رسالة دكتورا
هاجدنالجامعيالحرمفياليدن،جامعة
2014فبراير، 
)، أ. د. /فريست فان جامعة اليدن وجامعة بنسلفانيا-وري (الرئيسالمشرفون: أ. د. / ديفيد ال
جامعة اليدن وجامعة أنسخديه)(تورينفيلدجامعة اليدن)، و أ. د. / غيرنيه(مييردير 
        
 
األسباب المحتملة لعدم فاعلية كأحد) LKSالمحلية (فةالمعرةمتالزمتناقش هذه األطروحة بعمق 
ة"متالزمظهر تفي البلدان النامية.ةالعاماتالقطاعاتمساعدات المقدمة من المانحين في إصالحال
المحدد للمستفيدينمع السياق المانحين وبرامجهم مساعداتسياساتتتوافقالعندما "المعرفة المحلية
مأخوذة عنلإلصالحعامة لها ونماذجسند مقترحات الوضعالىتلجأعن ذلك وعوضاً واحتياجاتهم،
على إصالح الهيئات المساعدات الخارجيةسياسات تصمم تظهر أيضاً عندما كما متقدمة. الدول عدد من ال
"،  explicit knowledgeأو الصريحةالظاهرة"المعرفة أيضاً بـ والمؤسسات الرسمية والتي تدعى 
) للهيئات والمؤسسات غير  implicit knowledgeالغير صريحةأو الضمنية(المعرفةوتتجاهل
تؤثر واألفكار لدى صناع السياسات التنموية في الجانب المانحالمعلوماتوتوفرجودةنإالرسمية. 
د . وفي العديوبالتالي على فاعليه تلك المساعداتالخارجيةبشكل كبير على مسار برنامج المساعداتو
في القطاع العام تعمل إلى نافذةهنالك هيئات ومنظمات غير رسمية الفقيرة،من الدول النامية أو الشعوب 
قبضة والتي لها" the rule of the gamsاللعبقاعدةالرسمية. هنالك ما أسميه بـ "المؤسسات جانب 
قوية في جميع المسائل المتعلقة بالمساعدات التنموية. 
        
الدعم الهولندي في اليمن. تعتبر اليمن "دولة ضعيفة" وذات الدخل المنخفض تتركز حولطروحة هذه األ
تواجه اليمن العديد من التحديات منها الفقر والفساد واالضطرابات السياسية والوحيدة في الشرق األوسط. 
ضاء على سبل العيشإلى العنف والق. هذه المشاكل يمكن أن تؤدي العاماألمن، وحديثاً واالجتماعية
اليمنية عاجزة عن السيطرة فالحكومةوتعريض حياة المواطنين والدول الجوار والعالم األوسع للخطر. 
العالمية مثل اإلرهاب وتجارة المخدراتللتهديدات خصبةفهي تعتبر أرض ونتيجة لذلك على أراضيها. 
18ـبلمساعدات من مختلف المانحين بمبلغ يقدر تعهدات بااألوبئة. وقد تلقت الدولة كذلك والدمار البيئي و
هولندا لتنمية قدرات الدولة وقطاعها العام. ومع ذلك لم تمنع جهودمن بينها بليون دوالر أمريكي 
لها مأساويةتطورات ترقبال تزال اليمن وإلى اآلن إلى دولة فاشلة. التحول التنموية اليمن من المانحين
     .واالستقرارعلى األمن جوهريةها تأثيرات سيكون لالتي بمخرجات التنمية وعالقة
  
إصالح ةصب في تقييم جهود الحكومة الهولندية في تعزيز عملياألطروحةفي هذه اهتماميلَّ إن جُ 






نوفك الهولندي والذي وقد تم التركز بشكل مفصل على برنامجالتعليم بجميع مراحله. مباشرة إلى قطاع 
تممشروع 14على، والذي يحتوي)Nuffic-NPT(برنامج العالي قدرات التعليم هدف في تعزيز 
أخترت أربعة مشاريع ،في مختلف مؤسسات التعليم العالي في اليمن. وفي هذه األطروحةتنفيذها 
. وهذه (More Similer Case design)مستخدماً إستراتيجية أكثر الحاالت تشابهاً  (N=4)فقط
ماجستير برنامج) 2(صنعاء،جامعةب) MBA(األعمالإدارةفيماجستيرالبرنامج) 1(المشاريع هي: 
،(NIAS)اإلداريةللعلومالوطنيالمعهدمعجزئيةبالشراكة ال،صنعاءجامعةب)MPAاإلدارة العامة (
دارةإلا-صنعاءجامعةب,العلياالدراساتبرنامجفيوالبيئةالمياهمركز) 3(المدنية؛الخدمةوزارة
عدن،جامعةب،)WRTC( والتدريبللبحوثالمرأةمركز) 4(و،(IWRM)المائيةلمواردالمتكاملة ل
قطاع ( ذاتهم للمستفيدينهولنديةالالحكومةقبلمنتمويلها وتنفيذها نظراً لجميع هذه المشاريع متشابهة و
-2004)ذاته تقريباً الزمنياإلطارضمنصنعاء،جامعةعلى وجه الخصوص و،اليمنفيالتعليم العالي
لدى المؤسساتوالكفاءاتالمؤسسيةالقدراتبناءلمحددةأهدافالمختارة لهاالمشاريعجميعو. )2009
هيئة التدريس أعضاءونوعيةكميةوزيادة،لهاواإلداريةالتنظيميةالهياكلبناءخاللمنالمضيفة
الهدف العام واالستراتيجي من انشاء وتعزيز مثل هذه المراكز التعليمية والتدريبية هو كان . والموظفين
والخاصالعامالقطاعينفيالقدراتتنميةلتعزيزتدريبية خدمات خلق مؤسسات فاعلة قادرة على تقديم 
.اليمنفيالهولنديللبرنامجالعامالهدفمع تماشياً اليمنيةالحكوميةغيروالمنظمات
          
تصميم وتنفيذ سياساتالمعرفة المحلية أثناء3Tدمج كما تطرقت األطروحة أيضاً إلى العوامل المؤثرة على
لمثال على سبيل ااألفكار النظريةالعديد نظري دمج الخارجية للدول معتمدا على مدخل المساعدات
بشكل والممثلين الفاعلينشبكة ومنظور ،والنظرية الثقافية،النظريات المؤسسيةنظرية السياسة العامة، 
األسلوب استخدمتوفي هذه األطروحة، الهندسي. االجتماعيوالنموذج التنمية التشاركيجيةامنهأوضح 




بل تجانسةمغيرالمساعداتأنويفترضون كدونحيث يؤ. وروادها من العلماء) PCP( العاماالختيار
لمصلحةاأنهذا إلى العتقادهمويعود السبب األول . والمستفيدةمتلقية اللبلدانتشكل ضرر على اأنها
إلىتؤديأنيمكنو،مصلحة اآلخرينالمساعدات لأهدافضدتعملماغالباالمانحةلجهاتلالذاتية
وعلى الرغم من ذلك ها هذه المساعدات.تدخالتفاعليةمنيقللمما،المساعداتمشاريعمخرجات فساد
الذاتيةالمصلحةي بأناليمنالهولندياإلنمائيالتعاونمنأدلةقد أطلعت علىالدراسةهذهفيفإنني 
فيالهشةالدولفيالمانحةالجهاتفالخارجية.المساعداتفاعليةعدملالمتجانسالسببيالتفسيرتليس
كيفيةعنالمحليةالمعرفةإلىتفتقرولكنها،للدول المستفيدةأنظمة حكم بناءسعى إلى تاألحيانمنكثير
لمجرد بلدان هشة كهذه أصبح ضرورة على نحو متزايد ليس إن مساعدة. العمليةالناحيةمنبذلكالقيام
ةبيئأنهوPCPعلماءذكرهالتيالثانيالسبب. العالميباألمنتتعلقسبابضرورة أخالقية بل ألكونها 
فيالقصورألوجهالرئيسيالسببهي،والفاسدةالضعيفةوالمؤسساتالسياساتمثل،الضعيفةالسياسة
وإنماذاتهاالضعيفةالسياساتبيئةال تكمن في مشكلةوبالنسبة لي، فإن ال. الخارجيةالمساعداتبرامج
لفهموالبحثي والتركيبي والتي وضعت مفتقرة إلى التحليل المؤسسيللمساعداتالضعيفةسياساتالفي 
.الضعيفةالسياساتبيئة
        
سياسة برنامج دعم قدرات إصالحمضمونأنوجدتالمحلية،معرفةالمتالزمةتفسيرفيما يتعلق ب
كافيةغيرأوغامضةمعلوماتعلىكبيرحدإلىاستندقدياليمن-الهولندي)NPTالتعليم والتدريب (
)NPTبرنامج (السياسات في اعصنّ استخدم فقد . المتلقيةالمنظماتداخلالرسميةغيرالمؤسساتعن 
عن الحكم الرشيد لتحديد وزارة الشؤون الخارجية افتراضات وإثباتات عالمية وفرضيات غربيةلالتابع














دعم قدرات برنامجعملية تنفيذ تأعتمد. "الجميعيناسبواحدسمقا“الجهات المانحة وهوالعيديد من 
لممثلة االوسطىاإلدارةلم تستطع . األدنىإلىعلىاألمنمنهج ) ضمنياً على NPT(التعليم والتدريب
خطةالتنفيذليةمسؤوتتولوالتي ،) (Nufficالعاليالتعليممجالفيالدوليللتعاونالهولنديةالمؤسسةب
الرسميةالبياناتفينقصهناككان. فعالةبطريقة إنجاز المهمةاليمنفي) NPTلبرنامج (يةتنفيذال
، وعليه المستوياتمختلفعلىالرقابةالتنظيمي واإلداري والكادر الوظيفي والهيكلعن الرسميةوغير
أن المعلومات كما ". سياسة التناسب" لتحقيقالمستهدفةالمنظماتعنواضحةصورةهناكلم تكن 
المحتملة عند المعلومات الالزمة للتحضير للمشاكل ينالهولنديالمتعهدينالمقدمة في خطة التنفيذ لم تعطي
مواجهة الوضع المحلي خالل عملية التنفيذ الفعلية. أن المعرفة المحلية كانت كصندوق أسود مغلق. 
 جانب فريق تنفيذ المشروع.يتطلب لتضمينه جهود من فة المحلية كان وبالتالي فإن المعلومات حول المعر
      
بشكل جيد لتحديد كيفية تضمين المعلومات حول 3Tالتنمية التشاركيجية امنه3Tومنظور الشبكة وضع تم
3Tالتنمية التشاركيجية امنه3Tساعدات الخارجية. يصف المعرفة المحلية أثناء التنفيذ الفعلي لسياسة الم
3Tمنهاجية التنمية التشاركي3T، في حين يصف )MBA, WECمشاريع ناجحة (على سبيل المثال: قيتوافالو
). األنماط MPA-NIAS, WRTC المشاريع الفاشلة (على سبيل المثال: نموذج التعايش المتعارضمع 
هدين) هم األربعة المختارة هي أن القائمين بالتنفيذ (المتعNPTي بدت ظاهرة بين مشاريع والمواضيع الت
في قلب عملية تدخل المساعدات. وهذه الفكرة متصلة بمنظور شبكة الممثلين ونالالعبون األساسي
)LKSأن متالزمة المعرفة المحلية (فكرتها الرئيسية هيالمؤسساتتنمية منهجيةوالتي قدمت الفاعلين،
مباشر مع جميع الجهات الفاعلة التفاعل المباشر وغير اليمكن معالجته من خالل (فتح الصندوق األسود) 
المؤسساتتنمية منهجيةالمشاركة في العملية الفعلية لتنفيذ مشروع المساعدات في مكان وزمن معين. أن 
لديناميكا أعمقويتيح فهم تحليلللفريدةعدسةتقدمالتيساعداتالملسياساتبديلةتحليليةأداةهو
."المساعداتبرامجعمليات تنفيذ "
  
االهتماملفائدة من منظور الشبكة لتقييم نجاح المشروع من عدمه يسمح لنا بالنظر إلى ما وراء إن ا
حول األهداف المعلنة والنظر إلى المعرفة المحلية في سياق معين على سبيل المثال: األفكار المحدود 
التنمية أثناء "عملية والمؤسسات الرسمية وغير الرسمية واألفراد والمواد والتي تساهم جميعها في أنشطة
من جميع جوانب بناء تحالفات فعالة، ينبغيتدخالت علىالحصولأجلمنو". ذأو التنفياإلنتقال
الهياكلعوضاً عن مواجهة المفاوضاتطاولةإلىتقديمهمعلىيجب أن يكون التركيز المشروع. كما
منفذيأومتعهدي المانحينوخصوصا،لينالممثلين الفاعوجوديتطلبهذاو. الممثلين األقوياءوالقوية
خاللليكونوا أكثر فاعليةالتنفيذيةالمستوياتمختلف والوسطىاإلدارةفي كالً منالمساعداتمشروع
واضح،غيرهوعماإن المراقبة والسؤال .وااللتزامالثقةوتطويراالحتراملتحقيقنظرائهم،معالتعامل
النقاش حول اإلجراءات الواجب يسهلمعينةبطريقةرائهمنظتصرفسببحولتوضيحاتوطلب
على معرفة بما هو صحيح وما ينالفاعليكون الممثلينوبهذه الطريقة من قبل البرنامج.او تجنبها اتخاذها 
قبولخاللمنتنجحلنالمشاريعاألخذ بعين اإلعتبار بأن الممثلين الفاعلين. وعلى حالذي سينج
من خالل التكيف ولكنالمحلي،لمعدة مسبقاً والتي ال عالقة لها بالسياق اواألهدافةالسائداالفتراضات
الفاعلةالجهاتمعتحالفاتقيممتعاون ومنسجم يفريقتشكيلمع السياق المحلي. كما أنهم بحاجة إلى 
  .القوية
            
بيئات فيالخارجيةالمساعداتمشاريعفعاليةفي غاية األهمية لضمان المنهج التنموي التشاركي إن 
المسؤوليةتشجيعإلىالحاجةعلىولتسليط الضوءمن ناحية صنع سياسات تنموية فعالةضعيفة 
الدولية،اإلنمائيةوالمؤسساتالدوليةالتنميةبرامجعلىهامة آثارلهاإن مخرجات الدراسة . المشتركة
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